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PEG, Public Service Enterprise Group Inc

Multi-Utilities capital-intensive Regulated utility

It also offers appliance services and repairs to customers throughout its service territory and invests in regulated solar generation projects and regulated energy efficiency and related programs in New Jersey.

PSE&G earns revenues from its regulated rate tariffs under which it provides electric transmission and electric and natural gas distribution to residential, commercial and industrial (C&I) customers in its service territory.

PSEG Long Island LLC (PSEG LI), which operates the Long Island Power Authority's (LIPA) electric transmission and distribution (T&D) system under a contractual agreement; PSEG Energy Holdings L.L.C.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

PEG · Public Service Enterprise Group Inc

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$12.2B

+18.3% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $12.8B 5-yr avg $10.6B

Gross margin 75%

Operating margin 25.5% 5-yr avg 17.1%

ROIC 7% 5-yr avg 5%

Owner-earnings margin 18% 5-yr avg 12%

Free cash flow margin 1% 5-yr avg −6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is led by Electric Distribution (40%) and Gas Distribution (20%), with 2 more lines behind.
Situation: Regulated utility. Returns are set by regulation on an approved rate base; the capital spending regulators approve becomes the growth, recovered through allowed rates.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 68% and operating margin about 19% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −8.8% to 33% — on a steadier 68% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −110 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on rate base and the allowed return. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 17% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 4 lines, the largest Electric Distribution at 40%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Electric Distribution40%$4.9B
Gas Distribution20%$2.5B
Transmission15%$1.8B
Other Contract Revenues9%$1.1B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$9.0B	$9.1B	$9.7B	$10.1B	$9.6B	$9.7B	$9.8B	$11.2B	$10.3B	$12.2B	$12.8B	RevenueRevenue
68%	69%	67%	67%	68%	—	—	—	—	—	75%	Gross marginGross mgn
$1.6B	$1.4B	$2.3B	$1.9B	$2.3B	($856M)	$1.4B	$3.7B	$2.4B	$3.0B	$3.3B	Operating incomeOp. inc.
17.8%	15.7%	23.7%	19.3%	23.6%	−8.8%	14.1%	32.8%	22.9%	24.5%	25.5%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$887M	$1.6B	$1.4B	$1.7B	$1.9B	($648M)	$1.0B	$2.6B	$1.8B	$2.1B	$2.3B	Net incomeNet inc.
32%	—	22%	13%	17%	—	-3%	17%	3%	11%	13%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$3.3B	$3.3B	$2.9B	$3.4B	$3.1B	$1.7B	$1.5B	$3.8B	$2.1B	$3.3B	$3.5B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$1.5B	$2.0B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.3B	DepreciationDeprec.
$950M	($300M)	$317M	$438M	($88M)	$1.2B	($628M)	$108M	($821M)	($70M)	($9M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$4.2B	$4.2B	$3.9B	$3.2B	$2.9B	$2.7B	$2.9B	$3.3B	$3.4B	$3.3B	$3.3B	CapexCapex
46.8%	46.1%	40.3%	31.4%	30.4%	28.0%	29.5%	29.6%	32.8%	26.9%	26.1%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$1.8B	$1.3B	$1.8B	$2.1B	$1.8B	$520M	$403M	$2.7B	$951M	$2.0B	$2.3B	Owner earningsOwner earn.
20.5%	14.0%	18.1%	21.1%	18.9%	5.3%	4.1%	23.8%	9.2%	16.8%	17.6%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($886M)	($930M)	($999M)	$213M	$179M	($983M)	($1.4B)	$481M	($1.2B)	$26M	$183M	Free cash flowFCF
−9.9%	−10.2%	−10.3%	2.1%	1.9%	−10.1%	−14.1%	4.3%	−12.1%	0.2%	1.4%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$830M	$870M	$910M	$950M	$991M	$1.0B	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.3B	Dividends paidDiv. paid
—	—	—	—	$0	$0	$500M	$0	$0	—	—	BuybacksBuybacks
5%	5%	6%	6%	6%	-2%	4%	9%	6%	7%	7%	ROICROIC
7%	11%	10%	11%	12%	-4%	8%	17%	11%	12%	13%	Return on equityROE
0%	5%	4%	5%	6%	−12%	−0%	9%	4%	5%	6%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$423M	$313M	$177M	$147M	$543M	$818M	$465M	$54M	$125M	$132M	$568M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.9B	$1.9B	$1.5B	$1.6B	$1.9B	$2.1B	ReceivablesReceiv.
$1.5B	$1.7B	$1.5B	$1.4B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.1B	$1.5B	$1.2B	Accounts payablePayables
($298M)	($346M)	($16M)	($45M)	$78M	$544M	$673M	$268M	$461M	$399M	$1.2B	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$3.3B	$3.3B	$3.5B	$3.2B	$3.6B	$6.3B	$4.3B	$3.4B	$4.2B	$4.6B	$4.4B	Current assetsCur. assets
$3.3B	$4.2B	$4.9B	$5.0B	$5.5B	$7.1B	$6.7B	$5.1B	$6.5B	$5.7B	$4.5B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.0×	0.8×	0.7×	0.6×	0.7×	0.9×	0.6×	0.7×	0.7×	0.8×	1.0×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$16M	$16M	$16M	$0	—	—	—	—	—	—	$0	GoodwillGoodwill
$40.1B	$42.7B	$45.3B	$47.7B	$50.0B	$49.0B	$48.7B	$50.7B	$54.6B	$57.6B	$57.9B	Total assetsAssets
$11.4B	$13.1B	$14.5B	$15.1B	$16.2B	$15.9B	$18.1B	$19.3B	$21.1B	$22.5B	$23.1B	Total debtDebt
$11.0B	$12.8B	$14.3B	$15.0B	$15.6B	$15.1B	$17.6B	$19.2B	$21.0B	$22.4B	$22.5B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
4.2×	3.7×	4.8×	3.4×	3.8×	-1.5×	2.2×	4.9×	2.7×	3.0×	3.1×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$13.1B	$13.8B	$14.4B	$15.1B	$16.0B	$14.4B	$13.7B	$15.5B	$16.1B	$17.0B	$17.3B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
											Per share
508M	507M	507M	507M	507M	504M	501M	500M	500M	501M	500M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$17.65	$17.94	$19.12	$19.87	$18.94	$19.29	$19.56	$22.47	$20.58	$24.29	$25.59	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.75	$3.10	$2.84	$3.34	$3.76	$-1.29	$2.06	$5.13	$3.54	$4.21	$4.53	EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.62	$2.51	$3.46	$4.20	$3.58	$1.03	$0.80	$5.34	$1.90	$4.07	$4.51	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-1.74	$-1.83	$-1.97	$0.42	$0.35	$-1.95	$-2.76	$0.96	$-2.49	$0.05	$0.37	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.63	$1.72	$1.79	$1.87	$1.95	$2.05	$2.15	$2.27	$2.39	$2.51	$2.56	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$8.27	$8.26	$7.72	$6.24	$5.77	$5.39	$5.76	$6.65	$6.76	$6.53	$6.67	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$25.85	$27.31	$28.36	$29.76	$31.53	$28.65	$27.40	$30.95	$32.23	$33.90	$34.61	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+3.6%/yr	+5.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+1.3%/yr	+2.6%/yr
EPS	+10.3%/yr	+2.3%/yr
Dividends / share	+4.9%/yr	+5.1%/yr
Capital spending / share	−2.6%/yr	+2.5%/yr
Book value / share	+3.1%/yr	+1.5%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

