Owner Scorecard


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MTC, MMTec Inc.

Software asset-light Unprofitable

We provide comprehensive, Internet-based technology services and solutions to the Chinese language speaking hedge funds, mutual funds, registered investment advisors, proprietary trading groups, and brokerage firms engaging in securities market transactions and settlements globally.

We help these financial institutions to accelerate their integration into the overseas market by offering complete suite trading solutions, including services such as fund establishment, issuance, custody, transaction and settlement.

We assist PRC-based financial institutions in taking part in the overseas securities trading markets by providing them with comprehensive Internet-based securities solutions.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F
MTC · MMTec Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$808K
−56.8% YoY · 2% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM
Cash & investments $8M
Cash burn · annual $4M
Runway 2.2 yrs

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No meaningful revenue yet; the record is the cash on hand against the burn.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −556% through the cycle on a 75% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −47%, above 15% in 0 of 7 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2018–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
$27K$201K$742K$569K$1M$870K$2M$808K$808KRevenueRevenue
39%55%75%78%80%82%22%22%Gross marginGross mgn
($2M)($3M)($3M)($7M)($6M)($5M)($3M)($4M)($4M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
n/mn/m−429.1%n/m−550.8%−556.4%−163.8%−470.9%−470.9%Operating marginOp. mgn
($2M)($2M)($3M)($7M)($6M)$45M($91M)($56M)($56M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
($2M)($2M)($2M)($4M)($6M)($5M)$723K($4M)($4M)Operating cash flowOp. cash
$27K$26K$55K$40K$66K$46K$47K$84K$66KDepreciationDeprec.
$410K$78K$1M$3M($12K)($51M)$92M$52M$52MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$24K$130K$18K$37K$4K$970$5K$5KCapexCapex
88.8%64.6%2.5%6.5%0.4%0.1%0.3%0.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($2M)($2M)($2M)($4M)($6M)($5M)$718K($4M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
n/mn/m−269.7%−726.9%−521.2%−592.3%38.4%−458.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($2M)($2M)($2M)($4M)($6M)($5M)$718K($4M)Free cash flowFCF
n/mn/m−269.7%−726.9%−521.2%−592.3%38.4%−458.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
-209%-198%-38%-78%-3%-10%-47%-45%ROICROIC
-47%-118%-53%-60%38%-343%-386%-386%Return on equityROE
−47%−118%−53%−60%38%−343%−386%−386%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$94K$4M$1M$4M$2M$3M$8M$8MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$16K$46K$195K$200K$92K$92KReceivablesReceiv.
$16K$46K$195K$200K$92K$92KOperating working capitalOper. WC
$330K$4M$2M$14M$9M$3M$3M$8M$8MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$807K$805K$658K$1M$1M$5M$7M$669K$669KCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.4×5.4×3.4×12.3×7.7×0.6×0.4×12.5×12.5×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$108M$108M$108M$108MGoodwillGoodwill
$194K$6M$4M$15M$11M$157M$66M$18M$18MTotal assetsAssets
$356K$406K$406KTotal debtDebt
$356K($3M)($8M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-193961.7×-1.3×-0.4×Interest coverageInt. cov.
($444K)$5M$3M$13M$9M$119M$27M$15M$15MShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
39.6M20.0M2.0M2.5M437K13.2M25.0M53.6M99.6MShares out (diluted)Shares
$0.00$0.01$0.36$0.23$2.46$0.07$0.07$0.02$0.01Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.06$-0.11$-1.56$-2.88$-12.91$3.44$-3.65$-1.05$-0.56EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.05$-0.11$-0.98$-1.69$-12.80$-0.39$0.03$-0.04Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.05$-0.11$-0.98$-1.69$-12.80$-0.39$0.03$-0.04Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$0.01$0.01$0.02$0.01$0.00$0.00$0.00Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-0.01$0.24$1.32$5.45$21.47$8.99$1.06$0.27$0.15Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×1/1.98 into 2019 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1/9.82 into 2020 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1/5.61 into 2022 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×30.25 into 2023 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.89 into 2024 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×2.14 into 2025 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.86 into TTM — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
7-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+55.7%/yr−47.1%/yr
Capital spending / share−16.7%/yr (6-yr)−50.1%/yr
Book value / share−27.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
54Mpeak FY2017
ROIC
−47%low FY2017
Gross margin
22%low FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$718Kowner earningsvs.($91M)net incomelow FY2022

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2024 the business turned a $91M loss into $718K of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021FY2020
Reported net income($91M)$45M($6M)($7M)($3M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$47K+$46K+$66K+$40K+$55K
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$92M−$51M−$12K+$3M+$1M
Cash from operations$723K($5M)($6M)($4M)($2M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$5K−$970−$4K−$37K−$18K
Owner earnings$718K($5M)($6M)($4M)($2M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue38%-592%-521%-727%-270%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • No meaningful interest burden
    Little or no interest expense reported
    What this means

    Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.

  • Net cash
    Cash $8M − debt $406K
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $8M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    8-yr median, range -835%–-3%; -45% latest = NOPAT ($3M) ÷ invested capital $7M
    Industry peers: median -124%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran -45% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Consumes cash through the cycle
    7-yr median margin, range -7199%–38%; latest ($4M) = operating cash ($4M) − maintenance capex $5K
    Industry peers: median -500%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -458% of revenue this year, a -592% median across 7 years.

  • Loss, and burning cash
    Net income ($56M) · cash from operations ($4M)
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.08×
    Harvesting
    Capex $5K ÷ depreciation $66K
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $808K
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 12.50×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $406K vs $8M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (9-yr record) · 8 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.34/share (latest year $-0.56), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.15/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2018–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 1 of 8
    What this means

    Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Operating margin −3517% → −397% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −3517% early to −397% lately, median −556% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2018 · −8658.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2018, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +4.4%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

Despite the structural exposure, the filing positions AI as something it uses, not a threat to its product.

“Ltd., ("Xchain"), a Singapore company, for the purpose of providing technical support for the construction and development of a new solutions for the existing problems of the traditional financial industry, the difficulty experienced by investors in investing and allocating inves…”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$8M
  • Cash & short-term investments$8M
  • Receivables$92K
Current liabilities$669K
  • Debt due within a year$406K
  • Other current liabilities$264K
Current ratio12.50×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio12.50×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio12.23×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$8Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$406K due · $8M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Dec 31, 2025 balance sheet
Cash runway2.2 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($94M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$4MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$696K$291K of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill$108M588% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$0over 9 years buying other businesses, against $225K of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
GEGGLGreat Elm Group, Inc.$16M93%-46.5%-12%-3%
NXTTNext Technology Holding Inc.$12M59%-24.0%-1%-29%
PDYNPalladyne AI Corp.$5M30%-916.4%-333%-500%
DJTTrump Media & Technology Group Corp.$4M55%-3360.9%-18%-943%
ODYSOdysight.ai Inc.$3M29%-593.1%-442%-584%
PHUNPhunware Inc.$3M51%-175.0%-124%-161%
MTCMMTec Inc.$808K75%-553.6%-63%-592%
MOVECorvex Inc.$433K-3580.4%-243%-2604%
Group median55%-573.4%-93%-542%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. MMTec Inc. reports in USD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.

MMTec Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

$
The assumptions

Revenue, delivered11%/yr’20→’25

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach
Margin the price demands
Owner-earnings margin today−458%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "MMTec Inc. (MTC), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/MTC, data as of 2026-07-09.

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