Owner Scorecard


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MPC, Marathon Petroleum Corporation

Refining & Marketing capital-intensive

Marathon Petroleum buys crude oil and other feedstocks and runs them through large, complex refineries to make gasoline, diesel, jet fuel and related products, which it sells wholesale and through fuel stations carrying its brand. Around this core it runs a midstream business of pipelines, storage, gathering and processing that moves hydrocarbons for oil and gas producers, plus a smaller renewable diesel operation. The bulk of revenue, and nearly all the swing in profit, comes from refining and marketing.

We distribute our refined products through one of the largest terminal operations in the United States and one of the largest private domestic fleets of inland petroleum product barges.

Our integrated midstream energy asset network links producers of natural gas and NGLs from some of the largest supply basins in the United States to domestic and international markets.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
MPC · Marathon Petroleum Corporation
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$132.7B
−4.4% YoY · 14% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $135.4B 5-yr avg $143.5B
Gross margin 10% 5-yr avg 11%
Operating margin 6.7% 5-yr avg 7.3%
ROIC 15% 5-yr avg 19%
Owner-earnings margin 4% 5-yr avg 5%
Free cash flow margin 4% 5-yr avg 5%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Refining and Marketing (94%), Midstream (4%) and Renewable Diesel (2%).
What moves the needle
The question to settle is whether this is a franchise or a commodity processor, and the economics point to the latter: the gap between what crude costs and what refined fuel fetches is set by the market, not by Marathon, so the durable test is the cost position of the refineries — whether their complexity lets them run cheaper, disadvantaged feedstock that simpler plants cannot. Watch too for scale in the midstream and distribution network and the discipline of reinvestment, since this is a capital-hungry, cyclical business that competes on both feedstock supply and product price and carries debt, by the filing's own account. The bad case is plain — margins compress toward the trough while fixed costs and interest do not — so the record below, on margins, returns on capital and the debt load, is where the case is won or lost.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). By owner earnings: roughly 5% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Refining And Marketing is 94% of revenue, so this is largely a single-segment business.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Refining And Marketing94%$124.3B
  • Midstream4%$5.6B
  • Renewable Diesel2%$2.8B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$63.3B$74.7B$86.1B$111.1B$69.8B$120.0B$177.5B$148.4B$138.9B$132.7B$135.4BRevenueRevenue
10%10%10%11%6%8%15%13%9%10%10%Gross marginGross mgn
3%2%3%3%4%2%2%2%2%3%3%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$2.4B$4.0B$4.7B$4.5B($12.2B)$4.3B$21.5B$14.5B$6.8B$8.3B$9.0BOperating incomeOp. inc.
3.8%5.4%5.4%4.0%−17.6%3.6%12.1%9.8%4.9%6.2%6.7%Operating marginOp. mgn
$1.2B$3.4B$2.8B$2.6B($9.8B)$9.7B$14.5B$9.7B$3.4B$4.0B$4.6BNet incomeNet inc.
34%22%23%3%24%23%21%22%22%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$4.0B$6.6B$6.2B$9.4B$2.4B$4.4B$16.4B$14.1B$8.7B$8.3B$9.4BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$2.0B$2.1B$2.2B$3.2B$3.4B$3.4B$3.2B$3.3B$3.3B$3.3B$3.3BDepreciationDeprec.
$797M$1.0B$1.1B$3.4B$8.8B($8.8B)($1.5B)$918M$1.7B$795M$1.4BWorking capital & otherWC & other
$2.9B$2.7B$3.2B$4.8B$2.8B$1.5B$2.4B$1.9B$2.5B$3.5B$3.7BCapexCapex
4.6%3.7%3.7%4.3%4.0%1.2%1.4%1.3%1.8%2.6%2.8%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$2.0B$4.5B$4.0B$6.2B($368M)$2.9B$13.9B$12.2B$6.1B$4.8B$5.7BOwner earningsOwner earn.
3.2%6.0%4.6%5.6%−0.5%2.4%7.9%8.2%4.4%3.6%4.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$1.1B$3.9B$3.0B$4.6B($368M)$2.9B$13.9B$12.2B$6.1B$4.8B$5.7BFree cash flowFCF
1.8%5.2%3.5%4.2%−0.5%2.4%7.9%8.2%4.4%3.6%4.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$249M$3.8B$129M$0$0$413M$246M$688M$3.3B$3.1BAcquisitionsAcquis.
