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OI, O-I Glass Inc.

Containers & Packaging capital-intensive Distress / turnaroundCyclical

It competes in the glass container segment of the rigid packaging market and is the leading glass container manufacturer in most of the countries where it has manufacturing facilities.

By improving productivity and reducing costs, the Company aims to drive economies of scale across the manufacturing network.

The objective is to realign the Company's network to be the lowest cost in mainstream and the best cost in premium segments.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

OI · O-I Glass Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$6.4B

−1.6% YoY · 1% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $6.4B 5-yr avg $6.7B

Gross margin 16% 5-yr avg 18%

Operating margin 0.6% 5-yr avg 4.5%

ROIC 1% 5-yr avg 4%

Owner-earnings margin 1% 5-yr avg 0%

Free cash flow margin 1% 5-yr avg 0%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Americas (57%), Europe (42%) and Other (1%).
Situation: Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 18% and operating margin about 5.2% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The margin is cyclical, swinging between 0.4% and 12% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 15% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 8 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 3 segments, the largest Americas at 57%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

Americas57%$3.6B
Europe42%$2.7B
Other1%$96M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$6.7B	$6.9B	$6.9B	$6.7B	$6.1B	$6.4B	$6.9B	$7.1B	$6.5B	$6.4B	$6.4B	RevenueRevenue
18%	19%	19%	18%	16%	17%	18%	21%	16%	17%	16%	Gross marginGross mgn
8%	7%	7%	7%	7%	7%	7%	8%	7%	7%	7%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$600M	$518M	$626M	$29M	$353M	$332M	$805M	$67M	$38M	$266M	$38M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
9.0%	7.5%	9.1%	0.4%	5.8%	5.2%	11.7%	0.9%	0.6%	4.1%	0.6%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$209M	$180M	$257M	($400M)	$249M	$149M	$584M	($103M)	($106M)	($129M)	($186M)	Net incomeNet inc.
36%	28%	30%	—	26%	53%	23%	—	—	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$751M	$721M	$791M	$405M	$457M	$687M	$154M	$818M	$489M	$600M	$477M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$478M	$488M	$494M	$499M	$468M	$449M	$454M	$483M	$486M	$479M	$480M	DepreciationDeprec.
$64M	$53M	$40M	$306M	($260M)	$81M	($917M)	$395M	$95M	$225M	$157M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$454M	$441M	$536M	$426M	$311M	$398M	$539M	$688M	$617M	$432M	$439M	CapexCapex
6.8%	6.4%	7.8%	6.4%	5.1%	6.3%	7.9%	9.7%	9.4%	6.7%	6.9%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$297M	$280M	$255M	($21M)	$146M	$289M	($385M)	$130M	($128M)	$168M	$38M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
4.4%	4.1%	3.7%	−0.3%	2.4%	4.5%	−5.6%	1.8%	−2.0%	2.6%	0.6%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$297M	$280M	$255M	($21M)	$146M	$289M	($385M)	$130M	($128M)	$168M	$38M	Free cash flowFCF
4.4%	4.1%	3.7%	−0.3%	2.4%	4.5%	−5.6%	1.8%	−2.0%	2.6%	0.6%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$56M	$39M	$123M	$190M	$111M	$117M	$137M	$126M	$121M	$136M	$136M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	—	$31M	$8M	—	—	—	—	—	$8M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
