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R, Ryder System
Ryder System is a leading provider of outsourced logistics and transportation services throughout North America.
We offer port to door solutions that integrate every step of the supply chain, including international inbound flows and cross border logistics, fleet and transportation management, warehousing, manufacturing support and multi-channel final delivery.
Our complementary business segments provide a broad range of value-added solutions, which provides our customers with a seamless, end to end logistics network designed to reduce complexity and improve speed, reliability and efficiency across the entire flow of goods.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 7.8% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The margin is cyclical, swinging between 1.4% and 12% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −14 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 8 years). By owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $6.8B | $7.3B | $8.4B | $8.9B | $8.4B | $9.7B | $12.0B | $11.8B | $12.6B | $12.7B | $12.7B | RevenueRevenue |
| 62% | 59% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 77% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 12% | 12% | 10% | 10% | 12% | 12% | 12% | 12% | 12% | 12% | 12% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $553M | $438M | $568M | $198M | $121M | $904M | $1.4B | $914M | $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.1B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 8.2% | 6.0% | 6.7% | 2.2% | 1.4% | 9.4% | 12.1% | 7.8% | 8.3% | 8.6% | 8.4% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $263M | $720M | $285M | ($24M) | ($122M) | $519M | $867M | $406M | $489M | $499M | $494M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 35% | — | 26% | — | — | 25% | 29% | 34% | 26% | 27% | 26% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $1.6B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $2.1B | $2.2B | $2.2B | $2.3B | $2.4B | $2.3B | $2.6B | $2.5B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.9B | $2.0B | $1.8B | $1.7B | $2.1B | $2.2B | $2.2B | $2.2B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $132M | ($368M) | $20M | $286M | $276M | ($130M) | ($270M) | ($138M) | ($452M) | ($145M) | ($234M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $1.9B | $1.9B | $3.1B | $3.7B | $1.1B | $1.9B | $2.6B | $3.2B | $2.7B | $2.1B | $2.0B | CapexCapex |
| 28.2% | 25.6% | 36.3% | 41.8% | 13.6% | 20.1% | 21.9% | 27.4% | 21.2% | 16.9% | 16.2% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $414M | $370M | $329M | $262M | $1.0B | $234M | $597M | $268M | ($418M) | $459M | $478M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 6.1% | 5.1% | 3.9% | 2.9% | 12.3% | 2.4% | 5.0% | 2.3% | −3.3% | 3.6% | 3.8% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($304M) | ($232M) | ($1.3B) | ($1.6B) | $1.0B | $234M | ($321M) | ($881M) | ($418M) | $459M | $478M | Free cash flowFCF |
| −4.5% | −3.2% | −15.8% | −17.9% | 12.3% | 2.4% | −2.7% | −7.5% | −3.3% | 3.6% | 3.8% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $7M | $167M | $0 | $0 | $325M | $458M | $250M | $314M | $1M | $11M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $91M | $96M | $112M | $116M | $119M | $122M | $123M | $128M | $135M | $145M | $146M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $37M | $78M | $31M | $28M | $29M | $57M | $557M | $337M | $321M | $519M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 4% | 5% | 4% | — | — | 7% | 10% | 5% | 7% | 8% | 7% | ROICROIC |
| 13% | 29% | 11% | -1% | -5% | 19% | 30% | 13% | 16% | 16% | 17% | Return on equityROE |
