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PCG, PG&E Corp.

Multi-Utilities capital-intensive Regulated utilityDistress / turnaroundCyclical

PG&E is the holding company for Pacific Gas and Electric, a regulated utility that delivers electricity and natural gas to homes and businesses across northern and central California. It owns the poles, wires, substations, power plants and pipelines that carry the energy, and it bills customers for what it delivers. What it may charge is not set by the market but by a state regulator, which approves rates meant to cover its costs and earn an allowed return on the money sunk into that equipment.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

PCG · PG&E Corp.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$24.9B

+2.1% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $25.8B 5-yr avg $23.2B

Operating margin 19.4% 5-yr avg 13.2%

ROIC 5% 5-yr avg 4%

Owner-earnings margin −16% 5-yr avg −19%

Free cash flow margin −16% 5-yr avg −19%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Electric (73%) and Natural gas (27%).
Situation: Regulated utility. Returns are set by regulation on an approved rate base; the capital spending regulators approve becomes the growth, recovered through allowed rates. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: This is a franchise granted by regulators, not won in a market: the test is the regulatory compact — whether the utility is consistently allowed to earn its authorized return on its base of plant, since that approved return, not pricing power, is the whole game. Because the model is capital-hungry — it must keep pouring money into the grid and pipes whether or not that spending earns its keep — watch whether the cash it produces covers the cash it consumes, or whether the gap is filled with debt. The standing danger is its own equipment: lines and gas systems that can ignite fires or fail create open-ended liability the filing flags through wildfire securities suits, a customer credit trust, and leverage covenants — liability that can swamp years of allowed returns at once. The figures for margins, return on capital, and the debt load are in the record below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 4%, above 15% in 0 of 8 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Electric is 73% of revenue, with Natural gas the other meaningful line at 27%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Electric73%$18.3B
Natural gas27%$6.6B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$17.7B	$17.1B	$16.8B	$17.1B	$18.5B	$20.6B	$21.7B	$24.4B	$24.4B	$24.9B	$25.8B	RevenueRevenue
$2.1B	$2.9B	($9.7B)	($10.1B)	$1.8B	$1.9B	$1.8B	$2.7B	$4.5B	$4.7B	$5.0B	Operating incomeOp. inc.
11.8%	17.0%	−57.9%	−58.9%	9.5%	9.1%	8.5%	10.9%	18.3%	19.0%	19.4%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$1.4B	$1.6B	($6.9B)	($7.7B)	($1.3B)	($102M)	$1.8B	$2.2B	$2.5B	$2.6B	$2.8B	Net incomeNet inc.
4%	24%	—	—	—	—	—	—	-9%	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$4.4B	$6.0B	$4.8B	$4.8B	($19.1B)	$2.3B	$3.7B	$4.7B	$8.0B	$8.7B	$8.3B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$3.0B	$4.3B	$11.6B	$12.5B	($17.8B)	$2.4B	$1.9B	$2.5B	$5.6B	$6.1B	$5.5B	Working capital & otherWC & other
$5.7B	$5.6B	$6.5B	$6.3B	$7.7B	$7.7B	$9.6B	$9.7B	$10.4B	$11.8B	$12.5B	CapexCapex
