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PBF, PBF Energy

Refining & Marketing capital-intensive Cyclical

PBF Energy is an independent oil refiner. It buys crude oil, runs it through its refineries, and sells the refined fuels — gasoline, diesel and the like — to wholesale buyers and fuel distributors, with a single large customer accounting for a meaningful share of sales. Its profit is the spread between what it pays for the crude going in and what the finished products fetch going out.

We sell our products throughout the Northeast, Midwest, Gulf Coast and West Coast of the United States, as well as in other regions of the United States, Canada and Mexico and are able to ship products to other international destinations.

Our six oil refineries are all engaged in the refining of crude oil and other feedstocks into petroleum products, and represent the Refining segment.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

PBF · PBF Energy

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$29.3B

−11.4% YoY · 14% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $30.2B 5-yr avg $35.0B

Operating margin 2.5% 5-yr avg 3.3%

ROIC 8% 5-yr avg 24%

Owner-earnings margin −0% 5-yr avg 2%

Free cash flow margin −2% 5-yr avg 2%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: The first question is whether this is a franchise or a commodity, and a refiner sits near the commodity end: it sets neither the price of the crude it buys nor the price of the fuel it sells, so the outcome rides on the refining margin between the two — the crack spread — over which it has no say. With no pricing power to lean on, the tests that matter are the cost position and reliable uptime: whether the plants run cheaply and keep running, since any edge would have to show up in the margin rather than in the price. The bad case is plain — a thin or inverted spread while a unit is down (the Martinez refinery fire is the filing's own reminder of that hazard), against heavy fixed costs and debt that must be served whatever the spread does, plus a reliance on one large buyer and the capital the refineries demand each year. See the record below for the margins, the returns on capital, and the leverage.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 9%). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$15.9B	$21.8B	$27.2B	$24.5B	$15.1B	$27.3B	$46.8B	$38.3B	$33.1B	$29.3B	$30.2B	RevenueRevenue
4%	4%	2%	4%	—	3%	10%	—	−1%	—	—	Gross marginGross mgn
1%	1%	1%	1%	2%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$499M	$732M	$358M	$649M	($1.4B)	$597M	$4.2B	$3.0B	($699M)	($54M)	$757M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
3.1%	3.4%	1.3%	2.6%	−9.4%	2.2%	8.9%	7.7%	−2.1%	−0.2%	2.5%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$171M	$416M	$128M	$319M	($1.4B)	$231M	$2.9B	$2.1B	($534M)	($159M)	$442M	Net incomeNet inc.
45%	43%	21%	25%	—	5%	17%	25%	—	—	22%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$652M	$686M	$838M	$934M	($632M)	$477M	$4.8B	$1.3B	$43M	($78M)	$260M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$144M	$208M	$208M	$258M	$326M	$221M	$262M	$314M	$358M	$372M	$360M	DepreciationDeprec.
$314M	$36M	$476M	$319M	$401M	($10M)	$1.6B	($1.2B)	$175M	($330M)	($578M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$299M	$307M	$318M	$405M	$196M	$249M	$633M	$660M	$391M	$705M	$944M	CapexCapex
1.9%	1.4%	1.2%	1.7%	1.3%	0.9%	1.4%	1.7%	1.2%	2.4%	3.1%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$508M	$478M	$630M	$675M	($828M)	$228M	$4.5B	$1.0B	($348M)	($450M)	($100M)	Owner earningsOwner earn.
3.2%	2.2%	2.3%	2.8%	−5.5%	0.8%	9.6%	2.7%	−1.0%	−1.5%	−0.3%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$353M	$379M	$521M	$529M	($828M)	$228M	$4.1B	$679M	($348M)	($783M)	($684M)	Free cash flowFCF
2.2%	1.7%	1.9%	2.2%	−5.5%	0.8%	8.8%	1.8%	−1.0%	−2.7%	−2.3%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	—	—	$0	$1.2B	$0	$0	—	—	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$117M	$132M	$139M	$144M	—	—	—	—	—	—	$144M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$743K	$1M	$8M	$5M	$2M	$0	$156M	$533M	$329M	$0	—	BuybacksBuybacks
8%	11%	7%	11%	-24%	12%	83%	37%	-9%	-1%	8%	ROICROIC
8%	18%	5%	11%	-85%	12%	58%	33%	-10%	-3%	8%	Return on equityROE
3%	12%	−0%	6%	—	—	—	—	—	—	5%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$786M	$573M	$597M	$815M	$1.6B	$1.3B	$2.2B	$1.8B	$536M	$528M	$542M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$1.9B	$2.2B	$1.9B	$2.1B	$1.7B	$2.5B	$2.8B	$3.2B	$2.6B	$2.6B	$3.1B	InventoryInvent.
$536M	$579M	$488M	$601M	$407M	$912M	$855M	$959M	$736M	$801M	$862M	Accounts payablePayables
$1.3B	$1.6B	$1.4B	$1.5B	$1.3B	$1.6B	$1.9B	$2.2B	$1.9B	$1.8B	$2.2B	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$3.4B	$3.8B	$3.2B	$3.8B	$3.9B	$5.2B	$6.5B	$6.6B	$4.5B	$4.5B	$5.8B	Current assetsCur. assets
$2.1B	$2.4B	$2.1B	$2.5B	$2.5B	$3.8B	$5.2B	$4.2B	$3.6B	$3.7B	$4.4B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.7×	1.6×	1.5×	1.5×	1.6×	1.4×	1.3×	1.6×	1.3×	1.2×	1.3×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$7.6B	$8.1B	$8.0B	$9.1B	$10.5B	$11.6B	$13.5B	$14.4B	$12.7B	$13.0B	$14.7B	Total assetsAssets
$2.1B	$2.2B	$1.9B	$2.1B	$4.7B	$4.3B	$1.4B	$1.2B	$1.5B	$2.1B	$2.8B	Total debtDebt
$1.4B	$1.6B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$3.0B	$3.0B	($769M)	($538M)	$921M	$1.6B	$2.3B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
3.3×	4.7×	2.1×	4.1×	-5.5×	1.9×	16.9×	46.3×	-9.7×	-0.3×	4.0×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$2.0B	$2.3B	$2.7B	$3.0B	$1.6B	$1.9B	$4.9B	$6.5B	$5.5B	$5.3B	$5.5B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
104M	114M	119M	122M	121M	123M	127M	131M	117M	115M	121M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$153.66	$191.28	$228.89	$201.13	$125.28	$222.23	$369.15	$293.66	$282.77	$255.25	$250.21	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.65	$3.65	$1.08	$2.62	$-11.54	$1.88	$22.68	$16.40	$-4.56	$-1.38	$3.66	EPS (diluted)EPS
$4.90	$4.20	$5.31	$5.54	$-6.86	$1.86	$35.55	$7.85	$-2.97	$-3.91	$-0.83	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.41	$3.33	$4.38	$4.34	$-6.86	$1.86	$32.62	$5.20	$-2.97	$-6.82	$-5.67	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.13	$1.16	$1.17	$1.18	—	—	—	—	—	—	$1.19	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$2.88	$2.69	$2.67	$3.32	$1.63	$2.03	$4.99	$5.05	$3.34	$6.14	$7.83	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$19.55	$20.52	$22.53	$24.94	$13.62	$15.71	$38.86	$49.72	$47.34	$46.29	$45.78	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+5.8%/yr	+15.3%/yr
Dividends / share	+1.3%/yr (3-yr)	+1.3%/yr (3-yr)
Capital spending / share	+8.8%/yr	+30.4%/yr
Book value / share	+10.1%/yr	+27.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

