Owner Scorecard


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HP, Helmerich & Payne

Oilfield Services & Equipment capital-intensive UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundCyclical

We provide performance-driven drilling solutions and technologies that are intended to make hydrocarbon recovery safer and more economical for oil and gas exploration and production companies.

We are an important partner for a number of oil and gas exploration and production companies, but we focus primarily on the drilling segment of the oil and gas production value chain.

Our technology services focus on developing, promoting and commercializing technologies designed to improve the efficiency and accuracy of drilling operations, as well as wellbore quality and placement.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
HP · Helmerich & Payne
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$3.7B
+34.0% YoY · 16% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.9B 5-yr avg $2.5B
Operating margin −5.8% 5-yr avg 0.7%
ROIC −4% 5-yr avg 3%
Owner-earnings margin 7% 5-yr avg 6%
Free cash flow margin 7% 5-yr avg 6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 0.7% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −35% and 20% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 14% of sales, below what it charges for depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on the commodity price, and the cost to lift a barrel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −1%, above 15% in 0 of 6 years). By owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

33% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • United States67%$2.5B
  • Saudi Arabia7%$262M
  • Norway6%$220M
  • Oman5%$180M
  • Other foreign4%$163M
  • Argentina4%$156M
  • Other8%$284M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$1.8B$2.5B$2.8B$1.8B$1.2B$2.0B$2.9B$2.7B$3.7B$3.9BRevenueRevenue
8%8%7%10%14%9%7%9%8%7%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%1%1%1%2%1%1%1%1%1%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($169M)$33M$21M($620M)($429M)$45M$568M$457M$3M($227M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
−9.4%1.3%0.7%−35.2%−35.4%2.2%19.9%16.7%0.1%−5.8%Operating marginOp. mgn
($128M)$483M($34M)($494M)($326M)$7M$434M$344M($164M)($375M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
$371M$558M$856M$539M$136M$234M$834M$685M$543M$548MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$586M$584M$563M$482M$420M$403M$382M$397M$625M$731MDepreciationDeprec.
($112M)($540M)$292M$515M$15M($204M)($15M)($88M)$50M$156MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$398M$467M$458M$141M$82M$251M$395M$495M$426M$292MCapexCapex
22.2%18.9%16.5%8.0%6.8%12.2%13.8%18.0%11.6%7.5%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($26M)$91M$397M$398M$54M($17M)$438M$190M$117M$256MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−1.5%3.7%14.3%22.6%4.5%−0.8%15.3%6.9%3.2%6.6%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($26M)$91M$397M$398M$54M($17M)$438M$190M$117M$256MFree cash flowFCF
−1.5%3.7%14.3%22.6%4.5%−0.8%15.3%6.9%3.2%6.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$70M$48M$16M$0$0$0$0$1.8B$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$306M$308M$313M$260M$109M$107M$201M$168M$101M$101MDividends paidDiv. paid
-3%-15%-11%1%14%7%-4%ROICROIC
-3%11%-1%-15%-11%0%16%12%-6%-14%Return on equityROE
−10%4%−9%−23%−15%−4%8%6%−9%−18%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$566M$326M$401M$577M$1.1B$349M$351M$510M$218M$199MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$398M$531M$462M$150M$204M$431M$403M$419M$753M$811MReceivablesReceiv.
$137M$158M$150M$104M$84M$88M$94M$118M$324M$331MInventoryInvent.
$136M$133M$45M$36M$72M$127M$131M$135M$218M$177MAccounts payablePayables
$400M$556M$566M$218M$216M$392M$366M$401M$859M$964MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1.2B$1.1B$1.1B$963M$1.6B$1.0B$1.0B$1.2B$1.5B$1.5BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$344M$377M$410M$219M$866M$395M$419M$447M$815M$863MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.6×3.0×2.7×4.4×1.8×2.5×2.4×2.7×1.8×1.7×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$52M$65M$83M$46M$46M$46M$46M$46M$183M$184MGoodwillGoodwill
$6.4B$6.2B$5.8B$4.8B$5.0B$4.4B$4.4B$5.8B$6.7B$6.3BTotal assetsAssets
$493M$494M$479M$481M$1.0B$543M$545M$1.8B$2.1B$2.0BTotal debtDebt
($73M)$168M$78M($96M)($91M)$193M$194M$1.3B$1.8B$1.8BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-8.6×1.4×0.8×-25.3×-17.9×2.4×32.9×15.7×0.0×-2.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$4.2B$4.4B$4.0B$3.3B$2.9B$2.8B$2.8B$2.9B$2.8B$2.6BShareholders’ equityEquity
1.5%1.3%1.2%2.1%2.3%1.4%1.1%1.1%0.9%0.9%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$5M$38M$192M$192MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
109M109M109M108M108M107M103M99.1M99.3M99.7MShares out (diluted)Shares
$16.52$22.62$25.51$16.31$11.23$19.24$27.83$27.72$37.06$38.91Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-1.18$4.41$-0.31$-4.58$-3.03$0.07$4.22$3.47$-1.65$-3.77EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.24$0.83$3.64$3.69$0.50$-0.16$4.26$1.91$1.17$2.57Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.24$0.83$3.64$3.69$0.50$-0.16$4.26$1.91$1.17$2.57Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$2.82$2.82$2.87$2.41$1.01$1.01$1.96$1.70$1.01$1.01Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$3.66$4.27$4.20$1.30$0.76$2.35$3.84$5.00$4.29$2.92Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$38.38$40.07$36.74$30.72$27.01$25.95$26.95$29.45$28.50$26.38Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
8-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+10.6%/yr+17.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share−20.4%/yr
Dividends / share−12.0%/yr−15.9%/yr
Capital spending / share+2.0%/yr+26.9%/yr
Book value / share−3.7%/yr−1.5%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
99Mpeak FY2018
ROIC
7%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
15.8×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$117Mowner earningsvs.($164M)net incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $164M loss into $117M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($164M)$344M$434M$7M($326M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$625M+$397M+$382M+$403M+$420M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$32M+$31M+$32M+$28M+$28M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$50M−$88M−$15M−$204M+$15M
Cash from operations$543M$685M$834M$234M$136M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$426M−$495M−$395M−$251M−$82M
Owner earnings$117M$190M$438M($17M)$54M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue3%7%15%-1%4%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $32M), owner earnings is nearer $85M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income $3M ÷ interest expense $108M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.8B · 556.2× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $197M + ST investments $21M − debt $2.1B
    What this means

