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NOG, Northern Oil and Gas
We are an independent energy company engaged as a non-operator in the acquisition, exploration, development and production of oil and natural gas properties in the United States, primarily in the Williston Basin, the Permian Basin, the Appalachian Basin and the Uinta Basin.
Our acquisition activities were a significant driver of our 6% production growth from 131,777 Boe per day in the fourth quarter of 2024 to 140,064 Boe per day in the fourth quarter of 2025.
Strategy is focused on growing our reserves, production and free cash flow to create long-term value for our stakeholders while maintaining a strong balance sheet.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 51% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 81% and operating margin about 12% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −260% and 64% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −130 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on the commodity price, and the cost to lift a barrel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 9%). By owner earnings: roughly 58% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $145M | $209M | $679M | $472M | $324M | $975M | $2.0B | $2.2B | $2.2B | $2.5B | $1.9B | RevenueRevenue |
| 68% | 76% | 90% | 75% | 64% | 82% | 87% | 84% | 81% | 81% | 74% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 10% | 9% | 2% | 5% | 6% | 3% | 2% | 2% | 2% | 2% | 4% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ($229M) | $60M | $433M | $56M | ($841M) | $78M | $853M | $1.1B | $838M | $246M | ($638M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −158.2% | 28.9% | 63.7% | 11.8% | −259.6% | 8.0% | 43.0% | 51.8% | 37.6% | 9.9% | −34.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($293M) | ($9M) | $144M | ($76M) | ($906M) | $6M | $773M | $923M | $520M | $39M | ($623M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | -0% | — | — | 4% | 0% | 8% | 24% | 38% | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $102M | $73M | $244M | $340M | $332M | $396M | $928M | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.4B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $200K | $200K | $100K | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $100K | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $392M | $79M | $96M | $408M | $1.2B | $386M | $150M | $255M | $876M | $1.5B | $2.0B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $215K | $4K | $87K | $229M | $47M | $410M | $1.4B | $1.9B | $1.7B | $1.3B | $1.6B | CapexCapex |
| 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 48.5% | 14.5% | 42.1% | 68.2% | 85.9% | 75.2% | 50.6% | 86.4% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $102M | $73M | $244M | $340M | $332M | $396M | $928M | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.4B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 70.2% | 34.9% | 36.0% | 71.9% | 102.3% | 40.6% | 46.7% | 54.6% | 63.3% | 60.8% | 75.7% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $102M | $73M | $244M | $111M | $285M | ($14M) | ($427M) | ($678M) | ($266M) | $254M | ($201M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| 70.2% | 34.9% | 36.0% | 23.4% | 87.9% | −1.4% | −21.5% | −31.3% | −11.9% | 10.2% | −10.7% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $5M | $52M | $124M | $162M | $173M | $176M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $0 | $0 | $22M | $15M | $0 | $0 | $55M | $8M | $94M | $57M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| -53% | — | — | — | -92% | — | 37% | 27% | 14% | 3% | -12% | ROICROIC |
| — | — | 33% | -14% | — | 3% | 104% | 45% | 22% | 2% | -35% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | — | −14% | — | 1% | 97% | 39% | 15% | −6% | −45% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $6M | $102M | $2M | $16M | $1M | $10M | $3M | $8M | $9M | $14M | $37M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $36M | $47M | $96M | $108M | $71M | $194M | $271M | $371M | $390M | $350M | $395M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $56M | $93M | $55M | $69M | $36M | $65M | $129M | $193M | $203M | $219M | $235M | Accounts payablePayables |
| ($20M) | ($46M) | $41M | $39M | $35M | $128M | $143M | $178M | $187M | $131M | $160M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $47M | $153M | $228M | $133M | $126M | $215M | $320M | $509M | $501M | $586M | $473M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $77M | $124M | $232M | $203M | $182M | $328M | $345M | $386M | $544M | $539M | $899M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 0.6× | 1.2× | 1.0× | 0.7× | 0.7× | 0.7× | 0.9× | 1.3× | 0.9× | 1.1× | 0.5× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $432M | $632M | $1.5B | $1.9B | $872M | $1.5B | $2.9B | $4.5B | $5.6B | $5.4B | $5.5B | Total assetsAssets |
| $833M | $979M | $830M | $1.1B | $945M | $803M | $1.5B | $1.8B | $2.4B | $2.4B | $2.6B | Total debtDebt |
| $826M | $877M | $828M | $1.1B | $943M | $794M | $1.5B | $1.8B | $2.4B | $2.4B | $2.5B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -3.6× | 0.9× | 5.0× | 0.7× | -14.4× | 1.3× | 10.6× | 8.3× | 5.3× | 1.4× | -3.7× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ($487M) | ($491M) | $430M | $559M | ($223M) | $215M | $745M | $2.0B | $2.3B | $2.1B | $1.8B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 2.4% | 1.6% | 0.6% | 1.7% | 1.3% | 0.4% | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.5% | 0.6% | 0.8% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 61.2M | 62.4M | 23.7M | 38.7M | 42.7M | 63.0M | 86.7M | 92.1M | 101M | 99.3M | 98.5M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $2.37 | $3.35 | $28.67 | $12.20 | $7.58 | $15.48 | $22.91 | $23.53 | $21.98 | $24.93 | $19.07 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-4.80 | $-0.15 | $6.07 | $-1.97 | $-21.20 | $0.10 | $8.92 | $10.03 | $5.14 | $0.39 | $-6.33 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $1.66 | $1.17 | $10.31 | $8.78 | $7.76 | $6.29 | $10.71 | $12.85 | $13.91 | $15.15 | $14.43 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $1.66 | $1.17 | $10.31 | $2.86 | $6.66 | $-0.22 | $-4.92 | $-7.36 | $-2.63 | $2.55 | $-2.04 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| — | — | — | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.08 | $0.60 | $1.35 | $1.60 | $1.75 | $1.79 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $5.92 | $1.10 | $6.52 | $15.64 | $20.22 | $16.54 | $12.60 | $16.47 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-7.97 | $-7.86 | $18.16 | $14.43 | $-5.22 | $3.42 | $8.60 | $22.24 | $22.91 | $21.41 | $18.12 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1/2.64 into 2018 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1.63 into 2019 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1.47 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +29.9%/yr | +26.9%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +27.8%/yr | +14.3%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +148.3%/yr | +62.9%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $1.5B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $365K it takes just to hold its position. It put $1.3B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $254M.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $39M | $520M | $923M | $773M | $6M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$15M | +$12M | +$6M | +$6M | +$4M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$1.5B | +$876M | +$255M | +$150M | +$386M |
