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WEC, WEC Energy Group Inc.
WE generates and distributes electric energy to customers located in southeastern Wisconsin, east central Wisconsin, and northern Wisconsin.
Our electric energy deliveries included supply and distribution sales to retail, wholesale, and resale customers, and distribution sales to those customers who switched to an alternative electric supplier in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Regulated utility. Returns are set by regulation on an approved rate base; the capital spending regulators approve becomes the growth, recovered through allowed rates. Capital build-out. Capital spending has surged to 45% of sales, today's earnings are charged less depreciation than tomorrow's will be.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 64% and operating margin about 21% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. That margin has stayed fairly steady relative to where it runs (19%–25% over the years), so unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line, are the lever. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −51 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on rate base and the allowed return. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 9 years). By owner earnings: roughly 18% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $7.5B | $7.6B | $7.7B | $7.5B | $7.2B | $8.3B | $9.6B | $8.9B | $8.6B | $9.8B | $10.1B | RevenueRevenue |
| 65% | 63% | 62% | 64% | 68% | 60% | 55% | 64% | 69% | 67% | 65% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.9B | $1.9B | $2.2B | $2.2B | $2.3B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 22.7% | 23.2% | 19.1% | 20.4% | 23.6% | 20.6% | 20.0% | 21.5% | 25.0% | 22.9% | 22.7% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $939M | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.6B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 38% | 24% | 14% | 10% | 16% | 13% | 19% | 13% | 13% | 7% | 6% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $2.1B | $2.1B | $2.4B | $2.3B | $2.2B | $2.0B | $2.1B | $3.0B | $3.2B | $3.4B | $3.4B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $763M | $799M | $846M | $926M | $976M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.5B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $402M | $76M | $540M | $285M | $20M | ($342M) | ($470M) | $423M | $330M | $343M | $299M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $1.4B | $2.0B | $2.4B | $2.5B | $2.9B | $2.4B | $2.7B | $2.5B | $2.8B | $4.4B | $4.5B | CapexCapex |
| 19.1% | 25.6% | 31.5% | 33.6% | 39.7% | 28.5% | 28.1% | 28.0% | 32.3% | 44.9% | 44.8% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.6B | $1.4B | $1.2B | $958M | $938M | $1.8B | $1.9B | $1.9B | $1.9B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 17.9% | 16.7% | 20.8% | 18.9% | 16.8% | 11.5% | 9.8% | 19.7% | 21.6% | 19.4% | 19.2% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $680M | $119M | $28M | ($184M) | ($678M) | ($340M) | ($636M) | $526M | $431M | ($1.0B) | ($1.1B) | Free cash flowFCF |
| 9.1% | 1.6% | 0.4% | −2.4% | −9.4% | −4.1% | −6.6% | 5.9% | 5.0% | −10.4% | −10.7% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $226M | $0 | $0 | $365M | $0 | — | — | — | — | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $625M | $657M | $697M | $745M | $798M | $855M | $918M | $984M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.2B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $108M | $71M | $72M | $140M | $99M | $33M | $69M | $17M | $3M | $1M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 6% | 7% | — | 6% | 6% | 6% | 6% | 6% | 6% | 6% | 6% | ROICROIC |
