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NEM, Newmont Corporation

Gold & Precious Metals capital-intensive Cyclical

Newmont digs gold out of mines around the world and sells it, also pulling copper and other metals from the same operations. It does not set the price of what it sells; it takes the going metal price and earns the gap between that and the all-in cost of finding, mining, and processing each ounce.

Products References in this report to "attributable" means that portion of gold, copper, silver, lead, or zinc produced, sold or included in proven and probable reserves and measured, indicated, and inferred resources based on our proportionate ownership, unless otherwise noted.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

NEM · Newmont Corporation

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$22.7B

+21.3% YoY · 15% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $25.0B 5-yr avg $15.5B

Operating margin 52.8% 5-yr avg 14.0%

ROIC 26% 5-yr avg 6%

Owner-earnings margin 37% 5-yr avg 18%

Free cash flow margin 37% 5-yr avg 16%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Gold Dore (63%) and Sales from Concentrate and Other Production (37%).
Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: This is as pure a price-taker as the market offers: the metal price is handed to Newmont, and the only things it governs are cost and grade. The lever is the all-in cost of an ounce against a price set elsewhere, and the richness of the ore, since lower grade means moving more rock for the same metal. There is a second, quieter lever: every ounce mined is gone, so reserves must be replaced by finding or buying more, and what replacement costs decides whether the mine life behind the company holds. Mines deplete, costs press, and the price can sit anywhere. So weigh the cost per ounce and the reserve position against the price across the metal's swings in the record below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 4%, above 15% in 1 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 19% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Gold Dore is 63% of revenue, with Sales from Concentrate and Other Production the other meaningful line at 37%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Gold Dore63%$14.3B
Sales from Concentrate and Other Production37%$8.3B

