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PRMB, Primo Brands

Beverages consumer brand Distress / turnaround

Primo Brands is a leading North American branded beverage company focused on healthy hydration, delivering responsibly sourced diversified offerings across products, formats, channels, price points and consumer occasions, distributed in every U.S. state and Canada.

Primo Brands operates a vertically integrated coast-to-coast network that distributes its brands to more than 200,000 retail outlets, as well as directly reaching customers and consumers through its Direct Delivery, Exchange and Refill offerings.

Through Direct Delivery, Primo Brands delivers responsibly sourced hydration solutions direct to home and business customers.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

PRMB · Primo Brands

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$6.7B

+29.3% YoY · 14% 3-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 4-yr average

Revenue $6.7B 4-yr avg $5.2B

Gross margin 29% 4-yr avg 28%

Operating margin 6.2% 4-yr avg 5.7%

ROIC 3% 4-yr avg 5%

Owner-earnings margin 5% 4-yr avg 2%

Free cash flow margin 5% 4-yr avg 2%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is led by Regional spring water (50%) and Purified water (32%), with 3 more lines behind.
Situation: Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 29% and operating margin about 6.5% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from 0.5% to 8.6% — on a steadier 29% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 3%, above 15% in 0 of 3 years). By owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 5 lines, the largest Regional spring water at 50%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Regional spring water50%$3.3B
Purified water32%$2.1B
Other11%$763M
Premium water5%$350M
Other water2%$129M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2022–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
					Income statement
$4.4B	$4.7B	$5.2B	$6.7B	$6.7B	RevenueRevenue
22%	29%	31%	30%	29%	Gross marginGross mgn
20%	20%	20%	21%	21%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$23M	$406M	$360M	$430M	$415M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
0.5%	8.6%	7.0%	6.5%	6.2%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($127M)	$93M	($16M)	$60M	$59M	Net incomeNet inc.
—	21%	—	52%	51%	Effective tax rateTax rate
					Cash flow & returns
$108M	$321M	$464M	$680M	$745M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$326M	$306M	$333M	$610M	$623M	DepreciationDeprec.
($93M)	($79M)	$138M	($40M)	$16M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$259M	$204M	$150M	$377M	$420M	CapexCapex
5.8%	4.3%	2.9%	5.7%	6.3%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($150M)	$117M	$314M	$303M	$325M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−3.4%	2.5%	6.1%	4.5%	4.9%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($150M)	$117M	$314M	$303M	$325M	Free cash flowFCF
−3.4%	2.5%	6.1%	4.5%	4.9%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	$0	$36M	$151M	$157M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$0	$0	$10M	$422M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	9%	2%	3%	3%	ROICROIC
-94%	3437%	-0%	2%	2%	Return on equityROE
−94%	n/m	−2%	−3%	−3%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
					Balance sheet
$106M	$45M	$614M	$377M	$288M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$398M	$444M	$432M	$536M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$180M	$208M	$224M	$248M	InventoryInvent.
—	$357M	$472M	$519M	$498M	Accounts payablePayables
—	$221M	$181M	$136M	$286M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$698M	$1.5B	$1.2B	$1.3B	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$783M	$1.4B	$1.3B	$1.3B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	0.9×	1.1×	0.9×	1.0×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$817M	$817M	$3.6B	$3.6B	$3.6B	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$5.2B	$11.2B	$10.6B	$10.6B	Total assetsAssets
—	$3.5B	$5.0B	$5.2B	$5.2B	Total debtDebt
—	$3.4B	$4.4B	$4.8B	$4.9B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
0.1×	1.4×	1.1×	1.3×	1.3×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$135M	$3M	$3.4B	$3.0B	$3.0B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.7%	0.7%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
					Per share
327M	328M	363M	375M	366M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$13.56	$14.35	$14.18	$17.78	$18.25	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.39	$0.28	$-0.05	$0.16	$0.16	EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.46	$0.36	$0.86	$0.81	$0.89	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.46	$0.36	$0.86	$0.81	$0.89	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00	$0.00	$0.10	$0.40	$0.43	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.79	$0.62	$0.41	$1.01	$1.15	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$0.41	$0.01	$9.48	$7.98	$8.08	Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2025 are restated ×1.5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	3-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+9.4%/yr	+9.4%/yr (3-yr)
Capital spending / share	+8.4%/yr	+8.4%/yr (3-yr)
Book value / share	+168.8%/yr	+168.8%/yr (3-yr)

The record, charted

FY2022–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count

375Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

3%low FY2024

Gross margin

30%low FY2022

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

15.8×peak FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$303Mowner earningsvs.$60Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2022FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2022–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $60M of profit into $303M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$60M

Owner earnings$303M · 5% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022
Reported net income	$60M	($16M)	$93M	($127M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$610M	+$333M	+$306M	+$326M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$50M	+$9M	+$1M	+$2M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$40M	+$138M	−$79M	−$93M
Cash from operations	$680M	$464M	$321M	$108M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$377M	−$150M	−$204M	−$259M
Owner earnings	$303M	$314M	$117M	($150M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	5%	6%	2%	-3%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $50M), owner earnings is nearer $253M.

