Owner Scorecard


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RYAAY, Ryanair Holdings plc

Airlines capital-intensive Cyclical

Ryanair Holdings has provided an aggregate of approximately 1.56bn in letters of guarantee to secure obligations of certain of its subsidiaries in respect of loans, capital market transactions and bank advances, including those relating to aircraft financing and related hedging transactions.

He joined Kerry Group in 1976 and worked in a number of finance roles before being appointed as Vice President of Sales and Marketing in the USA in 1991, as President of Kerry North America in 1996 and as a Director of Kerry Group in 1999.

Since then, he has provided consultancy services on operational and safety matters to a number of large, international airlines.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F · figures as filed, in EUR · 1 ADS = 2 ordinary shares
RYAAY · Ryanair Holdings plc
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
€13.9B
+3.8% YoY · 10% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue €13.9B 5-yr avg €8.9B
Operating margin 11.2% 5-yr avg −3.7%
ROIC 29% 5-yr avg 14%
Owner-earnings margin 19% 5-yr avg −17%
Free cash flow margin 13% 5-yr avg −23%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run about 13% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −51% and 23% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 18% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on load factor against unit cost, and fuel. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on supplier & input dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run high across the record (median 21%, above 15% in 7 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 16% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2025
Income statement
€6.5B€6.6B€7.2B€7.7B€8.5B€1.6B€4.8B€10.8B€13.4B€13.9B€13.9BRevenueRevenue
€1.5B€1.5B€1.7B€1.0B€1.1B(€839M)(€340M)€1.4B€2.1B€1.6B€1.6BOperating incomeOp. inc.
22.3%23.1%23.3%13.2%13.3%−51.3%−7.1%13.4%15.3%11.2%11.2%Operating marginOp. mgn
€1.6B€1.3B€1.5B€885M€649M(€1.0B)(€241M)€1.3B€1.9B€1.6B€1.6BNet incomeNet inc.
9%11%10%7%3%9%10%10%10%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
€2.2B€1.8B€1.3B(€2.4B)€1.9B€3.9B€3.2B€3.4B€3.4BOperating cash flowOp. cash
€427M€498M€561M€641M€749M€571M€719M€923M€1.1B€1.2B€719MDepreciationDeprec.
€222M€234M(€70M)(€2.0B)€1.5B€1.7B€181M€590M€1.1BWorking capital & otherWC & other
€1.2B€1.4B€1.5B€1.3B€579M€295M€1.2B€1.9B€2.4B€1.6B€1.6BCapexCapex
18.6%21.8%20.6%16.7%6.8%18.0%24.6%17.8%17.8%11.1%11.1%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
€1.7B€1.1B€748M(€2.7B)€1.2B€3.0B€2.1B€2.2B€2.7BOwner earningsOwner earn.
23.4%14.5%8.8%−167.7%25.4%27.5%15.6%15.8%19.3%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
€763M€471M€748M(€2.7B)€759M€2.0B€766M€1.9B€1.9BFree cash flowFCF
10.7%6.1%8.8%−167.7%15.8%18.3%5.7%13.4%13.4%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
€1.1B€1.0B€829M€532M€581M€0€0€0€200M€438M€438MDividends paidDiv. paid
22%19%23%14%18%-12%-4%27%30%29%29%ROICROIC
43%30%32%17%13%-22%-4%23%25%23%23%Return on equityROE
13%7%14%7%1%−22%−4%23%23%17%17%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
€1.3B€1.2B€1.5B€1.7B€2.6B€2.7B€2.7B€3.6B€3.9B€3.9B€3.9BCash & investmentsCash+inv
€66M€54M€58M€60M€68M€19M€44M€60M€76M€74M€74MReceivablesReceiv.
€3M€3M€4M€3M€3M€4M€4M€6M€6M€5M€5MInventoryInvent.
€69M€57M€61M€62M€71M€22M€48M€66M€83M€78M€78MOperating working capitalOper. WC
€4.8B€4.7B€4.2B€3.8B€4.5B€3.5B€5.5B€5.9B€5.8B€6.0B€6.0BCurrent assetsCur. assets
€3.4B€3.0B€3.4B€4.1B€5.5B€3.5B€5.4B€7.4B€6.4B€8.2B€8.2BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.4×1.6×1.2×0.9×0.8×1.0×1.0×0.8×0.9×0.7×0.7×Current ratioCurr. ratio
€11.2B€12.0B€12.4B€13.3B€14.7B€12.3B€15.1B€16.4B€17.2B€17.5B€17.5BTotal assetsAssets
€3.6B€3.9B€3.5B€3.3B€3.6B€3.5B€3.7B€2.9B€2.5B€1.7B€1.7BTotal debtDebt
€2.3B€2.7B€2.0B€1.7B€1.0B€867M€1.0B(€746M)(€1.3B)(€2.2B)(€2.2B)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
20.5×22.8×27.7×17.2×2.3×-2.8×-3.7×18.8×24.8×23.4×23.4×Interest coverageInt. cov.
€3.6B€4.4B€4.5B€5.2B€4.9B€4.6B€5.5B€5.6B€7.6B€7.0B€7.0BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
1.34B1.25B1.19B1.14B1.11B1.11B1.13B1.14B1.14B1.10B1.10BShares out (diluted)Shares
€4.87€5.32€5.99€6.73€7.63€1.47€4.25€9.48€11.80€12.66€12.66Revenue / shareRev/sh
€1.16€1.05€1.22€0.77€0.58€-0.91€-0.21€1.16€1.68€1.46€1.46EPS (diluted)EPS
€1.40€0.98€0.67€-2.47€1.08€2.61€1.84€2.00€2.45Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
€0.64€0.41€0.67€-2.47€0.67€1.74€0.67€1.69€1.69Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
€0.82€0.81€0.69€0.46€0.52€0.00€0.00€0.00€0.18€0.40€0.40Dividends / shareDiv/sh
€0.91€1.16€1.23€1.13€0.52€0.27€1.05€1.68€2.10€1.41€1.41Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
€2.68€3.54€3.74€4.56€4.41€4.18€4.91€4.96€6.68€6.39€6.39Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+11.2%/yr+10.7%/yr
Owner earnings / share+5.2%/yr (7-yr)+24.4%/yr
EPS+2.6%/yr+20.2%/yr
Dividends / share−7.8%/yr−5.3%/yr
Capital spending / share+5.0%/yr+22.1%/yr
Book value / share+10.1%/yr+7.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
1.1Bpeak FY2016
ROIC
29%low FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

