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PLTK, Playtika Holding Corp.

IT Services & Consulting asset-light Serial acquirer

We are one of the world's leading operators of mobile games creating fun, innovative experiences that entertain and engage our users.

Our players love our games because they are fun, creative, engaging, and kept fresh through a release of new features that are customized for different player segments.

In certain acquisitions, we seek to enhance the scale and profitability of those games by leveraging our live operations services.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

PLTK · Playtika Holding Corp.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$2.8B

+8.1% YoY · 3% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $2.8B 5-yr avg $2.6B

Gross margin 73% 5-yr avg 72%

Operating margin −4.4% 5-yr avg 14.9%

ROIC −8% 5-yr avg 23%

Owner-earnings margin 19% 5-yr avg 18%

Free cash flow margin 19% 5-yr avg 18%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 57% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 4 of the record's 8 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 72% and operating margin about 18% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −0.2% to 29% — on a steadier 72% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run high across the record (median 34%, above 15% in 6 of 8 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 19% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

38% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025

United States62%$1.7B
EMEA23%$647M
Asia Pacific7%$204M
Other6%$163M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2018–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
									Income statement
$1.5B	$1.9B	$2.4B	$2.6B	$2.6B	$2.6B	$2.5B	$2.8B	$2.8B	RevenueRevenue
71%	70%	70%	72%	72%	72%	73%	72%	73%	Gross marginGross mgn
12%	11%	21%	13%	13%	12%	11%	22%	25%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
10%	11%	11%	15%	18%	16%	16%	15%	15%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$433M	$497M	$387M	$562M	$471M	$502M	$392M	($5M)	($123M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
29.0%	26.4%	16.3%	21.8%	18.0%	19.5%	15.4%	−0.2%	−4.4%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$338M	$289M	$92M	$309M	$275M	$235M	$162M	($206M)	($295M)	Net incomeNet inc.
22%	34%	53%	24%	24%	40%	42%	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
									Cash flow & returns
$453M	$492M	$518M	$552M	$494M	$516M	$490M	$568M	$572M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$18M	$24M	$38M	$43M	$46M	$46M	$47M	$47M	$46M	DepreciationDeprec.
$97M	$179M	$112M	$201M	$173M	$235M	$281M	$727M	$545M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$41M	$55M	$54M	$47M	$68M	$33M	$41M	$36M	$32M	CapexCapex
2.8%	2.9%	2.3%	1.8%	2.6%	1.3%	1.6%	1.3%	1.1%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$435M	$468M	$480M	$504M	$448M	$483M	$449M	$531M	$540M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
29.2%	24.8%	20.2%	19.5%	17.1%	18.8%	17.6%	19.3%	19.3%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$412M	$437M	$464M	$504M	$425M	$483M	$449M	$531M	$540M	Free cash flowFCF
27.6%	23.1%	19.5%	19.5%	16.3%	18.8%	17.6%	19.3%	19.3%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$3M	$423M	$0	$394M	$30M	$160M	$687M	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$400M	$2.4B	$0	$0	$0	$0	$112M	$150M	$151M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
213%	57%	35%	41%	33%	26%	13%	-0%	-8%	ROICROIC
									Balance sheet
$306M	$267M	$520M	$1.1B	$769M	$1.0B	$566M	$684M	$779M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$352M	$485M	$495M	$385M	$438M	$463M	—	$611M	Accounts payablePayables
—	$477M	$755M	$1.3B	$1.0B	$1.4B	$873M	$1.1B	$1.1B	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$554M	$640M	$570M	$462M	$540M	$559M	$968M	$904M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	0.9×	1.2×	2.3×	2.2×	2.5×	1.6×	1.1×	1.2×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$221M	$474M	$485M	$788M	$811M	$987M	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.7B	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$1.5B	$1.8B	$2.8B	$2.7B	$3.2B	$3.6B	$3.7B	$3.7B	Total assetsAssets
—	$2.5B	$2.3B	$2.4B	$2.4B	$2.4B	$2.4B	$2.4B	$2.4B	Total debtDebt
—	$2.2B	$1.8B	$1.3B	$1.7B	$1.4B	$1.8B	$1.7B	$1.6B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
865.2×	8.1×	2.0×	3.8×	4.0×	3.3×	2.5×	-0.0×	-0.9×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$465M	($1.6B)	($1.2B)	($378M)	($569M)	($222M)	($131M)	($411M)	($463M)	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.0%	0.0%	11.6%	—	—	—	—	—	9.9%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
									Per share
378M	378M	385M	411M	402M	367M	372M	376M	378M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$3.94	$4.99	$6.16	$6.28	$6.51	$7.00	$6.85	$7.33	$7.39	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.89	$0.76	$0.24	$0.75	$0.69	$0.64	$0.44	$-0.55	$-0.78	EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.15	$1.24	$1.25	$1.23	$1.12	$1.32	$1.21	$1.41	$1.43	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.09	$1.16	$1.21	$1.23	$1.06	$1.32	$1.21	$1.41	$1.43	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.06	$6.26	$0.00	$0.00	$0.00	$0.00	$0.30	$0.40	$0.40	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.11	$0.15	$0.14	$0.12	$0.17	$0.09	$0.11	$0.10	$0.08	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$1.23	$-4.27	$-3.23	$-0.92	$-1.42	$-0.60	$-0.35	$-1.09	$-1.22	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	7-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+9.3%/yr	+3.5%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+3.0%/yr	+2.5%/yr
Dividends / share	−13.0%/yr	—
Capital spending / share	−1.7%/yr	−7.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2018–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

