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QXO, QXO Inc.
QXO was primarily a technology solutions and professional services company, providing critical software applications, consulting and other professional services, including specialized programming, training and technical support to small and mid-size companies in the manufacturing, distribution and services industries.
QXO Building Products has served the building industry for over 95 years and operates approximately 600 branches throughout all 50 states in the U.S. and seven provinces in Canada.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −2.4% through the cycle on a 40% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −14 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −7%, above 15% in 1 of 8 years). By owner earnings: roughly 3% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2017–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| $35M | $36M | $39M | $41M | $42M | $45M | $55M | $57M | $6.8B | $8.6B | RevenueRevenue |
| 40% | 38% | 38% | 40% | 41% | 40% | 40% | 41% | 23% | 23% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 21% | 22% | 23% | 20% | 23% | 21% | 41% | 163% | 20% | 22% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $939K | ($1M) | ($2M) | $223K | ($231K) | ($385K) | ($1M) | ($71M) | ($245M) | ($458M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 2.7% | −3.2% | −5.0% | 0.5% | −0.6% | −0.9% | −2.4% | −124.8% | −3.6% | −5.3% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($486K) | $262K | $7M | $176K | ($134K) | ($282K) | ($1M) | $28M | ($279M) | ($515M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | -7% | 21% | — | — | — | 45% | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| $2M | $1M | ($903K) | $2M | $226K | $2M | $584K | $85M | $261M | $296M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $255K | $326K | $338K | $314K | $346K | $387K | $828K | $200K | $108M | $156M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $2M | $633K | ($8M) | $1M | ($427K) | $2M | $785K | $22M | $288M | $492M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $241K | $146K | $71K | $125K | $115K | $39K | $121K | $102K | $78M | $101M | CapexCapex |
| 0.7% | 0.4% | 0.2% | 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 1.1% | 1.2% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $2M | $1M | ($974K) | $2M | $111K | $2M | $463K | $85M | $183M | $195M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 5.9% | 3.2% | −2.5% | 3.9% | 0.3% | 4.4% | 0.8% | 148.9% | 2.7% | 2.3% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $2M | $1M | ($974K) | $2M | $111K | $2M | $463K | $85M | $183M | $195M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 5.9% | 3.2% | −2.5% | 3.9% | 0.3% | 4.4% | 0.8% | 148.9% | 2.7% | 2.3% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $300K | $60K | $185K | $646K | $150K | $278K | $0 | $10.6B | $10.6B | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $359K | $0 | $225K | $4M | $3M | $0 | $1M | $17M | $0 | $0 | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $0 | $4K | $0 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 19% | -27% | -200% | 13% | -3% | -11% | -34% | — | -2% | -4% | ROICROIC |
| -12% | 6% | 76% | 2% | -1% | -3% | -14% | 1% | -3% | -5% | Return on equityROE |
| −20% | 6% | 74% | −53% | −34% | −3% | −28% | 0% | −3% | −5% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| $2M | $2M | $9M | $7M | $7M | $8M | $6M | $5.1B | $2.4B | $3.0B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $2M | $2M | $3M | $2M | $2M | $2M | $3M | $3M | $1.1B | $1.1B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $0 | $1.5B | $1.7B | InventoryInvent. |
| $2M | $2M | $2M | $2M | $2M | $3M | $5M | $6M | $819M | $1.2B | Accounts payablePayables |
| $242K | ($128K) | $319K | ($295K) | ($111K) | ($1M) | ($2M) | ($4M) | $1.8B | $1.6B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $5M | $5M | $13M | $9M | $11M | $14M | $12M | $5.1B | $5.5B | $6.5B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $6M | $6M | $9M | $7M | $7M | $11M | $12M | $45M | $1.6B | $1.9B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 0.9× | 0.8× | 1.5× | 1.3× | 1.4× | 1.3× | 1.0× | 112.9× | 3.6× | 3.3× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $401K | $885K | $891K | $1M | $1M | $1M | $1M | $1M | $5.1B | $5.1B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $10M | $12M | $19M | $16M | $18M | $21M | $20M | $5.1B | $15.9B | $16.7B | Total assetsAssets |
| $486K | $995K | $717K | $717K | $757K | $1M | $2M | $0 | $3.1B | $3.1B | Total debtDebt |
| ($2M) | ($906K) | ($8M) | ($6M) | ($6M) | ($7M) | ($4M) | ($5.1B) | $696M | $16M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| — | — | — | — | -4.9× | -4.3× | -23.6× | -710.0× | -1.4× | -2.0× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $4M | $4M | $9M | $7M | $9M | $10M | $8M | $5.1B | $9.7B | $10.2B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.3% | 0.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 1.1% | 0.4% | 0.1% | 60.5% | 2.1% | 1.9% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 561K | 562K | 563K | 563K | 628K | 646K | 657K | 204M | 613M | 744M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $62.11 | $64.19 | $68.44 | $73.26 | $66.37 | $69.65 | $82.98 | $0.28 | $11.16 | $11.50 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.87 | $0.47 | $12.08 | $0.31 | $-0.21 | $-0.44 | $-1.63 | $0.14 | $-0.46 | $-0.69 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $3.68 | $2.04 | $-1.73 | $2.85 | $0.18 | $3.10 | $0.70 | $0.42 | $0.30 | $0.26 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $3.68 | $2.04 | $-1.73 | $2.85 | $0.18 | $3.10 | $0.70 | $0.42 | $0.30 | $0.26 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.64 | $0.00 | $0.40 | $7.20 | $4.90 | $0.00 | $1.60 | $0.09 | $0.00 | $0.00 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.43 | $0.26 | $0.13 | $0.22 | $0.18 | $0.06 | $0.18 | $0.00 | $0.13 | $0.14 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $7.53 | $7.71 | $15.81 | $12.94 | $14.89 | $14.79 | $11.42 | $24.77 | $15.83 | $13.66 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2023 are restated ×1/8 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
The diluted share count moved ×310.5 into 2024 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×3 into 2025 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 8-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | −19.3%/yr | −31.4%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −26.9%/yr | −36.3%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −14.1%/yr | −10.5%/yr |
| Book value / share | +9.7%/yr | +4.1%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Revenue+11925.0%
“Net sales for the year ended December 31, 2025 increased to $6.84 billion compared to $56.9 million for the year ended December 31, 2024. The increase in net sales was primarily driven by the Beacon Acquisition as Beacon’s net sales for the period of April 29, 2025 through December 31, 2025 are included in net sales for the year ended December 31, 2025.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2017–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $279M loss into $183M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($279M) | $28M | ($1M) | ($282K) | ($134K) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$108M | +$200K | +$828K | +$387K | +$346K |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$145M | +$34M | +$41K | +$180K | +$441K |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$288M | +$22M | +$785K | +$2M | −$427K |
