Share count
70Mpeak FY2025
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RGLD, Royal Gold
Metals & Mining REIT
Revenue is Stream interest (67%) and Royalty interest (33%).
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$1.0B
+43.2% YoY · 16% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $469M +142.5% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin 63.3% yr-ago 63.6%
Net income $282M yr-ago $114M
Net margin 60.0% yr-ago 58.7%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- A property business, read on funds from operations and net asset value rather than reported earnings.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 47% through the cycle, a wide margin for the work it does — whether that reflects a durable edge or one that can fade is what the record weighs. The operating margin has swung widely — from −16% to 62% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on concentrated dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 8%). This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Stream interest is 67% of revenue, with Royalty interest the other meaningful segment at 33%.
Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
- Stream interest67%$686M
- Royalty interest33%$344M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2017–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| $441M | $459M | $423M | $499M | $616M | $603M | $606M | $719M | $1.0B | $1.3B | RevenueRevenue |
| $102M | ($113M) | $94M | $199M | $303M | $239M | $239M | $332M | $466M | $634M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| $261M | $51M | $257M | $375M | $486M | $418M | $404M | $476M | $643M | $869M | Funds from operationsFFO |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| 24% | 127% | 26% | 19% | 16% | 22% | 24% | 22% | 18% | 15% | Dividend payout (FFO)Payout |
| $3.1B | $2.7B | $2.5B | $2.8B | $2.8B | $3.5B | $3.4B | $3.4B | $9.5B | $9.5B | Total assetsAssets |
| 19% | 13% | — | 11% | — | 16% | — | — | — | — | Debt / assetsDebt/assets |
| $586M | $351M | $215M | $300M | — | $572M | $246M | $0 | $895M | $646M | Total debtDebt |
| $497M | $243M | $95M | ($19M) | — | $453M | $142M | ($196M) | $489M | $311M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $2.3B | $2.1B | $2.1B | $2.3B | $2.6B | $2.7B | $2.9B | $3.1B | $7.2B | $7.4B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 65.3M | 65.3M | 65.5M | 65.6M | 65.6M | 65.7M | 65.7M | 65.8M | 69.6M | 85.0M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $4.00 | $0.77 | $3.92 | $5.71 | $7.41 | $6.36 | $6.15 | $7.24 | $9.25 | $10.22 | FFO / shareFFO/sh |
| $0.94 | $0.98 | $1.03 | $1.09 | $1.16 | $1.40 | $1.50 | $1.60 | $1.70 | $1.52 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $34.86 | $32.20 | $32.62 | $34.61 | $39.45 | $41.75 | $43.93 | $47.42 | $102.89 | $87.22 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 8-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +10.3%/yr | +14.3%/yr |
| EPS | +20.0%/yr | +17.2%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +7.7%/yr | +9.4%/yr |
| Book value / share | +14.5%/yr | +24.3%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2017–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
ROIC
7%low FY2018
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 375.4×ComfortableOperating income $638M ÷ interest expense $2M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $671M · 1.1× operating profitModest net debtCash $234M + ST investments $6M − debt $911M
What this means
Netting $240M of cash and short-term investments against $911M of debt leaves $671M owed, about 1.1× a year's operating profit (1.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). It also holds $173M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at $498M of net debt. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle9-yr median, range -2%–12%; 7% latest = NOPAT $523M ÷ invested capital $7.8BIndustry peers: median 3%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 14%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $705M ÷ net income $466M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? —Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.0B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 3.12×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $911M vs $257M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (9-yr record) · 1 loss year
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (9)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +1162%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4.08/share (latest year $5.49), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $84.33/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2017–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 8 of 9
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 8 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 17% → 57% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 17% early to 57% lately, median 47% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 15%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Worst year 2018 · −16.2% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2018, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +0.8%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$412M
- Cash & short-term investments$238M
- Other current assets$174M
Current liabilities$117M
- Debt due within a year$50M
- Accounts payable$7M
- Other current liabilities$60M
Current ratio3.52×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio3.52×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio2.03×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$295Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$50M due · $238M cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+142.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.1× → 3.5×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$7.4Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($1.6B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$683M$37M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$69Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Net income |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | (1)Mr. Heissenbuttel | $3.0M | $2.5M | $303M |
| 2022 | (1)Mr. Heissenbuttel | $3.1M | $3.5M | $239M |
| 2023 | (1)Mr. Heissenbuttel | $4.3M | $4.4M | $239M |
| 2024 | (1)Mr. Heissenbuttel | $4.2M | $1.6M | $332M |
| 2025 | (1)Mr. Heissenbuttel | $5.2M | $3.9M | $466M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$12M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Metals & Mining
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SSRMSSR Mining Inc. | $1.6B | 48% | 19.5% | 5% | 14% |
| RGLDRoyal Gold | $1.0B | — | 47.0% | 8% | — |
| MACMacerich | $1.0B | — | 1.5% | 0% | — |
| DEIDouglas Emmett | $1.0B | — | 23.1% | 2% | 31% |
| REXRRexford Industrial | $1.0B | — | 33.3% | 2% | 22% |
| SLGSL Green Realty | $1.0B | — | 65.3% | 6% | 13% |
| CUZCousins Properties | $994M | 66% | 66.4% | 6% | 12% |
| MPTMedical Properties Trust Inc. | $972M | 90% | 41.0% | 3% | — |
| Group median | — | — | 37.2% | 4% | — |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFRoyal Gold is profitable, but its owner-earnings base could not be formed from this filing’s tagged data (operating cash flow or capital spending is missing), so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
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The assumptions
Revenue, delivered12%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
Owner earnings it must reach—
Margin the price demands—
Owner-earnings margin today—
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Royal Gold (RGLD), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/RGLD, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← RGEN its page in the Manual RGNX →
Industry order: ← NX the Metals & Mining chapter RIO →