501Mpeak FY2016

ROIC

7%low FY2021

Gross margin

68%low FY2019

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

11.0×peak FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$2.0Bowner earningsvs.$2.1Bnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $2.0B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $1.3B it takes just to hold its position. It put $2.0B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $26M.

Reported net income$2.1B

Owner earnings$2.0B · 17% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$2.1B	$1.8B	$2.6B	$1.0B	($648M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$1.3B	+$1.2B	+$1.1B	+$1.1B	+$1.2B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$70M	−$821M	+$108M	−$628M	+$1.2B
Cash from operations	$3.3B	$2.1B	$3.8B	$1.5B	$1.7B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$1.3B	−$1.2B	−$1.1B	−$1.1B	−$1.2B
Owner earnings	$2.0B	$951M	$2.7B	$403M	$520M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$2.0B	−$2.2B	−$2.2B	−$1.8B	−$1.5B
Free cash flow	$26M	($1.2B)	$481M	($1.4B)	($983M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	17%	9%	24%	4%	5%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $1.3B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $2.0B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 3.0×

Adequate

Operating income $3.0B ÷ interest expense $1.0B

What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $22.3B · 7.5× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $132M + ST investments $160M − debt $22.5B

What this means
Netting $292M of cash and short-term investments against $22.5B of debt leaves $22.3B owed, about 7.5× a year's operating profit (7.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -121d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 57 + DIO 0 − DPO 178 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 6%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range -2%–9%; 7% latest = NOPAT $2.6B ÷ invested capital $39.4B

