Owner Scorecard


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KHC, The Kraft Heinz Company

Food Products consumer brand Cyclical

Kraft Heinz sells branded packaged food — ketchup and sauces, cheese, and shelf-stable grocery staples — under a stable of well-known labels. It sells mostly to grocery chains, large-format retailers, and discounters, who put the goods in front of shoppers, and earns its keep on the gap between what a shopper pays for the brand and what the food costs to make, package, and ship. The bulk of the business is in North America, with a smaller slice sold abroad.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
KHC · The Kraft Heinz Company
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$24.9B
−3.5% YoY · −1% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $25.0B 5-yr avg $26.0B
Gross margin 34% 5-yr avg 33%
Operating margin −18.9% 5-yr avg 6.4%
ROIC −6% 5-yr avg 2%
Owner-earnings margin 16% 5-yr avg 12%
Free cash flow margin 16% 5-yr avg 12%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is North America (75%) and International (14%).
Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
The question that governs this business is franchise or commodity: do decades-old grocery brands still pull a price a shopper will pay over a store label, or are these everyday staples that a handful of large buyers and discounters can squeeze? Watch the pricing-power test where it would show — in the gross margin held against input costs, and in whether the brands keep their shelf as a few big customers account for much of North American sales. The cost position, and the brand spending it takes to keep old labels worth a premium, decide whether the spread holds; the bad case is goodwill written down on brands that were paid up for, and debt carried under covenant. The record below holds the figures.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 3%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 11% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