32.3%	32.9%	38.9%	36.9%	41.6%	37.2%	44.2%	39.8%	42.5%	47.3%	48.4%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($1.3B)	$336M	($1.8B)	($1.5B)	($26.8B)	($5.4B)	($5.9B)	($5.0B)	($2.3B)	($3.1B)	($4.2B)	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−7.4%	2.0%	−10.5%	−8.7%	−145.2%	−26.3%	−27.0%	−20.3%	−9.6%	−12.3%	−16.3%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($1.3B)	$336M	($1.8B)	($1.5B)	($26.8B)	($5.4B)	($5.9B)	($5.0B)	($2.3B)	($3.1B)	($4.2B)	Free cash flowFCF
−7.4%	2.0%	−10.5%	−8.7%	−145.2%	−26.3%	−27.0%	−20.3%	−9.6%	−12.3%	−16.3%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$921M	$1.0B	$0	$0	—	—	$0	$0	$86M	—	$86M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
6%	6%	-15%	—	—	1%	3%	3%	5%	5%	5%	ROICROIC
8%	9%	-54%	-149%	-6%	-0%	8%	9%	8%	8%	9%	Return on equityROE
3%	3%	−54%	−149%	—	—	8%	9%	8%	—	8%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$177M	$449M	$1.7B	$1.6B	$484M	$291M	$734M	$635M	$940M	$713M	$1.1B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.1B	$1.3B	$1.9B	$2.3B	$2.6B	$2.0B	$2.2B	$2.3B	$1.9B	ReceivablesReceiv.
$117M	$115M	$111M	$97M	$95M	$44M	$91M	$65M	$52M	$75M	$68M	InventoryInvent.
$1.5B	$1.6B	$2.0B	$2.0B	$2.4B	$2.9B	$2.9B	$2.3B	$2.7B	$3.4B	$2.8B	Accounts payablePayables
($126M)	($288M)	($716M)	($570M)	($424M)	($466M)	($152M)	($196M)	($476M)	($1.0B)	($840M)	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$6.2B	$6.3B	$9.2B	$10.2B	$9.6B	$11.1B	$12.8B	$14.4B	$17.2B	$15.8B	$14.8B	Current assetsCur. assets
$7.6B	$7.1B	$41.7B	$7.6B	$13.6B	$17.4B	$15.8B	$17.3B	$16.3B	$16.3B	$12.3B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.8×	0.9×	0.2×	1.3×	0.7×	0.6×	0.8×	0.8×	1.1×	1.0×	1.2×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$68.6B	$68.0B	$77.0B	$85.2B	$97.9B	$103.3B	$118.6B	$125.7B	$133.7B	$141.6B	$142.0B	Total assetsAssets
$16.9B	$18.2B	$40.6B	$0	$37.3B	$42.7B	$50.0B	$52.4B	$55.7B	$58.2B	$60.8B	Total debtDebt
$16.7B	$17.7B	$39.0B	($1.6B)	$36.8B	$42.4B	$49.3B	$51.7B	$54.8B	$57.5B	$59.6B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
2.5×	3.3×	-10.4×	-10.8×	1.4×	1.2×	1.0×	0.9×	1.5×	1.6×	1.6×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$17.9B	$19.2B	$12.7B	$5.1B	$21.0B	$21.0B	$22.8B	$25.0B	$30.1B	$32.5B	$33.3B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
											Per share
501M	513M	517M	528M	1.26B	1.99B	2.13B	2.14B	2.15B	2.20B	2.28B	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$35.26	$33.40	$32.42	$32.44	$14.69	$10.40	$10.17	$11.43	$11.37	$11.32	$11.33	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.78	$3.21	$-13.25	$-14.50	$-1.05	$-0.05	$0.84	$1.05	$1.15	$1.18	$1.25	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-2.59	$0.65	$-3.41	$-2.84	$-21.34	$-2.73	$-2.75	$-2.32	$-1.09	$-1.39	$-1.85	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-2.59	$0.65	$-3.41	$-2.84	$-21.34	$-2.73	$-2.75	$-2.32	$-1.09	$-1.39	$-1.85	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.84	$1.99	$0.00	$0.00	—	—	$0.00	$0.00	$0.04	—	$0.04	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$11.40	$11.00	$12.60	$11.96	$6.12	$3.87	$4.50	$4.54	$4.83	$5.35	$5.48	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$35.81	$37.47	$24.47	$9.73	$16.71	$10.56	$10.70	$11.71	$14.04	$14.78	$14.58	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×2.38 into 2020 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.58 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−11.9%/yr	−5.1%/yr
EPS	−9.1%/yr	—
Dividends / share	−38.0%/yr (8-yr)	—
Capital spending / share	−8.1%/yr	−2.6%/yr
Book value / share	−9.4%/yr	−2.4%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

