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NEOG, Neogen

Biotechnology consumer brand Distress / turnaroundCyclicalSerial acquirer

Neogen Corporation develop, manufacture and market a diverse line of products and services dedicated to food and animal safety.

The majority of the test kits are consumables, single-use, culture, immunoassay and nucleic acid detection products that rely on proprietary antibodies and RNA and DNA testing methodologies to produce rapid and accurate test results.

Our line of food safety services also includes advanced software systems that help testers objectively analyze, store and identify emerging issues from their results from multiple locations over extended periods.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

NEOG · Neogen

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$895M

−3.2% YoY · 16% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $871M 5-yr avg $727M

Gross margin 45% 5-yr avg 48%

Operating margin −73.0% 5-yr avg −16.1%

ROIC −18% 5-yr avg −5%

Owner-earnings margin 1% 5-yr avg 1%

Free cash flow margin 1% 5-yr avg 1%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Food Safety (71%) and Animal Safety (29%).
Situation: Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power. Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 72% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 5 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 47% and operating margin about 16% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −119% to 18% — on a steadier 47% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Inventory runs near 20% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the pipeline against the patent cliff, and pricing. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 9%). By owner earnings: roughly 10% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Food Safety is 71% of revenue, with Animal Safety the other meaningful segment at 29%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

Food Safety71%$638M
Animal Safety29%$257M

By geographyInternational50%United States50%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMFeb 2026
											Income statement
$321M	$358M	$398M	$414M	$418M	$468M	$527M	$822M	$924M	$895M	$871M	RevenueRevenue
48%	47%	47%	46%	47%	46%	46%	49%	50%	47%	45%	Gross marginGross mgn
9%	10%	10%	10%	11%	11%	16%	24%	22%	24%	27%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
3%	3%	3%	3%	4%	3%	3%	3%	2%	2%	2%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$56M	$65M	$70M	$68M	$68M	$74M	$59M	$38M	$59M	($1.1B)	($636M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
17.6%	18.1%	17.6%	16.4%	16.1%	15.8%	11.1%	4.6%	6.3%	−118.6%	−73.0%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$37M	$44M	$63M	$60M	$59M	$61M	$48M	($23M)	($9M)	($1.1B)	($609M)	Net incomeNet inc.
34%	34%	14%	18%	18%	19%	20%	—	—	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$35M	$60M	$69M	$64M	$86M	$81M	$68M	$41M	$35M	$58M	$69M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$12M	$15M	$17M	$18M	$18M	$21M	$24M	$88M	$117M	$119M	$117M	DepreciationDeprec.
($19M)	($3M)	($16M)	($20M)	$2M	($7M)	($11M)	($35M)	($86M)	$1.0B	$546M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$14M	$15M	$21M	$15M	$24M	$27M	$24M	$66M	$111M	$105M	$63M	CapexCapex
4.4%	4.1%	5.3%	3.5%	5.8%	5.7%	4.6%	8.0%	12.1%	11.7%	7.3%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$21M	$46M	$48M	$49M	$67M	$60M	$44M	($25M)	($76M)	($46M)	$6M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
6.6%	12.8%	12.1%	11.9%	16.1%	12.8%	8.3%	−3.0%	−8.2%	−5.2%	0.7%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$21M	$46M	$48M	$49M	$62M	$54M	$44M	($25M)	($76M)	($46M)	$6M	Free cash flowFCF
6.6%	12.8%	12.1%	11.9%	14.8%	11.6%	8.3%	−3.0%	−8.2%	−5.2%	0.7%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$42M	$34M	$468K	$6M	$13M	$51M	$39M	$0	$0	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
11%	11%	13%	9%	8%	8%	6%	—	—	-30%	-18%	ROICROIC
9%	9%	11%	9%	8%	7%	5%	-1%	-0%	-53%	-29%	Return on equityROE
9%	9%	11%	9%	8%	7%	5%	−1%	−0%	−53%	−29%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$108M	$144M	$211M	$268M	$344M	$381M	$381M	$246M	$171M	$129M	$160M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$68M	$69M	$79M	$83M	$85M	$92M	$100M	$153M	$173M	$153M	$137M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$64M	$73M	$76M	$86M	$95M	$101M	$122M	$134M	$189M	$191M	$162M	InventoryInvent.