115Mpeak FY2023

ROIC

−1%low FY2020

Gross margin

−1%low FY2024

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

-0.5×peak FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($450M)owner earningsvs.($159M)net incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2024

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned ($450M) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $372M it takes just to hold its position. It put $334M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($783M).

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($159M)	($534M)	$2.1B	$2.9B	$231M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$372M	+$358M	+$314M	+$262M	+$221M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$39M	+$44M	+$52M	+$54M	+$36M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$330M	+$175M	−$1.2B	+$1.6B	−$10M
Cash from operations	($78M)	$43M	$1.3B	$4.8B	$477M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$372M	−$391M	−$314M	−$262M	−$249M
Owner earnings	($450M)	($348M)	$1.0B	$4.5B	$228M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$334M	—	−$345M	−$371M	—
Free cash flow	($783M)	($348M)	$679M	$4.1B	$228M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	-2%	-1%	3%	10%	1%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $372M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $334M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $39M), owner earnings is nearer ($489M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -0.3×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($54M) ÷ interest expense $182M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.7B

Net debt against an operating loss

Cash $528M − debt $2.2B

What this means
Netting $528M of cash and short-term investments against $2.2B of debt leaves $1.7B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 8%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median, range -24%–83%; -1% latest = NOPAT ($43M) ÷ invested capital $7.0B

