Share count
588Mpeak FY2025
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PGR, Progressive Corp.
Insurance — Property & Casualty financial
Progressive sells insurance to ordinary people, mostly car insurance with some home and property coverage, sold both straight to the customer and through agents. It collects premiums up front, pays claims later, and invests the money it holds in between. So it earns two ways: the underwriting spread between premiums taken in and claims and costs paid out, and the income on the pile of customer money it gets to hold while it waits to pay.
Our Chief Executive Officer (CEO) assesses performance and makes key operating decisions for our insurance, investment, and service operations and is supported by the following management team that oversees the business and corporate functions that support all areas of our organization.
In California, we operate a separate agency auto organization with its own management and customer relationship management organization.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$87.7B
+16.3% YoY · 15% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $89.5B 5-yr avg $64.7B
Revenue $22.2B +8.7% vs yr-ago qtr
Net income $2.8B yr-ago $2.6B
Net margin 12.7% yr-ago 12.6%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Auto insurance is close to a commodity — the policy is much the same wherever it is bought — so the whole game is selling it for less than it costs to pay the claims, year after year, and the lever is whether Progressive prices each driver's risk more accurately and runs at a lower cost than the rivals it must underprice to win. Watch the underwriting result across the cycle, not in one good year: the filing names the market as cyclical, with stretches of fat profit drawing in competition that then competes the profit away, and warns that price rivalry can be fierce. The bad case is mispriced risk or a cost edge that erodes, leaving it competing on price with no margin to spare; what the spread and the returns have actually been is in the record below.
- Is it a good business?
- It underwrites at a profit, about a 90% combined ratio (it keeps roughly 10% of premiums before investing the float). Book value per share, the measure Berkshire is judged on, has compounded about 16% a year across the record. The float runs about 1.4× equity, the leverage that magnifies both the underwriting and the investing. Whether the discipline holds through a soft market, and how the float is invested, are what the 10-K decides.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $23.4B | $26.8B | $32.0B | $39.0B | $42.7B | $47.7B | $50.5B | $62.1B | $75.4B | $87.7B | $89.5B | RevenueRevenue |
| $22.5B | $25.7B | $30.9B | $36.2B | $39.3B | $44.4B | $49.2B | $58.7B | $70.8B | $81.7B | $83.2B | Premiums earnedPremiums |
| $457M | $539M | $796M | $1.0B | $917M | $835M | $1.2B | $1.9B | $2.8B | $3.5B | $3.7B | Investment incomeInv. inc. |
| $1.0B | $1.6B | $2.6B | $4.0B | $5.7B | $3.4B | $722M | $3.9B | $8.5B | $11.3B | $11.6B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 29% | 25% | 17% | 23% | 20% | 20% | 22% | 20% | 21% | 20% | 21% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $2.7B | $3.8B | $6.3B | $6.3B | $6.9B | $7.8B | $6.8B | $10.6B | $15.1B | $17.5B | $16.8B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $2.6B | $3.6B | $6.1B | $6.0B | $6.7B | $7.5B | $6.6B | $10.4B | $14.8B | $17.2B | $16.4B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| ≈ 98% | ≈ 96% | ≈ 93% | ≈ 94% | ≈ 90% | ≈ 98% | ≈ 99% | ≈ 98% | ≈ 91% | ≈ 90% | ≈ 90% | Combined ratioCombined |
| 75% | 73% | 70% | 70% | 64% | 76% | 77% | 78% | 69% | 66% | 66% | Loss ratioLoss |
| 13% | 17% | 24% | 29% | 33% | 18% | 5% | 19% | 33% | 37% | 36% | Return on equityROE |
| 6% | 13% | 18% | 17% | 24% | −2% | 3% | 18% | 31% | 28% | 27% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $11.4B | $13.1B | $15.4B | $18.1B | $20.3B | $26.2B | $30.4B | $34.4B | $39.1B | $43.3B | $44.4B | Float (reserves)Float |
| $33.4B | $38.7B | $46.6B | $54.9B | $64.1B | $71.1B | $75.5B | $88.7B | $105.7B | $123.0B | $122.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| $3.8B | $3.1B | $1.9B | $2.0B | $5.3B | $1.1B | $3.1B | $1.9B | $769M | $10.1B | $2.3B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $8.0B | $9.3B | $10.8B | $13.7B | $17.0B | $18.2B | $15.9B | $20.3B | $25.6B | $30.3B | $32.0B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 585M | 586M | 587M | 587M | 588M | 587M | 587M | 588M | 588M | 588M | 587M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $1.76 | $2.72 | $4.46 | $6.76 | $9.71 | $5.71 | $1.23 | $6.64 | $14.43 | $19.23 | $19.70 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $4.44 | $6.15 | $10.39 | $10.26 | $11.37 | $12.81 | $11.17 | $17.69 | $25.24 | $29.25 | $27.98 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.89 | $0.68 | $1.12 | $2.80 | $2.64 | $6.38 | $0.40 | $0.40 | $1.15 | $4.88 | $4.89 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $13.60 | $15.85 | $18.45 | $23.29 | $29.00 | $31.05 | $27.07 | $34.51 | $43.54 | $51.56 | $54.59 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +15.7%/yr | +15.5%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +23.3%/yr | +20.8%/yr |
| EPS | +30.4%/yr | +14.6%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +20.9%/yr | +13.1%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +5.4%/yr | +9.2%/yr |
| Book value / share | +16.0%/yr | +12.2%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Revenue
$87.7Blow FY2016
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Is it a good business?