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 1.3×

Thin

Operating income $430M ÷ interest expense $327M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $4.8B · 11.1× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $377M − debt $5.2B

What this means
Netting $377M of cash and short-term investments against $5.2B of debt leaves $4.8B owed, about 11.1× a year's operating profit (12.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 0d

Tight

DSO 24 + DIO 18 − DPO 41 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 3%

Below average through the cycle

3-yr median, range 2%–9%; 3% latest = NOPAT $215M ÷ invested capital $7.8B

Industry peers: median 9%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 3 years (it ran 3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 5%

Thin, recently turned positive

latest $303M = operating cash $680M − maintenance capex $377M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (4-yr median 2%)

Industry peers: median 18%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 5% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 4 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $50M of SBC) leaves $253M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 11.32×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $680M ÷ net income $60M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 189%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $573M ÷ Owner Earnings $303M

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $303M of Owner Earnings, $573M (189%) went back to shareholders, $151M dividends, $422M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $50M stock comp, the real buyback was about $372M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
Investing or harvesting? 0.62×

Harvesting

Capex $377M ÷ depreciation $610M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 3 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $6.7B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.95×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $5.2B vs ($65M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.13/share (latest year $0.17), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $8.25/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2022–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 2 of 4

What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 3 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 5% → 7% (2-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 5% early to 7% lately, median 6% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2022 · 0.5% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count +19.8%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Our failure to develop innovative products or adopt new technologies, including artificial intelligence and data analytics, could put us at a competitive disadvantage in the marketplace, and our business and results of operations could be negatively affected.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.3B

Cash & short-term investments$288M
Receivables$536M
Inventory$248M
Other current assets$215M

Current liabilities$1.3B

Debt due within a year$73M
Accounts payable$498M
Other current liabilities$748M

Current ratio0.98×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.79×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.22×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($33M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$73M due · $288M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+0.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.1× → 1.0×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($3.6B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($6.3B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$5.7B$555M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $5.9B (annual-report basis)

From the company's latest filing.

Debt maturity

the debt note, SEC EDGAR →

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$36M

'27$32M

'28$3.5B

'29$1.5B

'30$200K

later$12M

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$36Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year

Within two years$68Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions

Biggest single year$3.5Bin 2028the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest

Total scheduled principal$5.1Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$288M

One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$303M

Together, against $36M due next year16.5×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $591M against the $36M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 16 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases

'26$173M

'27$142M

'28$114M

'29$92M

'30$78M

later$339M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$173Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$938Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$738Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$5.2B

Lease obligations (present value)$738M

Total fixed claims on the business$5.9B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $5.9B, of which the leases are 13%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2022–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$990M · 63%
Dividends$187M · 12%
Buybacks$432M · 27%

Returned to owners$619M
106% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $187M as dividends and $432M as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks$40.80
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 10M shares were bought for $422M, about $40.80 each.
Net change in share count11.7%
The diluted count rose from 327M to 366M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$0.40/sh
Paid in 2 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 4-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$6.6B62% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth

Cash spent acquiring$0over 4 years buying other businesses, against $990M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 4-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2024	$26.0M	$29.9M	$314M
2025	$6.6M	−$4.6M	$303M
2025	$14.9M	$16.1M	$303M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership32.9%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$50M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 12% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Primo Brands is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2022–2025.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?11.7%
Diluted shares grew 11.7% over 2022–2025, even as the company spent $432M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did reported profit become cash?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$1.4B · 21% of revenue on the largest customer (TTM)
“As of, and for the year ended, December 31, 2025, we have one customer who makes up approximately 20% of Trade receivables, net of allowance for expected credit losses and 21% of Net sales.”verify →
Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Credit & receivables as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Beverages

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
KDPKeurig Dr Pepper Inc.	$16.6B	55%	21.3%	5%	18%
TAPMolson Coors	$13.0B	50%	11.0%	6%	9%
STZConstellation Brands Inc.	$9.1B	50%	29.9%	9%	25%
MNSTMonster Beverage Corp.	$8.3B	58%	32.9%	28%	24%
COKECoca-Cola Consolidated	$7.2B	35%	7.9%	32%	6%
MKCMcCormick & Company Incorporated	$6.8B	39%	15.7%	9%	12%
PRMBPrimo Brands	$6.7B	30%	6.7%	3%	4%
BF-BBrown-Forman	$3.9B	61%	32.4%	22%	20%
Group median	—	50%	18.5%	9%	15%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Primo Brands has delivered.

Primo Brands’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Primo Brands earns about $235M on its 3.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 4.5% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($235M) Net of stock comp (−$48M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($368M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2023+61%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $325M on 363M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-04; net debt $4.9B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($420M) runs well above depreciation ($623M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $368M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh PRMB against another business →

The owners of PRMB: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Primo Brands (PRMB), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/PRMB, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← PRM its page in the Manual PRME →

Industry order: ← PEP the Beverages chapter STZ →