North America is 75% of revenue, with International the other meaningful segment at 14%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • North America75%$18.6B
  • International14%$3.5B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$26.3B$26.1B$26.3B$25.0B$26.2B$26.0B$26.5B$26.6B$25.8B$24.9B$25.0BRevenueRevenue
35%35%34%33%35%33%31%34%35%33%34%Gross marginGross mgn
13%11%73%20%27%20%17%16%28%52%53%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
0%0%0%0%0%1%0%1%1%1%1%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$5.6B$6.1B($10.2B)$3.1B$2.1B$3.5B$3.6B$4.6B$1.7B($4.7B)($4.7B)Operating incomeOp. inc.
21.3%23.2%−38.8%12.3%8.1%13.3%13.7%17.2%6.5%−18.7%−18.9%Operating marginOp. mgn
$3.6B$10.9B($10.2B)$1.9B$356M$1.0B$2.4B$2.9B$2.7B($5.8B)($5.8B)Net incomeNet inc.
27%27%40%20%22%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$2.6B$501M$2.6B$3.6B$4.9B$5.4B$2.5B$4.0B$4.2B$4.5B$4.7BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$1.3B$1.0B$983M$994M$969M$910M$933M$961M$948M$968M$982MDepreciationDeprec.
($2.3B)($11.5B)$11.8B$577M$3.4B$3.2B($975M)$19M$383M$9.2B$9.4BWorking capital & otherWC & other
$1.2B$1.2B$826M$768M$596M$905M$916M$1.0B$1.0B$801M$803MCapexCapex
4.7%4.6%3.1%3.1%2.3%3.5%3.5%3.8%4.0%3.2%3.2%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$1.4B($693M)$1.7B$2.8B$4.3B$4.5B$1.6B$3.0B$3.2B$3.7B$3.9BOwner earningsOwner earn.
5.3%−2.7%6.7%11.1%16.5%17.1%5.9%11.1%12.2%14.7%15.8%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$1.4B($693M)$1.7B$2.8B$4.3B$4.5B$1.6B$3.0B$3.2B$3.7B$3.9BFree cash flowFCF
5.3%−2.7%6.7%11.1%16.5%17.1%5.9%11.1%12.2%14.7%15.8%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$248M$199M$0$74M$481M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$3.6B$2.9B$3.2B$2.0B$2.0B$2.0B$2.0B$2.0B$1.9B$1.9B$1.9BDividends paidDiv. paid
$271M$280M$455M$988M$436MBuybacksBuybacks
5%7%-10%3%1%3%4%5%2%-6%-6%ROICROIC
6%19%-20%4%1%2%5%6%6%-14%-14%Return on equityROE
0%14%−26%−0%−3%−2%1%2%2%−19%−18%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$4.2B$3.2B$1.1B$2.3B$3.4B$3.4B$1.0B$1.4B$1.3B$2.6B$4.1BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$769M$936M$2.1B$2.0B$2.1B$2.0B$2.1B$2.1B$2.1B$2.3B$2.3BReceivablesReceiv.
$2.7B$3.1B$2.7B$2.7B$2.8B$2.7B$3.7B$3.6B$3.4B$3.2B$3.3BInventoryInvent.
$4.0B$3.9B$4.2B$4.0B$4.3B$4.8B$4.8B$4.6B$4.2B$4.3B$4.4BAccounts payablePayables
($543M)$172M$643M$691M$532M($67M)$923M$1.1B$1.3B$1.1B$1.2BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$8.8B$9.0B$9.1B$8.1B$10.8B$9.0B$7.9B$7.9B$7.7B$10.1B$10.7BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$9.5B$9.6B$7.5B$7.9B$8.1B$9.1B$9.0B$8.0B$7.3B$8.8B$8.9BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.9×0.9×1.2×1.0×1.3×1.0×0.9×1.0×1.1×1.2×1.2×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$44.1B$44.3B$36.5B$35.5B$33.1B$31.3B$30.8B$30.5B$28.7B$22.2B$22.2BGoodwillGoodwill
$120.5B$120.9B$103.5B$101.5B$99.8B$93.4B$90.5B$90.3B$88.3B$81.8B$82.0BTotal assetsAssets
$31.8B$31.0B$31.1B$29.2B$28.3B$21.8B$20.1B$20.0B$19.9B$21.2B$21.2BTotal debtDebt
$27.6B$27.8B$30.0B$27.0B$24.9B$18.4B$19.0B$18.6B$18.5B$18.6B$17.1BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
4.9×4.9×-7.9×2.3×1.5×1.7×3.9×5.0×1.8×-4.9×-4.9×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$57.4B$57.6B$51.7B$51.6B$50.1B$49.3B$48.7B$49.5B$49.2B$41.7B$41.9BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.2%0.2%0.1%0.2%0.6%0.8%0.6%0.5%0.4%0.4%0.4%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$7.0B$1.2B$2.3B$318M$444M$510M$1.6B$6.7B$6.7BGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
1.23B1.23B1.22B1.22B1.23B1.24B1.24B1.24B1.22B1.19B1.19BShares out (diluted)Shares
$21.45$21.23$21.55$20.41$21.32$21.07$21.45$21.57$21.27$21.01$21.04Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.93$8.91$-8.36$1.58$0.29$0.82$1.91$2.31$2.26$-4.93$-4.85EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.14$-0.56$1.43$2.27$3.53$3.61$1.26$2.40$2.60$3.08$3.32Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.14$-0.56$1.43$2.27$3.53$3.61$1.26$2.40$2.60$3.08$3.32Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$2.92$2.35$2.61$1.60$1.59$1.58$1.59$1.59$1.59$1.60$1.60Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.02$0.97$0.68$0.63$0.49$0.73$0.74$0.82$0.84$0.67$0.68Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$46.78$46.91$42.38$42.18$40.80$39.89$39.42$40.10$40.48$35.10$35.29Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−0.2%/yr−0.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share+11.7%/yr−2.7%/yr
Dividends / share−6.5%/yr+0.1%/yr
Capital spending / share−4.5%/yr+6.8%/yr
Book value / share−3.1%/yr−3.0%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Net income-313.0%
    “Net income/(loss) decreased 313.0% to a loss of $5.8 billion in 2025 compared to income of $2.7 billion in 2024. This decrease was due to the unfavorable changes in operating income/(loss) factors discussed above, higher income tax expense and higher interest expense, partially offset by favorable changes in other expense/(income). •Our effective tax rate was an expense of 7.4% on pre-tax loss in 2025 compared to a benefit of 220.5% on pre-tax income in 2024.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
1.2Bpeak FY2021
ROIC
−6%low FY2018
Gross margin
33%low FY2022
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
5.1×peak FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$3.7Bowner earningsvs.($5.8B)net incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $5.8B loss into $3.7B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($5.8B)$2.7B$2.9B$2.4B$1.0B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$968M+$948M+$961M+$933M+$910M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$95M+$109M+$141M+$148M+$197M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$9.2B+$383M+$19M−$975M+$3.2B
Cash from operations$4.5B$4.2B$4.0B$2.5B$5.4B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$801M−$1.0B−$1.0B−$916M−$905M
Owner earnings$3.7B$3.2B$3.0B$1.6B$4.5B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue15%12%11%6%17%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $95M), owner earnings is nearer $3.6B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($4.7B) ÷ interest expense $947M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $2.6B − debt $21.2B
    What this means