$16M	$16M	$21M	$19M	$26M	$24M	$35M	$77M	$83M	$80M	$75M	Accounts payablePayables
$116M	$125M	$134M	$150M	$154M	$169M	$187M	$210M	$279M	$265M	$224M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$248M	$293M	$376M	$450M	$537M	$591M	$627M	$586M	$589M	$577M	$590M	Current assetsCur. assets
$29M	$36M	$39M	$38M	$48M	$54M	$78M	$145M	$154M	$174M	$151M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
8.7×	8.1×	9.7×	11.8×	11.1×	11.0×	8.1×	4.0×	3.8×	3.3×	3.9×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$89M	$105M	$100M	$104M	$110M	$131M	$143M	$2.1B	$2.1B	$1.1B	$1.0B	GoodwillGoodwill
$450M	$528M	$618M	$696M	$797M	$920M	$993M	$4.6B	$4.5B	$3.4B	$3.4B	Total assetsAssets
$2M	—	—	—	—	—	—	$885M	$891M	$894M	$813M	Total debtDebt
($105M)	—	—	—	—	—	—	$640M	$720M	$765M	$653M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.4×	1.4×	-27.8×	-16.7×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$404M	$472M	$560M	$638M	$725M	$840M	$887M	$3.1B	$3.1B	$2.1B	$2.1B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
1.7%	1.5%	1.2%	1.3%	1.5%	1.4%	1.4%	1.2%	1.5%	1.9%	1.7%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
101M	102M	104M	105M	106M	107M	108M	189M	216M	217M	218M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$3.18	$3.50	$3.82	$3.95	$3.96	$4.37	$4.88	$4.35	$4.27	$4.12	$3.99	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.36	$0.43	$0.61	$0.57	$0.56	$0.57	$0.45	$-0.12	$-0.04	$-5.03	$-2.79	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.21	$0.45	$0.46	$0.47	$0.64	$0.56	$0.40	$-0.13	$-0.35	$-0.21	$0.03	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.21	$0.45	$0.46	$0.47	$0.58	$0.51	$0.40	$-0.13	$-0.35	$-0.21	$0.03	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.14	$0.14	$0.20	$0.14	$0.23	$0.25	$0.23	$0.35	$0.51	$0.48	$0.29	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$4.00	$4.61	$5.37	$6.08	$6.86	$7.85	$8.21	$16.59	$14.52	$9.55	$9.65	Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2019 are restated ×2 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

The diluted share count moved ×1.75 into 2023 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+2.9%/yr	+0.8%/yr
Capital spending / share	+14.7%/yr	+16.2%/yr
Book value / share	+10.1%/yr	+6.8%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Operating income-1908.6%
“Operating Income Operating income for the Food Safety segment decreased $1,068.1 million during fiscal year 2025 compared to the prior year. The decline was primarily due to the goodwill impairment charge of $1,059.3 million incurred in fiscal year 2025.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
International-2.2%
“International Revenue Neogen’s international revenues were $448.7 million in fiscal year 2025, compared to $459.0 million in fiscal 2024, a decrease of 2%. The decline was due to a $24.3 million currency headwind, partially offset by increased sales in the Latin America and European regions.”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count

217Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

−30%low FY2025

Gross margin

47%low FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($46M)owner earningsvs.($1.1B)net incomelow FY2024

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $1.1B loss into ($46M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($1.1B)	($9M)	($23M)	$48M	$61M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$119M	+$117M	+$88M	+$24M	+$21M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$17M	+$14M	+$10M	+$7M	+$6M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$1.0B	−$86M	−$35M	−$11M	−$7M
Cash from operations	$58M	$35M	$41M	$68M	$81M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$105M	−$111M	−$66M	−$24M	−$21M
Owner earnings	($46M)	($76M)	($25M)	$44M	$60M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	—	—	—	−$6M
Free cash flow	($46M)	($76M)	($25M)	$44M	$54M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	-5%	-8%	-3%	8%	13%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $17M), owner earnings is nearer ($64M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Material weakness in financial controls