Industry peers: median 7%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 2%

Thin through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -5%–10%; latest ($450M) = operating cash ($78M) − maintenance capex $372M

Industry peers: median 2%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -2% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 10 years. It chose to put $334M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($783M) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $39M of SBC) leaves ($489M).
Are earnings backed by cash? ($78M)

Loss, and burning cash

Net income ($159M) · cash from operations ($78M)

In the filing’s words And the filing leans heavily on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings — steering you off the GAAP figure just where the cash is not backing it. Read the reconciliation in the notes before taking the adjusted number.

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

No surplus to allocate

What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
Investing or harvesting? 1.90×

Expanding

Capex $705M ÷ depreciation $372M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $29.3B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.21×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $2.2B vs $783M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 4 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +103%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4.12/share (latest year $-1.35), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $45.39/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 7 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 3% → 2% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The margin has held, but the filing names price competition — the pressure is present even where the margin has absorbed it so far.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 3% early to 2% lately, median 2% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 8%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
Worst year 2020 · −9.4% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +1.2%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$5.8B

Cash & short-term investments$542M
Inventory$3.1B
Other current assets$2.2B

Current liabilities$4.4B

Accounts payable$862M
Other current liabilities$3.6B

Current ratio1.31×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.62×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.12×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$1.4Bthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+11.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.4× → 1.3×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$5.5Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($3.2B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$3.6B$764M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $3.0B (annual-report basis)

Deferred revenue$55Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$0

'27$0

'28$902M

'29$0

'30$1.3B

Bars scaled to the largest single year.

Due in the next 12 months$0the first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$0the near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$1.3Bin 2030the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Due over the next five years$2.2Bthe near slice; the balance sheet carries $2.2B of debt in all

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases

'26$283M

'27$162M

'28$125M

'29$100M

'30$96M

later$533M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$283Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$1.3Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$765Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$2.2B

Lease obligations (present value)$765M

Total fixed claims on the business$3.0B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $3.0B, of which the leases are 26%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $9.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$4.2B · 46%
Dividends$532M · 6%
Buybacks$1.0B · 11%
Retained (debt / cash)$3.3B · 37%

Returned to owners$1.6B
24% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $532M as dividends and $1.0B as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $1.0B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count16.4%
The diluted count rose from 104M to 121M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$1.18/sh
Paid in 4 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 1% a year. It was never cut over the span.
Return on what it retained−18%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($2.6B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $463M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.18 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	$7.3M	$12.4M	$228M
2022	$13.1M	$38.0M	$4.5B
2023	$12.2M	$16.2M	$1.0B
2023	$12.2M	$13.9M	$1.0B
2024	$8.8M	$2.6M	($348M)
2025	$7.9M	$3.9M	($450M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership5.5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$39M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why PBF Energy is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?0.0% vs 2.6%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 2.6% early in the record and 0.0% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?16.4%
Diluted shares grew 16.4% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $1.0B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$2.1B → $2.8B
Debt rose from $2.1B to $2.8B while owner earnings went from about $539M to $76M — about 4.0 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 37 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean

Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Refining & Marketing

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
COPConocoPhillips	$51.8B	57%	29.3%	13%	14%
PBFPBF Energy	$29.3B	4%	2.4%	9%	2%
SUNSunoco LP Common	$25.2B	8%	2.8%	—	2%
SUNCSunocoCorp LLC Common	$25.2B	9%	3.5%	—	2%
HESHess Corporation	$12.9B	—	2.9%	1%	-5%
DKDelek US Holdings	$10.7B	4%	1.9%	7%	2%
IEPIcahn Enterprises L.P.	$9.7B	—	-5.4%	2%	3%
CVICVR Energy Inc.	$7.2B	5%	2.5%	9%	3%
Group median	—	7%	2.6%	8%	2%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what PBF Energy has delivered.

PBF Energy’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, PBF Energy earns about $662M on its 2.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −1.5% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($662M) Net of stock comp (−$36M) Steady-state · maintenance capex (($112M))

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth, delivered—

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($684M) on 117M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $2.3B. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($944M) runs well above depreciation ($360M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ($112M), the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh PBF against another business →

The owners of PBF: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "PBF Energy (PBF), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PBF, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← PB its page in the Manual PBFS →

Industry order: ← MPC the Refining & Marketing chapter PSX →