Owner Scorecard


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OLLI, Ollie's Bargain

Ollie's Bargain Outlet Holdings, Inc. and subsidiaries is a leading off-price retailer of brand name household products.

Our highly experienced merchandise team is constantly scouring the market and leveraging deep, long-standing relationships across the supply chain to find the best products at the best prices.

We focus on buying cheap and selling cheap, and source products as unique buying opportunities present themselves.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K
OLLI · Ollie's Bargain
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026
$2.6B
+16.6% YoY · 8% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $2.7B 5-yr avg $2.1B
Gross margin 41% 5-yr avg 39%
Operating margin 11.4% 5-yr avg 10.4%
ROIC 12% 5-yr avg 13%
Owner-earnings margin 9% 5-yr avg 7%
Free cash flow margin 8% 5-yr avg 4%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 40% and operating margin about 11% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. Inventory runs near 24% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 14%, above 15% in 4 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 8% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26TTMTTMMay 2026
Income statement
$890M$1.1B$1.2B$1.4B$1.8B$1.8B$1.8B$2.1B$2.3B$2.6B$2.7BRevenueRevenue
40%40%40%39%40%39%36%40%40%41%41%Gross marginGross mgn
27%26%25%25%23%26%27%27%27%27%27%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$102M$136M$162M$172M$278M$205M$131M$228M$250M$298M$311MOperating incomeOp. inc.
11.5%12.6%13.1%12.2%15.3%11.7%7.2%10.8%11.0%11.2%11.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
$60M$128M$135M$141M$243M$157M$103M$181M$200M$241M$249MNet incomeNet inc.
38%2%16%18%13%23%23%25%25%24%24%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$67M$96M$126M$105M$361M$45M$114M$254M$227M$297M$313MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$10M$12M$14M$18M$23M$25M$29M$35M$44M$55M$57MDepreciationDeprec.
($10M)($51M)($30M)($61M)$90M($145M)($27M)$26M($36M)($12M)($7M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$16M$19M$74M$77M$31M$35M$52M$124M$121M$102M$101MCapexCapex
1.8%1.8%6.0%5.5%1.7%2.0%2.8%5.9%5.3%3.8%3.7%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$57M$84M$112M$88M$339M$20M$86M$220M$183M$241M$256MOwner earningsOwner earn.
6.4%7.8%9.0%6.2%18.7%1.1%4.7%10.4%8.1%9.1%9.4%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$51M$77M$52M$28M$331M$10M$63M$130M$107M$195M$213MFree cash flowFCF
5.7%7.1%4.2%2.0%18.3%0.6%3.4%6.2%4.7%7.3%7.8%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$0Dividends paidDiv. paid
$0$0$40M$301K$220M$42M$53M$53M$74MBuybacksBuybacks
8%16%15%14%27%15%9%14%13%14%12%ROICROIC
9%16%14%13%18%12%8%12%12%13%13%Return on equityROE
9%16%14%13%18%12%8%12%12%13%13%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$99M$39M$52M$90M$447M$247M$211M$266M$205M$260M$198MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$301K$1M$570K$3M$621K$1M$2M$2M$2M$4M$5MReceivablesReceiv.
$210M$255M$296M$335M$354M$467M$471M$506M$553M$650M$687MInventoryInvent.
$50M$74M$77M$63M$117M$107M$90M$128M$130M$169M$155MAccounts payablePayables
$160M$182M$220M$275M$237M$362M$383M$380M$425M$485M$537MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$313M$304M$358M$434M$809M$727M$754M$871M$994M$964M$961MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$105M$137M$151M$178M$284M$263M$259M$316M$304M$400M$414MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.0×2.2×2.4×2.4×2.8×2.8×2.9×2.8×3.3×2.4×2.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$445M$445M$445M$445M$445M$445M$445M$445M$445M$445M$445MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.0B$1.0B$1.2B$1.6B$2.0B$2.0B$2.0B$2.3B$2.6B$3.0B$3.0BTotal assetsAssets
$194M$49M$679K$800K$656K$719K$858K$1M$1M$974K$202MTotal debtDebt
$95M$10M($51M)($89M)($446M)($246M)($210M)($265M)($204M)($259M)$5MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
$651M$796M$943M$1.1B$1.3B$1.3B$1.4B$1.5B$1.7B$1.9B$1.9BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.8%0.7%0.6%0.5%0.4%0.5%0.5%0.6%0.9%0.5%0.5%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
62.4M65.0M65.9M65.9M65.9M64.9M62.7M62.1M61.8M61.8M61.2MShares out (diluted)Shares
$14.26$16.58$18.84$21.38$27.46$27.02$29.14$33.88$36.78$42.89$44.64Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.96$1.96$2.05$2.14$3.68$2.43$1.64$2.92$3.23$3.89$4.08EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.91$1.29$1.70$1.33$5.14$0.31$1.37$3.54$2.97$3.91$4.19Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.81$1.18$0.79$0.43$5.02$0.15$1.00$2.10$1.73$3.15$3.48Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$0.00$0.00Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.26$0.30$1.13$1.17$0.46$0.54$0.82$2.00$1.95$1.65$1.64Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$10.43$12.26$14.30$16.07$20.26$19.85$21.72$24.30$27.45$30.56$30.89Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+13.0%/yr+9.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share+17.6%/yr−5.3%/yr
EPS+16.9%/yr+1.1%/yr
Capital spending / share+22.6%/yr+28.9%/yr
Book value / share+12.7%/yr+8.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
62Mpeak FY2019
ROIC
14%low FY2017
Gross margin
41%low FY2023
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
-1.1×peak FY2017

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$241Mowner earningsvs.$241Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2017FY2026

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business earned $241M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $55M it takes just to hold its position. It put $47M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $195M.

