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PERI, Perion Network Ltd.
Perion is an advanced technology leader solving the complexities of modern digital advertising through AI-native execution infrastructure.
The global digital advertising market continues to expand rapidly; according to eMarketer, total digital advertising represents an addressable market of $870 billion in 2026, which is expected to grow to $1.13 trillion globally by 2029.
To help brands, agencies and retailers maximize the value of their media investments, we focus on making advertising more effective by seamlessly connecting data, creative, and media channels.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Display Advertising (79%) and Search Advertising (21%).
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 91% and operating margin about 3.7% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −28% to 17% — on a steadier 91% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 8%). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 12% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Display Advertising is 79% of revenue, with Search Advertising the other meaningful line at 21%.
- Display Advertising79%$349M
- Search Advertising21%$91M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMDec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $313M | $274M | $253M | $261M | $328M | $478M | $640M | $743M | $498M | $440M | $440M | RevenueRevenue |
| 92% | 91% | 91% | 90% | — | — | — | — | — | — | 94% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| $11M | ($76M) | $15M | $18M | $12M | $46M | $107M | $114M | ($3M) | ($15M) | ($15M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 3.6% | −27.6% | 5.8% | 6.9% | 3.7% | 9.6% | 16.8% | 15.4% | −0.6% | −3.4% | −3.4% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $201K | ($73M) | $8M | $13M | $10M | $39M | $97M | $115M | $13M | ($8M) | ($8M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 51% | — | 25% | 11% | -6% | 15% | 13% | 15% | 19% | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $30M | $36M | $33M | $45M | $22M | $71M | $122M | $155M | $7M | $42M | $42M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $26M | $17M | $10M | $10M | $10M | $10M | $14M | $14M | $16M | $18M | $18M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $4M | $92M | $15M | $22M | $2M | $23M | $11M | $26M | ($22M) | $32M | $32M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $2M | $2M | $2M | $1M | $459K | $627K | $1M | $811K | $7M | $4M | $4M | CapexCapex |
| 0.5% | 0.6% | 0.8% | 0.5% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 1.4% | 0.9% | 0.9% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $29M | $34M | $31M | $44M | $22M | $70M | $121M | $155M | $67K | $38M | $38M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 9.3% | 12.6% | 12.2% | 16.7% | 6.6% | 14.7% | 18.9% | 20.8% | 0.0% | 8.7% | 8.7% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $29M | $34M | $31M | $44M | $22M | $70M | $121M | $155M | $67K | $38M | $38M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 9.3% | 12.6% | 12.2% | 16.7% | 6.6% | 14.7% | 18.9% | 20.8% | 0.0% | 8.7% | 8.7% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| 2% | -42% | 8% | 11% | 8% | 11% | 23% | 18% | -0% | -2% | -2% | ROICROIC |
| 0% | -53% | 5% | 8% | 6% | 8% | 17% | 16% | 2% | -1% | -1% | Return on equityROE |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $32M | $37M | $43M | $62M | $60M | $322M | $430M | $395M | $296M | $241M | $241M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $71M | $63M | $56M | $49M | $81M | $115M | $160M | $232M | $164M | $188M | $188M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $38M | $39M | $38M | $48M | $72M | $108M | $156M | $217M | $122M | $130M | $130M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $33M | $24M | $17M | $1M | $9M | $8M | $5M | $14M | $42M | $58M | $58M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $114M | $114M | $104M | $115M | $147M | $446M | $603M | $727M | $561M | $520M | $520M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $87M | $81M | $77M | $83M | $120M | $194M | $235M | $340M | $162M | $189M | $189M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.3× | 1.4× | 1.3× | 1.4× | 1.2× | 2.3× | 2.6× | 2.1× | 3.5× | 2.8× | 2.8× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $191M | $125M | $125M | $126M | $152M | $189M | $196M | $248M | $247M | $266M | $266M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $368M | $274M | $256M | $284M | $359M | $713M | $870M | $1.1B | $916M | $914M | $914M | Total assetsAssets |
| $51M | $35M | $25M | $17M | $13M | $0 | — | — | — | — | $10M | Total debtDebt |
| $19M | ($2M) | ($18M) | ($45M) | ($48M) | ($322M) | — | — | — | — | ($231M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $208M | $138M | $149M | $165M | $184M | $467M | $583M | $718M | $723M | $676M | $676M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 25.6M | 25.8M | 25.9M | 26.4M | 28.8M | 37.8M | 48.1M | 50.1M | 49.6M | 42.1M | 39.0M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $12.24 | $10.60 | $9.78 | $9.92 | $11.39 | $12.65 | $13.32 | $14.84 | $10.06 | $10.45 | $11.27 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $0.01 | $-2.81 | $0.31 | $0.49 | $0.36 | $1.02 | $2.03 | $2.30 | $0.25 | $-0.19 | $-0.20 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $1.13 | $1.33 | $1.19 | $1.65 | $0.75 | $1.86 | $2.52 | $3.09 | $0.00 | $0.91 | $0.98 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $1.13 | $1.33 | $1.19 | $1.65 | $0.75 | $1.86 | $2.52 | $3.09 | $0.00 | $0.91 | $0.98 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.06 | $0.06 | $0.08 | $0.05 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.02 | $0.14 | $0.09 | $0.10 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $8.14 | $5.35 | $5.75 | $6.27 | $6.39 | $12.34 | $12.13 | $14.34 | $14.59 | $16.06 | $17.32 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −1.7%/yr | −1.7%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −2.5%/yr | +3.7%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +4.9%/yr | +41.5%/yr |
