← All companies ← MNRO Manual MNTN → ← KOF Beverages PEP →

MNST, Monster Beverage Corp.

Beverages consumer brand

We regularly assess the market risk of our investments and believe our current policies and investment practices adequately limit those risks.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

MNST · Monster Beverage Corp.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$8.3B

+10.7% YoY · 13% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $8.8B 5-yr avg $7.0B

Gross margin 55% 5-yr avg 54%

Operating margin 29.3% 5-yr avg 28.0%

ROIC 29% 5-yr avg 27%

Owner-earnings margin 24% 5-yr avg 21%

Free cash flow margin 24% 5-yr avg 20%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Monster Energy Drinks (92%), Strategic Brands (6%) and Alcohol Brands (2%).
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 56% and operating margin about 32% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. That margin has stayed fairly steady relative to where it runs (25%–36% over the years), so unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line, are the lever. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run high across the record (median 28%, above 15% in 10 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 24% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Monster Energy Drinks is 92% of revenue, so this is largely a single-segment business.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

Monster Energy Drinks92%$7.7B
Strategic Brands6%$469M
Alcohol Brands2%$135M
Other0%$25M

By geographyU.S. and Canada61%EMEA23%Latin America and Caribbean8%Asia Pacific8%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$3.0B	$3.4B	$3.8B	$4.2B	$4.6B	$5.5B	$6.3B	$7.1B	$7.5B	$8.3B	$8.8B	RevenueRevenue
64%	63%	60%	60%	59%	56%	50%	53%	54%	56%	55%	Gross marginGross mgn
$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.6B	$1.8B	$1.6B	$2.0B	$1.9B	$2.4B	$2.6B	Operating incomeOp. inc.
35.6%	35.6%	33.7%	33.4%	35.5%	32.4%	25.1%	27.4%	25.8%	29.2%	29.3%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$713M	$821M	$993M	$1.1B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.2B	$1.6B	$1.5B	$1.9B	$2.0B	Net incomeNet inc.
34%	32%	23%	22%	13%	24%	24%	21%	24%	23%	23%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$701M	$988M	$1.2B	$1.1B	$1.4B	$1.2B	$888M	$1.7B	$1.9B	$2.1B	$2.2B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$41M	$49M	$57M	$61M	$57M	$50M	$61M	$69M	$80M	$114M	$118M	DepreciationDeprec.
($98M)	$66M	$55M	($118M)	($173M)	($342M)	($429M)	($51M)	$248M	($47M)	($88M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$100M	$83M	$62M	$102M	$49M	$44M	$189M	$221M	$264M	$132M	$124M	CapexCapex
3.3%	2.5%	1.6%	2.4%	1.1%	0.8%	3.0%	3.1%	3.5%	1.6%	1.4%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$661M	$939M	$1.1B	$1.1B	$1.3B	$1.1B	$826M	$1.6B	$1.8B	$2.0B	$2.1B	Owner earningsOwner earn.
21.7%	27.9%	28.9%	25.1%	28.6%	20.1%	13.1%	23.1%	24.7%	23.7%	23.6%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$602M	$904M	$1.1B	$1.0B	$1.3B	$1.1B	$699M	$1.5B	$1.7B	$2.0B	$2.1B	Free cash flowFCF
19.7%	26.8%	28.9%	24.1%	28.6%	20.1%	11.1%	21.0%	22.2%	23.7%	23.6%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$688M	—	—	—	—	—	$329M	$363M	—	—	$363M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$2.3B	$361M	$1.3B	$707M	$596M	$14M	$771M	$659M	$3.8B	$104M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
24%	24%	33%	33%	36%	26%	21%	26%	31%	30%	29%	ROICROIC
21%	21%	28%	27%	27%	21%	17%	20%	25%	23%	23%	Return on equityROE
21%	21%	28%	27%	27%	21%	17%	20%	25%	23%	23%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$598M	$1.2B	$958M	$1.3B	$2.1B	$3.1B	$2.7B	$3.3B	$1.5B	$2.8B	$3.0B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$448M	$449M	$485M	$540M	$666M	$897M	$1.0B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.6B	$1.9B	ReceivablesReceiv.