Reported net income$241M
Owner earnings$241M · 9% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income$241M$200M$181M$103M$157M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$55M+$44M+$35M+$29M+$25M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$13M+$19M+$12M+$10M+$8M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$12M−$36M+$26M−$27M−$145M
Cash from operations$297M$227M$254M$114M$45M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$55M−$44M−$35M−$29M−$25M
Owner earnings$241M$183M$220M$86M$20M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$47M−$77M−$90M−$23M−$10M
Free cash flow$195M$107M$130M$63M$10M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue9%8%10%5%1%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $55M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $47M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $13M), owner earnings is nearer $228M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $298M ÷ interest expense $15M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash
    Cash $260M − debt $205M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $55M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 1 + DIO 151 − DPO 39 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 8%–27%; 12% latest = NOPAT $226M ÷ invested capital $1.8B
    Industry peers: median 23%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 12% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 1%–19%; latest $241M = operating cash $297M − maintenance capex $55M
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 9% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 10 years. It chose to put $47M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $195M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $13M of SBC) leaves $228M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $297M ÷ net income $241M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $74M ÷ Owner Earnings $241M
    What this means

    Of $241M Owner Earnings, $74M (31%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $74M buybacks. Net of $13M stock comp, the real buyback was about $61M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.85×
    Expanding
    Capex $102M ÷ depreciation $55M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 5 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.6B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.41×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $205M vs $564M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +93%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $3.43/share (latest year $3.98), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $31.23/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 12% → 11% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 12% early, 11% lately, median 11%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 13%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +13%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 13% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2023 · 7.2% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −0.1%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Costs and potential interruptions associated with the implementation of new or upgraded systems and technology or with maintenance or adequate support of our existing systems could disrupt or reduce the efficiency of our business. 21 Index We may not adopt technological advancements, such as AI, as quickly or effective…”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, May 2, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$961M
  • Cash & short-term investments$198M
  • Receivables$5M
  • Inventory$687M
  • Other current assets$72M
Current liabilities$414M
  • Debt due within a year$5M
  • Accounts payable$155M
  • Other current liabilities$254M
Current ratio2.32×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.66×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.48×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$547Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$5M due · $198M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the May 2, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+14.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters3.0× → 2.3×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$1.2Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($143M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$910M$708M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $889M (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$19Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

'26$126M
'27$137M
'28$122M
'29$102M
'30$78M
later$268M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$126Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$832Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$684Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$205M
Lease obligations (present value)$684M
Total fixed claims on the business$889M

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $889M, of which the leases are 77%, more than the debt itself. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Jan 31, 2026 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated $1.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$651M · 38%
  • Buybacks$482M · 28%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$561M · 33%
  • Returned to owners$482M

    34% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $482M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $482M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−2.0%

    The diluted count fell from 62M to 61M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$0.00/sh

    Paid no dividend over the span; it returns cash through buybacks or retains it.

  • Return on what it retained12%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.1B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $130M, so each retained $1 added about 0.12 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$675M23% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity24%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$0over 10 years buying other businesses, against $651M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2022$4.3M$1.0M$20M
2023$4.1M$5.9M$86M
2024$5.3M$8.4M$220M
2025Mr. Swygert$5.9M$11.4M$183M
2026Mr. van der Valk$5.0M$4.6M$241M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years. A dash under the name means the filing tags the figure without naming the officer.

  • Insider ownership0.8%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio146:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$13M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 4% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Ollie's Bargain is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

None of the 5 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Inventory as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Department & General Merchandise Stores

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
DGDollar General Corporation$42.7B31%8.4%18%6%
BJBJ's Wholesale$21.5B18%3.7%24%3%
DLTRDollar Tree Inc.$19.4B31%8.3%14%5%
BURLBurlington Stores$11.5B42%5.9%23%6%
DDSDillard's$6.5B37%8.2%29%8%
PSMTPriceSmart Inc.$5.3B15%4.3%13%3%
FIVEFive Below$4.8B36%11.2%25%9%
OLLIOllie's Bargain$2.6B40%11.6%14%8%
Group median34%8.2%21%6%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Ollie's Bargain has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Ollie's Bargain earns about $210M on its 7.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 9.1% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+42%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26+10%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $213M on 60M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-27; net debt $5M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($101M) runs well above depreciation ($57M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $258M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Ollie's Bargain (OLLI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/OLLI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← OLED its page in the Manual OLN →

Industry order: ← MNSO the Department & General Merchandise Stores chapter PSMT →