$719M$773M$954M$1.4B$1.5B$1.5B$1.3B$1.3B$1.2B$1.1B$1.1BDividends paidDiv. paid
$197M$2.4B$3.3B$1.9B$0$4.7B$11.9B$11.6B$9.2B$3.5BBuybacksBuybacks
7%16%6%6%-18%9%36%24%13%14%15%ROICROIC
9%24%8%8%-44%37%52%40%19%23%28%Return on equityROE
3%19%5%4%−51%31%48%35%13%17%21%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$887M$3.0B$1.7B$1.4B$415M$10.8B$11.8B$10.2B$3.2B$3.7B$2.2BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$3.6B$4.7B$5.9B$7.2B$5.8B$11.0B$13.5B$12.2B$11.1B$10.3B$14.6BReceivablesReceiv.
$5.7B$5.5B$9.8B$9.8B$8.0B$8.1B$8.8B$9.3B$9.6B$10.1B$10.8BInventoryInvent.
$5.6B$8.3B$9.4B$11.2B$7.8B$13.7B$15.3B$13.8B$13.9B$13.0B$17.6BAccounts payablePayables
$3.7B$1.9B$6.3B$5.8B$6.0B$5.4B$7.0B$7.7B$6.8B$7.5B$7.8BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$10.4B$13.4B$18.0B$30.5B$28.3B$30.5B$35.2B$32.1B$24.4B$24.8B$28.7BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$7.1B$10.5B$13.2B$16.9B$15.7B$17.9B$20.0B$20.1B$20.8B$19.7B$24.4BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.5×1.3×1.4×1.8×1.8×1.7×1.8×1.6×1.2×1.3×1.2×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$3.6B$3.6B$15.8B$15.7B$8.3B$8.3B$8.2B$8.2B$8.2B$9.4B$9.3BGoodwillGoodwill
$44.4B$49.0B$92.9B$98.6B$85.2B$85.4B$89.9B$86.0B$78.9B$84.0B$88.2BTotal assetsAssets
$11.1B$13.4B$28.0B$29.2B$32.0B$25.9B$27.1B$27.6B$27.8B$33.3B$33.3BTotal debtDebt
$10.2B$10.4B$26.3B$27.8B$31.6B$15.1B$15.3B$17.4B$24.6B$29.6B$31.1BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
4.2×6.0×4.7×3.6×-9.0×2.9×21.5×27.6×8.1×6.5×6.7×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$13.6B$14.0B$35.2B$33.7B$22.2B$26.2B$27.7B$24.4B$17.7B$17.3B$16.8BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.1%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.1%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$130M$1.2B$7.4BGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
530M512M526M664M649M638M516M409M341M306M295MShares out (diluted)Shares
$119.39$145.96$163.66$167.39$107.52$188.06$343.90$362.78$407.23$433.66$458.92Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.22$6.70$5.29$3.97$-15.14$15.26$28.13$23.67$10.10$13.23$15.70EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.80$8.79$7.58$9.36$-0.57$4.54$27.02$29.89$17.98$15.58$19.33Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.12$7.58$5.66$6.97$-0.57$4.54$27.02$29.89$17.98$15.58$19.33Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.36$1.51$1.81$2.11$2.33$2.33$2.48$3.08$3.38$3.73$3.90Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$5.46$5.34$6.04$7.24$4.29$2.29$4.69$4.62$7.43$11.39$12.66Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$25.58$27.41$66.87$50.74$34.20$41.08$53.71$59.67$52.04$56.58$56.79Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+15.4%/yr+32.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share+17.0%/yr
EPS+22.0%/yr
Dividends / share+11.9%/yr+9.9%/yr
Capital spending / share+8.5%/yr+21.5%/yr
Book value / share+9.2%/yr+10.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
306Mpeak FY2019
ROIC
14%low FY2020
Gross margin
10%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
6.2×peak FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$4.8Bowner earningsvs.$4.0Bnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $4.0B of profit into $4.8B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$4.0B
Owner earnings$4.8B · 4% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$4.0B$3.4B$9.7B$14.5B$9.7B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$3.3B+$3.3B+$3.3B+$3.2B+$3.4B
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$160M+$137M+$211M+$153M+$88M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$795M+$1.7B+$918M−$1.5B−$8.8B
Cash from operations$8.3B$8.7B$14.1B$16.4B$4.4B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$3.5B−$2.5B−$1.9B−$2.4B−$1.5B
Owner earnings$4.8B$6.1B$12.2B$13.9B$2.9B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue4%4%8%8%2%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $160M), owner earnings is nearer $4.6B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $8.3B ÷ interest expense $1.3B
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $29.6B · 3.6× operating profit
    Meaningful net debt
    Cash $3.7B − debt $33.3B
    What this means

