Owner Scorecard


← All companies ← QXO Manual RAL → ← PAG Auto Dealers & Services RUSHA →

R, Ryder System

Auto Dealers & Services capital-intensive Cyclical

Ryder System is a leading provider of outsourced logistics and transportation services throughout North America.

We offer port to door solutions that integrate every step of the supply chain, including international inbound flows and cross border logistics, fleet and transportation management, warehousing, manufacturing support and multi-channel final delivery.

Our complementary business segments provide a broad range of value-added solutions, which provides our customers with a seamless, end to end logistics network designed to reduce complexity and improve speed, reliability and efficiency across the entire flow of goods.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
R · Ryder System
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$12.7B
+0.2% YoY · 9% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $12.7B 5-yr avg $11.8B
Operating margin 8.4% 5-yr avg 9.2%
ROIC 7% 5-yr avg 7%
Owner-earnings margin 4% 5-yr avg 2%
Free cash flow margin 4% 5-yr avg −1%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 7.8% through the cycle, a thin margin, where volume, cost discipline and the price it gets all bear on the result. The margin is cyclical, swinging between 1.4% and 12% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −14 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 8 years). By owner earnings: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$6.8B$7.3B$8.4B$8.9B$8.4B$9.7B$12.0B$11.8B$12.6B$12.7B$12.7BRevenueRevenue
62%59%77%Gross marginGross mgn
12%12%10%10%12%12%12%12%12%12%12%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$553M$438M$568M$198M$121M$904M$1.4B$914M$1.0B$1.1B$1.1BOperating incomeOp. inc.
8.2%6.0%6.7%2.2%1.4%9.4%12.1%7.8%8.3%8.6%8.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
$263M$720M$285M($24M)($122M)$519M$867M$406M$489M$499M$494MNet incomeNet inc.
35%26%25%29%34%26%27%26%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$1.6B$1.6B$1.7B$2.1B$2.2B$2.2B$2.3B$2.4B$2.3B$2.6B$2.5BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$1.2B$1.3B$1.4B$1.9B$2.0B$1.8B$1.7B$2.1B$2.2B$2.2B$2.2BDepreciationDeprec.
$132M($368M)$20M$286M$276M($130M)($270M)($138M)($452M)($145M)($234M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$1.9B$1.9B$3.1B$3.7B$1.1B$1.9B$2.6B$3.2B$2.7B$2.1B$2.0BCapexCapex
28.2%25.6%36.3%41.8%13.6%20.1%21.9%27.4%21.2%16.9%16.2%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$414M$370M$329M$262M$1.0B$234M$597M$268M($418M)$459M$478MOwner earningsOwner earn.
6.1%5.1%3.9%2.9%12.3%2.4%5.0%2.3%−3.3%3.6%3.8%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($304M)($232M)($1.3B)($1.6B)$1.0B$234M($321M)($881M)($418M)$459M$478MFree cash flowFCF
−4.5%−3.2%−15.8%−17.9%12.3%2.4%−2.7%−7.5%−3.3%3.6%3.8%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$7M$167M$0$0$325M$458M$250M$314M$1M$11MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$91M$96M$112M$116M$119M$122M$123M$128M$135M$145M$146MDividends paidDiv. paid