By geographyUnited Kingdom58%South Korea14%Japan9%China6%Other6%Australia4%Other4%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$6.7B	$7.4B	$7.3B	$9.7B	$11.5B	$12.2B	$11.9B	$11.8B	$18.7B	$22.7B	$25.0B	RevenueRevenue
3%	3%	3%	3%	2%	2%	2%	3%	2%	2%	1%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
2%	2%	2%	2%	1%	1%	2%	2%	1%	1%	1%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($16M)	$1.3B	$790M	$1.3B	$2.8B	$1.3B	$203M	($1.7B)	$4.5B	$11.0B	$13.2B	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−0.2%	17.1%	10.9%	13.1%	24.4%	10.3%	1.7%	−14.4%	24.2%	48.4%	52.8%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($629M)	($114M)	$341M	$2.8B	$2.8B	$1.2B	($429M)	($2.5B)	$3.3B	$7.1B	$8.5B	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	53%	23%	20%	48%	—	—	29%	39%	39%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$2.8B	$2.1B	$1.8B	$2.9B	$4.9B	$4.3B	$3.2B	$2.8B	$6.4B	$10.3B	$12.1B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.2B	$2.0B	$2.3B	$2.3B	$2.2B	$2.1B	$2.6B	$2.5B	$2.6B	DepreciationDeprec.
$2.2B	$977M	$271M	($1.9B)	($247M)	$790M	$1.5B	$3.1B	$439M	$728M	$1.0B	Working capital & otherWC & other
$1.1B	$866M	$1.0B	$1.5B	$1.3B	$1.7B	$2.1B	$2.7B	$3.4B	$3.0B	$2.9B	CapexCapex
17.0%	11.7%	14.2%	15.0%	11.3%	13.5%	17.9%	22.6%	18.2%	13.4%	11.4%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$1.7B	$1.3B	$795M	$1.4B	$3.6B	$2.6B	$1.1B	$655M	$3.8B	$7.3B	$9.2B	Owner earningsOwner earn.
24.7%	17.0%	11.0%	14.4%	31.1%	21.5%	9.1%	5.5%	20.3%	32.2%	37.0%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$1.7B	$1.3B	$795M	$1.4B	$3.6B	$2.6B	$1.1B	$97M	$3.0B	$7.3B	$9.2B	Free cash flowFCF
24.7%	17.0%	11.0%	14.4%	31.1%	21.5%	9.1%	0.8%	15.8%	32.2%	37.0%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$6M	$15M	$140M	$0	$0	$328M	$15M	$0	$0	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$67M	$134M	$301M	$889M	$834M	$1.8B	$1.7B	$1.4B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.1B	Dividends paidDiv. paid
—	—	$98M	$479M	$521M	$525M	$0	$0	$1.2B	$2.3B	—	BuybacksBuybacks
-0%	6%	4%	4%	10%	3%	0%	-4%	9%	21%	26%	ROICROIC
-6%	-1%	3%	13%	12%	5%	-2%	-9%	11%	21%	24%	Return on equityROE
−6%	−2%	0%	9%	9%	−3%	−11%	−13%	7%	18%	21%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$2.8B	$3.3B	$3.4B	$2.5B	$5.8B	$5.1B	$3.8B	$3.0B	$3.6B	$8.2B	$9.1B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$160M	$124M	$254M	$373M	$449M	$337M	$366M	$734M	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.1B	ReceivablesReceiv.
$320M	$375M	$303M	$539M	$493M	$518M	$633M	$960M	$843M	$816M	$828M	Accounts payablePayables
($160M)	($251M)	($49M)	($166M)	($44M)	($181M)	($267M)	($226M)	$213M	$251M	$993M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$4.7B	$5.1B	$5.3B	$6.3B	$8.5B	$7.7B	$6.5B	$7.5B	$12.3B	$13.1B	$13.5B	Current assetsCur. assets
$1.8B	$1.4B	$1.8B	$2.4B	$3.4B	$2.7B	$2.9B	$6.0B	$7.5B	$5.7B	$5.5B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.7×	3.6×	3.0×	2.6×	2.5×	2.9×	2.2×	1.3×	1.6×	2.3×	2.4×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	—	$58M	$2.7B	$2.8B	$2.8B	$2.0B	$3.0B	$2.7B	$2.7B	$2.7B	GoodwillGoodwill
$21.1B	$20.6B	$20.7B	$40.0B	$41.4B	$40.6B	$38.5B	$55.5B	$56.3B	$57.1B	$57.7B	Total assetsAssets
$4.6B	$4.0B	$4.0B	$6.1B	$6.0B	$5.7B	$5.6B	$8.9B	$8.5B	$5.1B	$5.1B	Total debtDebt
$1.8B	$723M	$599M	$3.7B	$201M	$578M	$1.8B	$5.8B	$4.8B	($3.1B)	($4.0B)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$10.7B	$10.5B	$10.5B	$21.4B	$23.0B	$22.0B	$19.4B	$29.0B	$29.9B	$33.9B	$34.9B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
—	—	—	—	—	—	$800M	$1.8B	—	—	$1.8B	Goodwill written downGW imp.
											Per share
532M	535M	535M	737M	806M	801M	795M	841M	1.15B	1.11B	1.09B	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$12.56	$13.79	$13.56	$13.22	$14.26	$15.26	$14.99	$14.05	$16.27	$20.46	$22.97	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-1.18	$-0.21	$0.64	$3.81	$3.51	$1.46	$-0.54	$-2.97	$2.92	$6.39	$7.78	EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.11	$2.35	$1.49	$1.90	$4.44	$3.28	$1.37	$0.78	$3.30	$6.59	$8.50	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.11	$2.35	$1.49	$1.90	$4.44	$3.28	$1.37	$0.12	$2.58	$6.59	$8.50	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.13	$0.25	$0.56	$1.21	$1.03	$2.19	$2.20	$1.68	$1.00	$1.00	$1.02	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$2.13	$1.62	$1.93	$1.99	$1.62	$2.06	$2.68	$3.17	$2.96	$2.74	$2.62	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$20.15	$19.69	$19.63	$29.06	$28.55	$27.49	$24.34	$34.51	$26.07	$30.57	$32.13	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+5.6%/yr	+7.5%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+8.7%/yr	+8.2%/yr
EPS	—	+12.7%/yr
Dividends / share	+25.9%/yr	−0.7%/yr
Capital spending / share	+2.8%/yr	+11.1%/yr
Book value / share	+4.7%/yr	+1.4%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

1.1Bpeak FY2024

ROIC

21%low FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$7.3Bowner earningsvs.$7.1Bnet incomelow FY2023

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $7.1B of profit into $7.3B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$7.1B

Owner earnings$7.3B · 32% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$7.1B	$3.3B	($2.5B)	($429M)	$1.2B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$2.5B	+$2.6B	+$2.1B	+$2.2B	+$2.3B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$728M	+$439M	+$3.1B	+$1.5B	+$790M
Cash from operations	$10.3B	$6.4B	$2.8B	$3.2B	$4.3B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$3.0B	−$2.6B	−$2.1B	−$2.1B	−$1.7B
Owner earnings	$7.3B	$3.8B	$655M	$1.1B	$2.6B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	−$826M	−$558M	—	—
Free cash flow	$7.3B	$3.0B	$97M	$1.1B	$2.6B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	32%	20%	6%	9%	21%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 44.0×

