← All companies ← LGIH Manual LGND → ← KBR Construction & Engineering LMB →
LGN, Legence Corp.
We are a leading provider of engineering, installation and maintenance services for mission-critical systems in buildings.
We focus on high-growth sectors that have technically demanding buildings, including technology, life sciences, healthcare and education.
Legence Corp. is growing rapidly as data centers, manufacturers, pharmaceutical companies, hospitals, schools and universities make investments in both new and existing facilities to support growing demand for their products and services, reduce energy costs and increase resiliency.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 21% and operating margin about 2.4% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from 0.6% to 3.4% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2023–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||
| $1.6B | $2.1B | $2.6B | $3.1B | RevenueRevenue |
| 20% | 21% | 21% | 20% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 12% | 12% | 13% | 13% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $10M | $70M | $62M | $67M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 0.6% | 3.4% | 2.4% | 2.2% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($46M) | ($29M) | ($60M) | ($22M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||
| $34M | $29M | $257M | $348M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $80M | $97M | $100M | $111M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($10M) | ($45M) | $149M | $150M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $17M | $19M | $38M | $50M | CapexCapex |
| 1.1% | 0.9% | 1.5% | 1.6% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $17M | $10M | $219M | $297M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 1.0% | 0.5% | 8.6% | 9.6% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $17M | $10M | $219M | $297M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 1.0% | 0.5% | 8.6% | 9.6% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $120M | $225M | $16M | $297M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | -15% | -4% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | −15% | −4% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||
| — | $81M | $230M | $245M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $449M | $584M | $827M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $10M | $11M | $14M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $127M | $246M | $350M | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | $332M | $349M | $491M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $756M | $1.1B | $1.5B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $411M | $708M | $1.1B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.8× | 1.6× | 1.3× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $676M | $781M | $764M | $842M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $2.4B | $2.7B | $3.5B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $1.6B | $836M | $1.0B | Total debtDebt |
| — | $1.5B | $606M | $790M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 0.2× | 0.8× | 0.6× | 0.8× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| — | — | $392M | $505M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.6% | 0.3% | 2.6% | 3.5% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| $5M | $18M | $25M | $25M | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
The record, charted
FY2023–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $60M loss into $219M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($60M) | ($29M) | ($46M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$100M | +$97M | +$80M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$68M | +$5M | +$10M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$149M | −$45M | −$10M |
| Cash from operations | $257M | $29M | $34M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$38M | −$19M | −$17M |
| Owner earnings | $219M | $10M | $17M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 9% | 0% | 1% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $68M), owner earnings is nearer $151M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
“As discussed in more detail in Part II, Item 9A, "Controls and Procedures" below, we and our independent registered public accounting firm have identified material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- Does not cover its interestOperating income $62M ÷ interest expense $102M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $606M · 9.8× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $230M − debt $836M
What this means
Netting $230M of cash and short-term investments against $836M of debt leaves $606M owed, about 9.8× a year's operating profit (13.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 84 + DIO 2 − DPO 45 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 10%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Thin through the cycle3-yr median margin, range 0%–9%; latest $219M = operating cash $257M − maintenance capex $38MIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 9% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 3 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $68M of SBC) leaves $151M.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($60M) · cash from operations $257M
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.38×HarvestingCapex $38M ÷ depreciation $100M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 3 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $2.6B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.57×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $836M vs $402M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.67/share (latest year $-0.89), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $5.84/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.
“Includes facilities housing servers, networking equipment, systems critical for storing and managing data, operational facilities for internet service providers, software companies, information technologies ("IT") development hubs, AI (as defined below) development facilities and…”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$245M
- Receivables$827M
- Inventory$14M
- Other current assets$384M
- Accounts payable$350M
- Other current liabilities$783M
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 3-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$48M written down across 3 years (2023, 2024, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 3-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$68M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue, equal to 110% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Peers, Construction & Engineering
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BLDTopBuild | $5.4B | 28% | 13.4% | 12% | 9% |
| IESCIES Holdings Inc. | $3.4B | 19% | 4.0% | 17% | 3% |
| LGNLegence Corp. | $2.6B | 21% | 2.4% | — | 1% |
| AMRCAmeresco Inc. | $1.8B | 19% | 6.1% | 8% | -10% |
| AGXArgan Inc. | $945M | 17% | 8.9% | 29% | 19% |
| MTRXMatrix Service Company | $769M | 6% | -3.7% | -14% | 2% |
| LMBLimbach Holdings Inc. | $647M | 18% | 2.9% | 10% | 6% |
| BBCPConcrete Pumping Holdings Inc. | $356M | 37% | 12.6% | 6% | 11% |
| Group median | — | 19% | 5.1% | — | 4% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Legence Corp. has delivered.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $297M on 67M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $790M. The if-converted diluted count is 108M, 61% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($50M) runs well above depreciation ($111M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $310M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← LGIH its page in the Manual LGND →
Industry order: ← KBR the Construction & Engineering chapter LMB →