    Netting $2.6B of cash and short-term investments against $21.2B of debt leaves $18.6B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 33 + DIO 69 − DPO 95 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -10%–7%; -6% latest = NOPAT ($3.7B) ÷ invested capital $60.3B
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -3%–17%; latest $3.7B = operating cash $4.5B − maintenance capex $801M
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 15% of revenue this year, a 11% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $95M of SBC) leaves $3.6B.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($5.8B) · cash from operations $4.5B

    In the filing’s words And the filing leans heavily on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings — steering you off the GAAP figure just where the cash is not backing it. Read the reconciliation in the notes before taking the adjusted number.

    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $2.3B ÷ Owner Earnings $3.7B
    What this means

    Of $3.7B Owner Earnings, $2.3B (64%) went back to shareholders, $1.9B dividends, $436M buybacks. Net of $95M stock comp, the real buyback was about $341M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.83×
    Maintaining
    Capex $801M ÷ depreciation $968M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $24.9B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.15×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $21.2B vs $1.3B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −106%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.07/share (latest year $-4.93), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $35.14/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 2% → 2% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 2% early, 2% lately, median 12%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +29%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 29% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2018 · −38.8% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2018, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −0.4%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“We must also be able to respond successfully to technological advances by our competitors (including artificial intelligence, machine learning, and augmented reality, which may become critical in interpreting consumer preferences in the future), and failure to do so could compromise our competitive position and impact …”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 28, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$10.7B
  • Cash & short-term investments$4.1B
  • Receivables$2.3B
  • Inventory$3.3B
  • Other current assets$974M
Current liabilities$8.9B
  • Accounts payable$4.4B
  • Other current liabilities$4.5B
Current ratio1.20×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.82×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.46×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$1.7Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+0.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.0× → 1.2×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($17.6B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($29.3B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$14.2B$553M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$1.9B
'27$1.9B
'28$1.7B
'29$1.0B
'30$915M
later$13.6B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$1.9Bthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$3.8Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$1.9Bin 2027the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$20.9Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 28, 2026$4.1B
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$3.7B
Together, against $1.9B due next year4.1×

Cash on hand as of Mar 28, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $7.8B against the $1.9B due in the twelve months after the Dec 27, 2025 schedule: 4.1 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 27, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $34.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$9.3B · 27%
  • Dividends$23.3B · 67%
  • Buybacks$2.4B · 7%
  • Returned to owners$25.7B

    101% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $23.3B as dividends and $2.4B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell $10.5B and cash and short-term investments fell $113M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $2.4B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−3.1%

    The diluted count fell from 1226M to 1188M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$1.60/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 6% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$59.7B73% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity53%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$1.0Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $9.3B of capital spent building

$20.2B written down across 8 years (2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$8.6M$6.9M$4.5B
2022Mr. Patricio$7.1M$11.0M$1.6B
2023$11.4M$8.2M$3.0B
2024$9.0M$4.8M$3.2B
2025Mr. Abrams-Rivera$10.7M$7.0M$3.7B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years. A dash under the name means the filing tags the figure without naming the officer.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio170:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$95M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why The Kraft Heinz Company is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?13% → 22% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $3.5B to $5.6B while revenue grew −5%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (13% of revenue then, 22% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?10 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 10 of the last 10 years, $57.8B in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Pension & retirement, Income taxes as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Food Products

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
MDLZMondelez International Inc.$38.5B39%13.9%7%10%
KHCThe Kraft Heinz Company$24.9B34%12.8%3%11%
PPCPilgrim's Pride Corporation$18.5B10%6.4%13%3%
GISGeneral Mills Inc.$18.4B35%16.9%12%13%
KDPKeurig Dr Pepper Inc.$16.6B55%21.3%5%18%
SFDSmithfield Foods Inc.$15.5B13%7.9%13%4%
SJMThe J.M. Smucker Company$9.1B38%13.5%6%12%
LWLamb Weston$6.5B25%16.4%16%10%
Group median34%13.7%10%11%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what The Kraft Heinz Company has delivered.

The Kraft Heinz Company’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, The Kraft Heinz Company earns about $2.8B on its 11.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 14.7% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+3%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+29%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $3.9B on 1186M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-02; net debt $17.1B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "The Kraft Heinz Company (KHC), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/KHC, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← KGS its page in the Manual KIDS →

Industry order: ← K the Food Products chapter LANC →