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PM, Philip Morris International Inc
Philip Morris International sells cigarettes and smoke-free nicotine products — heat-not-burn devices and their consumables, nicotine pouches, and e-vapor — to adult smokers across markets outside the United States, led by Europe and a swath of emerging regions. It is a consumer-brand business: it makes a packaged good people buy by habit and brand name, and the profit comes from charging more for that pack than it costs to make and ship. The company has put years and a great deal of money into shifting that portfolio away from burning tobacco toward smoke-free alternatives.
Our current product portfolio primarily consists of cigarettes and smoke-free products, including heat-not-burn, nicotine pouch and e-vapor products.
Since 2008, we have invested over $16 billion to develop, scientifically substantiate and commercialize innovative smoke-free products for adults who would otherwise continue to smoke, with the goal of completely ending the sale of cigarettes.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Europe (42%) and SSEA, CIS & MEA (30%), with 2 more segments behind.
- What moves the needle
- The test is pricing power against an unusual headwind: this is a habit-forming branded product, which historically lets sellers raise price faster than cost — but the filing's own emphasis names the regulatory push toward "commoditization" of tobacco, which would strip exactly that advantage, and points to taxes, marketing limits, and product authorizations (FDA among them) as the force that can govern the brand more than the company can. Watch whether volume holds, or shrinks, when price goes up, and whether the smoke-free portfolio earns the same margins and loyalty the cigarette franchise has — the reinvestment runway depends on it. The bad case is a regulated commodity carrying debt: a product the state taxes, restricts, and can refuse to authorize, sold into litigation and policy risk across many jurisdictions at once. The margins, returns, and the debt balance are in the record below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has run high across the record (median 58%, above 15% in 10 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 29% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →The biggest segment, Europe, is also where the profit is made: 42% of revenue and 48% of segment operating profit.
- Europe42%$17.1B48% of profit
- SSEA, CIS & MEA30%$12.1B28% of profit
- EA, AU & PMI GTR16%$6.6B21% of profit
- Americas12%$4.9B3% of profit
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $26.7B | $28.7B | $29.6B | $29.8B | $28.7B | $31.4B | $31.8B | $35.2B | $37.9B | $40.6B | $41.5B | RevenueRevenue |
| 65% | 64% | 64% | 65% | 67% | 68% | 64% | 63% | 65% | 67% | 67% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 1% | 1% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 2% | 2% | 1% | 2% | 2% | 2% | 2% | 2% | 2% | 2% | 2% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $10.9B | $11.6B | $11.4B | $10.5B | $11.7B | $13.0B | $12.2B | $11.6B | $13.4B | $14.9B | $15.2B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 40.9% | 40.3% | 38.4% | 35.3% | 40.7% | 41.3% | 38.6% | 32.9% | 35.4% | 36.6% | 36.7% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $7.0B | $6.0B | $7.9B | $7.2B | $8.1B | $9.1B | $9.0B | $7.8B | $7.1B | $11.3B | $11.1B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 28% | 42% | 24% | 24% | 23% | 23% | 20% | 23% | 30% | 19% | 20% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $8.1B | $8.9B | $9.5B | $10.1B | $9.8B | $12.0B | $10.8B | $9.2B | $12.2B | $12.2B | $12.2B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $743M | $875M | $989M | $964M | $981M | $998M | $1.1B | $1.4B | $1.8B | $2.0B | $2.0B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $367M | $2.0B | $578M | $1.9B | $775M | $1.9B | $678M | ($7M) | $3.4B | ($1.1B) | ($938M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.4B | $852M | $602M | $748M | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.5B | CapexCapex |