—	—	$163M	$38M	—	$40M	$40M	$40M	$40M	$40M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
8%	7%	8%	—	5%	3%	12%	1%	0%	—	1%	ROICROIC
82%	22%	33%	-86%	84%	21%	41%	-6%	-10%	-10%	-13%	Return on equityROE
—	—	—	−92%	81%	—	—	—	—	—	−14%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$492M	$492M	$512M	$551M	$563M	$725M	$773M	$913M	$734M	$759M	$318M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$580M	$663M	$549M	$621M	$623M	$692M	$760M	$671M	$572M	$601M	$805M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$983M	$1.0B	$1.0B	$1.0B	$841M	$816M	$848M	$1.1B	$963M	$1.0B	$1.0B	InventoryInvent.
$1.1B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.1B	Accounts payablePayables
$428M	$375M	$246M	$390M	$338M	$298M	$253M	$305M	$393M	$402M	$751M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$2.3B	$2.4B	$2.4B	$2.5B	$2.3B	$2.5B	$2.6B	$2.9B	$2.5B	$2.6B	$2.4B	Current assetsCur. assets
$2.1B	$2.3B	$2.2B	$2.0B	$1.9B	$1.8B	$2.4B	$2.3B	$2.2B	$2.1B	$1.9B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.1×	1.1×	1.1×	1.2×	1.2×	1.4×	1.1×	1.2×	1.1×	1.2×	1.3×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$2.5B	$2.6B	$2.5B	$1.9B	$2.0B	$1.8B	$1.8B	$1.5B	$1.3B	$1.5B	$1.5B	GoodwillGoodwill
$9.1B	$9.8B	$9.7B	$9.6B	$8.9B	$8.8B	$9.1B	$9.7B	$8.7B	$9.2B	$8.9B	Total assetsAssets
$5.2B	$5.1B	$5.2B	$5.5B	$5.1B	$4.8B	$4.7B	$4.8B	$4.9B	$4.9B	$4.9B	Total debtDebt
$4.7B	$4.6B	$4.7B	$4.9B	$4.5B	$4.1B	$3.9B	$3.9B	$4.1B	$4.1B	$4.5B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
2.2×	1.9×	2.4×	0.1×	1.3×	1.5×	3.4×	0.2×	0.1×	0.8×	0.1×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$254M	$808M	$786M	$467M	$297M	$720M	$1.4B	$1.6B	$1.1B	$1.3B	$1.4B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
—	—	—	—	—	0.1%	0.5%	0.6%	0.2%	0.4%	0.4%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
—	—	—	$595M	—	—	—	$445M	—	—	$445M	Goodwill written downGW imp.
											Per share
163M	165M	162M	155M	159M	160M	159M	155M	155M	154M	153M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$41.16	$41.72	$42.43	$43.10	$38.36	$39.65	$43.12	$45.94	$42.26	$41.85	$41.91	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.28	$1.09	$1.59	$-2.58	$1.57	$0.93	$3.67	$-0.67	$-0.69	$-0.84	$-1.22	EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.82	$1.70	$1.57	$-0.14	$0.92	$1.80	$-2.42	$0.84	$-0.83	$1.09	$0.25	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.82	$1.70	$1.57	$-0.14	$0.92	$1.80	$-2.42	$0.84	$-0.83	$1.09	$0.25	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
—	—	—	$0.20	$0.05	—	—	—	—	—	$0.05	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$2.79	$2.68	$3.31	$2.74	$1.96	$2.48	$3.39	$4.45	$3.99	$2.81	$2.88	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$1.56	$4.91	$4.85	$3.01	$1.87	$4.49	$8.91	$10.40	$6.98	$8.43	$9.38	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+0.2%/yr	+1.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share	−5.5%/yr	+3.5%/yr
Dividends / share	−74.8%/yr (1-yr)	−74.8%/yr (1-yr)
Capital spending / share	+0.1%/yr	+7.5%/yr
Book value / share	+20.6%/yr	+35.1%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

