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MP, MP Materials

Metals & Mining capital-intensive UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundCapital build-out

Materials Corp. is the largest producer of rare earth materials in the Western Hemisphere.

The Materials segment generates revenue primarily from sales of neodymium-praseodymium ("NdPr") oxide and metal, primarily sold to customers in Japan, South Korea, and broader Asia.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

MP · MP Materials

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$224M

+10.1% YoY · 11% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $254M 5-yr avg $308M

Operating margin −54.6% 5-yr avg −9.0%

ROIC −5% 5-yr avg 5%

Owner-earnings margin −76% 5-yr avg −11%

Free cash flow margin −123% 5-yr avg −63%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 77% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has reached 62% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −10%) — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Capital spending runs about 62% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −4%, above 15% in 1 of 6 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
								Income statement
$73M	$134M	$332M	$528M	$253M	$204M	$224M	$254M	RevenueRevenue
15%	20%	17%	14%	31%	41%	50%	48%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($8M)	($35M)	$165M	$327M	($18M)	($169M)	($149M)	($139M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−10.4%	−25.8%	49.8%	62.1%	−7.0%	−83.1%	−66.6%	−54.6%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($7M)	($22M)	$135M	$289M	$24M	($65M)	($86M)	($71M)	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	16%	15%	27%	—	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
								Cash flow & returns
($437K)	$3M	$102M	$344M	$63M	$13M	($156M)	($94M)	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$5M	$7M	$24M	$18M	$56M	$78M	$89M	$100M	DepreciationDeprec.
$2M	$13M	($80M)	$4M	($43M)	($22M)	($189M)	($159M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$2M	$22M	$124M	$327M	$262M	$186M	$172M	$219M	CapexCapex
3.1%	16.7%	37.3%	61.9%	103.3%	91.4%	76.8%	86.2%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($3M)	($4M)	$78M	$325M	$7M	($65M)	($245M)	($194M)	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−3.7%	−2.7%	23.4%	61.6%	2.8%	−31.7%	−109.2%	−76.5%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($3M)	($19M)	($22M)	$17M	($199M)	($173M)	($328M)	($314M)	Free cash flowFCF
−3.7%	−14.2%	−6.6%	3.2%	−78.6%	−84.9%	−146.2%	−123.4%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	—	—	$0	$0	$225M	$0	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	-8%	28%	15%	-1%	-8%	-7%	-5%	ROICROIC
—	-3%	13%	22%	2%	-6%	-4%	-4%	Return on equityROE
—	−3%	13%	22%	2%	−6%	−4%	−4%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
								Balance sheet
$3M	$520M	$1.2B	$137M	$263M	$282M	$1.2B	$886M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$370K	$4M	$51M	$33M	$10M	$19M	$15M	$47M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$23M	$32M	$39M	$58M	$95M	$108M	$172M	$169M	InventoryInvent.
$12M	$16M	$36M	$15M	$28M	$24M	$37M	$33M	Accounts payablePayables
$11M	$20M	$54M	$75M	$77M	$103M	$150M	$183M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$27M	$561M	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.1B	$1.0B	$2.2B	$2.0B	Current assetsCur. assets
$31M	$43M	$60M	$97M	$109M	$164M	$299M	$285M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.9×	13.0×	21.4×	13.3×	10.4×	6.3×	7.2×	7.2×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$102M	$1.1B	$1.9B	$2.2B	$2.3B	$2.3B	$3.9B	$3.8B	Total assetsAssets
—	$3M	$675M	$678M	$682M	$909M	$999M	$1.0B	Total debtDebt
—	($516M)	($504M)	$542M	$419M	$626M	($167M)	$114M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-2.2×	-6.9×	18.6×	56.6×	-3.4×	-7.4×	-4.7×	-4.1×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
($18M)	$854M	$1.0B	$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.1B	$2.0B	$2.0B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.0%	3.7%	6.9%	6.0%	10.0%	11.4%	13.4%	14.1%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
								Per share
66.6M	79.7M	190M	193M	178M	170M	170M	178M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$1.10	$1.69	$1.75	$2.73	$1.42	$1.20	$1.32	$1.43	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.10	$-0.27	$0.71	$1.49	$0.14	$-0.39	$-0.50	$-0.40	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.04	$-0.05	$0.41	$1.68	$0.04	$-0.38	$-1.44	$-1.09	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.04	$-0.24	$-0.12	$0.09	$-1.12	$-1.02	$-1.93	$-1.76	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.03	$0.28	$0.65	$1.69	$1.47	$1.10	$1.01	$1.23	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-0.27	$10.71	$5.31	$6.79	$7.67	$6.21	$11.63	$11.05	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×2.38 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	6-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+3.1%/yr	−4.8%/yr
Capital spending / share	+75.9%/yr	+29.3%/yr
Book value / share	—	+1.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

170Mpeak FY2022

ROIC

−7%low FY2020

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

59.9×peak FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($245M)owner earningsvs.($86M)net incomelow FY2025

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2020FY2024

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned ($245M) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $89M it takes just to hold its position. It put $83M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($328M).