| 4.4% | 5.4% | 4.8% | 2.9% | 2.1% | 2.4% | 3.4% | 3.8% | 3.8% | 3.9% | 3.7% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $7.3B | $8.0B | $8.5B | $9.2B | $9.2B | $11.2B | $9.7B | $7.9B | $10.8B | $10.7B | $10.7B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 27.5% | 28.0% | 28.7% | 31.0% | 32.1% | 35.7% | 30.6% | 22.4% | 28.4% | 26.2% | 25.7% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $6.9B | $7.4B | $8.0B | $9.2B | $9.2B | $11.2B | $9.7B | $7.9B | $10.8B | $10.7B | $10.7B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 25.9% | 25.6% | 27.1% | 31.0% | 32.1% | 35.7% | 30.6% | 22.4% | 28.4% | 26.2% | 25.7% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | — | — | — | $0 | $2.1B | $14.0B | — | — | — | $14.0B | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $6.4B | $6.5B | $6.9B | $7.2B | $7.4B | $7.6B | $7.8B | $8.0B | $8.2B | $8.6B | $8.8B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $0 | $0 | — | $0 | $0 | $775M | $209M | $0 | $0 | — | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 68% | 51% | 73% | 65% | 79% | 77% | 39% | 28% | 32% | 35% | 39% | ROICROIC |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $4.2B | $8.4B | $6.6B | $6.9B | $7.3B | $4.5B | $3.2B | $3.1B | $4.2B | $4.9B | $5.5B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $3.5B | $3.2B | $3.0B | $3.1B | $2.9B | $3.1B | $3.9B | $3.5B | $3.8B | $4.6B | $5.1B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $9.0B | $8.8B | $8.8B | $9.2B | $9.6B | $8.7B | $9.9B | $10.8B | $9.5B | $11.5B | $11.4B | InventoryInvent. |
| $1.7B | $2.2B | $2.1B | $2.3B | $2.8B | $3.3B | $4.1B | $4.1B | $4.0B | $4.4B | $3.9B | Accounts payablePayables |
| $10.8B | $9.8B | $9.7B | $10.0B | $9.7B | $8.5B | $9.7B | $10.1B | $9.3B | $11.6B | $12.6B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $17.6B | $21.6B | $19.4B | $20.5B | $21.5B | $17.7B | $19.6B | $19.8B | $20.2B | $24.4B | $25.6B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $16.5B | $16.0B | $17.2B | $18.8B | $19.6B | $19.3B | $27.3B | $26.4B | $22.9B | $25.4B | $26.2B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.1× | 1.4× | 1.1× | 1.1× | 1.1× | 0.9× | 0.7× | 0.7× | 0.9× | 1.0× | 1.0× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $7.3B | $7.7B | $7.2B | $5.9B | $6.0B | $6.7B | $19.7B | $16.8B | $16.6B | $17.3B | $17.1B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $36.9B | $43.0B | $39.8B | $42.9B | $44.8B | $41.3B | $61.7B | $65.3B | $61.8B | $69.2B | $68.9B | Total assetsAssets |
| $28.4B | $33.8B | $31.0B | $30.7B | $31.3B | $27.6B | $37.5B | $45.9B | $45.6B | $48.7B | $46.3B | Total debtDebt |
| $24.2B | $25.4B | $24.4B | $23.8B | $24.0B | $23.1B | $34.3B | $42.9B | $41.3B | $43.8B | $40.8B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 10.2× | 10.6× | 13.3× | 13.2× | 16.0× | 17.6× | 15.9× | 7.6× | 7.6× | 9.4× | 9.6× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ($12.7B) | ($12.1B) | ($12.5B) | ($11.6B) | ($12.6B) | ($10.1B) | ($9.0B) | ($11.2B) | ($11.8B) | ($10.0B) | ($9.3B) | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $665M | — | $41M | $41M | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 1.55B | 1.55B | 1.55B | 1.56B | 1.56B | 1.56B | 1.55B | 1.55B | 1.56B | 1.56B | 1.56B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $17.21 | $18.51 | $19.05 | $19.15 | $18.42 | $20.14 | $20.47 | $22.65 | $24.34 | $26.09 | $26.62 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $4.49 | $3.89 | $5.09 | $4.62 | $5.17 | $5.84 | $5.83 | $5.03 | $4.54 | $7.28 | $7.12 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $4.73 | $5.18 | $5.46 | $5.94 | $5.91 | $7.20 | $6.27 | $5.08 | $6.92 | $6.84 | $6.84 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $4.45 | $4.74 | $5.17 | $5.94 | $5.91 | $7.20 | $6.27 | $5.08 | $6.92 | $6.84 | $6.84 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $4.11 | $4.20 | $4.43 | $4.60 | $4.73 | $4.86 | $5.03 | $5.13 | $5.27 | $5.54 | $5.65 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.76 | $1.00 | $0.92 | $0.55 | $0.39 | $0.48 | $0.69 | $0.85 | $0.93 | $1.01 | $0.97 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-8.18 | $-7.78 | $-8.01 | $-7.44 | $-8.07 | $-6.48 | $-5.77 | $-7.23 | $-7.55 | $-6.41 | $-5.95 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +4.7%/yr | +7.2%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +4.2%/yr | +3.0%/yr |
| EPS | +5.5%/yr | +7.1%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +3.4%/yr | +3.2%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +3.2%/yr | +21.1%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Revenue+7.3%
“Net revenues, excluding currency and acquisitions/divestitures, increased by 6.5%, mainly reflecting: a favorable pricing variance due to higher combustible tobacco pricing; and favorable volume/mix, driven by higher smoke-free products volume, notwithstanding unfavorable mix and lower volumes for cigarettes.”