$37M$78M$31M$28M$29M$57M$557M$337M$321M$519MBuybacksBuybacks
4%5%4%7%10%5%7%8%7%ROICROIC
13%29%11%-1%-5%19%30%13%16%16%17%Return on equityROE
8%25%7%−6%−11%14%25%9%11%12%12%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$59M$78M$68M$74M$151M$234M$267M$204M$154M$198M$182MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$832M$1.0B$1.2B$1.2B$1.2B$1.5B$1.6B$1.7B$1.9B$1.9B$1.9BReceivablesReceiv.
$70M$74M$79M$81M$61M$69M$78M$75MInventoryInvent.
$445M$599M$732M$595M$547M$748M$767M$833M$828M$689M$725MAccounts payablePayables
$456M$485M$589M$715M$696M$786M$921M$881M$1.0B$1.2B$1.3BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1.1B$1.3B$1.6B$1.6B$1.6B$2.5B$2.2B$2.3B$2.5B$2.5B$2.5BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$1.7B$2.0B$2.5B$2.6B$2.1B$3.2B$3.3B$3.6B$3.3B$2.8B$3.7BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.6×0.7×0.6×0.6×0.8×0.8×0.7×0.6×0.8×0.9×0.7×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$387M$396M$475M$475M$475M$571M$861M$940M$1.2B$1.2B$1.2BGoodwillGoodwill
$10.9B$11.7B$13.3B$14.5B$12.9B$13.8B$14.4B$15.8B$16.7B$16.4B$16.2BTotal assetsAssets
$6.2B$6.2B$7.6B$9.1B$7.1B$7.9B$7.7B$8.7B$8.9B$7.7B$9.5BTotal debtDebt
$6.1B$6.1B$7.5B$9.0B$7.0B$7.7B$7.4B$8.5B$8.7B$7.5B$9.3BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
3.7×3.1×3.1×0.8×0.5×4.2×6.4×3.1×2.7×2.7×2.7×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$2.1B$2.5B$2.5B$2.5B$2.3B$2.8B$2.9B$3.1B$3.1B$3.1B$2.9BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.3%0.3%0.3%0.2%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
53.4M53.0M52.7M52.3M52.4M53.5M50.9M46.5M44.2M41.8M39.6MShares out (diluted)Shares
$126.65$137.40$159.67$170.51$160.80$180.59$236.03$253.46$285.66$302.97$319.61Revenue / shareRev/sh
$4.93$13.58$5.40$-0.47$-2.33$9.70$17.04$8.73$11.05$11.94$12.47EPS (diluted)EPS
$7.76$6.99$6.25$5.00$19.77$4.37$11.73$5.76$-9.45$10.98$12.07Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-5.70$-4.38$-25.28$-30.46$19.77$4.37$-6.31$-18.95$-9.45$10.98$12.07Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.71$1.81$2.12$2.22$2.27$2.28$2.42$2.75$3.05$3.47$3.69Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$35.70$35.11$57.89$71.35$21.89$36.27$51.70$69.57$60.65$51.07$51.70Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$38.56$46.31$48.13$47.30$43.08$52.29$57.72$66.02$70.47$73.01$72.15Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+10.2%/yr+13.5%/yr
Owner earnings / share+3.9%/yr−11.1%/yr
EPS+10.3%/yr
Dividends / share+8.2%/yr+8.8%/yr
Capital spending / share+4.1%/yr+18.5%/yr
Book value / share+7.4%/yr+11.1%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Revenue+0.2%
    “Revenue increased 1% in 2025, reflecting ChoiceLease revenue growth, partially offset by lower rental demand.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
42Mpeak FY2021
ROIC
8%low FY2018
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
16.3×peak FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$459Mowner earningsvs.$499Mnet incomelow FY2024