$162M	$256M	$278M	$361M	$333M	$593M	$936M	$971M	$737M	$800M	$828M	InventoryInvent.
$193M	$246M	$249M	$274M	$297M	$404M	$444M	$564M	$467M	$566M	$784M	Accounts payablePayables
$417M	$459M	$514M	$627M	$702M	$1.1B	$1.5B	$1.6B	$1.5B	$1.9B	$1.9B	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$1.4B	$2.1B	$1.8B	$2.3B	$3.1B	$4.7B	$4.8B	$5.6B	$3.6B	$5.4B	$5.9B	Current assetsCur. assets
$471M	$560M	$601M	$661M	$750M	$965M	$1.0B	$1.2B	$1.1B	$1.4B	$1.8B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.0×	3.7×	3.0×	3.5×	4.2×	4.9×	4.8×	4.8×	3.3×	3.7×	3.3×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.3B	GoodwillGoodwill
$4.2B	$4.8B	$4.5B	$5.2B	$6.2B	$7.8B	$8.3B	$9.7B	$7.7B	$10.0B	$10.8B	Total assetsAssets
$3.3B	$3.9B	$3.6B	$4.2B	$5.2B	$6.6B	$7.0B	$8.2B	$6.0B	$8.3B	$8.7B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
1.5%	1.6%	1.5%	1.5%	1.5%	1.3%	1.0%	1.0%	1.2%	1.5%	1.5%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
1.20B	1.15B	1.13B	1.09B	1.07B	1.07B	1.07B	1.06B	1.01B	984M	988M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$2.54	$2.92	$3.37	$3.84	$4.30	$5.17	$5.92	$6.75	$7.40	$8.43	$8.90	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.59	$0.71	$0.88	$1.01	$1.32	$1.29	$1.12	$1.54	$1.49	$1.94	$2.06	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.55	$0.81	$0.97	$0.96	$1.23	$1.04	$0.77	$1.56	$1.82	$2.00	$2.10	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.50	$0.78	$0.97	$0.93	$1.23	$1.04	$0.66	$1.41	$1.64	$2.00	$2.10	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.08	$0.07	$0.05	$0.09	$0.05	$0.04	$0.18	$0.21	$0.26	$0.13	$0.13	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$2.78	$3.37	$3.20	$3.82	$4.82	$6.13	$6.59	$7.78	$5.88	$8.38	$8.83	Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2021 are restated ×2 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+14.2%/yr	+14.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+15.4%/yr	+10.2%/yr
EPS	+14.0%/yr	+8.0%/yr
Capital spending / share	+5.5%/yr	+24.2%/yr
Book value / share	+13.1%/yr	+11.7%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Operating income+25.3%
“Operating income for the Monster Energy® Drinks segment, exclusive of corporate and unallocated expenses, was $2.98 billion for the year ended December 31, 2025, an increase of approximately $514.0 million, or 20.9% higher than operating income of $2.46 billion for the year ended December 31, 2024. The increase in operating income for the Monster Energy® Drinks segment was primarily the result of an increase in net sales.”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count

984Mpeak FY2016

ROIC

30%low FY2022

Gross margin

56%low FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$2.0Bowner earningsvs.$1.9Bnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $1.9B of profit into $2.0B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$1.9B

Owner earnings$2.0B · 24% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$1.9B	$1.5B	$1.6B	$1.2B	$1.4B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$114M	+$80M	+$69M	+$61M	+$50M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$126M	+$91M	+$69M	+$64M	+$70M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$47M	+$248M	−$51M	−$429M	−$342M
Cash from operations	$2.1B	$1.9B	$1.7B	$888M	$1.2B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$132M	−$80M	−$69M	−$61M	−$44M
Owner earnings	$2.0B	$1.8B	$1.6B	$826M	$1.1B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	−$184M	−$153M	−$127M	—
Free cash flow	$2.0B	$1.7B	$1.5B	$699M	$1.1B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	24%	25%	23%	13%	20%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $126M), owner earnings is nearer $1.8B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? —

