Share count
1Bpeak FY2020
← All companies ← MPC Manual MPT → ← KNTK Pipelines & Midstream NGG →
MPLX, MPLX LP Common
We are a diversified, large-cap master limited partnership formed by MPC in 2012 that owns and operates midstream energy infrastructure and logistics assets, and provides fuels distribution services.
Consists of two segments based on the product-based value chain each supports: Crude Oil and Products Logistics and Natural Gas and NGL Services.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$9.7B
+5.8% YoY · 7% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $9.6B 5-yr avg $8.9B
ROIC 17%
Revenue $3.0B −2.8% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 40.0% yr-ago 43.7%
Net income $922M yr-ago $1.1B
Net margin 30.3% yr-ago 36.4%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Natural Gas and NGL Services (50%) and Crude Oil and Products Logistics (50%).
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 31% through the cycle, a wide margin for the work it does — whether that reflects a durable edge or one that can fade is what the record weighs. The margin is cyclical, swinging between 3.1% and 61% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 17% of sales, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on throughput and the contracts behind it. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 2 segments, the largest Natural Gas and NGL Services at 50%.
Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
- Natural Gas and NGL Services50%$4.9B
- Crude Oil and Products Logistics50%$4.8B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $3.0B | $3.9B | $5.4B | $7.0B | $6.9B | $8.0B | $8.9B | $8.7B | $9.2B | $9.7B | $9.6B | RevenueRevenue |
| 7% | 6% | 6% | 6% | 5% | 4% | 4% | 4% | 5% | 5% | 5% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $683M | $1.2B | $1.2B | $377M | $211M | $4.0B | $4.9B | $4.9B | $5.3B | $5.9B | $5.8B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 22.5% | 30.8% | 21.5% | 5.4% | 3.1% | 49.8% | 55.0% | 56.1% | 57.5% | 61.1% | 60.2% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $233M | $794M | $1.8B | $1.0B | ($720M) | $3.1B | $3.9B | $3.9B | $4.3B | $4.9B | $4.7B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| -5% | 0% | 0% | 0% | — | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | — | 0% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $1.5B | $1.9B | $3.1B | $4.1B | $4.5B | $4.9B | $5.0B | $5.4B | $5.9B | $5.9B | $6.0B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $591M | $683M | $867M | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.4B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $667M | $430M | $386M | $1.8B | $3.9B | $547M | ($155M) | $256M | $382M | ($351M) | ($67M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $1.3B | $1.4B | $2.1B | $2.4B | $1.2B | $529M | $806M | $937M | $1.1B | $1.8B | $2.1B | CapexCapex |
| 43.3% | 36.5% | 38.7% | 34.2% | 17.2% | 6.6% | 9.0% | 10.7% | 11.5% | 18.6% | 22.0% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $900M | $1.2B | $2.2B | $2.8B | $3.3B | $4.4B | $4.2B | $4.5B | $4.9B | $4.6B | $4.6B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 29.7% | 31.7% | 40.4% | 40.2% | 48.4% | 54.6% | 47.2% | 51.1% | 53.2% | 46.9% | 48.1% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $178M | $496M | $960M | $1.7B | $3.3B | $4.4B | $4.2B | $4.5B | $4.9B | $4.1B | $3.9B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 5.9% | 12.8% | 17.6% | 23.8% | 48.4% | 54.6% | 47.2% | 51.1% | 53.2% | 42.2% | 40.5% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $249M | $451M | — | $0 | $0 | $28M | $246M | $622M | $3.3B | $3.1B | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | $0 | $0 | $33M | $630M | $491M | $0 | $326M | $400M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $234M | $5M | $77M | $15M | $15M | $13M | $238M | $1.0B | $1.5B | $2.1B | $1.5B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $299M | $292M | $611M | $593M | $452M | $654M | $737M | $823M | $718M | $735M | $769M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $140M | $151M | $266M | $242M | $152M | $172M | $224M | $153M | $147M | $108M | $126M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $159M | $141M | $345M | $351M | $300M | $482M | $513M | $670M | $571M | $627M | $643M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $868M | $559M | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.9B | $2.8B | $3.3B | $4.0B | $3.5B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $763M | $1.3B | $2.3B | $2.1B | $2.1B | $3.3B | $2.4B | $2.6B | $3.2B | $3.2B | $3.2B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.1× | 0.4× | 0.6× | 0.7× | 0.7× | 0.5× | 0.8× | 1.1× | 1.0× | 1.2× | 1.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $2.2B | $2.2B | $10.0B | $9.5B | $7.7B | $7.7B | $7.6B | $7.6B | $7.6B | $8.8B | $8.7B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $17.5B | $19.5B | $39.3B | $40.4B | $36.4B | $35.5B | $35.7B | $36.5B | $37.5B | $43.0B | $42.9B | Total assetsAssets |
| $4.9B | $7.4B | $18.9B | $20.1B | $20.5B | $18.9B | $20.1B | $20.7B | $21.2B | $26.0B | $26.0B | Total debtDebt |
| $4.6B | $7.4B | $18.8B | $20.1B | $20.5B | $18.9B | $19.9B | $19.7B | $19.7B | $23.9B | $24.5B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | 5.3× | 5.3× | 5.7× | 6.0× | 5.5× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $130M | — | — | $1.2B | $1.8B | — | — | — | — | — | — | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 345M | 396M | 761M | 907M | 1.05B | 1.03B | 1.01B | 1.00B | 1.02B | 1.02B | 1.01B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $8.78 | $9.77 | $7.16 | $7.76 | $6.56 | $7.81 | $8.84 | $8.72 | $9.04 | $9.54 | $9.47 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.68 | $2.01 | $2.39 | $1.14 | $-0.69 | $3.00 | $3.90 | $3.92 | $4.21 | $4.82 | $4.62 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $2.61 | $3.09 | $2.90 | $3.12 | $3.18 | $4.27 | $4.17 | $4.45 | $4.81 | $4.47 | $4.56 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.52 | $1.25 | $1.26 | $1.85 | $3.18 | $4.27 | $4.17 | $4.45 | $4.81 | $4.02 | $3.84 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $3.81 | $3.56 | $2.77 | $2.65 | $1.13 | $0.52 | $0.80 | $0.94 | $1.04 | $1.77 | $2.08 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
The diluted share count moved ×1.92 into 2018 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +0.9%/yr | +7.8%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +6.2%/yr | +7.1%/yr |
| EPS | +24.4%/yr | — |
| Capital spending / share | −8.1%/yr | +9.5%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
5.2×peak FY2018
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$4.6Bowner earningsvs.$4.9Bnet incomelow FY2016
