Owner Scorecard


← All companies ← RMR Manual RNGR → ← RGTIW IT Services & Consulting SHAZ →

RNG, RingCentral Inc.

IT Services & Consulting asset-light Distress / turnaround

RingCentral Contact Center is a collaborative contact center solution that delivers AI-powered omni-channel and workforce engagement solutions integrated with RingEX.

Today, the company has an AI-powered, multi-product portfolio including Unified Communications as a Service ("UCaaS"), Contact Center as a Service ("CCaaS"), RingCentral AI solutions, Video and Events.

RingCentral is designed for intelligent, connected, and effortless businesses communications, making employee and customer experiences more productive and efficient.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
RNG · RingCentral Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$2.5B
+4.8% YoY · 16% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $2.5B 5-yr avg $2.1B
Gross margin 72% 5-yr avg 70%
Operating margin 6.3% 5-yr avg −11.1%
ROIC 16% 5-yr avg −19%
Owner-earnings margin 24% 5-yr avg 15%
Free cash flow margin 24% 5-yr avg 15%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −5.1% through the cycle on a 72% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Stock-based pay runs about 11% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −11%, above 15% in 1 of 9 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 7% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$380M$504M$674M$903M$1.2B$1.6B$2.0B$2.2B$2.4B$2.5B$2.5BRevenueRevenue
76%76%77%74%73%72%68%70%71%71%72%Gross marginGross mgn
15%14%15%16%17%18%15%15%11%10%10%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
17%15%15%15%16%19%18%15%14%13%12%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($13M)($5M)($16M)($46M)($113M)($302M)($649M)($199M)$3M$121M$160MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−3.4%−1.1%−2.4%−5.1%−9.6%−18.9%−32.7%−9.0%0.1%4.8%6.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
($16M)($4M)($26M)($54M)($83M)($376M)($879M)($165M)($58M)$43M$84MNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
$30M$41M$72M$65M($35M)$152M$191M$400M$483M$617M$632MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$15M$16M$23M$38M$76M$125M$247M$234M$223M$223M$224MDepreciationDeprec.
$430K($13M)$7M($21M)($217M)$45M$438M($96M)($20M)$82M$77MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$14M$19M$27M$28M$44M$29M$33M$24M$25M$30M$31MCapexCapex
3.7%3.9%4.0%3.1%3.7%1.8%1.6%1.1%1.0%1.2%1.2%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$15M$22M$45M$37M($79M)$123M$159M$376M$458M$587M$601MOwner earningsOwner earn.
4.1%4.3%6.7%4.1%−6.7%7.7%8.0%17.1%19.1%23.4%23.6%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$15M$22M$45M$37M($79M)$123M$159M$376M$458M$587M$601MFree cash flowFCF
4.1%4.3%6.7%4.1%−6.7%7.7%8.0%17.1%19.1%23.4%23.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$26M$28M$0$0$0$15M$26M$21M$29MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$15M$0$0$0$100M$311M$322M$334MBuybacksBuybacks
-54%-9%-11%-5%-9%-16%-58%-19%17%16%ROICROIC
-10%-2%-8%-7%-27%-111%Return on equityROE
−10%−2%−8%−7%−27%−111%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$160M$181M$566M$344M$640M$267M$270M$222M$243M$133M$119MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$30M$47M$94M$130M$176M$233M$311M$364M$386M$384M$363MReceivablesReceiv.
$63K$198K$199K$401K$551K$6M$1M$1M$1M$929K$1MInventoryInvent.
$8M$7M$10M$35M$54M$70M$63M$53M$22M$28M$30MAccounts payablePayables
$22M$40M$84M$96M$123M$168M$250M$313M$366M$357M$334MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$206M$265M$708M$536M$926M$651M$796M$849M$871M$765M$728MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$116M$125M$199M$281M$438M$526M$653M$633M$749M$1.2B$635MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.8×2.1×3.5×1.9×2.1×1.2×1.2×1.3×1.2×0.6×1.1×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$9M$9M$31M$55M$57M$55M$54M$67M$83M$98M$103MGoodwillGoodwill
$253M$360M$894M$1.5B$2.2B$2.6B$2.1B$1.9B$1.8B$1.5B$1.4BTotal assetsAssets
$15M$367M$387M$1.4B$1.4B$1.6B$1.5B$1.5B$1.3B$1.6BTotal debtDebt
($146M)($200M)$43M$735M$1.1B$1.4B$1.3B$1.3B$1.1B$1.5BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-17.2×-53.9×-1.0×-2.2×-2.3×-4.7×-135.1×-5.5×0.0×2.0×2.7×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$164M$228M$318M$746M$308M$339M($483M)($503M)($551M)($588M)($609M)Shareholders’ equityEquity
8.1%8.4%10.1%11.2%16.0%22.4%19.4%19.4%14.1%10.7%9.7%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
73.0M76.3M79.5M83.1M88.7M91.7M95.2M94.9M92.1M91.2M87.0MShares out (diluted)Shares
$5.21$6.60$8.47$10.86$13.35$17.38$20.88$23.20$26.06$27.57$29.28Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.22$-0.06$-0.33$-0.64$-0.94$-4.10$-9.23$-1.74$-0.63$0.48$0.97EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.21$0.28$0.57$0.45$-0.89$1.34$1.67$3.96$4.98$6.44$6.91Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.21$0.28$0.57$0.45$-0.89$1.34$1.67$3.96$4.98$6.44$6.91Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.20$0.26$0.34$0.33$0.49$0.32$0.34$0.25$0.27$0.33$0.36Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$2.25$2.99$4.00$8.97$3.48$3.69$-5.07$-5.30$-5.98$-6.45$-7.00Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+20.3%/yr+15.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share+46.1%/yr
Capital spending / share+6.0%/yr−7.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
91Mpeak FY2022
ROIC
17%low FY2022
Gross margin
71%low FY2022
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
1.9×peak FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$587Mowner earningsvs.$43Mnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $43M of profit into $587M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$43M
Owner earnings$587M · 23% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$43M($58M)($165M)($879M)($376M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$223M+$223M+$234M+$247M+$125M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$270M+$339M+$427M+$386M+$358M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$82M−$20M−$96M+$438M+$45M
Cash from operations$617M$483M$400M$191M$152M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$30M−$25M−$24M−$33M−$29M
Owner earnings$587M$458M$376M$159M$123M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue23%19%17%8%8%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $270M), owner earnings is nearer $318M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Thin
    Operating income $121M ÷ interest expense $60M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.5B · 12.3× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $133M + ST investments $28M − debt $1.6B
    What this means

