Owner Scorecard


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OC, Owens Corning Inc Common Stock New

Building Products capital-intensive Cyclical

Owens Corning is a building products leader committed to building a sustainable future through material innovation.

Our products provide durable, sustainable, and energy-efficient solutions that leverage our unique capabilities and market-leading positions to help our customers win and grow.

Our roofing products and systems enhance curb appeal and protect people's homes.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
OC · Owens Corning Inc Common Stock New
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$10.1B
+2.6% YoY · 7% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $9.8B 5-yr avg $9.3B
Gross margin 27% 5-yr avg 28%
Operating margin 0.7% 5-yr avg 14.5%
Owner-earnings margin 8% 5-yr avg 13%
Free cash flow margin 8% 5-yr avg 13%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 25% and operating margin about 12% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −2.0% and 20% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Inventory runs near 13% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 8%). By owner earnings: roughly 11% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$5.7B$6.4B$7.1B$7.2B$7.1B$8.5B$9.8B$8.4B$9.9B$10.1B$9.8BRevenueRevenue
24%25%23%22%23%26%27%29%31%28%27%Gross marginGross mgn
9%10%10%10%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%2%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$697M$797M$807M$787M($138M)$1.4B$1.7B$1.6B$1.5B$360M$73MOperating incomeOp. inc.
12.3%12.5%11.4%11.0%−2.0%16.9%17.6%19.6%15.0%3.6%0.7%Operating marginOp. mgn
$393M$289M$545M$405M($383M)$995M$1.2B$1.2B$647M($522M)($534M)Net incomeNet inc.
32%48%22%31%24%23%23%34%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$943M$1.0B$803M$1.0B$1.1B$1.5B$1.8B$1.7B$1.9B$1.8B$1.7BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$343M$371M$433M$457M$493M$502M$531M$609M$677M$694M$709MDepreciationDeprec.
$166M$312M($222M)$136M$984M($44M)($63M)($137M)$475M$1.5B$1.4BWorking capital & otherWC & other
$373M$337M$537M$447M$307M$416M$446M$526M$647M$824M$854MCapexCapex
6.6%5.3%7.6%6.2%4.4%4.9%4.6%6.3%6.6%8.2%8.7%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$570M$679M$266M$590M$828M$1.1B$1.3B$1.2B$1.2B$962M$827MOwner earningsOwner earn.
10.0%10.6%3.8%8.2%11.7%12.8%13.5%14.2%12.6%9.5%8.4%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$570M$679M$266M$590M$828M$1.1B$1.3B$1.2B$1.2B$962M$827MFree cash flowFCF
10.0%10.6%3.8%8.2%11.7%12.8%13.5%14.2%12.6%9.5%8.4%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$452M$570M$1.1B$0$0$42M$417M$6M$2.9B$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$81M$89M$92M$95M$104M$108M$136M$188M$208M$232M$236MDividends paidDiv. paid
$247M$159M$236M$61M$318M$570M$795M$657M$491M$815MBuybacksBuybacks
8%7%8%7%-2%17%20%20%10%ROICROIC
10%7%13%9%-10%23%27%23%13%-14%-15%Return on equityROE
8%5%11%7%−12%21%24%20%9%−20%−21%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$112M$246M$78M$172M$717M$959M$1.1B$1.6B$321M$345M$272MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$678M$806M$794M$770M$919M$939M$961M$987M$1.1B$937M$1.4BReceivablesReceiv.
$710M$841M$1.1B$1.0B$855M$1.1B$1.3B$1.2B$1.3B$1.5B$1.5BInventoryInvent.
$615M$834M$851M$815M$875M$1.1B$1.3B$1.2B$1.3B$1.3B$1.3BAccounts payablePayables
$773M$813M$1.0B$988M$899M$922M$950M$969M$1.2B$1.2B$1.6BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1.6B$2.0B$2.0B$2.1B$2.6B$3.1B$3.6B$3.9B$3.4B$3.3B$3.7BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$963M$1.3B$1.3B$1.3B$1.4B$1.7B$2.1B$2.3B$2.3B$2.7B$3.0BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.6×1.5×1.6×1.6×1.8×1.8×1.7×1.7×1.5×1.3×1.2×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$989M$990M$1.4B$1.4B$2.7B$1.7B$1.7BGoodwillGoodwill
$7.7B$8.6B$9.8B$10.0B$9.5B$10.0B$10.8B$11.2B$14.1B$13.0B$13.1BTotal assetsAssets
$2.1B$2.4B$3.4B$3.0B$3.1B$3.0B$3.0B$2.6B$5.1B$4.7B$4.7BTotal debtDebt
$2.0B$2.2B$3.3B$2.8B$2.4B$2.0B$1.9B$1.0B$4.8B$4.4B$4.5BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
6.5×7.4×6.9×6.0×-1.0×11.4×15.7×22.1×7.1×1.4×0.3×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$3.8B$4.2B$4.3B$4.6B$3.9B$4.3B$4.6B$5.2B$5.1B$3.9B$3.6BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.7%0.7%0.7%0.5%0.6%0.6%0.5%0.6%0.9%0.7%0.7%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$944M$1.1B$1.1BGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
115M113M111M110M109M104M97.7M91.0M87.8M84.0M81.1MShares out (diluted)Shares
$49.19$56.40$63.35$65.03$64.96$81.48$99.91$92.00$112.20$120.27$121.31Revenue / shareRev/sh
$3.41$2.55$4.89$3.68$-3.53$9.54$12.70$13.14$7.37$-6.21$-6.58EPS (diluted)EPS
$4.94$6.00$2.39$5.36$7.62$10.42$13.45$13.11$14.18$11.45$10.20Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$4.94$6.00$2.39$5.36$7.62$10.42$13.45$13.11$14.18$11.45$10.20Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.70$0.79$0.83$0.86$0.96$1.04$1.39$2.07$2.37$2.76$2.91Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$3.23$2.98$4.82$4.06$2.83$3.99$4.56$5.78$7.37$9.81$10.53Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$33.35$36.77$38.45$42.06$35.92$41.19$46.83$56.77$57.82$45.87$44.93Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+10.4%/yr+13.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share+9.8%/yr+8.5%/yr
Dividends / share+16.4%/yr+23.6%/yr
Capital spending / share+13.1%/yr+28.3%/yr
Book value / share+3.6%/yr+5.0%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
84Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
10%low FY2020
Gross margin
28%low FY2019
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
4.6×peak FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$962Mowner earningsvs.($522M)net incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $522M loss into $962M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($522M)$647M$1.2B$1.2B$995M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$694M+$677M+$609M+$531M+$502M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$71M+$93M+$51M+$51M+$50M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$1.5B+$475M−$137M−$63M−$44M
Cash from operations$1.8B$1.9B$1.7B$1.8B$1.5B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$824M−$647M−$526M−$446M−$416M
Owner earnings$962M$1.2B$1.2B$1.3B$1.1B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue10%13%14%13%13%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $71M), owner earnings is nearer $891M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Thin
    Operating income $360M ÷ interest expense $256M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $4.4B · 12.2× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $345M − debt $4.7B
    What this means

