Share count
128Mpeak FY2025
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NEO, NeoGenomics Inc.
NeoGenomics provides a wide range of oncology diagnostic testing and consultative services including technical laboratory services and professional interpretation of laboratory test results by licensed physicians or molecular experts who specialize in pathology and oncology.
We currently offer the following types of testing services: Cytogenetics ("karyotype analysis") the study of normal and abnormal chromosomes and their relationship to disease.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$727M
+10.1% YoY · 10% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $746M 5-yr avg $595M
Revenue $187M +11.1% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin −9.8% yr-ago −16.6%
Net income ($17M) yr-ago ($26M)
Net margin −9.2% yr-ago −15.4%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Client direct billing (71%), Commercial insurance (16%) and Medicare and other government (12%).
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −14% through the cycle on a 42% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −7%, above 15% in 0 of 7 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Client direct billing is 71% of revenue, with Commercial insurance the other meaningful line at 16%.
Revenue by product line, FY2025
- Client direct billing71%$519M
- Commercial insurance16%$118M
- Medicare and other government12%$91M
- Self-pay0%$114K
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $232M | $240M | $277M | $409M | $444M | $484M | $510M | $592M | $661M | $727M | $746M | RevenueRevenue |
| 42% | 42% | 46% | 48% | 42% | 39% | 37% | 41% | 44% | 43% | 43% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 28% | 29% | 31% | 31% | 32% | 46% | 48% | 41% | 39% | 38% | 36% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 2% | 2% | 1% | 2% | 2% | 5% | 6% | 5% | 5% | 5% | 5% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $2M | $3M | $10M | $13M | ($14M) | ($119M) | ($158M) | ($108M) | ($92M) | ($116M) | ($106M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 0.9% | 1.2% | 3.6% | 3.2% | −3.1% | −24.5% | −30.9% | −18.2% | −13.9% | −15.9% | −14.2% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($6M) | ($396K) | $3M | $8M | $4M | ($8M) | ($144M) | ($88M) | ($79M) | ($108M) | ($99M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $21M | $18M | $45M | $23M | $1M | ($27M) | ($66M) | ($2M) | $7M | $5M | $22M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $16M | $16M | $16M | $20M | $26M | $30M | $35M | $37M | $39M | $36M | $35M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $6M | ($4M) | $19M | ($15M) | ($39M) | ($71M) | $18M | $24M | $13M | $36M | $46M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $8M | $14M | $14M | $20M | $29M | $64M | $31M | $29M | $41M | $27M | $28M | CapexCapex |
| 3.3% | 5.7% | 5.2% | 4.9% | 6.5% | 13.2% | 6.1% | 4.9% | 6.2% | 3.7% | 3.7% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $14M | $4M | $30M | $3M | ($28M) | ($57M) | ($97M) | ($31M) | ($34M) | ($22M) | ($5M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 6.0% | 1.8% | 11.0% | 0.8% | −6.2% | −11.8% | −19.0% | −5.2% | −5.2% | −3.0% | −0.7% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $14M | $4M | $30M | $3M | ($28M) | ($91M) | ($97M) | ($31M) | ($34M) | ($22M) | ($5M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| 6.0% | 1.8% | 11.0% | 0.8% | −6.2% | −18.8% | −19.0% | −5.2% | −5.2% | −3.0% | −0.7% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $0 | $125M | $0 | $37M | $419M | $0 | $0 | $0 | $6M | $6M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | 2% | — | -2% | -7% | -10% | -7% | -7% | -9% | -7% | ROICROIC |
| -4% | -0% | 1% | 2% | 1% | -1% | -14% | -9% | -9% | -13% | -12% | Return on equityROE |
| −4% | −0% | 1% | 2% | 1% | −1% | −14% | −9% | −9% | −13% | −12% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $13M | $13M | $10M | $173M | $229M | $317M | $263M | $342M | $367M | $160M | $146M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $56M | $60M | $77M | $94M | $107M | $112M | $120M | $131M | $151M | $159M | $167M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $6M | $7M | $9M | $14M | $30M | $23M | $24M | $24M | $27M | $29M | $30M | InventoryInvent. |
| $17M | $10M | $18M | $20M | $25M | $18M | $21M | $20M | $22M | $23M | $26M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $45M | $57M | $68M | $89M | $111M | $118M | $123M | $135M | $156M | $165M | $171M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $79M | $86M | $104M | $291M | $449M | $682M | $605M | $597M | $596M | $376M | $374M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $38M | $36M | $61M | $64M | $73M | $87M | $90M | $96M | $301M | $88M | $85M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 2.1× | 2.4× | 1.7× | 4.5× | 6.1× | 7.8× | 6.7× | 6.2× | 2.0× | 4.3× | 4.4× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $147M | $147M | $198M | $199M | $211M | $527M | $523M | $523M | $523M | $524M | $524M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $337M | $344M | $505M | $710M | $988M | $1.9B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.6B | $1.4B | $1.3B | Total assetsAssets |
| $109M | $108M | $114M | $105M | $172M | $534M | $535M | $538M | $541M | $342M | $538M | Total debtDebt |
| $97M | $95M | $104M | ($68M) | ($57M) | $217M | $272M | $196M | $174M | $182M | $392M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 0.2× | 0.5× | 1.6× | 3.5× | -2.0× | -14.4× | -20.8× | -15.6× | -13.9× | -30.9× | -38.9× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $162M | $172M | $320M | $507M | $694M | $1.1B | $998M | $942M | $902M | $837M | $829M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 2.3% | 2.7% | 2.5% | 2.4% | 2.3% | 4.6% | 4.8% | 4.2% | 5.1% | 5.7% | 5.4% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 77.5M | 79.4M | 91.6M | 104M | 112M | 120M | 124M | 126M | 127M | 128M | 129M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $2.99 | $3.02 | $3.02 | $3.95 | $3.98 | $4.04 | $4.10 | $4.71 | $5.22 | $5.68 | $5.78 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.08 | $-0.00 | $0.03 | $0.08 | $0.04 | $-0.07 | $-1.16 | $-0.70 | $-0.62 | $-0.84 | $-0.77 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.18 | $0.05 | $0.33 | $0.03 | $-0.25 | $-0.47 | $-0.78 | $-0.24 | $-0.27 | $-0.17 | $-0.04 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.18 | $0.05 | $0.33 | $0.03 | $-0.25 | $-0.76 | $-0.78 | $-0.24 | $-0.27 | $-0.17 | $-0.04 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.10 | $0.17 | $0.16 | $0.19 | $0.26 | $0.53 | $0.25 | $0.23 | $0.32 | $0.21 | $0.21 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $2.09 | $2.17 | $3.50 | $4.90 | $6.21 | $9.24 | $8.03 | $7.50 | $7.12 | $6.53 | $6.42 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +7.4%/yr | +7.4%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +9.0%/yr | −4.1%/yr |
| Book value / share | +13.5%/yr | +1.0%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
−9%low FY2022
Gross margin
43%low FY2022
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
-20.2×peak FY2017
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
($22M)owner earningsvs.($108M)net incomelow FY2022