No meaningful interest burden

Little or no interest expense reported

What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$2.4B

Net cash

Cash $2.1B + ST investments $677M − debt $374M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $2.4B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 94d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 71 + DIO 80 − DPO 56 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 26%

Very high (≥25%) through the cycle

10-yr median, range 21%–36%; 28% latest = NOPAT $1.9B ÷ invested capital $6.5B

Industry peers: median 5%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 28% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 24%

High through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 13%–29%; latest $2.0B = operating cash $2.1B − maintenance capex $132M

Industry peers: median 7%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 24% of revenue this year, a 24% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $126M of SBC) leaves $1.8B.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.10×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $2.1B ÷ net income $1.9B

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 5%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $104M ÷ Owner Earnings $2.0B

What this means
Of $2.0B Owner Earnings, $104M (5%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $104M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($126M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.16×

Maintaining

Capex $132M ÷ depreciation $114M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 5 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $8.3B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 3.70×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $374M vs $3.9B WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +100%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.72/share (latest year $1.95), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $8.44/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 10 of 10

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Operating margin 35% → 27% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 35% early to 27% lately, median 32% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +10%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 10% a year over the record.
Worst year 2022 · 25.1% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count +5.7%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$5.9B

Cash & short-term investments$3.0B
Receivables$1.9B
Inventory$828M
Other current assets$216M

Current liabilities$1.8B

Accounts payable$784M
Other current liabilities$1.0B

Current ratio3.26×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio2.80×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.64×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$4.1Bthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+26.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters3.4× → 3.3×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$6.0Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$253M$53M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$202Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $13.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$1.2B · 9%
Buybacks$10.6B · 81%
Retained (debt / cash)$1.3B · 10%

Returned to owners$10.6B
85% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $10.6B as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $10.6B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count−17.6%
The diluted count fell from 1200M to 988M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Return on what it retained44%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($2.1B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $921M, so each retained $1 added about 0.44 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$2.7B27% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity16%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$1.4Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $1.2B of capital spent building

$86M written down across 1 year (2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2022	Hilton H. Schlosberg	$15.4M	$20.0M	$826M
2022	Rodney C. Sacks	$15.4M	$20.1M	$826M
2023	Hilton H. Schlosberg	$17.8M	$23.9M	$1.6B
2023	Rodney C. Sacks	$17.9M	$24.0M	$1.6B
2024	Hilton H. Schlosberg	$16.9M	$18.0M	$1.8B
2024	Rodney C. Sacks	$17.7M	$18.9M	$1.8B
2025	Hilton H. Schlosberg	$19.3M	$56.3M	$2.0B
2025	Rodney C. Sacks	$13.8M	$45.3M	$2.0B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership8.1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$126M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Monster Beverage Corp. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?20% → 31% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $610M to $2.7B while revenue grew 188%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (20% of revenue then, 31% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did reported profit become cash?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Beverages

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
KDPKeurig Dr Pepper Inc.	$16.6B	55%	21.3%	5%	18%
TAPMolson Coors	$13.0B	50%	11.0%	6%	9%
STZConstellation Brands Inc.	$9.1B	50%	29.9%	9%	25%
MNSTMonster Beverage Corp.	$8.3B	58%	32.9%	28%	24%
POSTPost Holdings	$8.2B	29%	9.8%	5%	7%
COKECoca-Cola Consolidated	$7.2B	35%	7.9%	32%	6%
PRMBPrimo Brands	$6.7B	30%	6.7%	3%	4%
CELHCelsius Holdings Inc.	$2.5B	43%	-1.3%	-2%	2%
Group median	—	46%	10.4%	6%	8%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Monster Beverage Corp. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Monster Beverage Corp. earns about $2.0B on its 24.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 23.7% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($2.0B) Net of stock comp (−$133M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+18%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+10%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $2.1B on 978M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net cash $2.8B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh MNST against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Monster Beverage Corp. (MNST), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/MNST, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← MNRO its page in the Manual MNTN →

Industry order: ← KOF the Beverages chapter PEP →