Share count
420Mpeak FY2018
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FTI, TechnipFMC plc Ordinary Share
TechnipFMC plc is a leading technology provider to the traditional and new energy industries, delivering fully integrated projects, products, and services.
With our proprietary technologies and comprehensive solutions, we transform our clients' project economics, unlocking new possibilities to develop energy resources while reducing carbon intensity and supporting their energy transition ambitions.
Organized in two business segments - Subsea and Surface Technologies - we will continue driving change in the energy industry with our pioneering integrated ecosystems, technology leadership, and digital innovation.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$9.9B
+9.4% YoY · 9% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $10.2B 5-yr avg $8.0B
Revenue $2.5B +11.6% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 15.5% yr-ago 12.5%
Net income $260M yr-ago $143M
Net margin 10.4% yr-ago 6.4%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Subsea (87%) and Surface Technologies (13%).
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 19% and operating margin about 5.6% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −50% and 14% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Read this kind of business on the capital-goods cycle and the aftermarket. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 4%, above 15% in 3 of 8 years). By owner earnings: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Subsea is 87% of revenue, with Surface Technologies the other meaningful segment at 13%.
Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
- Subsea87%$8.7B
- Surface Technologies13%$1.3B
By geographyBrazil22%United States14%Norway14%United Kingdom8%All other countries8%Guyana8%Other26%
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $9.2B | $15.1B | $12.6B | $7.0B | $6.5B | $6.4B | $6.7B | $7.8B | $9.1B | $9.9B | $10.2B | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | 14% | 16% | 19% | — | 26% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 6% | 7% | 9% | 11% | 11% | 10% | 9% | 9% | 7% | 7% | 7% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 1% | 1% | 2% | 2% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $766M | $1.4B | ($533M) | ($2.1B) | ($3.2B) | $183M | $376M | $658M | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.5B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 8.3% | 9.0% | −4.2% | −30.3% | −49.7% | 2.9% | 5.6% | 8.4% | 12.7% | 14.5% | 15.2% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $393M | $113M | ($1.9B) | ($2.4B) | ($3.3B) | $13M | ($107M) | $56M | $843M | $964M | $1.1B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 31% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 9% | 24% | 22% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $494M | $211M | ($185M) | $849M | $657M | $781M | $352M | $693M | $961M | $1.8B | $1.7B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $301M | $615M | $550M | $468M | $412M | $385M | $377M | $378M | $393M | $442M | $443M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($200M) | ($517M) | $1.2B | $2.8B | $3.5B | $383M | $82M | $259M | ($275M) | $359M | $130M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $313M | $256M | $368M | $413M | $256M | $192M | $158M | $225M | $282M | $317M | $311M | CapexCapex |
| 3.4% | 1.7% | 2.9% | 5.9% | 3.9% | 3.0% | 2.4% | 2.9% | 3.1% | 3.2% | 3.1% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $181M | ($45M) | ($554M) | $436M | $401M | $590M | $194M | $468M | $679M | $1.4B | $1.3B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 2.0% | −0.3% | −4.4% | 6.3% | 6.1% | 9.2% | 2.9% | 6.0% | 7.5% | 14.6% | 13.2% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $181M | ($45M) | ($554M) | $436M | $401M | $590M | $194M | $468M | $679M | $1.4B | $1.3B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 2.0% | −0.3% | −4.4% | 6.3% | 6.1% | 9.2% | 2.9% | 6.0% | 7.5% | 14.6% | 13.2% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $0 | $105M | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $2M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $112M | $61M | $238M | $233M | $59M | $0 | $0 | $44M | $86M | $82M | $81M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $187M | $59M | $443M | $93M | $0 | $0 | — | — | — | — | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 39% | 6% | -5% | -16% | -40% | 2% | — | — | 37% | 40% | 19% | ROICROIC |
| 8% | 1% | -19% | -32% | -79% | 0% | -3% | 2% | 27% | 29% | 32% | Return on equityROE |
| 6% | 0% | −21% | −35% | −81% | 0% | −3% | 0% | 24% | 26% | 30% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $6.3B | $6.7B | $5.5B | $1.6B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.1B | $952M | $1.2B | $1.0B | $981M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $1.5B | $1.5B | $2.5B | $2.3B | — | — | — | — | — | — | $2.3B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $335M | $987M | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.3B | $1.0B | $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.2B | InventoryInvent. |
| $3.8B | $4.0B | $2.6B | $2.7B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.3B | Accounts payablePayables |
| ($2.0B) | ($1.5B) | $1.1B | $1.0B | $52M | ($262M) | ($243M) | ($256M) | ($226M) | ($27M) | $2.2B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $10.9B | $13.0B | $11.8B | $11.9B | $11.4B | $5.3B | $5.0B | $5.2B | $5.5B | $5.5B | $5.5B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $10.9B | $9.8B | $9.1B | $10.1B | $10.4B | $3.9B | $4.2B | $4.5B | $4.9B | $4.9B | $4.9B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.0× | 1.3× | 1.3× | 1.2× | 1.1× | 1.4× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.1× | 1.1× | 1.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $3.7B | $8.9B | $7.6B | $3.1B | $2.5B | — | — | — | — | — | $2.5B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $18.7B | $28.3B | $24.8B | $23.5B | $19.7B | $10.0B | $9.4B | $9.7B | $9.9B | $10.1B | $10.1B | Total assetsAssets |