| 8% | 25% | 7% | −6% | −11% | 14% | 25% | 9% | 11% | 12% | 12% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $59M | $78M | $68M | $74M | $151M | $234M | $267M | $204M | $154M | $198M | $182M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $832M | $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.9B | $1.9B | $1.9B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $70M | $74M | $79M | $81M | $61M | $69M | $78M | — | — | — | $75M | InventoryInvent. |
| $445M | $599M | $732M | $595M | $547M | $748M | $767M | $833M | $828M | $689M | $725M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $456M | $485M | $589M | $715M | $696M | $786M | $921M | $881M | $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.3B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.6B | $1.6B | $1.6B | $2.5B | $2.2B | $2.3B | $2.5B | $2.5B | $2.5B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $1.7B | $2.0B | $2.5B | $2.6B | $2.1B | $3.2B | $3.3B | $3.6B | $3.3B | $2.8B | $3.7B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 0.6× | 0.7× | 0.6× | 0.6× | 0.8× | 0.8× | 0.7× | 0.6× | 0.8× | 0.9× | 0.7× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $387M | $396M | $475M | $475M | $475M | $571M | $861M | $940M | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $10.9B | $11.7B | $13.3B | $14.5B | $12.9B | $13.8B | $14.4B | $15.8B | $16.7B | $16.4B | $16.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| $6.2B | $6.2B | $7.6B | $9.1B | $7.1B | $7.9B | $7.7B | $8.7B | $8.9B | $7.7B | $9.5B | Total debtDebt |
| $6.1B | $6.1B | $7.5B | $9.0B | $7.0B | $7.7B | $7.4B | $8.5B | $8.7B | $7.5B | $9.3B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 3.7× | 3.1× | 3.1× | 0.8× | 0.5× | 4.2× | 6.4× | 3.1× | 2.7× | 2.7× | 2.7× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $2.1B | $2.5B | $2.5B | $2.5B | $2.3B | $2.8B | $2.9B | $3.1B | $3.1B | $3.1B | $2.9B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.3% | 0.3% | 0.3% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.2% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 53.4M | 53.0M | 52.7M | 52.3M | 52.4M | 53.5M | 50.9M | 46.5M | 44.2M | 41.8M | 39.6M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $126.65 | $137.40 | $159.67 | $170.51 | $160.80 | $180.59 | $236.03 | $253.46 | $285.66 | $302.97 | $319.61 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $4.93 | $13.58 | $5.40 | $-0.47 | $-2.33 | $9.70 | $17.04 | $8.73 | $11.05 | $11.94 | $12.47 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $7.76 | $6.99 | $6.25 | $5.00 | $19.77 | $4.37 | $11.73 | $5.76 | $-9.45 | $10.98 | $12.07 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-5.70 | $-4.38 | $-25.28 | $-30.46 | $19.77 | $4.37 | $-6.31 | $-18.95 | $-9.45 | $10.98 | $12.07 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $1.71 | $1.81 | $2.12 | $2.22 | $2.27 | $2.28 | $2.42 | $2.75 | $3.05 | $3.47 | $3.69 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $35.70 | $35.11 | $57.89 | $71.35 | $21.89 | $36.27 | $51.70 | $69.57 | $60.65 | $51.07 | $51.70 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $38.56 | $46.31 | $48.13 | $47.30 | $43.08 | $52.29 | $57.72 | $66.02 | $70.47 | $73.01 | $72.15 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +10.2%/yr | +13.5%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +3.9%/yr | −11.1%/yr |
| EPS | +10.3%/yr | — |
| Dividends / share | +8.2%/yr | +8.8%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +4.1%/yr | +18.5%/yr |
| Book value / share | +7.4%/yr | +11.1%/yr |
The year, in the company's words
the filing →Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.
- Revenue+0.2%
“Revenue increased 1% in 2025, reflecting ChoiceLease revenue growth, partially offset by lower rental demand.”