    Netting $218M of cash and short-term investments against $2.1B of debt leaves $1.8B owed, about 556.2× a year's operating profit (622.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    6-yr median, range -15%–14%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit
    Industry peers: median 0%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin, recently turned positive
    latest $117M = operating cash $543M − maintenance capex $426M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (9-yr median 4%)
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 3% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $32M of SBC) leaves $85M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($164M) · cash from operations $543M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $160M ÷ Owner Earnings $117M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $117M of Owner Earnings, $160M (138%) went back to shareholders, $101M dividends, $60M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $32M stock comp, the real buyback was about $28M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.68×
    Harvesting
    Capex $426M ÷ depreciation $625M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.7B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.80×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $2.1B vs $651M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (9-yr record) · 5 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (9)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +92%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.05/share (latest year $-1.64), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $28.31/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 4 of 9
    What this means

    Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −2% → 12% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The margin widened even though the filing names price competition — the gain came from volume or cost, not pricing power. Read where.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −2% early to 12% lately, median 1% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +21%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 21% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2021 · −35.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −1.1%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 9 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.5B
  • Cash & short-term investments$199M
  • Receivables$811M
  • Inventory$331M
  • Other current assets$132M
Current liabilities$863M
  • Debt due within a year$146M
  • Accounts payable$177M
  • Other current liabilities$540M
Current ratio1.71×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.32×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.23×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$609Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$146M due · $199M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−8.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.1× → 1.7×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$2.0Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($779M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$2.1B$146M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$68Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2025

Over the record, the business generated $4.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$3.1B · 65%
  • Dividends$1.9B · 39%
  • Returned to owners$1.9B

    114% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.9B as dividends and $0 as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$233M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $233M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $493M to $2.0B, and cash and short-term investments drew down $367M.

  • Net change in share count−8.1%

    The diluted count fell from 109M to 100M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$1.01/sh

    Paid in 9 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 12% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$668M10% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity6%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$2.0Bover 9 years buying other businesses, against $3.1B of capital spent building

$235M written down across 3 years (2018, 2020, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Lindsay$8.5M$11.9M$54M
2022Mr. Lindsay$8.0M$15.5M($17M)
2023Mr. Lindsay$8.6M$8.4M$438M
2024Mr. Lindsay$9.3M$4.7M$190M
2025Mr. Lindsay$9.0M$5.3M$117M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership4.4%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio70:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$32M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 952% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Helmerich & Payne is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$493M → $2.0B

    Debt rose from $493M to $2.0B while owner earnings went from about $154M to $248M — about 3.2 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 8.1 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?7 of 9 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 7 of the last 9 years, $1.3B in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Oilfield Services & Equipment

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
PTENPatterson-UTI Energy$4.8B-14.6%-8%9%
LBRTLiberty Energy$4.0B22%7.1%2%4%
RIGTransocean Ltd (Switzerland)$4.0B37%-13.7%-2%9%
HPHelmerich & Payne$3.7B0.7%-1%4%
NENoble Corporation plc A$3.3B16.2%7%11%
NBRNabors Industries$3.2B37%1.8%-2%4%
OIIOceaneering International$2.6B12%2.6%5%4%
SDRLSeadrill Limited$1.1B28.5%-7%
Group median2.2%-1%4%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Helmerich & Payne has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Helmerich & Payne earns about $165M on its 4.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 3.2% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+69%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’25+21%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $256M on 100M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net debt $1.8B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Helmerich & Payne (HP), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/HP, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← HOV its page in the Manual HPE →

Industry order: ← HLX the Oilfield Services & Equipment chapter HPK →