Owner Scorecard


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RJET, Republic Airways Holdings Inc.

Airlines capital-intensive

Republic is the second largest independent regional airline in the United States based on total fleet and daily departures.

As of December 31, 2025, Republic had an operational fleet of 275 regional jet aircraft that regularly provides scheduled passenger service on approximately 1,300 daily flights to approximately 130 cities in the United States, Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean.

Substantially all of Republic's service are operated under multi-year Capacity Purchase Agreements ("CPAs") with the Partner Airlines.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
RJET · Republic Airways Holdings Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.3B
+15.5% YoY · 20% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.5B 5-yr avg $932M
Operating margin 11.5% 5-yr avg 2.8%
ROIC 5% 5-yr avg 2%
Owner-earnings margin 13% 5-yr avg 11%
Free cash flow margin −8% 5-yr avg 2%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 12% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The operating margin has swung widely — from −35% to 17% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Capital spending runs about 17% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on load factor against unit cost, and fuel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 1 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 10% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$588M$644M$682M$723M$545M$504M$531M$1.1B$1.2B$1.3B$1.5BRevenueRevenue
7%6%8%7%10%10%8%4%4%3%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$57M$100M$73M$121M$80M$63M($185M)$135M$137M$168M$170MOperating incomeOp. inc.
9.7%15.6%10.7%16.7%14.7%12.5%−34.8%12.2%11.8%12.5%11.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
$15M$33M$33M$48M$27M$17M($183M)$55M$65M$76M$76MNet incomeNet inc.
40%39%25%26%26%38%26%33%34%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$104M$75M$119M$152M$175M$133M$13M$329M$226M$322M$326MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$46M$61M$65M$78M$82M$83M$82M$159M$117M$126M$130MDepreciationDeprec.
$42M($20M)$8M$21M$60M$30M$112M$114M$44M$99M$100MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$490M$85M$118M$125M$27M$17M$41M$378M$227M$397M$451MCapexCapex
83.4%13.1%17.3%17.3%4.9%3.4%7.7%34.0%19.4%29.5%30.7%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$58M$14M$54M$74M$148M$116M($27M)$170M$109M$196M$196MOwner earningsOwner earn.
9.9%2.1%7.9%10.2%27.2%23.0%−5.2%15.3%9.4%14.5%13.3%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($386M)($10M)$950K$26M$148M$116M($27M)($49M)($600K)($75M)($125M)Free cash flowFCF
−65.6%−1.5%0.1%3.6%27.2%23.0%−5.2%−4.4%−0.1%−5.6%−8.5%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$1M$1M$5M$2M$586K$1M$455KBuybacksBuybacks
23%6%6%8%5%5%-10%5%5%5%5%ROICROIC
8%15%9%11%6%3%-18%5%6%6%6%Return on equityROE
8%15%9%11%6%3%−18%5%6%6%6%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$38M$57M$123M$69M$99M$121M$58M$33M$302M$297M$273MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$9M$14M$23M$14M$3M$4M$8M$5M$20MReceivablesReceiv.
$63M$89M$95MInventoryInvent.
$45M$54M$50M$53M$61M$59M$59M$72M$57MAccounts payablePayables
($36M)($40M)($27M)($40M)($58M)($55M)($51M)($4M)$89M$58MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$146M$198M$158M$156M$158M$98M$139M$453M$541M$487MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$218M$251M$257M$353M$258M$214M$268M$489M$574M$520MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.7×0.8×0.6×0.4×0.6×0.5×0.5×0.9×0.9×0.9×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$0$2M$2M$123M$123MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.4B$1.5B$1.5B$1.5B$1.5B$1.1B$898M$2.8B$3.3B$3.3BTotal assetsAssets
$944M$915M$843M$732M$651M$600M$528M$1.0B$1.1B$1.1BTotal debtDebt
$888M$792M$774M$632M$531M$542M$495M$721M$798M$822MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
1.7×2.2×1.3×2.2×1.8×1.8×-5.2×2.7×2.4×2.8×2.7×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$189M$222M$374M$426M$458M$488M$991M$1.0B$1.1B$1.3B$1.4BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.3%0.2%1.9%0.8%0.8%0.6%0.5%0.1%0.1%1.5%1.4%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
24.1M23.4M25.3M35.1M35.3M38.8M36.1M39.7M39.8M40.7M46.1MShares out (diluted)Shares
$24.41$27.54$26.99$20.63$15.44$12.96$14.70$28.03$29.32$33.12$31.91Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.62$1.40$1.32$1.36$0.78$0.43$-5.06$1.38$1.62$1.87$1.65EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.43$0.59$2.13$2.10$4.19$2.98$-0.76$4.28$2.74$4.81$4.25Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-16.01$-0.42$0.04$0.75$4.19$2.98$-0.76$-1.23$-0.02$-1.84$-2.71Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$20.35$3.62$4.67$3.57$0.76$0.44$1.13$9.53$5.70$9.76$9.79Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$7.85$9.51$14.83$12.15$12.97$12.56$27.43$26.38$27.93$32.68$29.35Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+3.4%/yr+16.5%/yr
Owner earnings / share+7.9%/yr+2.8%/yr
EPS+13.1%/yr+19.2%/yr
Capital spending / share−7.8%/yr+66.8%/yr
Book value / share+17.2%/yr+20.3%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Revenue+15.5%
    “Revenues Revenues increased $202.5 million, or 13.7%, to $1,676.5 million for the year ended December 31, 2025 compared to $1,474.0 million for the year ended December 31, 2024, primarily related to a $188.3 million increase in variable revenue year-over-year due in part to the increase in flying compared to the prior year.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
41Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
5%low FY2022
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
4.1×peak FY2017