| 10% | 13% | — | 11% | 11% | 12% | 12% | 11% | 12% | 11% | 11% | Return on equityROE |
| 4% | 6% | — | 4% | 4% | 4% | 4% | 3% | 4% | 3% | 3% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $38M | $39M | $85M | $38M | $25M | $16M | $29M | $43M | $10M | $28M | $46M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.8B | $1.5B | $1.7B | $2.1B | $1.9B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $862M | $860M | $876M | $908M | $881M | $1.0B | $1.2B | $897M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $831M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $380M | $491M | $405M | $268M | $322M | $500M | $620M | $607M | $532M | $923M | $1.1B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $2.2B | $2.2B | $2.2B | $2.1B | $2.1B | $2.7B | $3.2B | $2.8B | $2.9B | $3.3B | $3.0B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $2.4B | $3.9B | $3.3B | $3.2B | $4.1B | $3.8B | $4.6B | $5.1B | $4.8B | $5.6B | $4.4B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 0.9× | 0.6× | 0.7× | 0.7× | 0.5× | 0.7× | 0.7× | 0.5× | 0.6× | 0.6× | 0.7× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $3.0B | $3.1B | $3.1B | $3.1B | $3.1B | $3.1B | $3.1B | $3.1B | $3.1B | $3.1B | $3.1B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $30.1B | $31.6B | $33.5B | $35.0B | $37.0B | $39.0B | $41.9B | $43.9B | $47.4B | $51.5B | $51.7B | Total assetsAssets |
| $9.4B | $9.6B | $10.4B | $11.9B | $12.5B | $13.6B | $15.5B | $16.6B | $18.9B | $20.0B | $19.9B | Total debtDebt |
| $9.3B | $9.6B | $10.3B | $11.8B | $12.4B | $13.5B | $15.4B | $16.6B | $18.9B | $20.0B | $19.9B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 4.2× | 4.3× | 3.3× | 3.1× | 3.5× | 3.6× | 3.7× | 2.6× | 2.6× | 2.5× | 2.5× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $9.0B | $9.5B | — | $10.3B | $10.7B | $11.1B | $11.6B | $12.1B | $12.8B | $14.1B | $14.6B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 317M | 317M | 317M | 317M | 317M | 316M | 316M | 316M | 317M | 324M | 328M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $23.58 | $24.11 | $24.23 | $23.75 | $22.88 | $26.29 | $30.36 | $28.15 | $27.17 | $30.27 | $30.72 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $2.96 | $3.79 | $3.34 | $3.58 | $3.79 | $4.11 | $4.45 | $4.22 | $4.83 | $4.81 | $4.99 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $4.23 | $4.04 | $5.05 | $4.48 | $3.85 | $3.03 | $2.97 | $5.55 | $5.87 | $5.87 | $5.90 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $2.15 | $0.38 | $0.09 | $-0.58 | $-2.14 | $-1.07 | $-2.01 | $1.66 | $1.36 | $-3.15 | $-3.29 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $1.97 | $2.07 | $2.20 | $2.35 | $2.52 | $2.70 | $2.90 | $3.12 | $3.34 | $3.54 | $3.58 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $4.49 | $6.18 | $7.63 | $7.99 | $9.08 | $7.50 | $8.53 | $7.89 | $8.79 | $13.58 | $13.75 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $28.27 | $29.92 | — | $32.38 | $33.69 | $35.14 | $36.75 | $38.21 | $40.45 | $43.40 | $44.38 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +2.8%/yr | +5.8%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +3.7%/yr | +8.8%/yr |
| EPS | +5.5%/yr | +4.9%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +6.7%/yr | +7.1%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +13.1%/yr | +8.4%/yr |
| Book value / share | +4.9%/yr | +5.2%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $1.9B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $1.5B it takes just to hold its position. It put $2.9B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($1.0B).