154Mpeak FY2017

ROIC

0%low FY2024

Gross margin

17%low FY2020

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

24.7×peak FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$168Mowner earningsvs.($129M)net incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $129M loss into $168M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($129M)	($106M)	($103M)	$584M	$149M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$479M	+$486M	+$483M	+$454M	+$449M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$25M	+$14M	+$43M	+$33M	+$8M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$225M	+$95M	+$395M	−$917M	+$81M
Cash from operations	$600M	$489M	$818M	$154M	$687M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$432M	−$617M	−$688M	−$539M	−$398M
Owner earnings	$168M	($128M)	$130M	($385M)	$289M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	3%	-2%	2%	-6%	5%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $25M), owner earnings is nearer $143M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 0.1×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income $38M ÷ interest expense $341M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $4.4B · 116.3× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $759M + ST investments $1M − debt $5.2B

What this means
Netting $760M of cash and short-term investments against $5.2B of debt leaves $4.4B owed, about 116.3× a year's operating profit (136.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 20d

Tight

DSO 34 + DIO 69 − DPO 82 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 5%

Below average through the cycle

8-yr median, range 0%–12%; 1% latest = NOPAT $30M ÷ invested capital $5.7B

Industry peers: median 14%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 2%

Thin through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -6%–5%; latest $168M = operating cash $600M − maintenance capex $432M

Industry peers: median 12%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 3% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $25M of SBC) leaves $143M.
Are earnings backed by cash? $600M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($129M) · cash from operations $600M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 29%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $48M ÷ Owner Earnings $168M

What this means
Of $168M Owner Earnings, $48M (29%) went back to shareholders, $8M dividends, $40M buybacks. Net of $25M stock comp, the real buyback was about $15M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.90×

Maintaining

Capex $432M ÷ depreciation $479M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $6.4B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.25×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $5.2B vs $512M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 2 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −152%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.73/share (latest year $-0.84), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $8.44/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 6 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 9% → 2% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices but names price competition too — and the margin slipped, so the pressure is winning here.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 9% early to 2% lately, median 5% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth −26%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 26% a year over the record.
Worst year 2019 · 0.4% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count −0.6%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 2 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.4B

Cash & short-term investments$318M
Receivables$805M
Inventory$1.0B
Other current assets$258M

Current liabilities$1.9B

Debt due within a year$64M
Accounts payable$1.1B
Other current liabilities$773M

Current ratio1.26×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.73×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.17×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$490Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$64M due · $318M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−1.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.3× → 1.3×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($218M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$5.1B$196M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$35M

'27$54M

'28$54M

'29$48M

'30$666M

later$614M

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$35Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$89Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$666Min 2030the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Total scheduled principal$1.5Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$318M

One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$168M

Together, against $35M due next year13.9×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $486M against the $35M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 14 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $5.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$4.8B · 82%
Dividends$39M · 1%
Buybacks$401M · 7%
Retained (debt / cash)$591M · 10%

Returned to owners$440M
43% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $39M as dividends and $401M as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks$16.57
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 24M shares were bought for $401M, about $16.57 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $12.12 (2025) to $20.00 (2023); its heaviest year, 2018, paid $18.95 ($163M).
Net change in share count−6.2%
The diluted count fell from 163M to 153M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$0.05/sh
Paid in 2 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 75% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
Return on what it retained−49%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($450M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $221M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.49 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$1.7B18% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth

Cash spent acquiring$1.2Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $4.8B of capital spent building

$1.0B written down across 2 years (2019, 2023): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 90% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Gordon J. Hardie	$10.8M	$6.4M	$289M
2022	Gordon J. Hardie	$12.2M	$21.3M	($385M)
2023	Gordon J. Hardie	$11.8M	$14.4M	$130M
2024	Gordon J. Hardie	$4.1M	−$5.6M	($128M)
2024	Gordon J. Hardie	$7.5M	$5.0M	($128M)
2025	Gordon J. Hardie	$11.5M	$18.1M	$168M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$25M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 66% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why O-I Glass Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?0.8% vs 4.1%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 4.1% early in the record and 0.8% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?5 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 5 of the last 10 years, $1.2B in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Did the share count rise anyway?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Pension & retirement, Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Containers & Packaging

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
CRHCRH Public Limited Company	$37.4B	34%	12.0%	12%	9%
AMRZAmrize Ltd	$11.8B	26%	16.2%	—	12%
OCOwens Corning Inc Common Stock New	$10.1B	25%	12.4%	8%	11%
OIO-I Glass Inc.	$6.4B	18%	5.5%	6%	3%
JHXJames Hardie Industries plc.	$4.8B	39%	16.9%	16%	15%
EXPEagle Materials	$2.3B	—	28.6%	18%	20%
APOGApogee Enterprises Inc.	$1.4B	23%	7.5%	11%	6%
TGLSTecnoglass Inc.	$984M	39%	20.5%	20%	12%
Group median	—	26%	14.3%	12%	12%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what O-I Glass Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, O-I Glass Inc. earns about $161M on its 2.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 2.6% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($161M) Net of stock comp (−$26M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−26%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $38M on 153M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-03-31; net debt $4.5B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh OI against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "O-I Glass Inc. (OI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/OI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← OHI its page in the Manual OII →

Industry order: ← NWL the Containers & Packaging chapter PACK →