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2016FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $108M loss into ($22M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($108M) | ($79M) | ($88M) | ($144M) | ($8M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$36M | +$39M | +$37M | +$35M | +$30M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$41M | +$33M | +$25M | +$25M | +$22M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$36M | +$13M | +$24M | +$18M | −$71M |
| Cash from operations | $5M | $7M | ($2M) | ($66M) | ($27M) |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$27M | −$41M | −$29M | −$31M | −$30M |
| Owner earnings | ($22M) | ($34M) | ($31M) | ($97M) | ($57M) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | — | — | — | −$34M |
| Free cash flow | ($22M) | ($34M) | ($31M) | ($97M) | ($91M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -3% | -5% | -5% | -19% | -12% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $41M), owner earnings is nearer ($63M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -30.9×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($116M) ÷ interest expense $4M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $160M − debt $538M
What this means
Netting $160M of cash and short-term investments against $538M of debt leaves $379M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 80 + DIO 25 − DPO 20 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle7-yr median, range -10%–2%; -8% latest = NOPAT ($92M) ÷ invested capital $1.2BIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran -8% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Consumes cash through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -19%–11%; latest ($22M) = operating cash $5M − maintenance capex $27MIndustry peers: median 4%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -3% of revenue this year, a -5% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $41M of SBC) leaves ($63M).
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($108M) · cash from operations $5M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.75×HarvestingCapex $27M ÷ depreciation $36M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $727M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 4.26×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $538M vs $288M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 7 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.70/share (latest year $-0.83), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $6.42/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 3 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 2% → −16% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words Input costs rose and the filing says it could not fully pass them on — which is where this margin compressed.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 2% early to −16% lately, median −14% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −11%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Worst year 2022 · −30.9% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +5.7%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- How management talks about it Promotional
What this means
The returns have faded, yet the filing reaches for a promoter’s vocabulary — world-class, best-in-class, disruptive — more than an owner’s. When the words sell harder than the results deliver, the gap is the thing to weigh.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“We may also face increased competition from other companies that are using AI, some of which may develop more effective methods to deploy these technologies than we or any of our business partners have, which could impair our ability to compete effectively.”
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$374M
- Cash & short-term investments$146M
- Receivables$167M
- Inventory$30M
- Other current assets$30M
Current liabilities$85M
- Accounts payable$26M
- Other current liabilities$59M
Current ratio4.42×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio4.06×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.73×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$289Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+11.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.0× → 4.4×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$26Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($144M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$408M$66M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$899Kcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $27M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$277M · 1035%
- Source of funding−$250M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $250M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $109M to $538M.
- Net change in share count66.6%
The diluted count rose from 78M to 129M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$811M60% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity63%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$589Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $277M of capital spent building
$4M written down across 1 year (2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership1.1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$41M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 6% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why NeoGenomics Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
4 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−4.4% vs 6.3%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 6.3% early in the record and −4.4% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?66.6%
Diluted shares grew 66.6% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$109M → $538M
Debt rose from $109M to $538M while owner earnings went from about $16M to ($29M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?5 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 5 of the last 10 years, $10M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
And these came back clean
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Life Sciences Tools & Services
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ULSUL Solutions Inc. | $3.1B | 48% | 16.2% | 27% | 10% |
| MEDPMedpace Holdings | $2.5B | — | 17.6% | 27% | 22% |
| EVHEvolent Health | $1.9B | 23% | -12.2% | -6% | -11% |
| ONTOnterris Inc. | $831M | 35% | -4.8% | -5% | 3% |
| NEONeoGenomics Inc. | $727M | 42% | -8.5% | -7% | -4% |
| MGMistras Group Inc | $724M | 32% | 2.9% | 3% | 4% |
| WLDNWilldan Group Inc. | $682M | 35% | 4.9% | 8% | 4% |
| EXPOExponent | $582M | — | 20.8% | 44% | 22% |
| Group median | — | 35% | 3.9% | 6% | 4% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFNeoGenomics Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
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The assumptions
Revenue, delivered11%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
Owner earnings it must reach—
Margin the price demands—
Owner-earnings margin today−1%
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "NeoGenomics Inc. (NEO), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/NEO, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← NEM its page in the Manual NEOG →
Industry order: ← MTD the Life Sciences Tools & Services chapter NRC →