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MTRX, Matrix Service Company

Construction & Engineering capital-intensive Unprofitable

We provide engineering, fabrication, construction, and maintenance services to support critical energy infrastructure and industrial markets.

We began operations in 1984 as an Oklahoma corporation under the name of Matrix Service.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

MTRX · Matrix Service Company

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$769M

+5.6% YoY · −7% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $845M 5-yr avg $735M

Gross margin 6% 5-yr avg 4%

Operating margin −2.6% 5-yr avg −6.9%

Owner-earnings margin 6% 5-yr avg 3%

Free cash flow margin 6% 5-yr avg 3%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Storage and Terminal Solutions (48%), Utility and Power Infrastructure (32%) and Process and Industrial Facilities (20%).
Situation: Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −4.1% through the cycle on a 5.6% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −14%, above 15% in 0 of 9 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

The largest slice of sales is Storage and Terminal Solutions at 48%, but the profit engine is Utility and Power Infrastructure: 32% of revenue and 89% of the profitable segments' operating profit. Storage and Terminal Solutions ran a $9M operating loss; Corporate ran a $30M operating loss.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

Operating profit profitable segments only

Storage and Terminal Solutions48%$366Mloss of $9M
Utility and Power Infrastructure32%$249M89% of profit
Process and Industrial Facilities20%$155M11% of profit
Corporate0%$0loss of $30M

