Owner Scorecard


← All companies ← URBN Manual URGN → ← TRX Gold & Precious Metals VOXR →

URG, Ur Energy Inc Common Shares (Canada)

Gold & Precious Metals capital-intensive UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundCapital build-out

A metals and mining business, a price-taker on a global commodity.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
URG · Ur Energy Inc Common Shares (Canada)
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$27M
−19.3% YoY · 27% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM
Cash & investments $123M
Cash burn · annual $62M
Runway 2.0 yrs

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No meaningful revenue yet; the record is the cash on hand against the burn. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 87% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −174% through the cycle on a 6.1% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Inventory runs near 62% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the commodity price and the cost position. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −32%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
$27M$38M$23M$32M$8M$16K$19K$18M$34M$27M$27MRevenueRevenue
6%−56%−10%−9%10%10%Gross marginGross mgn
17%13%23%18%63%n/mn/m35%24%33%39%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
11%11%7%4%6%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$271K$1M$1M($8M)($13M)($17M)($20M)($31M)($63M)($69M)($74M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
1.0%3.6%5.6%−25.7%−160.4%n/mn/m−174.5%−187.2%−255.0%−271.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
($3M)$76K$5M($8M)($15M)($23M)($17M)($31M)($53M)($75M)($93M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
$3M$6M($5M)$4M($8M)($12M)($18M)($17M)($72M)($43M)($62M)Operating cash flowOp. cash
$5M$5M$4M$4M$2M$2M$2M$2M$3M$4M$4MDepreciationDeprec.
$399K($231K)($14M)$7M$4M$8M($4M)$10M($24M)$26M$24MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$296K$181K$55K$271K$43K$1M$709K$2M$9M$24M$32MCapexCapex
1.1%0.5%0.2%0.8%0.5%n/mn/m11.5%26.8%86.8%118.0%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$3M$5M($5M)$4M($8M)($13M)($19M)($19M)($81M)($67M)($95M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
11.3%14.2%−23.1%11.5%−102.0%n/mn/m−107.6%−240.2%−245.3%−347.4%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$3M$5M($5M)$4M($8M)($13M)($19M)($19M)($81M)($67M)($95M)Free cash flowFCF
11.3%14.2%−23.1%11.5%−102.0%n/mn/m−107.6%−240.2%−245.3%−347.4%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
0%2%2%-13%-25%-39%-44%-117%-88%-274%-211%ROICROIC
-8%0%9%-19%-43%-33%-27%-41%-40%-97%-112%Return on equityROE
−8%0%9%−19%−43%−33%−27%−41%−40%−97%−112%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$2M$4M$6M$7M$4M$46M$33M$60M$76M$124M$123MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$16K$33K$31K$22K$0$4K$8K$0$17M$20KReceivablesReceiv.
$4M$5M$15M$7M$8M$8M$10M$3M$21M$24M$28MInventoryInvent.
$725K$840K$620K$523K$396K$854K$660K$2M$3M$9M$9MAccounts payablePayables
$3M$4M$14M$7M$7M$7M$9M$891K$34M$16M$19MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$7M$9M$9M$8M$5M$49M$44M$64M$115M$150M$154MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$8M$8M$7M$2M$4M$6M$7M$10M$19M$28M$35MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.8×1.2×1.2×3.6×1.4×7.8×6.7×6.3×6.0×5.4×4.4×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$90M$88M$100M$90M$82M$121M$108M$128M$194M$272M$292MTotal assetsAssets
$24M$19M$15M$12M$13M$11M$6M$6M$66M$68MTotal debtDebt
$22M$16M$9M$5M$8M($35M)($27M)($54M)($57M)($56M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
1.3×-12.4×-18.8×-22.9×-42.8×-187.8×-35.6×-16.0×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$36M$39M$52M$44M$34M$69M$62M$75M$133M$77M$83MShareholders’ equityEquity
3.1%2.3%3.8%2.4%11.4%n/mn/m5.8%7.1%7.0%9.9%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
142M148M152M160M164M196M220M260M318M368M389MShares out (diluted)Shares
$0.19$0.26$0.15$0.20$0.05$0.00$0.00$0.07$0.11$0.07$0.07Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.02$0.00$0.03$-0.05$-0.09$-0.12$-0.08$-0.12$-0.17$-0.20$-0.24EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.02$0.04$-0.04$0.02$-0.05$-0.07$-0.09$-0.07$-0.25$-0.18$-0.24Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.02$0.04$-0.04$0.02$-0.05$-0.07$-0.09$-0.07$-0.25$-0.18$-0.24Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.00$0.01$0.00$0.01$0.03$0.06$0.08Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$0.26$0.26$0.34$0.28$0.21$0.35$0.28$0.29$0.42$0.21$0.21Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−10.1%/yr+7.8%/yr
Capital spending / share+46.3%/yr+200.5%/yr
Book value / share−2.1%/yr+0.3%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
368Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
−274%low FY2025
Gross margin
10%low FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($67M)owner earningsvs.($75M)net incomelow FY2024