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($86M)	($65M)	$24M	$289M	$135M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$89M	+$78M	+$56M	+$18M	+$24M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$30M	+$23M	+$25M	+$32M	+$23M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$189M	−$22M	−$43M	+$4M	−$80M
Cash from operations	($156M)	$13M	$63M	$344M	$102M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$89M	−$78M	−$56M	−$18M	−$24M
Owner earnings	($245M)	($65M)	$7M	$325M	$78M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$83M	−$108M	−$206M	−$308M	−$99M
Free cash flow	($328M)	($173M)	($199M)	$17M	($22M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	-109%	-32%	3%	62%	23%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $89M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $83M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $30M), owner earnings is nearer ($275M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -4.7×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($149M) ÷ interest expense $31M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$167M

Net cash

Cash $1.2B − debt $999M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $167M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -7%

Below average through the cycle

6-yr median, range -8%–28%; -7% latest = NOPAT ($118M) ÷ invested capital $1.8B

Industry peers: median -12%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran -7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin -3%

Consumes cash through the cycle

7-yr median margin, range -109%–62%; latest ($245M) = operating cash ($156M) − maintenance capex $89M

Industry peers: median -105%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -109% of revenue this year, a -3% median across 7 years. It chose to put $83M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($328M) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $30M of SBC) leaves ($275M).
Are earnings backed by cash? ($156M)

Loss, and burning cash

Net income ($86M) · cash from operations ($156M)

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

No surplus to allocate

What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
Investing or harvesting? 1.93×

Expanding

Capex $172M ÷ depreciation $89M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $224M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 7.24×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $999M vs $1.9B WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (7-yr record) · 4 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −219%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.24/share (latest year $-0.48), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $11.12/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 3 of 7

What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 6 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 5% → −52% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 5% early to −52% lately, median −10% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −14%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
Worst year 2024 · −83.1% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“As robotics, physical AI applications, critical defense systems, and other advanced technologies become increasingly central to productivity and economic competitiveness, OEMs are expected to continue seeking long term partnerships with suppliers capable of delivering consistent quality at scale.…”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.0B

Cash & short-term investments$886M
Receivables$47M
Inventory$169M
Other current assets$944M

Current liabilities$285M

Debt due within a year$67M
Accounts payable$33M
Other current liabilities$185M

Current ratio7.18×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio6.58×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio3.11×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$1.8Bthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$67M due · $886M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Cash runway2.8 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+49.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters6.9× → 7.2×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$2.0Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$587MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$1.0B$17M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$140Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2019–2025

Over the record, the business generated $369M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$1.1B · 297%
Buybacks$225M · 61%

Returned to owners$225M
240% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $225M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$952M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $952M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
Average price paid for buybacks$14.81
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 15M shares were bought for $225M, about $14.81 each.
Net change in share count167.5%
The diluted count rose from 67M to 178M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Return on what it retained−287%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($43M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $125M, so each retained $1 gave back about 2.87 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Litinsky	$34.8M	$36.3M	$78M
2022	Mr. Litinsky	$1.6M	−$13.6M	$325M
2023	Mr. Litinsky	$4.2M	$130k	$7M
2024	Mr. Litinsky	$6.0M	$3.8M	($65M)
2025	Mr. Litinsky	$28.0M	$50.8M	($245M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership8.2%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio303:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$30M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 13% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why MP Materials is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.

3 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−46.1% vs 5.6%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 5.6% early in the record and −46.1% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?167.5%
Diluted shares grew 167.5% over 2019–2025, even as the company spent $225M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?32% → 85% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $23M to $216M while revenue grew 248%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (32% of revenue then, 85% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean

Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Inventory as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Metals & Mining

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
CDECoeur Mining Inc.	$2.1B	79%	4.3%	2%	2%
MPMP Materials	$224M	—	-10.4%	-4%	-3%
MUXMcEwen Inc.	$198M	77%	-43.0%	-9%	-7%
IAUXi-80 Gold Corp.	$95M	—	-177.0%	-15%	-157%
UECUranium Energy Corp.	$67M	31%	-103.9%	-12%	-168%
EUenCore Energy Corp.	$43M	17%	-168.1%	-16%	-106%
IDRIdaho Strategic Resources Inc.	$42M	6%	-2.6%	-9%	-8%
URGUr Energy Inc Common Shares (Canada)	$27M	-9%	-167.4%	-32%	-105%
Group median	—	—	-73.4%	-11%	-56%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

MP Materials is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

Today’s price $

The assumptions Required return 9% Years to get there 10 Revenue growth 0%

Revenue, delivered1%/yr’20→’25

Mature owner-earnings margin 15%

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach—

Margin the price demands—

Owner-earnings margin today−123%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Weigh MP against another business →

The owners of MP: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "MP Materials (MP), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/MP, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← MOVE its page in the Manual MPB →

Industry order: ← MLM the Metals & Mining chapter MSB →