    Netting $161M of cash and short-term investments against $1.6B of debt leaves $1.5B owed, about 12.3× a year's operating profit (13.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 56 + DIO 0 − DPO 14 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    9-yr median, range -58%–17%; 10% latest = NOPAT $93M ÷ invested capital $918M
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 10% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -7%–23%; latest $587M = operating cash $617M − maintenance capex $30M
    Industry peers: median 17%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 23% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $270M of SBC) leaves $318M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $617M ÷ net income $43M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $334M ÷ Owner Earnings $587M
    What this means

    Of $587M Owner Earnings, $334M (57%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $334M buybacks. Net of $270M stock comp, the real buyback was about $65M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.14×
    Harvesting
    Capex $30M ÷ depreciation $223M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.5B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.63×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1.6B vs ($453M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 9 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.71/share (latest year $0.51), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-6.95/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 1 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 9 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −2% → −1% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about −2% early, −1% lately, median −5%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −3%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth +45%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 45% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2022 · −32.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +2.5%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    The record and the register agree: capital is compounding and the filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share value, return on capital, the long term — not a promoter’s.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“GAAP operating cash flow and non-GAAP free cash flow; our ability to successfully penetrate the market for larger businesses and key verticals; our ability to upsell our customers to our existing and new products and services; our ability to limit and manage down sell and churn; our dependency on third-party vendors an…”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$728M
  • Cash & short-term investments$119M
  • Receivables$363M
  • Inventory$1M
  • Other current assets$245M
Current liabilities$635M
  • Debt due within a year$46M
  • Accounts payable$30M
  • Other current liabilities$559M
Current ratio1.15×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.14×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.19×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$92Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$46M due · $119M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+5.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.1× → 1.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($824M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($1.1B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.3B$49M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$257Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$273M · 14%
  • Buybacks$1.1B · 54%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$661M · 33%
  • Returned to owners$1.1B

    62% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $1.1B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $1.6B and cash and short-term investments fell $41M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$43.44

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 2M shares were bought for $100M, about $43.44 each.

  • Net change in share count19.2%

    The diluted count rose from 73M to 87M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2020$19.1M$61.5M($79M)
2021$19.2M−$6.4M$123M
2022$20.2M−$7.8M$159M
2023$21.1M$24.2M$376M
2023$38.1M$12.4M$376M
2024$15.5M$14.1M$458M
2024$15.5M$14.1M$458M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$270M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 11% of revenue, equal to 224% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why RingCentral Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?19.2%

    Diluted shares grew 19.2% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $1.1B on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$15M → $1.6B

    Debt rose from $15M to $1.6B while owner earnings went from about $27M to $474M — about 0.5 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 3.5 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?8% → 14% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $30M to $364M while revenue grew 570%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (8% of revenue then, 14% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, IT Services & Consulting

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
VRSKVerisk Analytics Inc.$3.1B65%40.3%14%32%
PLTKPlaytika Holding Corp.$2.8B72%18.8%34%19%
DBXDropbox$2.5B79%1.5%-1%29%
RNGRingCentral Inc.$2.5B72%-4.2%-11%7%
CLVTClarivate Plc$2.5B66%-10.8%-2%12%
RDDTReddit Inc.$2.2B88%-21.6%22%3%
PEGAPegasystems$1.7B71%1.9%3%7%
FAFirst Advantage Corporation$1.6B9.8%4%17%
Group median72%1.7%4%14%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what RingCentral Inc. has delivered.

RingCentral Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, RingCentral Inc. earns about $181M on its 7.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 23.4% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+39%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+45%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $601M on 85M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $1.5B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "RingCentral Inc. (RNG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/RNG, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← RMR its page in the Manual RNGR →

Industry order: ← RGTIW the IT Services & Consulting chapter SHAZ →