By geographyUnited States94%Canada5%Other international1%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of the profitable segments' operating profit (a loss-making segment carries its loss in dollars in the legend, not a share of the bar), before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.1B	$1.4B	$1.1B	$673M	$708M	$795M	$728M	$769M	$845M	RevenueRevenue
10%	7%	8%	9%	9%	5%	−0%	4%	6%	5%	6%	Gross marginGross mgn
6%	6%	8%	7%	8%	10%	10%	9%	10%	9%	8%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$41M	$5M	($10M)	$38M	($37M)	($44M)	($88M)	($53M)	($30M)	($35M)	($22M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
3.1%	0.4%	−1.0%	2.7%	−3.3%	−6.5%	−12.4%	−6.7%	−4.1%	−4.6%	−2.6%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$29M	($183K)	($11M)	$28M	($33M)	($31M)	($64M)	($52M)	($25M)	($29M)	($15M)	Net incomeNet inc.
											Cash flow & returns
$34M	($19M)	$75M	$41M	$44M	($3M)	($54M)	$10M	$73M	$117M	$56M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$21M	$22M	$20M	$18M	$19M	$18M	$15M	$14M	$11M	$10M	$9M	DepreciationDeprec.
($23M)	($48M)	$57M	($17M)	$48M	$2M	($13M)	$42M	$79M	$128M	$55M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$14M	$12M	$9M	$20M	$19M	$4M	$3M	$9M	$7M	$8M	$6M	CapexCapex
1.1%	1.0%	0.8%	1.4%	1.7%	0.6%	0.5%	1.1%	1.0%	1.0%	0.8%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$20M	($31M)	$66M	$22M	$26M	($7M)	($58M)	$1M	$66M	$110M	$50M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
1.5%	−2.6%	6.0%	1.5%	2.3%	−1.1%	−8.1%	0.2%	9.0%	14.3%	5.9%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$20M	($31M)	$66M	$22M	$26M	($7M)	($58M)	$1M	$66M	$110M	$50M	Free cash flowFCF
1.5%	−2.6%	6.0%	1.5%	2.3%	−1.1%	−8.1%	0.2%	9.0%	14.3%	5.9%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$13M	$41M	$2M	$0	$0	—	—	—	—	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$10M	$0	$0	$5M	$17M	$0	$0	—	—	—	—	BuybacksBuybacks
11%	1%	-3%	11%	-14%	-17%	-40%	-33%	-49%	—	—	ROICROIC
9%	-0%	-4%	8%	-11%	-11%	-28%	-29%	-15%	-21%	-11%	Return on equityROE
9%	−0%	−4%	8%	−11%	−11%	−28%	−29%	−15%	−21%	−11%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$72M	$44M	$64M	$90M	$100M	$84M	$52M	$55M	$116M	$225M	$233M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$190M	$211M	$203M	$218M	$161M	$148M	$154M	$146M	$139M	$155M	$139M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$4M	$4M	$5M	$8M	$6M	$7M	$10M	$7M	$9M	$6M	$6M	InventoryInvent.
$141M	$106M	$79M	$115M	$73M	$61M	$75M	$76M	$66M	$80M	$90M	Accounts payablePayables
$53M	$109M	$129M	$112M	$94M	$94M	$89M	$77M	$82M	$80M	$55M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$375M	$359M	$357M	$417M	$335M	$291M	$287M	$262M	$302M	$420M	$412M	Current assetsCur. assets
$246M	$219M	$238M	$275M	$176M	$153M	$178M	$188M	$265M	$436M	$460M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.5×	1.6×	1.5×	1.5×	1.9×	1.9×	1.6×	1.4×	1.1×	1.0×	0.9×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$78M	$114M	$96M	$93M	$60M	$61M	$42M	$29M	$29M	$29M	$29M	GoodwillGoodwill
$565M	$586M	$558M	$633M	$517M	$468M	$441M	$401M	$451M	$600M	$617M	Total assetsAssets
48.0×	2.2×	-4.0×	29.3×	-22.9×	-28.1×	-29.8×	-26.1×	-26.6×	-67.7×	-45.1×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$317M	$322M	$319M	$352M	$308M	$286M	$228M	$181M	$164M	$143M	$139M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.5%	0.6%	0.8%	0.8%	0.9%	1.2%	1.1%	0.9%	1.1%	1.2%	0.9%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
—	—	$17M	—	$33M	—	$18M	$12M	—	—	—	Goodwill written downGW imp.
											Per share
27.1M	26.5M	26.8M	27.6M	26.6M	26.5M	26.7M	27.0M	27.4M	27.8M	28.3M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$48.41	$45.13	$40.78	$51.35	$41.36	$25.46	$26.48	$29.46	$26.60	$27.70	$29.92	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.07	$-0.01	$-0.43	$1.01	$-1.24	$-1.18	$-2.39	$-1.94	$-0.91	$-1.06	$-0.53	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.73	$-1.16	$2.46	$0.79	$0.96	$-0.28	$-2.15	$0.05	$2.40	$3.95	$1.77	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.73	$-1.16	$2.46	$0.79	$0.96	$-0.28	$-2.15	$0.05	$2.40	$3.95	$1.77	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.51	$0.45	$0.33	$0.71	$0.70	$0.16	$0.13	$0.33	$0.26	$0.28	$0.23	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$11.69	$12.13	$11.91	$12.76	$11.57	$10.80	$8.52	$6.72	$6.00	$5.14	$4.93	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−6.0%/yr	−7.7%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+20.7%/yr	+32.7%/yr
Capital spending / share	−6.7%/yr	−16.9%/yr
Book value / share	−8.7%/yr	−15.0%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Process and Industrial Facilities-41.9%
“Process and Industrial Facilities revenues decreased by $111.6 million, or 42%, in fiscal 2025 compared to fiscal 2024. The decrease is primarily attributable to lower revenue volumes for a now completed large renewable diesel project and lower revenue volumes for thermal vacuum chambers.”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

28Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

−49%low FY2024

Gross margin

5%low FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$110Mowner earningsvs.($29M)net incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $29M loss into $110M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($29M)	($25M)	($52M)	($64M)	($31M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$10M	+$11M	+$14M	+$15M	+$18M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$9M	+$8M	+$7M	+$8M	+$8M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$128M	+$79M	+$42M	−$13M	+$2M
Cash from operations	$117M	$73M	$10M	($54M)	($3M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$8M	−$7M	−$9M	−$3M	−$4M
Owner earnings	$110M	$66M	$1M	($58M)	($7M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	14%	9%	0%	-8%	-1%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $9M), owner earnings is nearer $101M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -67.7×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($35M) ÷ interest expense $518K