✓ figure matches the filed record - Operating income+11.1%
“Operating income, excluding currency and acquisitions/divestitures, increased by 11.7%, reflecting the same factors as for net revenues.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business reported $11.3B of profit but $10.7B of owner earnings: $684M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $11.3B | $7.1B | $7.8B | $9.0B | $9.1B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$2.0B | +$1.8B | +$1.4B | +$1.1B | +$998M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$1.1B | +$3.4B | −$7M | +$678M | +$1.9B |
| Cash from operations | $12.2B | $12.2B | $9.2B | $10.8B | $12.0B |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$1.6B | −$1.4B | −$1.3B | −$1.1B | −$748M |
| Owner earnings | $10.7B | $10.8B | $7.9B | $9.7B | $11.2B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 26% | 28% | 22% | 31% | 36% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- ComfortableOperating income $14.9B ÷ interest expense $1.6B
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $43.8B · 2.9× operating profitMeaningful net debtCash $4.9B − debt $48.7B
What this means
Netting $4.9B of cash and short-term investments against $48.7B of debt leaves $43.8B owed, about 2.9× a year's operating profit (3.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 41 + DIO 313 − DPO 120 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Very high (≥25%) through the cycle10-yr median, range 28%–79%; 35% latest = NOPAT $12.0B ÷ invested capital $33.8BIndustry peers: median 11%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 35% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 22%–36%; latest $10.7B = operating cash $12.2B − maintenance capex $1.6BIndustry peers: median 17%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 26% of revenue this year, a 28% median across 10 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $12.2B ÷ net income $11.3B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $8.6B ÷ Owner Earnings $10.7B
What this means
Of $10.7B Owner Earnings, $8.6B (81%) went back to shareholders, $8.6B dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.79×HarvestingCapex $1.6B ÷ depreciation $2.0B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $40.6B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.96×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $48.7B vs ($1.1B) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth NearEarnings +33% over the record · +25%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $5.61/share (latest year $7.28), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-6.41/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 10 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 40% → 35% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing claims pricing power in its strongest form — price raised, volume held — yet the margin here has not widened to match. The claim leads the record; weigh them together.
What this means
The recent-years average (35%) sits below the early years (40%), but the latest year (37%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is 38% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 12%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Owner earnings growth +4%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 4% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2023 · 32.9% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +0.1%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
- How management talks about it Promotional
What this means
Results have held roughly flat while the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary — watch whether the words are doing work the numbers are not.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.
“We increasingly use artificial intelligence-based solutions in our business, which could result in reputational harm, legal liability, and adversely affect our operating results.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$5.5B
- Receivables$5.1B
- Inventory$11.4B
- Other current assets$3.6B
- Debt due within a year$1.4B
- Accounts payable$3.9B
- Other current liabilities$20.9B
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $102.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$11.8B · 11%
- Dividends$74.5B · 72%
- Buybacks$984M · 1%
- Retained (debt / cash)$15.6B · 15%
- Returned to owners$75.5B
82% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $74.5B as dividends and $984M as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $17.8B and cash and short-term investments rose $1.2B.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $984M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count0.5%
The diluted count barely moved (1551M to 1559M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$5.54/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 3% a year. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained—
Not read here: owner earnings are negative over the span, or the company returned nearly all its earnings rather than retaining them, so there is too little retained to measure a return on.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$706M written down across 2 years (2023, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $15.3M | $30.4M | $11.2B |
| 2021 | $10.6M | $15.5M | $11.2B |
| 2022 | $15.8M | $24.4M | $9.7B |
| 2023 | $25.5M | $22.4M | $7.9B |
| 2024 | $20.2M | $44.5M | $10.8B |
| 2025 | $29.1M | $56.8M | $10.7B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- CEO pay ratio375:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Philip Morris International Inc is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$28.4B → $46.3B
Debt rose from $28.4B to $46.3B while owner earnings went from about $8.0B to $9.8B — about 3.6 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 4.7 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?5 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 5 of the last 10 years, $945M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, nearest by economic model
No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (consumer & brand), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TMOThermo Fisher Scientific Inc | $44.6B | 80% | 17.2% | 8% | 17% |
| ABTAbbott Laboratories | $44.3B | 56% | 15.8% | 11% | 17% |
| PMPhilip Morris International Inc | $40.6B | 65% | 38.5% | 58% | 29% |
| MDLZMondelez International Inc. | $38.5B | 39% | 13.9% | 7% | 10% |
| SBUXStarbucks Corporation | $37.2B | 68% | 15.5% | 96% | 13% |
| AMGNAmgen Inc. | $36.8B | 76% | 36.1% | 18% | 35% |
| MDTMedtronic plc. | $36.4B | 67% | 17.8% | 6% | 16% |
| MOAltria Group Inc. | $23.3B | 72% | 42.0% | 38% | 32% |
| Group median | — | 67% | 17.5% | 14% | 17% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Philip Morris International Inc has delivered.
Through the cycle, Philip Morris International Inc earns about $11.6B on its 28.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 26.2% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $10.7B on 1559M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-17; net debt $40.8B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← PLXS its page in the Manual PNC →
Industry order: ← MO the Tobacco chapter RLX →