    Netting $3.7B of cash and short-term investments against $33.3B of debt leaves $29.6B owed, about 3.6× a year's operating profit (4.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 28 + DIO 31 − DPO 40 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -18%–36%; 14% latest = NOPAT $6.5B ÷ invested capital $46.9B
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 14% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin, recently turned positive
    latest $4.8B = operating cash $8.3B − maintenance capex $3.5B; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 4%)
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $160M of SBC) leaves $4.6B.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $8.3B ÷ net income $4.0B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $4.6B ÷ Owner Earnings $4.8B
    What this means

    Of $4.8B Owner Earnings, $4.6B (97%) went back to shareholders, $1.1B dividends, $3.5B buybacks. Net of $160M stock comp, the real buyback was about $3.3B. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.07×
    Maintaining
    Capex $3.5B ÷ depreciation $3.3B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $132.7B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.26×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $33.3B vs $5.1B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +133%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $19.61/share (latest year $13.86), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $59.31/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 5% → 7% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 5% early to 7% lately, median 5% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +6%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 6% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · −17.6% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −5.9%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$28.7B
  • Cash & short-term investments$2.2B
  • Receivables$14.6B
  • Inventory$10.8B
  • Other current assets$1.2B
Current liabilities$24.4B
  • Debt due within a year$2.1B
  • Accounts payable$17.6B
  • Other current liabilities$4.7B
Current ratio1.18×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.73×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.09×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$4.3Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$2.1B due · $2.2B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+8.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.3× → 1.2×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$4.8Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($36.1B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$6.9B$1.5B of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$2.3B
'27$2.0B
'28$1.8B
'29$764M
'30$2.6B

Bars scaled to the largest single year.

Due in the next 12 months$2.3Bthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$4.3Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$2.6Bin 2030the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Due over the next five years$9.4Bthe near slice; the balance sheet carries $33.3B of debt in all

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$2.2B
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$4.8B
Together, against $2.3B due next year3.1×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $6.9B against the $2.3B due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 3.1 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $80.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$28.2B · 35%
  • Dividends$11.7B · 15%
  • Buybacks$48.6B · 60%
  • Returned to owners$60.3B

    107% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $11.7B as dividends and $48.6B as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$8.1B

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $8.1B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $11.1B to $33.3B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$97.46

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 499M shares were bought for $48.6B, about $97.46 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $49.25 (2016) to $173.38 (2024); its heaviest year, 2022, paid $91.01 ($11.9B).

  • Net change in share count−44.3%

    The diluted count fell from 530M to 295M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$3.73/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 12% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$12.1B14% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity54%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$8.9Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $28.2B of capital spent building

$8.7B written down across 3 years (2016, 2019, 2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 98% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
20212025: Ms. Mannen$21.2M$34.9M$2.9B
20222025: Ms. Mannen$21.3M$54.0M$13.9B
20232025: Ms. Mannen$24.1M$49.6M$12.2B
20242025: Ms. Mannen$14.4M$13.4M$6.1B
20242025: Ms. Mannen$23.8M$21.9M$6.1B
20252025: Ms. Mannen$19.0M$22.5M$4.8B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$160M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Marathon Petroleum Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$11.1B → $33.3B

    Debt rose from $11.1B to $33.3B while owner earnings went from about $3.5B to $7.7B — about 3.2 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 4.3 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?15% → 19% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $9.3B to $25.4B while revenue grew 114%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (15% of revenue then, 19% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Refining & Marketing

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
XOMExxon Mobil Corporation$332.2B7.6%7%7%
CVXChevron Corporation$184.4B41%8.2%5%9%
MPCMarathon Petroleum Corporation$132.7B10%5.1%11%5%
PSXPhillips 66$132.4B12%3.9%10%
VLOValero Energy Corporation$122.7B5%3.7%11%4%
COPConocoPhillips$51.8B57%29.3%13%14%
PBFPBF Energy$29.3B4%2.4%9%2%
SUNSunoco LP Common$25.2B8%2.8%2%
Group median10%4.5%10%5%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Marathon Petroleum Corporation has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Marathon Petroleum Corporation earns about $6.0B on its 4.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 3.6% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−10%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+9%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $5.7B on 292M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $31.1B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Marathon Petroleum Corporation (MPC), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/MPC, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← MPB its page in the Manual MPLX →

Industry order: ← IEP the Refining & Marketing chapter PBF →