Share count
102Mpeak FY2023
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PERF, Perfect Corp. Class A Ordinary Share
Software asset-light
A software business, earning high margins on code once it is written.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$69M
+14.9% YoY · 18% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $69M 5-yr avg $54M
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −11% through the cycle on a 81% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −26%, above 15% in 0 of 4 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 13% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 5 regions, the largest United States at 38%.
Revenue by geography, FY2025
- United States38%$26M
- Europe29%$20M
- Asia Pacific17%$12M
- Americas12%$8M
- Others4%$3M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2020–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||
| $30M | $41M | $47M | $54M | $60M | $69M | $69M | RevenueRevenue |
| 87% | 86% | 85% | 81% | 78% | 77% | 77% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| ($3M) | ($5M) | ($71M) | ($6M) | ($3M) | ($2M) | ($2M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −9.5% | −12.4% | −150.3% | −10.6% | −5.2% | −2.5% | −2.5% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($6M) | ($157M) | ($162M) | $5M | $5M | $5M | $5M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | — | 2% | — | 19% | 19% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||
| $2M | $2M | ($3M) | $14M | $13M | $13M | $13M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $456K | $598K | $703K | $638K | $747K | $871K | $871K | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $7M | $158M | $158M | $8M | $7M | $8M | $8M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $215K | $154K | $165K | $289K | $392K | $425K | $425K | CapexCapex |
| 0.7% | 0.4% | 0.3% | 0.5% | 0.7% | 0.6% | 0.6% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $2M | $1M | ($3M) | $13M | $13M | $13M | $13M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 6.6% | 3.4% | −7.3% | 24.8% | 20.9% | 18.6% | 18.6% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $2M | $1M | ($3M) | $13M | $13M | $13M | $13M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 6.6% | 3.4% | −7.3% | 24.8% | 20.9% | 18.6% | 18.6% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $10M | $0 | $0 | $51M | $0 | $0 | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | — | -290% | -36% | -16% | -5% | -5% | ROICROIC |
| — | — | -89% | 4% | 3% | 3% | 3% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | −89% | 4% | 3% | 3% | 3% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||
| $79M | $80M | $163M | $124M | $127M | $126M | $126M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $6M | $7M | $8M | $7M | $8M | $8M | $8M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $88K | $45K | $33K | $18K | $17K | $17K | InventoryInvent. |
| $6M | $7M | $8M | $7M | $8M | $8M | $8M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $87M | $209M | $169M | $178M | $173M | $173M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $20M | $25M | $29M | $32M | $38M | $38M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 4.4× | 8.4× | 5.8× | 5.5× | 4.6× | 4.6× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $89M | $210M | $170M | $181M | $192M | $192M | Total assetsAssets |
| ($79M) | ($80M) | ($163M) | ($124M) | ($127M) | ($126M) | ($126M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -315.7× | -559.7× | -8884.3× | -377.3× | -174.6× | -108.0× | -108.0× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ($36M) | ($190M) | $182M | $139M | $147M | $153M | $153M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||
| 55.4M | 53.0M | 68.3M | 118M | 102M | 102M | 102M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $0.54 | $0.77 | $0.69 | $0.45 | $0.59 | $0.68 | $0.68 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.10 | $-2.96 | $-2.37 | $0.05 | $0.05 | $0.05 | $0.05 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.04 | $0.03 | $-0.05 | $0.11 | $0.12 | $0.13 | $0.13 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.04 | $0.03 | $-0.05 | $0.11 | $0.12 | $0.13 | $0.13 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.00 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-0.64 | $-3.60 | $2.66 | $1.18 | $1.44 | $1.50 | $1.50 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1.73 into 2023 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 5-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +4.7%/yr | +4.7%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +28.8%/yr | +28.8%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +1.5%/yr | +1.5%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2020–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
−5%low FY2022
Gross margin
77%low FY2025
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$13Mowner earningsvs.$5Mnet incomelow FY2022
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
FY2020FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $5M of profit into $13M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $5M | $5M | $5M | ($162M) | ($157M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$871K | +$747K | +$638K | +$703K | +$598K |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$8M | +$7M | +$8M | +$158M | +$158M |
| Cash from operations | $13M | $13M | $14M | ($3M) | $2M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$425K | −$392K | −$289K | −$165K | −$154K |
| Owner earnings | $13M | $13M | $13M | ($3M) | $1M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 19% | 21% | 25% | -7% | 3% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Material weakness in financial controls
“Based on that evaluation, our management has concluded that, due to the outstanding material weakness described below under "— Internal Control over Financial Reporting," as of December 31, 2025, our disclosure controls and procedures were not effective.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -108.0×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($2M) ÷ interest expense $16K
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net cash, debt-freeCash $126M − debt $0
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $126M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median -31%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Solid through the cycle6-yr median margin, range -7%–25%; latest $13M = operating cash $13M − maintenance capex $425KIndustry peers: median -19%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 19% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 6 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $13M ÷ net income $5M
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $13M
What this means
Of $13M Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.49×HarvestingCapex $425K ÷ depreciation $871K
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $69M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 4.60×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (6-yr record) · 3 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.05/share (latest year $0.05), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.50/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2020–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 3 of 6
What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin −57% → −6% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −57% early to −6% lately, median −11% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Owner earnings growth +50%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 50% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2022 · −150.3% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.
- How management talks about it Promotional
What this means
The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“User engagement remains closely tied to the pace of innovation in AI-powered features, competitive dynamics within mobile app marketplaces and user acquisition costs across digital advertising channels.”
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$173M
- Cash & short-term investments$126M
- Receivables$8M
- Inventory$17K
- Other current assets$40M
Current liabilities$38M
- Other current liabilities$38M
Current ratio4.60×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio4.60×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio3.34×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$136Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$146Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$134MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$683K$683K of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$22Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2020–2025
Over the record, the business generated $40M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested$2M · 4%
- Buybacks$61M · 151%
- Returned to owners$61M
158% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $61M as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$22M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $22M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $61M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count83.7%
The diluted count rose from 55M to 102M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Perfect Corp. Class A Ordinary Share is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2020–2025.
1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?83.7%
Diluted shares grew 83.7% over 2020–2025, even as the company spent $61M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SOUNSoundHound AI Inc | $169M | 69% | -308.2% | -6% | -150% |
| BLZEBackblaze Inc. | $146M | 52% | -32.1% | -88% | 1% |
| BBAIBigBear.ai Inc. | $128M | 25% | -62.6% | -31% | -19% |
| RDVTRed Violet Inc. Common Stock | $90M | — | -3.0% | -3% | 20% |
| SLPSimulations Plus Inc. | $79M | 74% | 27.8% | 9% | 29% |
| PERFPerfect Corp. Class A Ordinary Share | $69M | 83% | -10.0% | -26% | 13% |
| SVCOSilvaco Group Inc. | $63M | 80% | -67.5% | -40% | -34% |
| RCATRed Cat Holdings Inc. | $41M | 18% | -562.0% | -53% | -250% |
| Group median | — | 69% | -47.3% | -29% | -9% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Perfect Corp. Class A Ordinary Share's US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Perfect Corp. Class A Ordinary Share has delivered.
Perfect Corp. Class A Ordinary Share’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
$
Through the cycle, Perfect Corp. Class A Ordinary Share earns about $9M on its 12.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 18.6% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’20→’25+50%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’20→’25+50%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings $13M on 102M shares outstanding, the balance-sheet count at 2025-06-30; net cash $126M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Perfect Corp. Class A Ordinary Share (PERF), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PERF, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← PDS its page in the Manual PERI →
Industry order: ← PDYN the Software chapter PINS →