| Book value / share | +7.8%/yr | +20.2%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $8M loss into $38M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($8M) | $13M | $115M | $97M | $39M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$18M | +$16M | +$14M | +$14M | +$10M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$32M | −$22M | +$26M | +$11M | +$23M |
| Cash from operations | $42M | $7M | $155M | $122M | $71M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$4M | −$7M | −$811K | −$1M | −$627K |
| Owner earnings | $38M | $67K | $155M | $121M | $70M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 9% | 0% | 21% | 19% | 15% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- No meaningful interest burdenLittle or no interest expense reported
What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
- Net cashCash $90M + ST investments $151M − debt $10M
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $231M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- How long is cash tied up? -1702dNegative, funded by othersDSO 156 + DIO 0 − DPO 1858 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median, range -42%–23%; -2% latest = NOPAT ($12M) ÷ invested capital $596MIndustry peers: median -15%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -2% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 0%–21%; latest $38M = operating cash $42M − maintenance capex $4MIndustry peers: median 1%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 9% of revenue this year, a 12% median across 10 years.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($8M) · cash from operations $42M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $339M ÷ Owner Earnings $38M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $38M of Owner Earnings, $339M (888%) went back to shareholders, $339M dividends, $0 buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.21×HarvestingCapex $4M ÷ depreciation $18M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $440M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.76×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $10M vs $331M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.02/share (latest year $-0.20), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $17.32/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 8 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −6% → 4% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −6% early to 4% lately, median 4% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth −5%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 5% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2017 · −27.6% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2017, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +5.7%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- How management talks about it Promotional
What this means
The returns have faded, yet the filing reaches for a promoter’s vocabulary — world-class, best-in-class, disruptive — more than an owner’s. When the words sell harder than the results deliver, the gap is the thing to weigh.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$241M
- Receivables$188M
- Other current assets$91M
- Debt due within a year$6M
- Accounts payable$130M
- Other current liabilities$53M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $564M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$20M · 4%
- Retained (debt / cash)$544M · 96%
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell $42M and cash and short-term investments rose $209M.
- Net change in share count52.7%
The diluted count rose from 26M to 39M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained15%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($215M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $33M, so each retained $1 added about 0.15 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Perion Network Ltd. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?9.8% vs 11.3%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 11.3% early in the record and 9.8% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?52.7%
Diluted shares grew 52.7% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?23% → 43% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $71M to $188M while revenue grew 41%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (23% of revenue then, 43% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, IT Services & Consulting
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DOCSDoximity | $645M | 88% | 33.0% | 16% | 40% |
| XPERXperi Inc. Common Stock | $448M | — | -29.1% | -19% | -7% |
| YEXTYext Inc. | $447M | 75% | -24.8% | -85% | 1% |
| ALKTAlkami Technology Inc. | $444M | 54% | -28.2% | -15% | -19% |
| PERIPerion Network Ltd. | $440M | 91% | 4.8% | 8% | 12% |
| GRNDGrindr Inc. | $440M | — | 21.4% | 22% | 26% |
| VIAVia Transportation Inc. | $434M | 40% | -24.8% | -24% | -21% |
| TBRGTruBridge Inc. | $347M | 52% | 6.5% | 6% | 9% |
| Group median | — | 65% | -10.0% | -4% | 5% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Perion Network Ltd.'s US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Perion Network Ltd. has delivered.
Through the cycle, Perion Network Ltd. earns about $54M on its 12.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 8.7% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $38M on 39M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net cash $231M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← PERF its page in the Manual PFAI →
Industry order: ← PEGA the IT Services & Consulting chapter PHUN →