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2019

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $75M loss into ($67M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($75M)($53M)($31M)($17M)($23M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$4M+$3M+$2M+$2M+$2M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$2M+$2M+$1M+$1M+$1M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$26M−$24M+$10M−$4M+$8M
Cash from operations($43M)($72M)($17M)($18M)($12M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$24M−$9M−$2M−$709K−$1M
Owner earnings($67M)($81M)($19M)($19M)($13M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-245%-240%-108%-98947%-80550%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $2M), owner earnings is nearer ($69M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($69M) ÷ interest expense $2M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net cash
    Cash $124M − debt $66M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $57M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 222 + DIO 363 − DPO 129 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -274%–2%; -274% latest = NOPAT ($55M) ÷ invested capital $20M
    Industry peers: median -12%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -274% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Consumes cash through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -98947%–14%; latest ($67M) = operating cash ($43M) − maintenance capex $24M
    Industry peers: median -106%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -245% of revenue this year, a -108% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $2M of SBC) leaves ($69M).

  • Loss, and burning cash
    Net income ($75M) · cash from operations ($43M)
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 6.18×
    Expanding
    Capex $24M ÷ depreciation $4M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $27M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 5.44×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $66M vs $123M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 8 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −10021%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.13/share (latest year $-0.19), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.19/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 2 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 8 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 3% → −206% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 3% early to −206% lately, median −174% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2021 · −104731.3% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“As a result, our competitors may adopt technological advancements, including artificial intelligence, that provide them an advantage over our operations.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$154M
  • Cash & short-term investments$123M
  • Receivables$20K
  • Inventory$28M
  • Other current assets$3M
Current liabilities$35M
  • Accounts payable$9M
  • Other current liabilities$25M
Current ratio4.44×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio3.63×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio3.55×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$119Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Cash runway1.3 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Current ratio, recent quarters15.7× → 4.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$83Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$107MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$8M$1M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$4Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2023Mr. Cash$1.1M$1.3M($19M)
2024Mr. Cash$1.0M$876k($81M)
2025Mr. Cash$1.3M$1.4M($67M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Stock-based compensation$2M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 7% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Ur Energy Inc Common Shares (Canada) is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−66.0% vs 0.8%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 0.8% early in the record and −66.0% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$24M → $68M

    Debt rose from $24M to $68M while owner earnings went from about $1M to ($56M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?15% → 103% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $4M to $28M while revenue grew −0%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (15% of revenue then, 103% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Gold & Precious Metals

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
MPMP Materials$224M-10.4%-4%-3%
MUXMcEwen Inc.$198M77%-43.0%-9%-7%
IAUXi-80 Gold Corp.$95M-177.0%-15%-157%
UECUranium Energy Corp.$67M31%-103.9%-12%-168%
EUenCore Energy Corp.$43M17%-168.1%-16%-106%
IDRIdaho Strategic Resources Inc.$42M6%-2.6%-9%-8%
URGUr Energy Inc Common Shares (Canada)$27M-9%-167.4%-32%-105%
IEIvanhoe Electric Inc.$3M65%-3501.0%-65%-2787%
Group median24%-135.7%-14%-106%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Ur Energy Inc Common Shares (Canada) has delivered.

Ur Energy Inc Common Shares (Canada)’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, below the record’s own through-cycle owner earnings. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, Ur Energy Inc Common Shares (Canada) earns about $3M on its 11.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −245.3% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($95M) on 397M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net cash $56M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits off the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($32M) runs well above depreciation ($4M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ($86M), the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Ur Energy Inc Common Shares (Canada) (URG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/URG, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← URBN its page in the Manual URGN →

Industry order: ← TRX the Gold & Precious Metals chapter VOXR →