| $2.6B | $3.9B | $4.2B | $4.5B | $3.5B | $2.0B | $1.4B | $1.1B | $885M | $430M | $3.8B | Total debtDebt |
| ($3.7B) | ($2.9B) | ($1.3B) | $2.9B | $2.2B | $678M | $310M | $116M | ($273M) | ($602M) | $2.8B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 6.7× | 3.0× | -1.1× | -15.6× | -24.2× | 1.2× | 2.7× | 5.4× | 11.9× | 17.6× | 20.3× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $5.1B | $13.4B | $10.4B | $7.7B | $4.2B | $3.4B | $3.2B | $3.1B | $3.1B | $3.4B | $3.4B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| — | — | $1.4B | $2.0B | $3.1B | — | — | — | — | — | $3.1B | Goodwill written downGW imp. |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 125M | 448M | 458M | 448M | 449M | 455M | 450M | 452M | 441M | 420M | 410M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $73.54 | $33.61 | $27.41 | $15.51 | $14.55 | $14.09 | $14.91 | $17.30 | $20.62 | $23.67 | $24.86 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $3.14 | $0.25 | $-4.20 | $-5.39 | $-7.33 | $0.03 | $-0.24 | $0.12 | $1.91 | $2.30 | $2.64 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $1.45 | $-0.10 | $-1.21 | $0.97 | $0.89 | $1.30 | $0.43 | $1.03 | $1.54 | $3.45 | $3.28 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $1.45 | $-0.10 | $-1.21 | $0.97 | $0.89 | $1.30 | $0.43 | $1.03 | $1.54 | $3.45 | $3.28 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.89 | $0.14 | $0.52 | $0.52 | $0.13 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.10 | $0.20 | $0.20 | $0.20 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $2.50 | $0.57 | $0.80 | $0.92 | $0.57 | $0.42 | $0.35 | $0.50 | $0.64 | $0.76 | $0.76 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $40.41 | $29.88 | $22.61 | $17.10 | $9.26 | $7.49 | $7.21 | $6.93 | $7.02 | $8.01 | $8.20 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×3.58 into 2017 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −11.8%/yr | +10.2%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +10.1%/yr | +31.0%/yr |
| EPS | −3.4%/yr | — |
| Dividends / share | −15.5%/yr | +8.2%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −12.5%/yr | +5.8%/yr |
| Book value / share | −16.5%/yr | −2.8%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Surface Technologies+0.3%
“Surface Technologies •Inbound orders of $1.1 billion were driven by international markets; and •Revenue from international markets increased year-over-year, representing 65% of segment revenue; and •Experienced further commercial success of iComplete®—our high-performance, surface pressure containment ecosystem—with increased client adoption in high activity basins.”
✓ direction matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
40%low FY2020
Gross margin
19%low FY2022
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
-0.4×peak FY2019
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$1.4Bowner earningsvs.$964Mnet incomelow FY2018
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2016FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $964M of profit into $1.4B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $964M | $843M | $56M | ($107M) | $13M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$442M | +$393M | +$378M | +$377M | +$385M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$359M | −$275M | +$259M | +$82M | +$383M |
| Cash from operations | $1.8B | $961M | $693M | $352M | $781M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$317M | −$282M | −$225M | −$158M | −$192M |
| Owner earnings | $1.4B | $679M | $468M | $194M | $590M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 15% | 7% | 6% | 3% | 9% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 17.6×ComfortableOperating income $1.4B ÷ interest expense $81M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.7B · 1.9× operating profitModest net debtCash $1.0B + ST investments $10M − debt $3.8B
What this means
Netting $1.0B of cash and short-term investments against $3.8B of debt leaves $2.7B owed, about 1.9× a year's operating profit (2.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 84 + DIO 57 − DPO 58 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle8-yr median, range -40%–40%; 18% latest = NOPAT $1.1B ÷ invested capital $6.1BIndustry peers: median 5%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 18% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -4%–15%; latest $1.4B = operating cash $1.8B − maintenance capex $317MIndustry peers: median 5%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 15% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 10 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $1.8B ÷ net income $964M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $82M ÷ Owner Earnings $1.4B
What this means
Of $1.4B Owner Earnings, $82M (6%) went back to shareholders, $82M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.72×HarvestingCapex $317M ÷ depreciation $442M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $9.9B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.13×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $3.8B vs $631M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 8 of 10 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.56/share (latest year $2.42), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $8.44/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 6 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 4% → 12% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 4% early to 12% lately, median 6% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +36%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 36% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2020 · −49.7% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Dividend record paid
What this means
Paid a dividend in 8 of the years on record.