| Cash from operations | $261M | $85M | $584K | $2M | $226K |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$78M | −$102K | −$121K | −$39K | −$115K |
| Owner earnings | $183M | $85M | $463K | $2M | $111K |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 3% | 149% | 1% | 4% | 0% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $145M), owner earnings is nearer $39M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -1.4×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($245M) ÷ interest expense $174M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $2.4B − debt $3.1B
What this means
Netting $2.4B of cash and short-term investments against $3.1B of debt leaves $696M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 61 + DIO 104 − DPO 57 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle8-yr median, range -200%–19%; -2% latest = NOPAT ($194M) ÷ invested capital $10.4BIndustry peers: median 15%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran -2% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin, recently turned positivelatest $183M = operating cash $261M − maintenance capex $78M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (9-yr median 3%)Industry peers: median 5%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 3% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $145M of SBC) leaves $39M.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($279M) · cash from operations $261M
In the filing’s words And the filing leans heavily on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings — steering you off the GAAP figure just where the cash is not backing it. Read the reconciliation in the notes before taking the adjusted number.
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $0 ÷ Owner Earnings $183M
What this means
Of $183M Owner Earnings, $0 (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.72×HarvestingCapex $78M ÷ depreciation $108M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $6.8B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 3.58×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $3.1B vs $4.0B WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (9-yr record) · 5 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 6 of 9 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −3943%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.12/share (latest year $-0.39), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $13.39/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2017–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 4 of 9
What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 8 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −2% → −44% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
The recent-years average (−44%) sits below the early years (−2%), but the latest year (−4%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is −2% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −2%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Owner earnings growth +74%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 74% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2024 · −124.8% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“In addition, we have made and expect to continue to make significant investments in AI and other emerging technologies to remain competitive, but there can be no assurance that our efforts will be successful or that we will be able to recoup the costs of such investments.”
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$3.0B
- Receivables$1.1B
- Inventory$1.7B
- Other current assets$606M
- Debt due within a year$3M
- Accounts payable$1.2B
- Other current liabilities$763M
From the company's latest filing.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
True leverage: debt plus leases
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $3.9B, of which the leases are 22%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2017–2025
Over the record, the business generated $353M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$79M · 22%
- Dividends$26M · 7%
- Buybacks$4K · 0%
- Retained (debt / cash)$248M · 70%
- Returned to owners$26M
10% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $26M as dividends and $4K as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $3.1B and cash and short-term investments rose $3.0B.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $4K over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count132561.7%
The diluted count rose from 1M to 744M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$0.00/sh
Paid in 6 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Brad Jacobs | $1.2M | $1.2M | $463K |
| 2024 | Brad Jacobs | $189.4M | $251.2M | $85M |
| 2024 | Brad Jacobs | $4.0M | $4.0M | $85M |
| 2025 | Brad Jacobs | $750k | $53.6M | $183M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership41%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$145M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why QXO Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.
3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?132561.7%
Diluted shares grew 132561.7% over 2017–2025, even as the company spent $4K on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$486K → $3.1B
Debt rose from $486K to $3.1B while owner earnings went from about $747K to $89M — about 0.7 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 34 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?7% → 13% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $2M to $1.1B while revenue grew 24458%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (7% of revenue then, 13% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Trading Companies & Distributors
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CNMCore & Main Inc. | $7.6B | 27% | 9.4% | 15% | 6% |
| REZIResideo Technologies Inc. Common Stock | $7.5B | 28% | 9.2% | 11% | 3% |
| WSOWatsco | $7.2B | 26% | 9.1% | 21% | 7% |
| QXOQXO Inc. | $6.8B | 40% | -2.4% | -7% | 3% |
| BCCBoise Cascade L.L.C. | $6.4B | 56% | 4.7% | 20% | 4% |
| POOLPool Corporation | $5.3B | 29% | 11.3% | 29% | 7% |
| SITESiteOne Landscape | $4.7B | — | 5.3% | 12% | 5% |
| BXCBluelinx Holdings Inc. | $3.0B | 15% | 2.2% | 11% | 2% |
| Group median | — | 28% | 7.2% | 14% | 4% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what QXO Inc. has delivered.
Through the cycle, QXO Inc. earns about $200M on its 2.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 2.7% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $195M on 725M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-05; net debt $16M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($101M) runs well above depreciation ($156M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $217M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← QXL its page in the Manual R →
Industry order: ← PRG the Trading Companies & Distributors chapter SHW →