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $499M of profit but $459M of owner earnings: $40M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$499M
Owner earnings$459M · 4% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$499M$489M$406M$867M$519M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$2.2B+$2.2B+$2.1B+$1.7B+$1.8B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$145M−$452M−$138M−$270M−$130M
Cash from operations$2.6B$2.3B$2.4B$2.3B$2.2B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$2.1B−$2.7B−$2.1B−$1.7B−$1.9B
Owner earnings$459M($418M)$268M$597M$234M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$1.1B−$918M
Free cash flow$459M($418M)($881M)($321M)$234M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue4%-3%2%5%2%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $1.1B ÷ interest expense $404M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $8.4B · 7.7× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $198M − debt $8.6B
    What this means

    Netting $198M of cash and short-term investments against $8.6B of debt leaves $8.4B owed, about 7.7× a year's operating profit (7.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 55 + DIO 10 − DPO 85 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    8-yr median, range 4%–10%; 7% latest = NOPAT $794M ÷ invested capital $11.4B
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -3%–12%; latest $459M = operating cash $2.6B − maintenance capex $2.1B
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $25M of SBC) leaves $434M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $2.6B ÷ net income $499M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $664M ÷ Owner Earnings $459M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $459M of Owner Earnings, $664M (145%) went back to shareholders, $145M dividends, $519M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $25M stock comp, the real buyback was about $494M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.95×
    Maintaining
    Capex $2.1B ÷ depreciation $2.2B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $12.7B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.89×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $8.6B vs ($305M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Near
    Earnings +33% over the record · +10%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $12.01/share (latest year $12.90), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $78.88/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 7% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 7% early, 8% lately, median 8%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth −28%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 28% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · 1.4% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −2.7%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    Returns have thinned, but the filing discusses it in an owner’s vocabulary rather than selling past it — candor about a hard stretch counts for more than an adjective.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“We use artificial intelligence in our business, and challenges with its use could result in reputational or competitive harm and legal liability, which could have an adverse impact on our results of operations.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.5B
  • Cash & short-term investments$182M
  • Receivables$1.9B
  • Inventory$75M
  • Other current assets$297M
Current liabilities$3.7B
  • Debt due within a year$1.7B
  • Accounts payable$725M
  • Other current liabilities$1.2B
Current ratio0.68×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.66×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.05×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($1.2B)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$1.7B due · $182M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−0.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.7× → 0.7×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$1.3Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($10.9B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$10.5B$1.0B of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $9.7B (annual-report basis)
Deferred revenue$691Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$790M
'27$1.4B
'28$1.6B
'29$1.5B
'30$1.8B
later$600M

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$790Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$2.2Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$1.8Bin 2030the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$7.6Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$182M
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$459M
Together, against $790M due next year0.81×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $641M against the $790M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: about 81% of it, so the near maturities lean on refinancing or the rest of the year’s cash.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases
'26$389M
'27$323M
'28$234M
'29$139M
'30$88M
later$113M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$389Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year
Total lease payments$1.3Bevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take
On the balance sheet$1.1Bthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$8.6B
Lease obligations (present value)$1.1B
Total fixed claims on the business$9.7B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $9.7B, of which the leases are 12%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $21.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$24.3B · 116%
  • Dividends$1.2B · 6%
  • Buybacks$2.0B · 10%
  • Returned to owners$3.2B

    90% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.2B as dividends and $2.0B as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$6.5B

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $6.5B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $6.2B to $9.5B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$102.03

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 18M shares were bought for $1.8B, about $102.03 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $45.53 (2020) to $162.19 (2025); its heaviest year, 2022, paid $79.57 ($557M).

  • Net change in share count−25.8%

    The diluted count fell from 53M to 40M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$3.47/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 8% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained−37%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($720M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $268M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.37 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Sanchez$8.8M$24.3M$234M
2022Mr. Sanchez$9.8M$15.0M$597M
2023Mr. Sanchez$9.2M$20.6M$268M
2024Mr. Sanchez$9.3M$23.5M($418M)
2025Mr. Sanchez$10.2M$16.7M$459M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership4.9%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio184:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$25M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Ryder System is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?0.9% vs 5.0%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 5.0% early in the record and 0.9% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$6.2B → $9.5B

    Debt rose from $6.2B to $9.5B while owner earnings went from about $371M to $103M — about 17 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 92 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Pension & retirement, Insurance reserves as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Auto Dealers & Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
RRyder System$12.7B77%8.0%6%4%
DRVNDriven Brands Holdings Inc.$1.9B11.4%5%9%
MNROMonro Inc.$1.2B6.9%8%9%
MCWMister Car Wash$1.1B19.0%8%16%
UHALU-Haul Holding$761M96%39.3%8%-29%
EVGOEVgo Inc.$384M-2%-184.6%-114%
Group median77%9.7%8%6%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Ryder System has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Ryder System earns about $477M on its 3.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 3.6% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−53%/yr
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $478M on 39M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-03-31; net debt $9.3B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Ryder System (R), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/R, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← QXO its page in the Manual RAL →

Industry order: ← PAG the Auto Dealers & Services chapter RUSHA →