    Netting $345M of cash and short-term investments against $4.7B of debt leaves $4.4B owed, about 12.2× a year's operating profit (13.1× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 34 + DIO 74 − DPO 63 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    9-yr median, range -2%–20%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit
    Industry peers: median 14%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 4%–14%; latest $962M = operating cash $1.8B − maintenance capex $824M
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 10% of revenue this year, a 11% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $71M of SBC) leaves $891M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($522M) · cash from operations $1.8B
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $1.0B ÷ Owner Earnings $962M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $962M of Owner Earnings, $1.0B (109%) went back to shareholders, $232M dividends, $815M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $71M stock comp, the real buyback was about $744M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.19×
    Maintaining
    Capex $824M ÷ depreciation $694M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $10.1B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.26×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $4.7B vs $685M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Near
    Earnings +33% over the record · +8%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $5.47/share (latest year $-6.48), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $47.85/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 12% → 13% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing claims pricing power in its strongest form — price raised, volume held — yet the margin here has not widened to match. The claim leads the record; weigh them together.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 12% early, 13% lately, median 12%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +7%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 7% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · −2.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −3.5%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$3.7B
  • Cash & short-term investments$272M
  • Receivables$1.4B
  • Inventory$1.5B
  • Other current assets$606M
Current liabilities$3.0B
  • Debt due within a year$38M
  • Accounts payable$1.3B
  • Other current liabilities$1.7B
Current ratio1.24×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.74×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.09×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$711Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$38M due · $272M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−10.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.4× → 1.2×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($518M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($5.7B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$5.2B$516M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $5.5B (annual-report basis)

From the company's latest filing.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases
'26$162M
'27$132M
'28$108M
'29$93M
'30$72M
later$476M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$162Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$1.0Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$784Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$4.7B
Lease obligations (present value)$784M
Total fixed claims on the business$5.5B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $5.5B, of which the leases are 14%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $13.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$4.9B · 36%
  • Dividends$1.3B · 10%
  • Buybacks$4.3B · 32%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$3.1B · 22%
  • Returned to owners$5.7B

    65% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.3B as dividends and $4.3B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $2.6B and cash and short-term investments rose $160M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $4.3B over the span, but a stock split in the window left the reported buyback-share counts on a basis the diluted-share count doesn't match, so a comparable average price can't be drawn.

  • Net change in share count−29.7%

    The diluted count fell from 115M to 81M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$2.76/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 16% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$4.2B32% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity44%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$5.5Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $4.9B of capital spent building

$2.1B written down across 2 years (2020, 2025): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 38% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Chambers$9.8M$12.6M$1.1B
2022Mr. Chambers$11.0M$14.1M$1.3B
2023Mr. Chambers$11.2M$31.1M$1.2B
2024Mr. Chambers$12.2M$18.2M$1.2B
2025Mr. Chambers$12.2M−$814k$962M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$71M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 20% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Owens Corning Inc Common Stock New is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 6 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
    ≈$1.6B · 16% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
    “In 2025, we had two customers that represented 16% and 12% of our annual net sales, respectively.”verify →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Building Products

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
CRHCRH Public Limited Company$37.4B34%12.0%12%9%
AMRZAmrize Ltd$11.8B26%16.2%12%
OCOwens Corning Inc Common Stock New$10.1B25%12.4%8%11%
OIO-I Glass Inc.$6.4B18%5.5%6%3%
JHXJames Hardie Industries plc.$4.8B39%16.9%16%15%
EXPEagle Materials$2.3B28.6%18%20%
APOGApogee Enterprises Inc.$1.4B23%7.5%11%6%
TGLSTecnoglass Inc.$984M39%20.5%20%12%
Group median26%14.3%12%12%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Owens Corning Inc Common Stock New has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Owens Corning Inc Common Stock New earns about $1.1B on its 11.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 9.5% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−2%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+7%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $827M on 81M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $4.5B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Owens Corning Inc Common Stock New (OC), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/OC, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← OBT its page in the Manual OCFC →

Industry order: ← MBC the Building Products chapter PRLB →