Share count
144Mpeak FY2021
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MRVI, Maravai LifeSciences Holdings Inc.
Maravai LifeSciences Holdings Inc. is a life sciences company providing critical products and services to enable the development of drugs, therapeutics, vaccines, and diagnostics, and support research on human disease.
Our comprehensive product portfolio addresses the critical stages of biopharmaceutical development, offering: complex nucleic acids for therapeutic, vaccine, and diagnostic applications; custom enzymes for research and diagnostic use; and antibody-based solutions to detect impurities during the production of biopharmaceutical products.
We operate and report our business in two segments TriLink, formerly referred to as Nucleic Acid Production, and Cygnus, formerly referred to as Biologics Safety Testing.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$186M
−28.3% YoY · −8% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $205M 5-yr avg $483M
Revenue $66M +40.5% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin −3.3% yr-ago −104.9%
Net income ($6M) yr-ago ($53M)
Net margin −9.7% yr-ago −112.8%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is TriLink (64%) and Cygnus (36%).
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 53% and operating margin about 17% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −116% and 69% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 8.9% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on the pipeline against the patent cliff, and pricing. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −32%, above 15% in 1 of 4 years). By owner earnings: roughly 21% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →TriLink is 64% of revenue, with Cygnus the other meaningful segment at 36%.
Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
- TriLink64%$120M
- Cygnus36%$66M
By geographyNorth America61%Asia Pacific22%EMEA17%Latin and Central America1%
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2019–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||
| $143M | $284M | $799M | $883M | $289M | $259M | $186M | $205M | RevenueRevenue |
| 53% | 72% | 82% | 81% | 49% | 42% | 18% | 29% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 34% | 33% | 13% | 15% | 52% | 62% | 78% | 66% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 3% | 3% | 2% | 2% | 6% | 7% | 9% | 8% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $24M | $120M | $555M | $574M | ($32M) | ($236M) | ($215M) | ($168M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 16.8% | 42.2% | 69.4% | 65.0% | −11.0% | −90.9% | −115.9% | −82.2% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($4M) | $89M | $182M | $220M | ($119M) | ($145M) | ($131M) | ($105M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | 3% | 25% | 22% | — | — | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||
| $24M | $152M | $369M | $536M | $126M | $7M | ($58M) | ($40M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $4M | $6M | $6M | $8M | $13M | $21M | $24M | $23M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $23M | $33M | $170M | $290M | $198M | $82M | $19M | $16M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $17M | $25M | $15M | $17M | $66M | $30M | $13M | $13M | CapexCapex |
| 12.0% | 8.9% | 1.9% | 1.9% | 22.7% | 11.4% | 7.1% | 6.4% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $7M | $127M | $354M | $519M | $61M | ($22M) | ($71M) | ($53M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 4.9% | 44.6% | 44.3% | 58.8% | 21.0% | −8.6% | −38.1% | −25.7% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $7M | $127M | $354M | $519M | $61M | ($22M) | ($71M) | ($53M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| 4.9% | 44.6% | 44.3% | 58.8% | 21.0% | −8.6% | −38.1% | −25.7% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | $0 | $239M | $70M | $0 | $19M | $362K | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $0 | $34M | $0 | $0 | — | — | — | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | 30% | — | — | -4% | -62% | -59% | -46% | ROICROIC |
| -3% | 101% | 58% | 40% | -29% | -45% | -62% | -49% | Return on equityROE |
| −3% | 101% | 58% | 40% | −29% | −45% | −62% | −49% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||
| $25M | $236M | $551M | $632M | $575M | $322M | $217M | $166M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $51M | $118M | $139M | $55M | $39M | $25M | $33M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $33M | $52M | $43M | $51M | $50M | $40M | $40M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $8M | $8M | $6M | — | $12M | $3M | $9M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $76M | $161M | $176M | $106M | $77M | $63M | $65M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $332M | $740M | $848M | $700M | $429M | $296M | $252M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $131M | $94M | $110M | $87M | $57M | $45M | $43M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 2.5× | 7.9× | 7.7× | 8.0× | 7.5× | 6.6× | 5.9× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $224M | $153M | $284M | $326M | $160M | $129M | $129M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $1.3B | $1.9B | $2.3B | $1.5B | $1.0B | $771M | $713M | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $535M | $531M | $527M | $524M | $296M | $292M | $241M | Total debtDebt |
| — | $298M | ($21M) | ($105M) | ($51M) | ($26M) | $75M | $75M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 0.8× | 3.9× | 18.3× | 28.1× | -0.7× | -4.9× | -8.0× | -6.5× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $145M | $89M | $315M | $545M | $417M | $325M | $212M | $212M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 1.2% | 8.7% | 1.3% | 2.1% | 12.0% | 19.1% | 16.2% | 13.0% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| — | — | — | — | — | $166M | $43M | $30M | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | ||||||||
| 254M | 28.9M | 258M | 255M | 132M | 138M | 144M | 146M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $0.56 | $9.83 | $3.10 | $3.46 | $2.19 | $1.88 | $1.29 | $1.40 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.02 | $3.08 | $0.71 | $0.86 | $-0.90 | $-1.05 | $-0.91 | $-0.71 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.03 | $4.39 | $1.37 | $2.03 | $0.46 | $-0.16 | $-0.49 | $-0.36 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.03 | $4.39 | $1.37 | $2.03 | $0.46 | $-0.16 | $-0.49 | $-0.36 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.07 | $0.88 | $0.06 | $0.07 | $0.50 | $0.22 | $0.09 | $0.09 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $0.57 | $3.06 | $1.22 | $2.14 | $3.16 | $2.36 | $1.47 | $1.44 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1/8.78 into 2020 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×8.92 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1/1.94 into 2023 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 6-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +14.7%/yr | −33.4%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +5.1%/yr | −36.5%/yr |
| Book value / share | +17.1%/yr | −13.6%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- TriLink-39.0%
“TriLink revenue decreased from $196.3 million for the year ended December 31, 2024 to $119.8 million for the year ended December 31, 2025, representing a decrease of $76.5 million, or 39.0%. The decrease in TriLink was primarily driven by the absence of $65.9 million of sales for high-volume CleanCap® for commercial phase vaccine programs received in 2024 that did not recur in 2025, and by lower demand for discovery products.”