- Combined ratio ≈ 90%Underwriting profitTotal benefits, losses and expenses $73.4B ÷ premiums earned $81.7BIndustry peers: median 100%
What this means
The heart of a property-casualty insurer: claims and costs as a share of premiums. Below 100% means it is paid to hold the float, the gold standard; above 100% means it loses money on the policies and must make it back on investments. Approximate here, taken from the filer's total benefits, losses and expenses over premiums, so it can sit a point or two off the company's headline figure; a number held below 100% across cycles is the mark of a disciplined underwriter, the rarest thing in the business.
- Return on equity 37%StrongNet income $11.3B ÷ equity $30.3BIndustry peers: median 12%
What this means
What it earns on shareholders' capital, the underwriting result plus what the float earns invested. Durably above the ~10% cost of equity is what compounds book value.
The float
- Float (reserves) $43.3B1.4× equityLoss and claim reserves $43.3B, 1.4× equity
What this means
Money held against future claims and invested in the meantime. Buffett's insight was that good underwriting makes this float cost less than nothing, a pool of other people's money the owners earn on. Measured here from loss and claim reserves only; it excludes unearned premiums and funds held, so the true float is somewhat larger than shown. The larger it is against equity, the more that leverage works, for better or worse.
- Investment income $3.5B8.2% on the floatNet investment income $3.5B, 8.2% on the float
What this means
What the float and capital earned this year. This is the second engine: an insurer that breaks even on underwriting still wins if the float is large and invested well.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Named as a competitive risk
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“Furthermore, our competitors or other third parties may be able to replace legacy systems, incorporate Advanced AI into their products and operations, or optimize or redesign their processes more quickly, or more successfully, than us.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mrs. Griffith | $14.5M | $26.4M | $7.5B |
| 2022 | Mrs. Griffith | $12.7M | $48.5M | $6.6B |
| 2023 | Mrs. Griffith | $15.6M | $49.0M | $10.4B |
| 2024 | Mrs. Griffith | $16.4M | $61.1M | $14.8B |
| 2025 | Mrs. Griffith | $17.7M | $25.8M | $17.2B |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio204:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Peers, Insurance — Property & Casualty
The same industry, side by side on the underwriting lens. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Combined ratio | Loss ratio | ROE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PGRProgressive Corp. | $87.7B | 95% | 72% | 22% |
| ALLAllstate Corp. | $67.7B | 100% | 65% | 13% |
| CBChubb Ltd. | $59.5B | 91% | 57% | 9% |
| TRVTravelers Companies | $48.8B | 99% | 67% | 12% |
| HIGThe Hartford Insurance Group Inc. | $28.4B | 107% | 68% | 13% |
| AIGAmerican International Group | $28.0B | 124% | 76% | 3% |
| ACGLArch Capital | $19.9B | 88% | 55% | 13% |
| LLoews Corp. | $18.5B | 149% | 76% | 6% |
| Group median | — | 100% | 67% | 13% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
price / tangible bookAn insurer is worth a multiple of its tangible book value, and the multiple it deserves is set by the return it earns on that book. Type today’s price; we show what you would be paying against what Progressive Corp.’s record justifies.
$
The assumptions
Tangible book / share, delivered13%/yr’20→’25
The justified multiple is (return on tangible equity − growth) ÷ (cost of equity − growth). An insurer earning exactly its cost of equity is worth about one times tangible book; the premium above that prices each point of durable excess return. A higher cost of equity lowers the justified multiple for an insurer.
Enter a price above to run it.
Price / tangible book—
Justified by the return—
Normalized return on tangible equity23%
Price / book—
Earnings yield—
P/E (3-yr avg ’23–’25)—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham applied the same standards to financial enterprises (Intelligent Investor ch.14): the 15× multiple cap on averaged earnings, and P/E times price-to-book at most 22.5. The gate marks the bargain-hunter’s floor, not a verdict.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Tangible book $31.7B on 584M shares, a 23% normalized return on it. The dials set the multiple such a return would justify; your price sets the multiple you are paying. It assumes the insurer keeps earning that return; an underwriting cycle, a reserve shortfall or a bad year on the float changes it, which is what the record and the 10-K are for.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Progressive Corp. (PGR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PGR, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← PGNY its page in the Manual PGY →
Industry order: ← ORI the Insurance — Property & Casualty chapter PLGO →