Industry peers: median 6%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 17%

High through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 4%–24%; latest $2.0B = operating cash $3.3B − maintenance capex $1.3B

Industry peers: median 12%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 17% of revenue this year, a 17% median across 10 years. It chose to put $2.0B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $26M — the gap is investment, not weakness.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.56×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $3.3B ÷ net income $2.1B

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 62%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $1.3B ÷ Owner Earnings $2.0B

What this means
Of $2.0B Owner Earnings, $1.3B (62%) went back to shareholders, $1.3B dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 2.60×

Expanding

Capex $3.3B ÷ depreciation $1.3B

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $12.2B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.80×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $22.5B vs ($1.1B) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Near

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +65%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4.31/share (latest year $4.24), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $34.08/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 9 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 19% → 27% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 19% early to 27% lately, median 19% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 12%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
Owner earnings growth −0%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 0% a year over the record.
Worst year 2021 · −8.8% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count −0.2%/yr

What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
How management talks about it Owner’s terms

What this means
Returns have thinned, but the filing discusses it in an owner’s vocabulary rather than selling past it — candor about a hard stretch counts for more than an adjective.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“Moreover, new or updated security laws or regulations , including laws and regulations that respond to evolving application of AI, or unforeseen threat sources could require changes in current measures taken by us and our business operations, which could result in increased costs…”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$4.4B

Cash & short-term investments$568M
Receivables$2.1B
Inventory$360M
Other current assets$1.4B

Current liabilities$4.5B

Debt due within a year$425M
Accounts payable$1.2B
Other current liabilities$2.9B

Current ratio0.97×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.89×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.12×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($141M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. This business collects from customers before it pays suppliers (a negative cash-conversion cycle), so the balance sheet is funded by that float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Debt due this year vs. cash$425M due · $568M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+22.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.6× → 1.0×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$17.3Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$23.2B$144M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$0

'27$700M

'28$600M

'29$750M

'30$1.1B

later$2.1B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$0the first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$700Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$1.1Bin 2030the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Total scheduled principal$5.3Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $28.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$34.0B · 119%
Dividends$10.3B · 36%
Buybacks$500M · 2%

Returned to owners$10.8B
70% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $10.3B as dividends and $500M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$16.3B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $16.3B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $11.4B to $23.1B.
Average price paid for buybacks$67.57
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 7M shares were bought for $500M, about $67.57 each.
Net change in share count−1.6%
The diluted count fell from 508M to 500M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$2.51/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 5% a year. It was never cut over the span.
Return on what it retained7%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($3.6B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $266M, so each retained $1 added about 0.07 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Izzo	$14.2M	$16.8M	$520M
2022	Mr. Izzo	$12.9M	$1.5M	$403M
2022	Mr. LaRossa	$9.5M	$6.4M	$403M
2023	Mr. LaRossa	$11.8M	$13.0M	$2.7B
2024	Mr. LaRossa	$12.4M	$31.4M	$951M
2025	Mr. LaRossa	$13.9M	$11.3M	$2.0B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Public Service Enterprise Group Inc is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$11.4B → $23.1B
Debt rose from $11.4B to $23.1B while owner earnings went from about $1.6B to $1.9B — about 7.0 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 12 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Multi-Utilities

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
EXCExelon Corporation	$24.3B	—	14.1%	5%	-8%
EDConsolidated Edison Inc.	$17.0B	—	22.1%	6%	12%
XELXcel Energy Inc.	$14.7B	67%	17.7%	6%	13%
PEGPublic Service Enterprise Group Inc	$12.2B	68%	21.1%	6%	17%
WECWEC Energy Group Inc.	$9.8B	64%	22.1%	6%	18%
AEEAmeren Corporation	$8.8B	—	21.5%	5%	18%
CMSCMS Energy Corporation	$8.3B	—	18.7%	5%	12%
NINiSource Inc	$6.5B	68%	20.5%	6%	10%
Group median	—	67%	20.8%	6%	12%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Public Service Enterprise Group Inc has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Public Service Enterprise Group Inc earns about $2.1B on its 17.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 16.8% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($2.1B) Net of stock comp Steady-state · maintenance capex ($2.3B)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+34%/yr

Owner-earnings growth, delivered—

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $183M on 498M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-21; net debt $22.5B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($3.3B) runs well above depreciation ($1.3B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $2.3B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh PEG against another business →

The owners of PEG: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Public Service Enterprise Group Inc (PEG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PEG, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← PECO its page in the Manual PEGA →

Industry order: ← PCG the Multi-Utilities chapter SRE →