376Mpeak FY2021

ROIC

−0%low FY2025

Gross margin

72%low FY2020

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

3.2×peak FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$531Mowner earningsvs.($206M)net incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2018FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $206M loss into $531M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($206M)	$162M	$235M	$275M	$309M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$47M	+$47M	+$46M	+$46M	+$43M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$727M	+$281M	+$235M	+$173M	+$201M
Cash from operations	$568M	$490M	$516M	$494M	$552M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$36M	−$41M	−$33M	−$46M	−$47M
Owner earnings	$531M	$449M	$483M	$448M	$504M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	—	—	−$22M	—
Free cash flow	$531M	$449M	$483M	$425M	$504M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	19%	18%	19%	17%	20%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -0.0×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($5M) ÷ interest expense $143M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.7B

Net debt against an operating loss

Cash $684M − debt $2.4B

What this means
Netting $684M of cash and short-term investments against $2.4B of debt leaves $1.7B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 33%

Very high (≥25%) through the cycle

8-yr median, range -0%–213%; -0% latest = NOPAT ($4M) ÷ invested capital $1.3B

Industry peers: median 4%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran -0% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 19%

High through the cycle

8-yr median margin, range 17%–29%; latest $531M = operating cash $568M − maintenance capex $36M

Industry peers: median 12%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 19% of revenue this year, a 19% median across 8 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $276M of SBC) leaves $255M.
Are earnings backed by cash? $568M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($206M) · cash from operations $568M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 28%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $150M ÷ Owner Earnings $531M

What this means
Of $531M Owner Earnings, $150M (28%) went back to shareholders, $150M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.78×

Harvesting

Capex $36M ÷ depreciation $47M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.8B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.10×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $2.4B vs $96M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Near

A profit every year (8-yr record) · 1 loss year

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 4 of 8 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −73%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.17/share (latest year $-0.54), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-1.08/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2018–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 7 of 8

What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 5 of 7 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 24% → 12% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 24% early to 12% lately, median 18% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −17%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
Owner earnings growth +1%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 1% a year over the record.
Worst year 2025 · −0.2% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count −0.1%/yr

What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 4 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“In addition, the market for our games is characterized by rapid technological developments, including the increasing use of AI-driven tools in game development, content creation and performance marketing, frequent launches of new games and enhancements to current games, changes in player needs and behavior, disruption …”

The moat the record shows, a high return on capital held across years, was earned before AI collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.1B

Cash & short-term investments$779M
Other current assets$290M

Current liabilities$904M

Debt due within a year$11M
Accounts payable$611M
Other current liabilities$282M

Current ratio1.18×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.18×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.86×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$165Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$11M due · $779M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+5.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters3.0× → 1.2×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($2.6B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($3.1B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$2.5B$134M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$21Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$19M

'27$19M

'28$1.8B

'29$600M

Bars scaled to the largest single year.

Due in the next 12 months$19Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$38Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$1.8Bin 2028the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Due over the next five years$2.4Bthe near slice; the balance sheet carries $2.4B of debt in all

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$779M

One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$531M

Together, against $19M due next year69.0×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $1.3B against the $19M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 69 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2018–2025

Over the record, the business generated $4.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$376M · 9%
Dividends$3.0B · 74%
Retained (debt / cash)$678M · 17%

Returned to owners$3.0B
80% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $3.0B as dividends and $0 as buybacks.
Net change in share count0.1%
The diluted count barely moved (378M to 378M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$0.40/sh
Paid in 4 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 13% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 8-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$2.1B57% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity—goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$1.7Bover 8 years buying other businesses, against $376M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 8-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Robert Antokol	$63.1M	$12.3M	$504M
2022	Robert Antokol	$57.3M	$12.9M	$448M
2023	Robert Antokol	$49.0M	$49.1M	$483M
2024	Robert Antokol	$84.1M	$77.4M	$449M
2025	Robert Antokol	$5.9M	−$10.9M	$531M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Stock-based compensation$276M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 10% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Playtika Holding Corp. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2018–2025.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?18.6% vs 24.8%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 24.8% early in the record and 18.6% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

And these came back clean

Did the share count rise anyway?
Did reported profit become cash?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Does management own its misses?
1 plain admission in this year's filing
“Impairment charges in 2023 reflect charges recorded for the excess of the carrying amount over estimated fair value of our identifiable intangible assets.”verify →
Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, IT Services & Consulting

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
VRSKVerisk Analytics Inc.	$3.1B	65%	40.3%	14%	32%
PLTKPlaytika Holding Corp.	$2.8B	72%	18.8%	34%	19%
PTCPTC Inc.	$2.7B	79%	21.1%	10%	19%
RNGRingCentral Inc.	$2.5B	72%	-4.2%	-11%	7%
CLVTClarivate Plc	$2.5B	66%	-10.8%	-2%	12%
RDDTReddit Inc.	$2.2B	88%	-21.6%	22%	3%
PEGAPegasystems	$1.7B	71%	1.9%	3%	7%
FAFirst Advantage Corporation	$1.6B	—	9.8%	4%	17%
Group median	—	72%	5.8%	7%	14%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Playtika Holding Corp. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Playtika Holding Corp. earns about $535M on its 19.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 19.3% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($535M) Net of stock comp (−$276M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+1%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’25+2%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $540M on 380M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-04; net debt $1.6B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh PLTK against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Playtika Holding Corp. (PLTK), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PLTK, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← PLSE its page in the Manual PLTR →

Industry order: ← PHUN the IT Services & Consulting chapter QBTS →