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$225M

Net cash, debt-free

Cash $225M − debt $0

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $225M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 36d

Tight

DSO 74 + DIO 3 − DPO 40 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital —

Not enough data

Industry peers: median 11%

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Owner-earnings margin 14%

Solid, recently turned positive

latest $110M = operating cash $117M − maintenance capex $8M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 1%)

Industry peers: median 6%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 14% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $9M of SBC) leaves $101M.
Are earnings backed by cash? $117M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($29M) · cash from operations $117M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 0%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $110M

What this means
Of $110M Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.77×

Harvesting

Capex $8M ÷ depreciation $10M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $769M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.96×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 8 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −721%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.27/share (latest year $-1.05), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $5.07/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 2 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 8 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Operating margin 1% → −5% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 1% early to −5% lately, median −4% — competition or costs are biting in.
Worst year 2022 · −12.4% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +0.3%/yr

What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Additionally, we may use artificial intelligence in our business, and challenges with effectively managing associated processes, data, and models could result in reputational harm, competitive harm, and legal liability, and adversely affect our results of operations.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$412M

Cash & short-term investments$233M
Receivables$139M
Inventory$6M
Other current assets$34M

Current liabilities$460M

Accounts payable$90M
Other current liabilities$370M

Current ratio0.90×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.88×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.51×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($48M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+3.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.1× → 0.9×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$110Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($65M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$28M$19M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$341Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $318M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.

Reinvested$104M · 33%
Buybacks$33M · 10%
Retained (debt / cash)$181M · 57%

Returned to owners$33M
15% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $33M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $161M.
Average price paid for buybacks$16.24
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 2M shares were bought for $33M, about $16.24 each.
Net change in share count4.3%
The diluted count rose from 27M to 28M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$30M5% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity20%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$56Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $104M of capital spent building

$81M written down across 4 years (2018, 2020, 2022, 2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2022	Mr. Hewitt	$3.5M	$279k	($58M)
2023	Mr. Hewitt	$2.4M	$2.0M	$1M
2024	Mr. Hewitt	$4.1M	$6.0M	$66M
2025	Mr. Hewitt	$3.1M	$5.5M	$110M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership4.4%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio28:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$9M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Matrix Service Company is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?4.3%
Diluted shares grew 4.3% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $33M on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$147M · 17% of revenue on the largest customer (TTM)
“One customer accounted for $133.9 million or 17.4% of our consolidated revenue in fiscal 2025, which was primarily included in the Utilities and Power Infrastructure segment.”verify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Construction & Engineering

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
BLDTopBuild	$5.4B	28%	13.4%	12%	9%
IESCIES Holdings Inc.	$3.4B	19%	4.0%	17%	3%
LGNLegence Corp.	$2.6B	21%	2.4%	—	1%
AMRCAmeresco Inc.	$1.8B	19%	6.1%	8%	-10%
AGXArgan Inc.	$945M	17%	8.9%	29%	19%
MTRXMatrix Service Company	$769M	6%	-3.7%	-14%	2%
LMBLimbach Holdings Inc.	$647M	18%	2.9%	10%	6%
BBCPConcrete Pumping Holdings Inc.	$356M	37%	12.6%	6%	11%
Group median	—	19%	5.1%	10%	4%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Matrix Service Company has delivered.

Matrix Service Company’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Matrix Service Company earns about $12M on its 1.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 14.3% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($12M) Net of stock comp (−$8M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2023+842%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $50M on 28M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-06; net cash $224M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh MTRX against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Matrix Service Company (MTRX), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/MTRX, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← MTRN its page in the Manual MTSI →

Industry order: ← MG the Construction & Engineering chapter MTZ →