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2016FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $4.6B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $1.4B it takes just to hold its position. It put $457M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $4.1B.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $4.9B | $4.3B | $3.9B | $3.9B | $3.1B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$1.4B | +$1.3B | +$1.2B | +$1.2B | +$1.3B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$351M | +$382M | +$256M | −$155M | +$547M |
| Cash from operations | $5.9B | $5.9B | $5.4B | $5.0B | $4.9B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$1.4B | −$1.1B | −$937M | −$806M | −$529M |
| Owner earnings | $4.6B | $4.9B | $4.5B | $4.2B | $4.4B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$457M | — | — | — | — |
| Free cash flow | $4.1B | $4.9B | $4.5B | $4.2B | $4.4B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 47% | 53% | 51% | 47% | 55% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $1.4B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $457M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- ComfortableOperating income $5.9B ÷ interest expense $983M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $23.9B · 4.0× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $2.1B − debt $26.0B
What this means
Netting $2.1B of cash and short-term investments against $26.0B of debt leaves $23.9B owed, about 4.0× a year's operating profit (4.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- HighNOPAT $5.9B ÷ invested capital $33.1B (debt + equity − cash)
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 30%–55%; latest $4.6B = operating cash $5.9B − maintenance capex $1.4BIndustry peers: median 5%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 47% of revenue this year, a 47% median across 10 years. It chose to put $457M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $4.1B — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $5.9B ÷ net income $4.9B
In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $400M ÷ Owner Earnings $4.6B
What this means
Of $4.6B Owner Earnings, $400M (9%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $400M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.34×ExpandingCapex $1.8B ÷ depreciation $1.4B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $9.7B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.23×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $26.0B vs $745M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +361%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4.31/share (latest year $4.84), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $9.12/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 9 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin 25% → 58% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 25% early to 58% lately, median 31% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Owner earnings growth +18%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 18% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2020 · 3.1% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$3.5B
- Cash & short-term investments$1.5B
- Receivables$769M
- Other current assets$1.2B
Current liabilities$3.2B
- Debt due within a year$1.5B
- Accounts payable$126M
- Other current liabilities$1.6B
Current ratio1.10×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.10×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.47×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$330Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$1.5B due · $1.5B cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−2.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.0× → 1.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($841M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($25.1B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.8B$261M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$116Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $42.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$13.6B · 32%
- Buybacks$1.9B · 4%
- Retained (debt / cash)$26.8B · 63%
- Returned to owners$1.9B
6% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $1.9B as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $21.1B and cash and short-term investments rose $1.3B.
- Average price paid for buybacks$34.14
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 55M shares were bought for $1.9B, about $34.14 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $22.39 (2020) to $51.58 (2025); its heaviest year, 2021, paid $27.50 ($630M).
- Net change in share count194.2%
The diluted count rose from 345M to 1015M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained15%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($21.4B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $3.2B, so each retained $1 added about 0.15 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$10.2B24% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity95%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$4.9Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $13.6B of capital spent building
$3.1B written down across 3 years (2016, 2019, 2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 64% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why MPLX LP Common is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?194.2%
Diluted shares grew 194.2% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $1.9B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$4.9B → $26.0B
Debt rose from $4.9B to $26.0B while owner earnings went from about $1.4B to $4.6B — about 3.4 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 5.6 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Pipelines & Midstream
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PAAPlains All American Pipeline L.P. Common | $44.3B | 10% | 2.9% | — | 5% |
| PAGPPlains GP Holdings L.P. Class A | $44.3B | 10% | 2.9% | — | 5% |
| DINOHF Sinclair | $26.9B | 19% | 3.8% | 7% | 3% |
| MPLXMPLX LP Common | $9.7B | — | 40.3% | 18% | 47% |
| GELGenesis Energy | $1.6B | — | 10.9% | — | 3% |
| DKLDelek Logistics Partners L.P. Common | $1.0B | 25% | 20.9% | — | 17% |
| Group median | — | — | 7.3% | — | 5% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what MPLX LP Common has delivered.
$
Through the cycle, MPLX LP Common earns about $4.6B on its 47.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 46.9% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+2%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+33%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+18%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow $3.9B on 1015M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $24.5B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($2.1B) runs well above depreciation ($1.4B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $4.7B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "MPLX LP Common (MPLX), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/MPLX, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← MPC its page in the Manual MPT →
Industry order: ← KNTK the Pipelines & Midstream chapter NGG →