Owner Scorecard


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PKG, Packaging Corporation of America

Containers & Packaging capital-intensive

Packaging Corporation of America is the third largest producer of containerboard products and a leading producer of uncoated freesheet paper in North America.

We operate ten mills and 91 corrugated products plants and related facilities.

The Greif containerboard business includes two containerboard mills with approximately 800,000 tons of production capacity and eight sheet feeder and corrugated plants located across the United States.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
PKG · Packaging Corporation of America
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$9.0B
+7.2% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $9.2B 5-yr avg $8.3B
Gross margin 20% 5-yr avg 23%
Operating margin 11.7% 5-yr avg 14.4%
ROIC 10% 5-yr avg 15%
Owner-earnings margin 8% 5-yr avg 10%
Free cash flow margin 8% 5-yr avg 8%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Packaging (92%) and Paper (7%).
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 22% and operating margin about 14% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 15%, above 15% in 5 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 10% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

The biggest segment, Packaging, is also where the profit is made: 92% of revenue and 90% of the profitable segments' operating profit. Corporate and Other ran a $148M operating loss.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
Operating profit profitable segments only
  • Packaging92%$8.3B90% of profit
  • Paper7%$615M10% of profit
  • Corporate and Other1%$80Mloss of $148M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of the profitable segments' operating profit (a loss-making segment carries its loss in dollars in the legend, not a share of the bar), before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$5.8B$6.4B$7.0B$7.0B$6.7B$7.7B$8.5B$7.8B$8.4B$9.0B$9.2BRevenueRevenue
22%23%23%24%21%24%25%22%21%21%20%Gross marginGross mgn
8%8%8%8%8%7%7%7%7%7%7%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
0%0%0%0%0%0%0%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$783M$933M$1.1B$1.1B$724M$1.2B$1.4B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1BOperating incomeOp. inc.
13.6%14.5%15.2%15.1%10.9%16.1%16.8%13.8%13.1%12.3%11.7%Operating marginOp. mgn
$450M$669M$738M$696M$461M$841M$1.0B$765M$805M$774M$741MNet incomeNet inc.
35%19%24%24%27%24%25%25%24%25%24%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$807M$856M$1.2B$1.2B$1.0B$1.1B$1.5B$1.3B$1.2B$1.6B$1.5BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$358M$391M$411M$388M$410M$418M$457M$518M$526M$653M$740MDepreciationDeprec.
($20M)($225M)$8M$93M$132M($200M)($27M)($8M)($188M)$85M$24MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$274M$343M$551M$400M$421M$605M$824M$470M$670M$829M$846MCapexCapex
4.7%5.3%7.9%5.7%6.3%7.8%9.7%6.0%8.0%9.2%9.2%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$533M$513M$769M$808M$612M$677M$1.0B$845M$666M$905M$702MOwner earningsOwner earn.
9.2%8.0%11.0%11.6%9.2%8.8%12.2%10.8%7.9%10.1%7.6%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$533M$513M$629M$808M$612M$489M$671M$845M$522M$729M$702MFree cash flowFCF
9.2%8.0%9.0%11.6%9.2%6.3%7.9%10.8%6.2%8.1%7.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$485M$274M$56M$0$0$195M$0$0$0$1.8B$1.8BAcquisitionsAcquis.
$216M$238M$268M$299M$300M$380M$420M$449M$449M$450M$449MDividends paidDiv. paid
$100M$0$0$193M$523M$42M$0$153MBuybacksBuybacks
12%16%17%16%11%17%18%13%13%10%10%ROICROIC
26%31%28%23%14%23%28%19%18%17%16%Return on equityROE
13%20%18%13%5%13%17%8%8%7%6%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$239M$217M$362M$680M$975M$619M$320M$648M$685M$529M$397MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$689M$831M$902M$846M$832M$1.1B$1.0B$1.0B$1.1B$1.3B$1.3BReceivablesReceiv.
$724M$763M$796M$794M$788M$903M$977M$1.0B$1.1B$1.2B$1.3BInventoryInvent.
$324M$403M$382M$352M$387M$452M$410M$402M$430M$471M$557MAccounts payablePayables
$1.1B$1.2B$1.3B$1.3B$1.2B$1.5B$1.6B$1.6B$1.8B$2.0B$2.0BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1.7B$1.9B$2.1B$2.5B$2.8B$2.7B$2.5B$3.3B$3.2B$3.2B$3.3BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$625M$833M$694M$724M$783M$885M$876M$1.3B$1.0B$1.0B$1.1BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.7×2.3×3.0×3.4×3.5×3.1×2.9×2.6×3.2×3.2×3.1×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$738M$883M$917M$919M$864M$924M$922M$922M$922M$1.4B$1.4BGoodwillGoodwill
$5.8B$6.2B$6.6B$7.2B$7.4B$7.8B$8.0B$8.7B$8.8B$10.7B$10.8BTotal assetsAssets
$2.6B$2.6B$2.5B$2.5B$2.5B$2.5B$2.5B$2.9B$2.5B$4.0B$4.0BTotal debtDebt
$2.4B$2.4B$2.1B$1.8B$1.5B$1.9B$2.2B$2.2B$1.8B$3.4B$3.6BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
$1.8B$2.2B$2.7B$3.1B$3.2B$3.6B$3.7B$4.0B$4.4B$4.6B$4.6BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.3%0.3%0.3%0.4%0.5%0.5%0.4%0.5%0.6%0.5%0.5%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
93.7M93.7M93.9M94.1M94.4M94.5M92.7M89.5M89.5M89.6M89.1MShares out (diluted)Shares
$61.68$68.78$74.70$74.01$70.53$81.80$91.46$87.18$93.67$100.33$103.44Revenue / shareRev/sh
$4.80$7.14$7.86$7.40$4.88$8.90$11.11$8.55$9.00$8.64$8.32EPS (diluted)EPS
$5.68$5.48$8.19$8.59$6.48$7.16$11.20$9.45$7.44$10.10$7.88Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$5.68$5.48$6.70$8.59$6.48$5.17$7.24$9.45$5.83$8.13$7.88Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$2.31$2.54$2.86$3.17$3.17$4.02$4.53$5.02$5.01$5.02$5.04Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$2.93$3.66$5.87$4.25$4.46$6.40$8.89$5.25$7.48$9.25$9.49Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$18.78$23.29$28.46$32.64$34.39$38.17$39.56$44.66$49.21$51.32$51.49Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+5.6%/yr+7.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share+6.6%/yr+9.3%/yr
EPS+6.8%/yr+12.1%/yr
Dividends / share+9.0%/yr+9.6%/yr
Capital spending / share+13.6%/yr+15.7%/yr
Book value / share+11.8%/yr+8.3%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
90Mpeak FY2021
ROIC
10%low FY2025
Gross margin
21%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
3.8×peak FY2017