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$196Mowner earningsvs.$76Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $196M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $126M it takes just to hold its position. It put $271M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($75M).

Reported net income$76M
Owner earnings$196M · 15% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$76M$65M$55M($183M)$17M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$126M+$117M+$159M+$82M+$83M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$20M+$1M+$2M+$3M+$3M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$99M+$44M+$114M+$112M+$30M
Cash from operations$322M$226M$329M$13M$133M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$126M−$117M−$159M−$41M−$17M
Owner earnings$196M$109M$170M($27M)$116M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$271M−$110M−$219M
Free cash flow($75M)($600K)($49M)($27M)$116M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue15%9%15%-5%23%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $126M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $271M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $20M), owner earnings is nearer $176M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $168M ÷ interest expense $61M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $798M · 4.7× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $134M + ST investments $162M − debt $1.1B
    What this means

    Netting $297M of cash and short-term investments against $1.1B of debt leaves $798M owed, about 4.7× a year's operating profit (6.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -10%–23%; 5% latest = NOPAT $113M ÷ invested capital $2.3B
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -5%–27%; latest $196M = operating cash $322M − maintenance capex $126M
    Industry peers: median 4%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 15% of revenue this year, a 10% median across 10 years. It chose to put $271M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($75M) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $20M of SBC) leaves $176M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $322M ÷ net income $76M

    In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $455K ÷ Owner Earnings $196M
    What this means

    Of $196M Owner Earnings, $455K (0%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $455K buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($20M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 3.14×
    Expanding
    Capex $397M ÷ depreciation $126M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.3B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.94×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1.1B vs ($34M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +141%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.39/share (latest year $1.63), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $28.37/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 12% → 12% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 12% early, 12% lately, median 12%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 6%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +17%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 17% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2022 · −34.8% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +6.0%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$487M
  • Cash & short-term investments$273M
  • Receivables$20M
  • Inventory$95M
  • Other current assets$97M
Current liabilities$520M
  • Debt due within a year$68M
  • Accounts payable$57M
  • Other current liabilities$395M
Current ratio0.94×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.75×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.53×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($34M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$68M due · $273M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+33.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.5× → 0.9×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$1.2Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($1.4B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.2B$137M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$12Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$196M
'27$120M
'28$172M
'29$76M
'30$110M
later$351M

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$196Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$316Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$196Min 2026the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$1.0Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$273M
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$196M
Together, against $196M due next year2.4×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $469M against the $196M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 2.4 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested$1.9B · 116%
  • Buybacks$12M · 1%
  • Returned to owners$12M

    1% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $12M as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$268M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $268M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $12M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count91.2%

    The diluted count rose from 24M to 46M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained67%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($174M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $116M, so each retained $1 added about 0.67 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$1.9M$3.6M$116M
2022$1.9M$161k($27M)
2023$1.9M$1.7M$170M
2024$1.8M$1.9M$109M
2025$5.5M$5.7M$196M
2025$4.3M$4.8M$196M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership3%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio77:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$20M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 12% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Republic Airways Holdings Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?91.2%

    Diluted shares grew 91.2% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $12M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Airlines

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
ALKAlaska Air$14.2B6.3%7%10%
JBLUJetBlue Airways Corporation$9.1B-1.9%-2%4%
SKYWSkyWest Inc.$4.1B12%11.3%6%22%
ULCCFrontier Group Holdings Inc.$3.7B-1.4%-24%-4%
ALGTAllegiant Travel Company$2.3B12.7%6%12%
VTOLBristow Group Inc.$1.5B2.3%2%4%
RJETRepublic Airways Holdings Inc.$1.3B12.3%5%10%
UPWheels Up Experience Inc.$736M7%-27.6%-17%
Group median4.3%5%7%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Republic Airways Holdings Inc. has delivered.

Republic Airways Holdings Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

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Through the cycle, Republic Airways Holdings Inc. earns about $136M on its 10.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 14.5% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+36%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+17%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($125M) on 47M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-28; net debt $822M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($451M) runs well above depreciation ($130M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $200M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Republic Airways Holdings Inc. (RJET), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/RJET, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← RIVN its page in the Manual RJF →

Industry order: ← LUV the Airlines chapter RYAAY →