- How management talks about it Owner’s terms
What this means
The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Named as a competitive risk
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“In order to compete effectively, we must develop and implement innovative technologies and processes, including building artificial intelligence ("AI") capabilities into our products and services, and execute our clients' projects effectively.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$5.5B
- Cash & short-term investments$981M
- Receivables$2.3B
- Inventory$1.2B
- Other current assets$1.0B
Current liabilities$4.9B
- Debt due within a year$36M
- Accounts payable$1.3B
- Other current liabilities$3.6B
Current ratio1.13×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.88×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.20×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$625Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$36M due · $981M cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+11.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.1× → 1.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$448Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($1.2B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.2B$792M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $4.7B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$2.2Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Operating leasesFinance leases
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
Due in the next 12 months$233Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$1.2Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$913Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability
True leverage: debt plus leases
On-balance-sheet debt$3.8B
Lease obligations (present value)$913M
Total fixed claims on the business$4.7B
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $4.7B, of which the leases are 19%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $6.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$2.8B · 42%
- Dividends$914M · 14%
- Buybacks$781M · 12%
- Retained (debt / cash)$2.1B · 32%
- Returned to owners$1.7B
45% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $914M as dividends and $781M as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $1.2B and cash and short-term investments fell $5.3B.
- Average price paid for buybacks$23.18
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 4M shares were bought for $93M, about $23.18 each.
- Net change in share count227.7%
The diluted count rose from 125M to 410M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$0.20/sh
Paid in 8 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 15% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$2.9B29% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity75%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$105Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $2.8B of capital spent building
$6.5B written down across 3 years (2018, 2019, 2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $21.9M | $15.3M | $590M |
| 2022 | $14.8M | $52.8M | $194M |
| 2023 | $17.1M | $62.6M | $468M |
| 2024 | $16.5M | $56.5M | $679M |
| 2025 | $17.8M | $56.5M | $1.4B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio120:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why TechnipFMC plc Ordinary Share is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
4 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?227.7%
Diluted shares grew 227.7% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $781M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$2.6B → $3.8B
Debt rose from $2.6B to $3.8B while owner earnings went from about ($139M) to $865M: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?20% → 34% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $1.8B to $3.5B while revenue grew 11%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (20% of revenue then, 34% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?8 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 8 of the last 10 years, $14.1B in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Pension & retirement as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Oilfield Services & Equipment
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BKRBaker Hughes Company | $27.7B | 66% | 5.1% | 3% | 4% |
| AGCOAgco Corp /de | $10.1B | 23% | 5.6% | 10% | 5% |
| FTITechnipFMC plc Ordinary Share | $9.9B | 16% | 7.0% | 4% | 6% |
| NOVNOV Inc. | $8.7B | 16% | 0.0% | -1% | 7% |
| DOVDover Corporation | $8.1B | 37% | 14.8% | 13% | 11% |
| TEXTerex | $5.4B | 20% | 8.6% | 11% | 5% |
| WFRDWeatherford International plc | $4.9B | 56% | 3.2% | 5% | 5% |
| DNOWDNOW Inc. | $2.8B | 20% | -0.5% | -1% | 6% |
| Group median | — | 21% | 5.3% | 5% | 6% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what TechnipFMC plc Ordinary Share has delivered.
TechnipFMC plc Ordinary Share’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
$
Through the cycle, TechnipFMC plc Ordinary Share earns about $602M on its 6.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 14.6% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+28%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+36%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+36%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings $1.3B on 399M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-28; net debt $2.8B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "TechnipFMC plc Ordinary Share (FTI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/FTI, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← FTDR its page in the Manual FTK →
Industry order: ← FLOC the Oilfield Services & Equipment chapter HAL →