| Cash from operations | $1.5B | $1.4B | $1.2B | $928M | $396M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$365K | −$328K | −$319K | −$292K | −$144K |
| Owner earnings | $1.5B | $1.4B | $1.2B | $928M | $396M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$1.3B | −$1.7B | −$1.9B | −$1.4B | −$410M |
| Free cash flow | $254M | ($266M) | ($678M) | ($427M) | ($14M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 61% | 63% | 55% | 47% | 41% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $365K, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $1.3B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $15M), owner earnings is nearer $1.5B.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- ThinOperating income $246M ÷ interest expense $172M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.4B · 9.7× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $14M − debt $2.4B
What this means
Netting $14M of cash and short-term investments against $2.4B of debt leaves $2.4B owed, about 9.7× a year's operating profit. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle6-yr median, range -92%–37%; 3% latest = NOPAT $152M ÷ invested capital $4.5BIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years (it ran 3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 35%–102%; latest $1.5B = operating cash $1.5B − maintenance capex $100KIndustry peers: median 23%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 61% of revenue this year, a 55% median across 10 years. It chose to put $1.3B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $254M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $15M of SBC) leaves $1.5B.
- Are earnings backed by cash? 38.84×Cash-backedCash from ops $1.5B ÷ net income $39M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $230M ÷ Owner Earnings $1.5B
What this means
Of $1.5B Owner Earnings, $230M (15%) went back to shareholders, $173M dividends, $57M buybacks. Net of $15M stock comp, the real buyback was about $42M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 12517.03×ExpandingCapex $1.3B ÷ depreciation $100K
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $2.5B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.09×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $2.4B vs $47M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 5 of 10 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4.67/share (latest year $0.37), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $20.10/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 6 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −22% → 33% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The margin widened even though the filing names price competition — the gain came from volume or cost, not pricing power. Read where.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −22% early to 33% lately, median 12% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 14%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Owner earnings growth +37%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 37% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2020 · −259.6% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +5.5%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$37M
- Receivables$395M
- Other current assets$41M
- Accounts payable$235M
- Other current liabilities$664M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $6.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$6.8B · 105%
- Dividends$516M · 8%
- Buybacks$251M · 4%
- Returned to owners$767M
12% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $516M as dividends and $251M as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$1.1B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $1.1B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $833M to $2.6B.
- Average price paid for buybacks$9.83
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 10M shares were bought for $100M, about $9.83 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $3.02 (2018) to $28.55 (2022), and 2022, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($55M).
- Net change in share count61.0%
The diluted count rose from 61M to 99M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$1.75/sh
Paid in 5 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained347%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($353M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $1.2B, so each retained $1 added about 3.47 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Nick O’Grady | $2.6M | $3.8M | $396M |
| 2022 | Nick O’Grady | $2.9M | $4.6M | $928M |
| 2023 | Nick O’Grady | $10.2M | $10.3M | $1.2B |
| 2024 | Nick O’Grady | $8.1M | $8.6M | $1.4B |
| 2025 | Nick O’Grady | $5.6M | −$3.5M | $1.5B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership2.8%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$15M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 6% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Northern Oil and Gas is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?61.0%
Diluted shares grew 61.0% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $251M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Oil & Gas Producers
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MTDRMatador Resources | $3.7B | 95% | 37.4% | 12% | 35% |
| RRCRange Resources | $3.0B | 91% | 5.4% | -3% | 26% |
| CRCCalifornia Resources | $2.9B | 24% | 19.7% | 13% | 12% |
| NOGNorthern Oil and Gas | $2.5B | 81% | 20.3% | 9% | 58% |
| CNXCNX Resources | $2.2B | — | -3.2% | -0% | 24% |
| CRKComstock Resources Inc. | $2.2B | — | 16.7% | -0% | 16% |
| TALOTalos Energy Inc. | $1.8B | — | 12.7% | 6% | 5% |
| GPORGulfport Energy | $1.4B | 69% | 0.5% | 7% | 23% |
| Group median | — | 81% | 14.7% | 7% | 24% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Northern Oil and Gas has delivered.
Northern Oil and Gas’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Northern Oil and Gas earns about $1.4B on its 54.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 60.8% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
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9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow ($201M) on 106M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-24; net debt $2.5B. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($1.6B) runs well above depreciation ($100K), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $1.4B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← NODK its page in the Manual NOV →
Industry order: ← MUR the Oil & Gas Producers chapter NUAI →