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$905Mowner earningsvs.$774Mnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $905M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $653M it takes just to hold its position. It put $176M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $729M.

Reported net income$774M
Owner earnings$905M · 10% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$774M$805M$765M$1.0B$841M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$653M+$526M+$518M+$457M+$418M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$45M+$49M+$40M+$36M+$36M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$85M−$188M−$8M−$27M−$200M
Cash from operations$1.6B$1.2B$1.3B$1.5B$1.1B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$653M−$526M−$470M−$457M−$418M
Owner earnings$905M$666M$845M$1.0B$677M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$176M−$144M−$367M−$188M
Free cash flow$729M$522M$845M$671M$489M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue10%8%11%12%9%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $653M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $176M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $45M), owner earnings is nearer $860M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Interest expense not tagged in the data
    What this means

    No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $3.4B · 3.1× operating profit
    Meaningful net debt
    Cash $529M − debt $4.0B
    What this means

    Netting $529M of cash and short-term investments against $4.0B of debt leaves $3.4B owed, about 3.1× a year's operating profit (3.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 51 + DIO 64 − DPO 24 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 10%–18%; 10% latest = NOPAT $834M ÷ invested capital $8.0B
    Industry peers: median 10%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 10% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 8%–12%; latest $905M = operating cash $1.6B − maintenance capex $653M
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 10% of revenue this year, a 9% median across 10 years. It chose to put $176M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $729M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $45M of SBC) leaves $860M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $1.6B ÷ net income $774M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $603M ÷ Owner Earnings $905M
    What this means

    Of $905M Owner Earnings, $603M (67%) went back to shareholders, $450M dividends, $153M buybacks. Net of $45M stock comp, the real buyback was about $108M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.27×
    Expanding
    Capex $829M ÷ depreciation $653M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $9.0B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 3.17×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $4.0B vs $2.2B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Near
    Earnings +33% over the record · +26%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $8.77/share (latest year $8.69), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $51.61/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 5 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 14% → 13% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The margin has held, but the filing names price competition — the pressure is present even where the margin has absorbed it so far.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 14% early, 13% lately, median 14%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 6%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +5%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 5% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · 10.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −0.5%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Promotional
    What this means

    The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$3.3B
  • Cash & short-term investments$397M
  • Receivables$1.3B
  • Inventory$1.3B
  • Other current assets$266M
Current liabilities$1.1B
  • Accounts payable$557M
  • Other current liabilities$504M
Current ratio3.07×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.88×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.37×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$2.2Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+10.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.4× → 3.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$2.6Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$4.4B$392M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $11.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$5.4B · 46%
  • Dividends$3.5B · 30%
  • Buybacks$1.0B · 9%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.9B · 16%
  • Returned to owners$4.5B

    61% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $3.5B as dividends and $1.0B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$50.47

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 2M shares were bought for $100M, about $50.47 each.

  • Net change in share count−4.9%

    The diluted count fell from 94M to 89M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$5.02/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 9% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained7%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($2.8B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $200M, so each retained $1 added about 0.07 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$2.0B18% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity30%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$2.8Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $5.4B of capital spent building

$55M written down across 1 year (2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Kowlzan$12.5M$8.9M$677M
2022Mr. Kowlzan$12.2M$14.2M$1.0B
2023Mr. Kowlzan$15.2M$26.4M$845M
2024Mr. Kowlzan$15.7M$37.8M$666M
2025Mr. Kowlzan$17.0M$13.0M$905M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership1.6%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$45M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 4% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Packaging Corporation of America is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 6 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Containers & Packaging

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
SWSmurfit WestRock plc$31.2B22%8.4%4%5%
IPInternational Paper Company$23.6B29%8.1%10%6%
KMBKimberly-Clark Corp.$16.4B36%14.3%27%11%
PKGPackaging Corporation of America$9.0B22%14.1%15%10%
AVYAvery Dennison Corporation$8.9B27%9.9%15%7%
GPKGraphic Packaging Holding$8.6B18%9.0%9%9%
SONSonoco$7.5B20%8.7%9%5%
REYNReynolds Consumer Products Inc.$3.7B25%14.4%10%9%
Group median24%9.4%10%8%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Packaging Corporation of America has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Packaging Corporation of America earns about $867M on its 9.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 10.1% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−2%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+2%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $702M on 89M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-01; net debt $3.6B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($846M) runs well above depreciation ($740M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $895M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Packaging Corporation of America (PKG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PKG, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← PKE its page in the Manual PKOH →

Industry order: ← PACK the Containers & Packaging chapter SEE →