Owner Scorecard


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NOV, NOV Inc.

Oilfield Services & Equipment capital-intensive Cyclical

NOV also manufactures coiled tubing, high-pressure fiberglass tubing, and sells and rents advanced in-line inspection equipment to makers of oil country tubular goods.

More recently, by applying its deep knowledge in technology, the Company has helped advance solutions supporting alternative forms of energy.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
NOV · NOV Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$8.7B
−1.4% YoY · 8% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $8.7B 5-yr avg $7.8B
Gross margin 20% 5-yr avg 19%
Operating margin 4.5% 5-yr avg 4.9%
ROIC 3% 5-yr avg 5%
Owner-earnings margin 8% 5-yr avg 3%
Free cash flow margin 8% 5-yr avg 3%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Products (67%), Services (22%) and Rental (11%).
Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −2.4% through the cycle on a 14% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Inventory runs near 25% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the capital-goods cycle and the aftermarket. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −1%, above 15% in 0 of 9 years). By owner earnings: roughly 7% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Products is 67% of revenue, with Services the other meaningful line at 22%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Products67%$5.8B
  • Services22%$2.0B
  • Rental11%$963M
  • Royalty1%$57M
By geographyOther Countries45%United States34%Norway10%Brazil10%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$7.3B$7.3B$8.5B$8.5B$6.1B$5.5B$7.2B$8.6B$8.9B$8.7B$8.7BRevenueRevenue
−1%12%17%10%7%14%18%21%23%20%20%Gross marginGross mgn
18%16%15%15%16%16%15%14%13%14%14%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($2.4B)($277M)$211M($6.3B)($2.4B)($134M)$264M$651M$876M$494M$389MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−33.3%−3.8%2.5%−74.1%−39.8%−2.4%3.6%7.6%9.9%5.6%4.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
($2.4B)($237M)($31M)($6.1B)($2.5B)($250M)$155M$993M$635M$145M$91MNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
$960M$832M$521M$714M$926M$291M($179M)$143M$1.3B$1.3B$1.1BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$703M$698M$690M$533M$352M$306M$301M$302M$343M$355M$358MDepreciationDeprec.
$2.6B$247M($248M)$6.1B$3.0B$157M($702M)($1.2B)$256M$684M$564MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$284M$192M$244M$233M$226M$201M$214M$283M$351M$375M$356MCapexCapex
3.9%2.6%2.9%2.7%3.7%3.6%3.0%3.3%4.0%4.3%4.1%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$676M$640M$277M$481M$700M$90M($393M)($140M)$953M$876M$734MOwner earningsOwner earn.
9.3%8.8%3.3%5.7%11.5%1.6%−5.4%−1.6%10.7%10.0%8.4%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$676M$640M$277M$481M$700M$90M($393M)($140M)$953M$876M$734MFree cash flowFCF
9.3%8.8%3.3%5.7%11.5%1.6%−5.4%−1.6%10.7%10.0%8.4%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$230M$86M$280M$180M$14M$52M$49M$22M$298M$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$230M$76M$76M$77M$19M$20M$78M$79M$108M$190M$195MDividends paidDiv. paid
-12%-1%-58%-36%-2%3%9%10%4%3%ROICROIC
-17%-2%-0%-78%-49%-5%3%16%10%2%1%Return on equityROE
−19%−2%−1%−79%−49%−5%2%15%8%−1%−2%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$1.4B$1.4B$1.4B$1.2B$1.7B$1.6B$1.1B$816M$1.2B$1.6B$1.3BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$2.1B$2.0B$2.1B$1.9B$1.3B$1.3B$1.7B$1.9B$1.8B$1.7B$1.7BReceivablesReceiv.
$3.3B$3.0B$3.0B$2.2B$1.4B$1.3B$1.8B$2.2B$1.9B$1.8B$1.9BInventoryInvent.
$414M$510M$722M$715M$489M$612M$906M$904M$837M$831M$852MAccounts payablePayables
$5.0B$4.5B$4.4B$3.3B$2.2B$2.0B$2.6B$3.2B$2.9B$2.7B$2.7BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$7.9B$7.2B$7.3B$6.1B$5.2B$4.9B$5.5B$5.8B$5.8B$5.8B$5.7BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$3.0B$2.4B$2.3B$2.2B$1.9B$1.9B$2.4B$2.4B$2.3B$2.4B$2.3BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.6×3.1×3.1×2.7×2.8×2.6×2.3×2.4×2.5×2.4×2.5×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$6.1B$6.2B$6.3B$2.8B$1.5B$1.5B$1.5B$1.6B$1.6B$1.6B$1.6BGoodwillGoodwill
$21.1B$20.2B$19.8B$13.1B$9.9B$9.6B$10.1B$11.3B$11.4B$11.3B$11.1BTotal assetsAssets
$3.2B$2.7B$2.7B$2.0B$1.8B$1.7B$1.7B$1.7B$1.7B$1.7B$2.7BTotal debtDebt
$1.8B$1.3B$1.3B$818M$142M$122M$661M$909M$510M$166M$1.4BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-23.0×-2.7×2.3×-62.8×-28.9×-1.7×3.4×7.4×9.6×5.6×4.4×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$13.9B$14.1B$13.8B$7.8B$5.2B$5.0B$5.1B$6.2B$6.4B$6.3B$6.2BShareholders’ equityEquity
1.5%1.7%1.3%1.5%1.7%1.4%0.9%0.8%0.8%0.8%0.9%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$972M$3.5B$1.3B$40M$40MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
376M377M378M382M384M386M394M397M396M375M364MShares out (diluted)Shares
$19.28$19.37$22.36$22.20$15.86$14.31$18.37$21.62$22.40$23.32$23.88Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-6.41$-0.63$-0.08$-15.96$-6.62$-0.65$0.39$2.50$1.60$0.39$0.25EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.80$1.70$0.73$1.26$1.82$0.23$-1.00$-0.35$2.41$2.34$2.02Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.80$1.70$0.73$1.26$1.82$0.23$-1.00$-0.35$2.41$2.34$2.02Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.61$0.20$0.20$0.20$0.05$0.05$0.20$0.20$0.27$0.51$0.54Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.76$0.51$0.65$0.61$0.59$0.52$0.54$0.71$0.89$1.00$0.98Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$37.07$37.38$36.56$20.36$13.57$12.95$12.93$15.54$16.10$16.71$17.07Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+2.1%/yr+8.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share+3.0%/yr+5.1%/yr
Dividends / share−2.1%/yr+59.2%/yr
Capital spending / share+3.2%/yr+11.2%/yr
Book value / share−8.5%/yr+4.3%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
375Mpeak FY2023
ROIC
4%low FY2019
Gross margin
20%low FY2016
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
0.2×peak FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$876Mowner earningsvs.$145Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $145M of profit into $876M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$145M
Owner earnings$876M · 10% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$145M$635M$993M$155M($250M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$355M+$343M+$302M+$301M+$306M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$67M+$70M+$66M+$67M+$78M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$684M+$256M−$1.2B−$702M+$157M
Cash from operations$1.3B$1.3B$143M($179M)$291M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$375M−$351M−$283M−$214M−$201M
Owner earnings$876M$953M($140M)($393M)$90M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue10%11%-2%-5%2%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $67M), owner earnings is nearer $809M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $494M ÷ interest expense $88M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.2B · 2.3× operating profit
    Meaningful net debt
    Cash $1.6B − debt $2.7B
    What this means