Comfortable

Operating income $11.0B ÷ interest expense $249M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$3.1B

Net cash

Cash $7.6B + ST investments $594M − debt $5.1B

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $3.1B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. It also holds $334M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at net cash of $3.5B. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 4%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range -4%–21%; 21% latest = NOPAT $6.6B ÷ invested capital $31.3B

Industry peers: median 2%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 21% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 17%

High through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 6%–32%; latest $7.3B = operating cash $10.3B − maintenance capex $3.0B

Industry peers: median 2%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 32% of revenue this year, a 17% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $51M of SBC) leaves $7.2B.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.46×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $10.3B ÷ net income $7.1B

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 47%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $3.4B ÷ Owner Earnings $7.3B

What this means
Of $7.3B Owner Earnings, $3.4B (47%) went back to shareholders, $1.1B dividends, $2.3B buybacks. Net of $51M stock comp, the real buyback was about $2.3B. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.20×

Expanding

Capex $3.0B ÷ depreciation $2.5B

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $22.7B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.29×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $5.1B vs $7.4B WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.48/share (latest year $6.64), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $31.72/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 6 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 9% → 19% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 9% early to 19% lately, median 11% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 11%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
Owner earnings growth +16%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 16% a year over the record.
Worst year 2023 · −14.4% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$13.5B

Cash & short-term investments$8.8B
Receivables$1.1B
Inventory$684M
Other current assets$2.9B

Current liabilities$5.5B

Accounts payable$828M
Other current liabilities$4.7B

Current ratio2.44×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio2.32×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.59×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$8.0Bthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+45.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.1× → 2.4×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$32.2Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($9.1B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$5.2B$104M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $5.7B (annual-report basis)

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$0

'27$0

'28$0

'29$267M

'30$671M

later$4.4B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$0the first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$0the near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$671Min 2030the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Total scheduled principal$5.3Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases

'26$152M

'27$109M

'28$93M

'29$68M

'30$58M

later$251M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$152Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$731Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$583Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$5.1B

Lease obligations (present value)$583M

Total fixed claims on the business$5.7B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $5.7B, of which the leases are 10%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $41.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$18.7B · 45%
Dividends$9.4B · 23%
Buybacks$5.2B · 12%
Retained (debt / cash)$8.2B · 20%

Returned to owners$14.6B
60% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $9.4B as dividends and $5.2B as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks$48.06
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 60M shares were bought for $2.9B, about $48.06 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $36.30 (2018) to $58.33 (2021); its heaviest year, 2024, paid $47.92 ($1.2B).
Net change in share count104.3%
The diluted count rose from 532M to 1087M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$1.00/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 26% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$2.8B5% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity8%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$1.3Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $18.7B of capital spent building

$2.6B written down across 2 years (2022, 2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Palmer	$12.7M	$15.4M	$2.6B
2022	Mr. Palmer	$13.7M	$3.4M	$1.1B
2023	Mr. Palmer	$11.7M	$1.1M	$655M
2024	Mr. Palmer	$13.0M	$3.3M	$3.8B
2025	Mr. Palmer	$15.6M	$46.3M	$7.3B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

CEO pay ratio187:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$51M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 0% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Newmont Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?104.3%
Diluted shares grew 104.3% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $5.2B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?2% → 5% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $160M to $1.1B while revenue grew 274%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (2% of revenue then, 5% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?10 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 10 of the last 10 years, $5.6B in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Gold & Precious Metals

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
FCXFreeport-McMoRan Inc.	$25.2B	29%	25.5%	15%	13%
NEMNewmont Corporation	$22.7B	—	12.0%	4%	19%
CLFCleveland-Cliffs	$18.6B	14%	8.4%	16%	9%
SCCOSouthern Copper Corporation	$13.4B	52%	41.5%	18%	24%
CDECoeur Mining Inc.	$2.1B	79%	4.3%	2%	2%
MUXMcEwen Inc.	$198M	77%	-43.0%	-9%	-7%
IAUXi-80 Gold Corp.	$95M	—	-177.0%	-15%	-157%
IDRIdaho Strategic Resources Inc.	$42M	6%	-2.6%	-9%	-8%
Group median	—	—	6.4%	3%	5%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Newmont Corporation has delivered.

Newmont Corporation’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Newmont Corporation earns about $4.2B on its 18.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 32.2% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($4.2B) Net of stock comp (−$57M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+31%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+15%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $9.2B on 1068M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-16; net cash $4.0B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh NEM against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Newmont Corporation (NEM), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/NEM, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← NEE its page in the Manual NEO →

Industry order: ← NAMM the Gold & Precious Metals chapter NFGC →