“As disclosed in Item 9A, "Controls and Procedures," we have identified additional material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -27.8×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($1.1B) ÷ interest expense $38M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $765M

Net debt against an operating loss

Cash $129M − debt $894M

What this means
Netting $129M of cash and short-term investments against $894M of debt leaves $765M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 148d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 63 + DIO 147 − DPO 61 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 8%

Solid through the cycle

8-yr median, range -30%–13%; -30% latest = NOPAT ($838M) ÷ invested capital $2.8B

Industry peers: median -11%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran -30% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 8%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -8%–16%; latest ($46M) = operating cash $58M − maintenance capex $105M

Industry peers: median 9%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -5% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $17M of SBC) leaves ($64M).
Are earnings backed by cash? $58M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($1.1B) · cash from operations $58M

In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

No surplus to allocate

What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
Investing or harvesting? 0.88×

Maintaining

Capex $105M ÷ depreciation $119M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Miss

Revenue ≥ $2B · $895M

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 3.32×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $894M vs $403M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −883%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.72/share (latest year $-5.02), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $9.52/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 7 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 4 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 18% → −36% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 18% early to −36% lately, median 16% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −36%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
Worst year 2025 · −118.6% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Feb 28, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$590M

Cash & short-term investments$160M
Receivables$137M
Inventory$162M
Other current assets$131M

Current liabilities$151M

Debt due within a year$19M
Accounts payable$75M
Other current liabilities$56M

Current ratio3.92×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio2.84×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.06×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$439Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$19M due · $160M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Feb 28, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−4.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters3.8× → 3.9×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($287M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($667M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$831M$19M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$4Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $598M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$421M · 70%
Buybacks$3M · 1%
Retained (debt / cash)$174M · 29%

Returned to owners$3M
2% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $3M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $810M and cash and short-term investments rose $52M.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $3M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count115.8%
The diluted count rose from 101M to 218M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$2.5B72% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity51%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$198Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $421M of capital spent building

$1.1B written down across 1 year (2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	$2.5M	$4.6M	$60M
2022	$4.3M	$2.3M	$44M
2023	$5.3M	$4.9M	($25M)
2024	$7.2M	$4.5M	($76M)
2025	$6.8M	−$458k	($46M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio135:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$17M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Neogen is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−5.5% vs 10.5%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 10.5% early in the record and −5.5% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?115.8%
Diluted shares grew 115.8% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $3M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$2M → $813M
Debt rose from $2M to $813M while owner earnings went from about $38M to ($49M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean

Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Biotechnology

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
LNTHLantheus Holdings	$1.5B	51%	17.2%	24%	17%
IONSIonis Pharmaceuticals	$944M	99%	-16.9%	-11%	-14%
USNAUSANA Health Sciences	$925M	82%	12.7%	57%	10%
NEOGNeogen	$895M	47%	16.0%	9%	10%
ANIPANI Pharmaceuticals Inc.	$883M	62%	8.8%	4%	17%
BCRXBioCryst Pharmaceuticals Inc.	$875M	95%	-148.8%	-142%	-128%
MYGNMyriad Genetics Inc.	$825M	70%	-17.7%	-14%	9%
TLRYTilray Brands Inc. Common Stock	$821M	24%	-66.6%	-32%	-32%
Group median	—	66%	-4.1%	-4%	9%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Neogen has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Neogen earns about $90M on its 10.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −5.2% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($90M) Net of stock comp (−$15M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth, delivered—

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $6M on 218M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-02-28; net debt $653M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh NEOG against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Neogen (NEOG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/NEOG, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← NEO its page in the Manual NESR →

Industry order: ← NBIX the Biotechnology chapter NNNN →