✓ figure matches the filed record - Cygnus+5.0%
“Cygnus revenue increased from $62.8 million for the year ended December 31, 2024 to $66.0 million for the year ended December 31, 2025, representing an increase of $3.2 million, or 5.0%. The increase was primarily driven by strength in HCP kits and qualification services and increased demand for MockV viral clearance kits.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2019–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
−59%low FY2024
Gross margin
18%low FY2025
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
-0.8×peak FY2020
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
($71M)owner earningsvs.($131M)net incomelow FY2025
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2019FY2024
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $131M loss into ($71M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($131M) | ($145M) | ($119M) | $220M | $182M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$24M | +$21M | +$13M | +$8M | +$6M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$30M | +$49M | +$35M | +$19M | +$10M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$19M | +$82M | +$198M | +$290M | +$170M |
| Cash from operations | ($58M) | $7M | $126M | $536M | $369M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$13M | −$30M | −$66M | −$17M | −$15M |
| Owner earnings | ($71M) | ($22M) | $61M | $519M | $354M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -38% | -9% | 21% | 59% | 44% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $30M), owner earnings is nearer ($101M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Material weakness in financial controls
“During the year ended December 31, 2025, under the oversight of the Audit Committee of our Board of Directors, we completed the implementation of our remediation plan and enhanced the design and operation of controls to address the previously identified…”
Restated past financials
“Risks Related to Being a Public Company Risks and uncertainty related to the restatement of our previously issued quarterly financial statements.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -8.0×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($215M) ÷ interest expense $27M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $217M − debt $292M
What this means
Netting $217M of cash and short-term investments against $292M of debt leaves $75M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 50 + DIO 97 − DPO 7 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle4-yr median, range -62%–30%; -59% latest = NOPAT ($170M) ÷ invested capital $287MIndustry peers: median -66%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 4 years (it ran -59% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle7-yr median margin, range -38%–59%; latest ($71M) = operating cash ($58M) − maintenance capex $13MIndustry peers: median -254%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -38% of revenue this year, a 21% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $30M of SBC) leaves ($101M).
- Are earnings backed by cash? ($58M)Loss, and burning cashNet income ($131M) · cash from operations ($58M)
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.56×HarvestingCapex $13M ÷ depreciation $24M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $186M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 6.60×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt NearDebt ≤ working capital · $292M vs $251M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (7-yr record) · 4 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −248%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.90/share (latest year $-0.89), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.45/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2019–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 3 of 7
What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 6 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 43% → −73% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 43% early to −73% lately, median 17% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2025 · −115.9% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −9.0%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“Our use of Artificial Intelligence technologies, including Machine Learning, and the integration of AI technologies within our custom products offerings and marketing campaigns, may not be successful and may present business, compliance, and reputational challenges, which could lead to operational or reputational damag…”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$252M
- Cash & short-term investments$166M
- Receivables$33M
- Inventory$40M
- Other current assets$12M
Current liabilities$43M
- Debt due within a year$5M
- Accounts payable$9M
- Other current liabilities$29M
Current ratio5.91×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio4.96×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio3.89×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$209Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$5M due · $166M cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Cash runway3.2 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+40.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters9.9× → 5.9×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($63M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($92M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$283M$42M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$2Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2019–2025
Over the record, the business generated $1.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$183M · 16%
- Buybacks$34M · 3%
- Retained (debt / cash)$940M · 81%
- Returned to owners$34M
3% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $34M as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $34M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−42.3%
The diluted count fell from 254M to 146M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained−296%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($58M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $173M, so each retained $1 gave back about 2.96 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 7-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$281M36% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity61%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$328Mover 7 years buying other businesses, against $183M of capital spent building
$209M written down across 2 years (2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 64% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 7-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership2.5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio93:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$30M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 16% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Maravai LifeSciences Holdings Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.
1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−8.5% vs 31.2%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 31.2% early in the record and −8.5% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
And these came back clean
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Pharmaceuticals
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AMRNAmarin Corporation plc | $214M | 77% | -24.3% | -15% | -18% |
| RYTMRhythm Pharmaceuticals Inc. | $190M | 90% | -238.1% | -67% | -176% |
| MRVIMaravai LifeSciences Holdings Inc. | $186M | 53% | 16.8% | -32% | 21% |
| STOKStoke Therapeutics Inc. | $184M | — | -559.3% | -79% | -254% |
| CYRXCryoPort Inc. | $176M | 46% | -44.0% | -14% | -17% |
| PHATPhathom Pharmaceuticals Inc. | $175M | 86% | -502.2% | — | -483% |
| SNDXSyndax Pharmaceuticals Inc. | $172M | — | -3263.2% | -64% | -2251% |
| LQDALiquidia Corporation | $158M | 76% | -419.6% | -163% | -266% |
| Group median | — | 77% | -328.9% | -64% | -215% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFMaravai LifeSciences Holdings Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
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The assumptions
Revenue, delivered−17%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
Owner earnings it must reach—
Margin the price demands—
Owner-earnings margin today−26%
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Maravai LifeSciences Holdings Inc. (MRVI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/MRVI, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← MRTN its page in the Manual MRVL →
Industry order: ← MRK the Pharmaceuticals chapter NAMS →