Share count
187Mpeak FY2025
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EU, enCore Energy Corp.
A capital-intensive business, run on heavy physical assets that must be kept working and earn a return above what they cost to maintain.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$43M
−26.0% YoY · 117% 3-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 4-yr average
Revenue $43M 4-yr avg $32M
Revenue $18M +0.3% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 54.4% yr-ago −85.7%
Net income $3M yr-ago ($25M)
Net margin 13.7% yr-ago −139.2%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No meaningful revenue yet; the record is the cash on hand against the burn. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 46% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −184% through the cycle on a 12% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Capital spending runs about 23% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −16%, above 15% in 0 of 4 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2022–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||
| $4M | $22M | $58M | $43M | $43M | RevenueRevenue |
| 37% | 12% | −12% | 22% | 22% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 292% | 90% | 46% | 99% | 104% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ($26M) | ($41M) | ($72M) | ($66M) | ($40M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −610.4% | −183.9% | −123.7% | −152.4% | −93.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($23M) | ($26M) | ($61M) | ($57M) | ($27M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||
| ($20M) | ($23M) | ($45M) | ($25M) | ($39M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $736K | $6M | $3M | $5M | $5M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($2M) | ($7M) | $8M | $22M | ($23M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $980K | $8M | $11M | $20M | $20M | CapexCapex |
| 23.1% | 34.9% | 19.5% | 46.3% | 46.3% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($21M) | ($29M) | ($48M) | ($30M) | ($44M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −495.8% | −129.4% | −83.1% | −70.4% | −102.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($21M) | ($31M) | ($57M) | ($45M) | ($59M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −501.5% | −138.7% | −96.9% | −104.2% | −135.8% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| -15% | -12% | -23% | -18% | -10% | ROICROIC |
| -12% | -10% | -21% | -25% | -11% | Return on equityROE |
| −12% | −10% | −21% | −25% | −11% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||
| $57M | $24M | $57M | $52M | $66M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | — | $0 | $5M | $5M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $9K | $21M | $5M | $10M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $9K | $21M | $10M | $15M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $25M | $87M | $110M | $134M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $6M | $30M | $14M | $12M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 4.0× | 2.9× | 8.0× | 11.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $327M | $393M | $430M | $452M | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $19M | $0 | $110M | $110M | Total debtDebt |
| — | ($5M) | ($57M) | $58M | $45M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| — | -11.6× | -41.6× | -19.4× | -8.3× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $196M | $262M | $286M | $229M | $255M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 102.0% | 15.6% | 8.2% | 9.7% | 13.2% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||
| 106M | 144M | 182M | 187M | 191M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $0.04 | $0.15 | $0.32 | $0.23 | $0.23 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.22 | $-0.18 | $-0.34 | $-0.30 | $-0.14 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.20 | $-0.20 | $-0.27 | $-0.16 | $-0.23 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.20 | $-0.21 | $-0.31 | $-0.24 | $-0.31 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.01 | $0.05 | $0.06 | $0.11 | $0.10 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $1.85 | $1.82 | $1.57 | $1.23 | $1.33 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 3-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +79.1%/yr | +79.1%/yr (3-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | +125.9%/yr | +125.9%/yr (3-yr) |
| Book value / share | −12.8%/yr | −12.8%/yr (3-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2022–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
−18%low FY2024
Gross margin
22%low FY2024
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
($30M)owner earningsvs.($57M)net incomelow FY2024
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned ($30M) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $5M it takes just to hold its position. It put $15M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($45M).
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($57M) | ($61M) | ($26M) | ($23M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$5M | +$3M | +$6M | +$736K |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$4M | +$5M | +$3M | +$4M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$22M | +$8M | −$7M | −$2M |
| Cash from operations | ($25M) | ($45M) | ($23M) | ($20M) |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$5M | −$3M | −$6M | −$736K |
| Owner earnings | ($30M) | ($48M) | ($29M) | ($21M) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$15M | −$8M | −$2M | −$244K |
| Free cash flow | ($45M) | ($57M) | ($31M) | ($21M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -70% | -83% | -129% | -496% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $5M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $15M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $4M), owner earnings is nearer ($35M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Material weakness in financial controls
“We have identified material weaknesses in our internal controls over financial reporting.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -19.4×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($66M) ÷ interest expense $3M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $52M + ST investments $18M − debt $110M
What this means
Netting $70M of cash and short-term investments against $110M of debt leaves $40M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle4-yr median, range -23%–-12%; -18% latest = NOPAT ($52M) ÷ invested capital $287MIndustry peers: median -12%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 4 years (it ran -18% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Owner-earnings margin -129%Consumes cash through the cycle4-yr median margin, range -496%–-70%; latest ($30M) = operating cash ($25M) − maintenance capex $5MIndustry peers: median -105%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -70% of revenue this year, a -129% median across 4 years. It chose to put $15M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($45M) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $4M of SBC) leaves ($35M).
- Are earnings backed by cash? ($25M)Loss, and burning cashNet income ($57M) · cash from operations ($25M)
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 3.72×ExpandingCapex $20M ÷ depreciation $5M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 3 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $43M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 8.03×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt NearDebt ≤ working capital · $110M vs $96M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.25/share (latest year $-0.29), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.18/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2022–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 0 of 4
What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 3 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −397% → −138% (2-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −397% early to −138% lately, median −184% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2022 · −610.4% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +21.0%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- How management talks about it Promotional
What this means
The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Framed as a capability
The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.
“As of December 31, 2025, the council has actively advanced its agenda with the following: Encouragement for power plants to increase output by 10% to 15% to support rising electricity demand, especially from artificial intelligence systems.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$134M
- Cash & short-term investments$66M
- Receivables$5M
- Inventory$10M
- Other current assets$53M
Current liabilities$12M
- Other current liabilities$12M
Current ratio11.08×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio10.25×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio5.44×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$121Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Cash runway1.1 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+0.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters4.4× → 11.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$254Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($37M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$114M$3M of it operating leases
From the company's latest filing.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Mr. Goranson | $1.9M | $2.5M | ($29M) |
| 2024 | Mr. Goranson | $1.1M | $935k | ($48M) |
| 2025 | Goranson | $792k | $119k | ($30M) |
| 2025 | Willette | $3.2M | $2.9M | ($30M) |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership3%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$4M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 10% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Peers, Coal & Consumable Fuels
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MPMP Materials | $224M | — | -10.4% | -4% | -3% |
| MUXMcEwen Inc. | $198M | 77% | -43.0% | -9% | -7% |
| IAUXi-80 Gold Corp. | $95M | — | -177.0% | -15% | -157% |
| UECUranium Energy Corp. | $67M | 31% | -103.9% | -12% | -168% |
| EUenCore Energy Corp. | $43M | 17% | -168.1% | -16% | -106% |
| IDRIdaho Strategic Resources Inc. | $42M | 6% | -2.6% | -9% | -8% |
| URGUr Energy Inc Common Shares (Canada) | $27M | -9% | -167.4% | -32% | -105% |
| IEIvanhoe Electric Inc. | $3M | 65% | -3501.0% | -65% | -2787% |
| Group median | — | 24% | -135.7% | -14% | -106% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFenCore Energy Corp. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
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The assumptions
Enter a price to run it.
Owner earnings it must reach—
Margin the price demands—
Owner-earnings margin today−136%
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "enCore Energy Corp. (EU), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/EU, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← ETSY its page in the Manual EVC →
Industry order: ← DNN the Coal & Consumable Fuels chapter HCC →