Owner Scorecard


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PFIS, Peoples Financial Services Corp.

Banks financial

The Bank is a state-chartered bank and trust company under the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania Department of Banking and Securities and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

The Bank's forty community banking offices, all similar with respect to economic characteristics, share a majority of the following aggregation criteria: products and services; operating processes; customer bases; delivery systems; and regulatory oversight.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
PFIS · Peoples Financial Services Corp.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$188M
+39.7% YoY · 14% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · FY2025, with 5-yr average
Revenue $188M 5-yr avg $128M
Return on equity 11% 5-yr avg 9%
Return on tangible equity 14% 5-yr avg 11%
Efficiency ratio 61% 5-yr avg 63%
Equity / assets 9.9% 5-yr avg 9.4%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Net interest margin, loan losses, and book value. A lender is read on the quality of its balance sheet, not an earnings multiple, and the worst year of credit losses matters more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on equity has sat below the cost of equity (median 9%, above 12% in only 2 of 10 years). It runs at a 61% efficiency ratio, about average. The cycle and the loan book decide this one; weigh the recession years in the record, not the average, and read the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25
Income statement
$78M$83M$85M$91M$96M$110M$108M$101M$134M$188MRevenueRevenue
$62M$66M$71M$76M$80M$85M$96M$87M$116M$166MNet interest incomeNet int.
$16M$17M$14M$15M$17M$26M$12M$14M$18M$22MNoninterest incomeFee inc.
$5M$5M$4M$6M$7M$2M($449K)Credit-loss provisionProvision
$20M$18M$25M$26M$29M$44M$38M$27M$8M$59MNet incomeNet inc.
20%31%12%11%14%19%16%16%-0%18%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
1.0%0.9%1.1%1.0%1.0%1.3%1.1%0.7%0.2%1.1%Return on assetsROA
8%7%9%9%9%13%12%8%2%11%Return on equityROE
4%3%5%5%6%10%8%5%−2%7%Retained to equityRetained/eq
10%9%12%11%12%16%15%10%2%14%Return on tangible equityROTCE
62%62%62%61%57%50%58%67%79%61%Efficiency ratioEffic.
Balance sheet
$2.0B$2.2B$2.3B$2.5B$2.9B$3.4B$3.6B$3.7B$5.1B$5.3BTotal assetsAssets
$1.6B$1.7B$1.9B$2.0B$2.4B$3.0B$3.0B$3.3B$4.4B$4.4BDepositsDeposits
$63M$63M$63M$63M$63M$63M$63M$63M$76M$76MGoodwillGoodwill
$257M$265M$279M$299M$317M$340M$315M$340M$469M$520MShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
7.4M7.4M7.4M7.4M7.3M7.2M7.2M7.2M8.6M10.1MShares out (diluted)Shares
$2.65$2.50$3.37$3.47$4.00$6.01$5.28$3.83$0.99$5.88EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.24$1.26$1.31$1.37$1.43$1.49$1.57$1.63$2.11$2.45Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$34.69$35.83$37.64$40.34$43.18$47.01$43.73$47.60$54.62$51.60Book value / shareBVPS
$26.13$27.26$28.77$31.58$34.42$38.19$34.93$38.74$41.78$41.31Tangible book / shareTBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+6.6%/yr+7.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share+4.0%/yr+1.2%/yr
EPS+9.3%/yr+8.0%/yr
Dividends / share+7.8%/yr+11.3%/yr
Capital spending / share+1.9%/yr+28.3%/yr
Book value / share+4.5%/yr+3.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
10Mpeak FY2025
Revenue
$188Mlow FY2016
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • Adequate
    Net income $59M ÷ equity $520M
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    The bank's north star, what it earns on shareholders' capital. Cost of equity is roughly 10%, so a return durably above that builds value and below it destroys it. One year is noisy; the durability across a full credit cycle is what counts.

  • Solid
    Net income ÷ (equity − goodwill $76M − intangibles $28M)
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    The cleaner return, stripping out the goodwill paid for past acquisitions. This is the number a buyer of the whole bank actually earns on the hard capital.

  • Efficient (<65%)
    Noninterest expense $115M ÷ (net interest income + fees)
    Industry peers: median 65%
    What this means

    The share of revenue eaten by running costs; lower is better, and below about 60% marks a genuinely efficient operation. A low ratio held for years is the operational side of a moat.

Is it sound?

  • Capital (equity / assets) 9.9%
    Adequate
    Equity $520M ÷ assets $5.3B
    What this means

    A plain-English leverage read: how much of the balance sheet is the owners' own money. This is a rough proxy; the regulatory figure is the CET1 ratio, which is risk-weighted and reported in the filing. The point is the same, how much loss the bank can absorb before depositors are at risk.

  • Deposit-funded
    Deposits $4.4B ÷ assets $5.3B
    What this means

    Low-cost, sticky deposits are a bank's real moat, the cheap raw material it lends out at a spread. A bank funded mostly by deposits earns more durably than one that rents its money in the wholesale market.

  • Credit cost (provision / NII) -0%
    Net reserve release
    Provision for credit losses ($449K) ÷ net interest income $166M
    What this means

    What the bank set aside this year against loans going bad, as a share of its lending income. This swings hard with the cycle, low in good years and spiking in recessions, so read it across the record, not in one year. Disciplined underwriting shows up as low, stable provisions through a downturn.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“The development and use of Artificial Intelligence ("AI") presents risks and challenges that may adversely impact our business.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021A. Champi$1.0M$1.2M$38M
2022A. Champi$992k$1.0M$39M
2023A. Champi$927k$894k$30M
2024A. Champi$924k$710k$32M
2025A. Champi$1.1M$1.1M$51M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership8.2%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$348K

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 0% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Peers, Banks

The same industry, side by side on the bank lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueROEROTCEEfficiencyNII / assets
FISIFinancial Institutions Inc.$245M11%13%61%2.8%
SHBIShore Bancshares Inc$225M8%9%64%3.0%
ALRSAlerus Financial Corporation$224M10%12%77%2.8%
SMBKSmartFinancial Inc.$200M7%9%69%2.9%
PFISPeoples Financial Services Corp.$188M9%11%62%2.9%
BCALCalifornia BanCorp$180M8%9%65%3.9%
BFCBank First Corporation$174M12%14%50%3.2%
CARECarter Bankshares Inc.$153M7%7%75%2.7%
Group median8%10%64%2.9%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

price / tangible book

A bank is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Peoples Financial Services Corp.’s record justifies.

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The assumptions

Tangible book / share, delivered4%/yr’20→’25

The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). A bank earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for a bank.

Enter a price above to run it.

Price / tangible book
Justified by the return
Normalized return on tangible equity11%
Price / book
Earnings yield
P/E (3-yr avg ’23–’25)
Graham’s price gate

Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.

Tangible book $416M on 10M shares, a 11% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the bank keeps earning that return; a credit cycle, a rate shock or a bad acquisition changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Peoples Financial Services Corp. (PFIS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PFIS, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← PFH its page in the Manual PFS →

Industry order: ← PEBO the Banks chapter PFS →