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PLGO, Pelagos Insurance Capital Limited
Our disciplined underwriting and active capital management enable us to respond dynamically 38 to market cycles and pursue opportunities that we believe offer an attractive balance of risk and return.
Through this operating model, we are well positioned to make nimble, disciplined and efficient decisions enabling us to respond quickly to changing conditions and an evolving marketplace.
Treasuries, non-U.S. government bonds, government agency bonds, corporate bonds, investment-grade emerging market debt, mortgage and other asset-backed securities) together with small allocations to sub-investment grade fixed maturity securities.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Underwriting discipline and the float. What decides it: whether the combined ratio stays below 100% so the policies make money on their own, how large the float is against equity, and what that float earns once it is invested. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Claims run 48% of premiums, with underwriting costs on top. Book value per share, the measure Berkshire is judged on, has compounded about 31% a year across the record. The float runs about 1.2× equity, the leverage that magnifies both the underwriting and the investing. Whether the discipline holds through a soft market, and how the float is invested, are what the 10-K decides.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2021–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||
| $1.2B | $1.5B | $3.6B | $2.4B | $2.5B | $2.5B | RevenueRevenue |
| $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.8B | $2.3B | $2.3B | $2.3B | Premiums earnedPremiums |
| $34M | $7M | $124M | $162M | $207M | $194M | Investment incomeInv. inc. |
| $78M | $62M | $2.1B | $113M | $226M | $226M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 1% | 22% | -4% | 17% | 18% | 19% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||
| $346M | $741M | $495M | $618M | ($408M) | $299M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $341M | $738M | $495M | $614M | ($410M) | $298M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 60% | 55% | — | 51% | 48% | 48% | Loss ratioLoss |
| — | 3% | 87% | 5% | 9% | 10% | Return on equityROE |
| — | 3% | 87% | 5% | 9% | 10% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| $1.4B | $2.0B | $2.4B | $3.1B | $2.6B | $2.7B | Float (reserves)Float |
| — | $8.3B | $10.0B | $11.8B | $12.4B | $13.7B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $1.2B | $712M | $743M | $873M | $895M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $2.0B | $2.4B | $2.4B | $2.4B | $2.3B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||
| 200M | 199M | 114M | 116M | 107M | 85.5M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $0.39 | $0.31 | $18.65 | $0.98 | $2.11 | $2.64 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $1.70 | $3.70 | $4.33 | $5.31 | $-3.84 | $3.48 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| — | $9.92 | $21.43 | $21.17 | $22.48 | $26.36 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1/1.74 into 2023 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 4-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +40.8%/yr | +40.8%/yr (4-yr) |
| EPS | +52.5%/yr | +52.5%/yr (4-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | −24.9%/yr | −24.9%/yr (4-yr) |
| Book value / share | +31.4%/yr (3-yr) | +31.4%/yr (3-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2021–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- Loss ratio 48%Claims share of premiumsClaims incurred $1.1B ÷ premiums earned $2.3B
What this means
Claims as a share of premiums (the expense side was not cleanly tagged, so we show the loss ratio alone rather than a full combined ratio). Lower is better; the rest of underwriting cost sits on top of this.
- Return on equity 10%SolidNet income $226M ÷ equity $2.3BIndustry peers: median 14%
What this means
What it earns on shareholders' capital, the underwriting result plus what the float earns invested. Durably above the ~10% cost of equity is what compounds book value.
The float
- Float (reserves) $2.7B1.2× equityLoss and claim reserves $2.7B, 1.2× equity
What this means
Money held against future claims and invested in the meantime. Buffett's insight was that good underwriting makes this float cost less than nothing, a pool of other people's money the owners earn on. Measured here from loss and claim reserves only; it excludes unearned premiums and funds held, so the true float is somewhat larger than shown. The larger it is against equity, the more that leverage works, for better or worse.
- Investment income $194M7.0% on the floatNet investment income $194M, 7.0% on the float
What this means
What the float and capital earned this year. This is the second engine: an insurer that breaks even on underwriting still wins if the float is large and invested well.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Does management own its misses?1 plain admission in this year's filing
“These increases were partially offset by the Aviation & Aerospace line of business, where certain deals did not meet our underwriting criteria and rating hurdles, and by premium estimate revisions in multiple lines of business.”verify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Insurance — Property & Casualty
The same industry, side by side on the underwriting lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Combined ratio | Loss ratio | ROE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HGHamilton Insurance Group Ltd. Class B | $2.9B | 100% | — | 14% |
| PLGOPelagos Insurance Capital Limited | $2.5B | — | 53% | 7% |
| RLIRLI Corp | $1.9B | 90% | 48% | 20% |
| KNSLKinsale Capital Group Inc. | $1.9B | — | 57% | 18% |
| UVEUNIVERSAL INSURANCE HOLDINGS INC | $1.6B | 104% | 73% | 18% |
| ROOTRoot Inc. | $1.5B | — | — | -62% |
| SKWDSkyward Specialty Insurance Group Inc. | $1.4B | 94% | — | 13% |
| TIPTTiptree Inc. | $1.5B | — | 49% | 5% |
| Group median | — | — | 53% | 13% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Pelagos Insurance Capital Limited's US listing is the ordinary share itself. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed.
An insurer is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Pelagos Insurance Capital Limited’s record justifies.
Tangible book / share, delivered28%/yr’22→’25
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). An insurer earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for an insurer.
Enter a price above to run it.
Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Tangible book $2.3B on 97M shares, a 7% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the insurer keeps earning that return; an underwriting cycle, a reserve shortfall or a bad year on the float changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
Manual order: ← PLBL its page in the Manual PLUT →
Industry order: ← PGR the Insurance — Property & Casualty chapter PLMR →