    Netting $1.6B of cash and short-term investments against $2.7B of debt leaves $1.2B owed, about 2.3× a year's operating profit (5.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 71 + DIO 94 − DPO 43 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    9-yr median, range -58%–10%; 3% latest = NOPAT $247M ÷ invested capital $7.4B
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -5%–11%; latest $876M = operating cash $1.3B − maintenance capex $375M
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 10% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $67M of SBC) leaves $809M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $1.3B ÷ net income $145M

    In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $505M ÷ Owner Earnings $876M
    What this means

    Of $876M Owner Earnings, $505M (58%) went back to shareholders, $190M dividends, $315M buybacks. Net of $67M stock comp, the real buyback was about $248M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.06×
    Maintaining
    Capex $375M ÷ depreciation $355M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $8.7B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.42×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $2.7B vs $3.4B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 6 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.65/share (latest year $0.40), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $17.47/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 4 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −12% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The margin widened even though the filing names price competition — the gain came from volume or cost, not pricing power. Read where.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −12% early to 8% lately, median −2% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +4%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 4% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2019 · −74.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −0.0%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 10 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“In contrast, if we are unable to maintain our technology leadership position, including building artificial intelligence and machine learning capabilities into our products where appropriate, it could adversely affect our competitive advantage for certain products and services.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$5.7B
  • Cash & short-term investments$1.3B
  • Receivables$1.7B
  • Inventory$1.9B
  • Other current assets$841M
Current liabilities$2.3B
  • Debt due within a year$27M
  • Accounts payable$852M
  • Other current liabilities$1.4B
Current ratio2.47×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.66×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.58×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$3.4Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$27M due · $1.3B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−2.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.6× → 2.5×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$4.2Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$846MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$2.1B$365M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $3.3B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$575Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases
'26$122M
'27$98M
'28$80M
'29$62M
'30$49M
later$283M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$122Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$694Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$622Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$2.7B
Lease obligations (present value)$622M
Total fixed claims on the business$3.3B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $3.3B, of which the leases are 19%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $6.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$2.6B · 38%
  • Dividends$953M · 14%
  • Buybacks$544M · 8%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$2.7B · 39%
  • Returned to owners$1.5B

    36% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $953M as dividends and $544M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $544M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−3.2%

    The diluted count fell from 376M to 364M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.51/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 2% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$2.0B18% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity25%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$1.2Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $2.6B of capital spent building

$5.8B written down across 4 years (2016, 2019, 2020, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Williams$11.3M$7.9M$90M
2022Williams$13.1M$22.5M($393M)
2023Williams$13.0M$8.6M($140M)
2024Williams$12.0M−$668k$953M
2025Williams$12.7M$15.3M$876M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership1.2%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$67M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 14% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why NOV Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 5 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Inventory as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Oilfield Services & Equipment

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
BKRBaker Hughes Company$27.7B66%5.1%3%4%
FTITechnipFMC plc Ordinary Share$9.9B16%7.0%4%6%
XYLXylem Inc. Common Stock New$9.0B38%11.3%9%10%
NOVNOV Inc.$8.7B16%0.0%-1%7%
DOVDover Corporation$8.1B37%14.8%13%11%
TEXTerex$5.4B20%8.6%11%5%
WFRDWeatherford International plc$4.9B56%3.2%5%5%
DNOWDNOW Inc.$2.8B20%-0.5%-1%6%
Group median29%6.0%5%6%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what NOV Inc. has delivered.

NOV Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, NOV Inc. earns about $631M on its 7.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 10.0% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+4%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $734M on 359M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net debt $1.4B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "NOV Inc. (NOV), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/NOV, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← NOG its page in the Manual NOVT →

Industry order: ← NOA the Oilfield Services & Equipment chapter OII →