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $1.6B | $1.5B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.3B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$1.5B | +$1.4B | +$1.3B | +$1.1B | +$1.1B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$343M | +$330M | +$423M | −$470M | −$342M |
| Cash from operations | $3.4B | $3.2B | $3.0B | $2.1B | $2.0B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$1.5B | −$1.4B | −$1.3B | −$1.1B | −$1.1B |
| Owner earnings | $1.9B | $1.9B | $1.8B | $938M | $958M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$2.9B | −$1.4B | −$1.2B | −$1.6B | −$1.3B |
| Free cash flow | ($1.0B) | $431M | $526M | ($636M) | ($340M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 19% | 22% | 20% | 10% | 12% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $1.5B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $2.9B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $2.2B ÷ interest expense $895M
What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $20.0B · 8.9× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $28M − debt $20.0B
What this means
Netting $28M of cash and short-term investments against $20.0B of debt leaves $20.0B owed, about 8.9× a year's operating profit. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 77 + DIO 0 − DPO 127 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle9-yr median, range 6%–7%; 6% latest = NOPAT $2.1B ÷ invested capital $34.0BIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 10%–22%; latest $1.9B = operating cash $3.4B − maintenance capex $1.5BIndustry peers: median 13%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 19% of revenue this year, a 18% median across 10 years. It chose to put $2.9B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($1.0B) — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $3.4B ÷ net income $1.6B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks $1.1B ÷ Owner Earnings $1.9B
What this means
Of $1.9B Owner Earnings, $1.1B (60%) went back to shareholders, $1.1B dividends, $1M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 2.97×ExpandingCapex $4.4B ÷ depreciation $1.5B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $9.8B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.59×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $20.0B vs ($2.3B) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +38%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4.52/share (latest year $4.78), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $43.14/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 22% → 23% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 22% early, 23% lately, median 21%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 6%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Owner earnings growth +4%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 4% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2018 · 19.1% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +0.2%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
- How management talks about it Owner’s terms
What this means
The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$46M
- Receivables$1.9B
- Other current assets$1.0B
- Debt due within a year$520M
- Accounts payable$831M
- Other current liabilities$3.0B
Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. This business collects from customers before it pays suppliers (a negative cash-conversion cycle), so the balance sheet is funded by that float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.
From the company's latest filing.
Debt maturity
the debt note, SEC EDGAR →Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.
Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.
Against what the business has and earns
Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $1.9B against the $1.5B due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 1.3 times it.
Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $24.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$25.9B · 104%
- Dividends$8.5B · 34%
- Buybacks$614M · 2%
- Returned to owners$9.1B
64% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $8.5B as dividends and $614M as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$10.2B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $10.2B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $9.4B to $19.9B.
- Average price paid for buybacks$75.78
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 8M shares were bought for $614M, about $75.78 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $60.00 (2016) to $137.39 (2024); its heaviest year, 2019, paid $77.83 ($140M).
- Net change in share count3.6%
The diluted count rose from 317M to 328M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$3.54/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 7% a year. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained12%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($3.6B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $431M, so each retained $1 added about 0.12 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $18.5M | $14.2M | $958M |
| 2022 | $8.1M | $9.7M | $938M |
| 2022 | $8.2M | $17.3M | $938M |
| 2023 | $9.6M | $5.7M | $1.8B |
| 2024 | $10.9M | $16.2M | $1.9B |
| 2025 | $12.2M | $20.9M | $1.9B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why WEC Energy Group Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?3.6%
Diluted shares grew 3.6% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $614M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$9.4B → $19.9B
Debt rose from $9.4B to $19.9B while owner earnings went from about $1.4B to $1.8B — about 6.6 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 11 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Pension & retirement, Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Multi-Utilities
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EDConsolidated Edison Inc. | $17.0B | — | 22.1% | 6% | 12% |
| XELXcel Energy Inc. | $14.7B | 67% | 17.7% | 6% | 13% |
| PEGPublic Service Enterprise Group Inc | $12.2B | 68% | 21.1% | 6% | 17% |
| WECWEC Energy Group Inc. | $9.8B | 64% | 22.1% | 6% | 18% |
| AEEAmeren Corporation | $8.8B | — | 21.5% | 5% | 18% |
| CMSCMS Energy Corporation | $8.3B | — | 18.7% | 5% | 12% |
| NINiSource Inc | $6.5B | 68% | 20.5% | 6% | 10% |
| EVRGEvergy | $5.7B | — | 24.7% | 6% | 17% |
| Group median | — | 67% | 21.3% | 6% | 15% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what WEC Energy Group Inc. has delivered.
WEC Energy Group Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, WEC Energy Group Inc. earns about $1.8B on its 18.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 19.4% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
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9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow ($1.1B) on 326M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-03-31; net debt $19.9B. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($4.5B) runs well above depreciation ($1.5B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $2.0B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← WEAV its page in the Manual WELL →
Industry order: ← VIVO the Multi-Utilities chapter XEL →