2.2Bpeak FY2025

ROIC

5%low FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($3.1B)owner earningsvs.$2.6Bnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $2.6B of profit but ($3.1B) of owner earnings: $5.7B less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$2.6B	$2.5B	$2.2B	$1.8B	($102M)
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$6.1B	+$5.6B	+$2.5B	+$1.9B	+$2.4B
Cash from operations	$8.7B	$8.0B	$4.7B	$3.7B	$2.3B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$11.8B	−$10.4B	−$9.7B	−$9.6B	−$7.7B
Owner earnings	($3.1B)	($2.3B)	($5.0B)	($5.9B)	($5.4B)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	-12%	-10%	-20%	-27%	-26%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 1.6×

Thin

Operating income $4.7B ÷ interest expense $3.0B

What this means
Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $57.5B · 12.1× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $713M − debt $58.2B

What this means
Netting $713M of cash and short-term investments against $58.2B of debt leaves $57.5B owed, about 12.1× a year's operating profit (12.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 3%

Below average through the cycle

8-yr median, range -15%–6%; 5% latest = NOPAT $4.7B ÷ invested capital $90.0B

Industry peers: median 6%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin -12%

Consumes cash through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -145%–2%; latest ($3.1B) = operating cash $8.7B − maintenance capex $11.8B

Industry peers: median 13%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -12% of revenue this year, a -12% median across 10 years.
Are earnings backed by cash? 3.36×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $8.7B ÷ net income $2.6B

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

No surplus to allocate

What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
Investing or harvesting? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $24.9B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.97×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $58.2B vs ($470M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 4 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 3 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.91/share (latest year $0.97), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $12.14/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 6 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −10% → 16% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −10% early to 16% lately, median 10% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 12%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
Worst year 2019 · −58.9% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 3 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$14.8B

Cash & short-term investments$1.1B
Receivables$1.9B
Inventory$68M
Other current assets$11.7B

Current liabilities$12.3B

Debt due within a year$622M
Accounts payable$2.8B
Other current liabilities$8.9B

Current ratio1.20×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.19×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.09×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$2.5Bthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$622M due · $1.1B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+15.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.9× → 1.2×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$33.2Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$61.3B$498M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $28.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$81.0B · 286%
Dividends$2.0B · 7%

Returned to owners$2.0B
$2.0B as dividends and $0 as buybacks.
Source of funding−$54.7B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $54.7B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $16.9B to $60.8B.
Net change in share count355.3%
The diluted count rose from 501M to 2281M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$0.04/sh
Paid in 3 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 47% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why PG&E Corp. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−14.1% vs −5.3%
The business ran at a loss early in the record (an owner-earnings margin of −5.3%) and the loss has widened to −14.1% across the last three years, with the latest year at −12.3%. Ask the filing where the widening sits — price, cost, or spending growing faster than revenue — and what would narrow it.
Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?355.3%
Diluted shares grew 355.3% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$16.9B → $60.8B
Debt rose from $16.9B to $60.8B while owner earnings went from about ($909M) to ($3.5B): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean

Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Pension & retirement, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Multi-Utilities

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
DUKDuke Energy Corporation	$32.2B	72%	22.8%	4%	13%
PCGPG&E Corp.	$24.9B	—	10.2%	4%	-11%
EXCExelon Corporation	$24.3B	—	14.1%	5%	-8%
EDConsolidated Edison Inc.	$17.0B	—	22.1%	6%	12%
XELXcel Energy Inc.	$14.7B	67%	17.7%	6%	13%
PEGPublic Service Enterprise Group Inc	$12.2B	68%	21.1%	6%	17%
WECWEC Energy Group Inc.	$9.8B	64%	22.1%	6%	18%
AEEAmeren Corporation	$8.8B	—	21.5%	5%	18%
Group median	—	—	21.3%	6%	13%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

PG&E Corp. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

Today’s price $

The assumptions Required return 9% Years to get there 10 Revenue growth 0%

Revenue, delivered6%/yr’20→’25

Mature owner-earnings margin 15%

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach—

Margin the price demands—

Owner-earnings margin today−16%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Weigh PCG against another business →

The owners of PCG: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "PG&E Corp. (PCG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PCG, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← PCB its page in the Manual PCOR →

Industry order: ← NWE the Multi-Utilities chapter PEG →