✓ figure matches the filed record
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business reported $499M of profit but $459M of owner earnings: $40M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $499M | $489M | $406M | $867M | $519M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$2.2B | +$2.2B | +$2.1B | +$1.7B | +$1.8B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$145M | −$452M | −$138M | −$270M | −$130M |
| Cash from operations | $2.6B | $2.3B | $2.4B | $2.3B | $2.2B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$2.1B | −$2.7B | −$2.1B | −$1.7B | −$1.9B |
| Owner earnings | $459M | ($418M) | $268M | $597M | $234M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | — | −$1.1B | −$918M | — |
| Free cash flow | $459M | ($418M) | ($881M) | ($321M) | $234M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 4% | -3% | 2% | 5% | 2% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $1.1B ÷ interest expense $404M
What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $8.4B · 7.7× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $198M − debt $8.6B
What this means
Netting $198M of cash and short-term investments against $8.6B of debt leaves $8.4B owed, about 7.7× a year's operating profit (7.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 55 + DIO 10 − DPO 85 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle8-yr median, range 4%–10%; 7% latest = NOPAT $794M ÷ invested capital $11.4BIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -3%–12%; latest $459M = operating cash $2.6B − maintenance capex $2.1BIndustry peers: median 9%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $25M of SBC) leaves $434M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $2.6B ÷ net income $499M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $664M ÷ Owner Earnings $459M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $459M of Owner Earnings, $664M (145%) went back to shareholders, $145M dividends, $519M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $25M stock comp, the real buyback was about $494M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.95×MaintainingCapex $2.1B ÷ depreciation $2.2B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $12.7B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.89×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $8.6B vs ($305M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth NearEarnings +33% over the record · +10%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $12.01/share (latest year $12.90), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $78.88/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 8 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 7% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 7% early, 8% lately, median 8%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth −28%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 28% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2020 · 1.4% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −2.7%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
- How management talks about it Owner’s terms
What this means
Returns have thinned, but the filing discusses it in an owner’s vocabulary rather than selling past it — candor about a hard stretch counts for more than an adjective.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“We use artificial intelligence in our business, and challenges with its use could result in reputational or competitive harm and legal liability, which could have an adverse impact on our results of operations.”
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$182M
- Receivables$1.9B
- Inventory$75M
- Other current assets$297M
- Debt due within a year$1.7B
- Accounts payable$725M
- Other current liabilities$1.2B
From the company's latest filing.
Debt maturity
the debt note, SEC EDGAR →Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.
Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.
Against what the business has and earns
Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $641M against the $790M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: about 81% of it, so the near maturities lean on refinancing or the rest of the year’s cash.
Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
True leverage: debt plus leases
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $9.7B, of which the leases are 12%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $21.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$24.3B · 116%
- Dividends$1.2B · 6%
- Buybacks$2.0B · 10%
- Returned to owners$3.2B
90% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.2B as dividends and $2.0B as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$6.5B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $6.5B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $6.2B to $9.5B.
- Average price paid for buybacks$102.03
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 18M shares were bought for $1.8B, about $102.03 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $45.53 (2020) to $162.19 (2025); its heaviest year, 2022, paid $79.57 ($557M).
- Net change in share count−25.8%
The diluted count fell from 53M to 40M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$3.47/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 8% a year. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained−37%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($720M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $268M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.37 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Mr. Sanchez | $8.8M | $24.3M | $234M |
| 2022 | Mr. Sanchez | $9.8M | $15.0M | $597M |
| 2023 | Mr. Sanchez | $9.2M | $20.6M | $268M |
| 2024 | Mr. Sanchez | $9.3M | $23.5M | ($418M) |
| 2025 | Mr. Sanchez | $10.2M | $16.7M | $459M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership4.9%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio184:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$25M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Ryder System is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?0.9% vs 5.0%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 5.0% early in the record and 0.9% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$6.2B → $9.5B
Debt rose from $6.2B to $9.5B while owner earnings went from about $371M to $103M — about 17 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 92 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Pension & retirement, Insurance reserves as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Auto Dealers & Services
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RRyder System | $12.7B | 77% | 8.0% | 6% | 4% |
| DRVNDriven Brands Holdings Inc. | $1.9B | — | 11.4% | 5% | 9% |
| MNROMonro Inc. | $1.2B | — | 6.9% | 8% | 9% |
| MCWMister Car Wash | $1.1B | — | 19.0% | 8% | 16% |
| UHALU-Haul Holding | $761M | 96% | 39.3% | 8% | -29% |
| EVGOEVgo Inc. | $384M | -2% | -184.6% | — | -114% |
| Group median | — | 77% | 9.7% | 8% | 6% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Ryder System has delivered.
Through the cycle, Ryder System earns about $477M on its 3.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 3.6% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $478M on 39M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-03-31; net debt $9.3B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← QXO its page in the Manual RAL →
Industry order: ← PAG the Auto Dealers & Services chapter RUSHA →