€2.2Bowner earningsvs.€1.6Bnet incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2018FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned €2.2B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the €1.2B it takes just to hold its position. It put €338M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was €1.9B.

Reported net income€1.6B
Owner earnings€2.2B · 16% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income€1.6B€1.9B€1.3B(€241M)(€1.0B)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+€1.2B+€1.1B+€923M+€719M+€571M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+€590M+€181M+€1.7B+€1.5B−€2.0B
Cash from operations€3.4B€3.2B€3.9B€1.9B(€2.4B)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−€1.2B−€1.1B−€923M−€719M−€295M
Owner earnings€2.2B€2.1B€3.0B€1.2B(€2.7B)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−€338M−€1.3B−€992M−€462M
Free cash flow€1.9B€766M€2.0B€759M(€2.7B)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue16%16%28%25%-168%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about €1.2B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other €338M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income €1.6B ÷ interest expense €67M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash
    Cash €3.9B − debt €1.7B
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by €2.2B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -12%–30%; 29% latest = NOPAT €1.4B ÷ invested capital €4.9B
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 29% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    8-yr median margin, range -168%–28%; latest €2.7B = operating cash €3.4B − maintenance capex €719M
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 19% of revenue this year, a 16% median across 8 years. It chose to put €833M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was €1.9B — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops €3.4B ÷ net income €1.6B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks €1.9B ÷ Owner Earnings €2.7B
    What this means

    Of €2.7B Owner Earnings, €1.9B (71%) went back to shareholders, €438M dividends, €1.5B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 2.16×
    Expanding
    Capex €1.6B ÷ depreciation €719M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size
    Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · €13.9B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.74×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · €1.7B vs (€2.1B) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 7 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Near
    Earnings +33% over the record · +12%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are €1.55/share (latest year €1.54), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is €6.74/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 7 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 23% → 13% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 23% early to 13% lately, median 13% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +6%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 6% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2021 · −51.3% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −2.2%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 7 of the years on record.

  • How management talks about it Promotional
    What this means

    The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Mar 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets€6.0B
  • Cash & short-term investments€3.9B
  • Receivables€74M
  • Inventory€5M
  • Other current assets€2.1B
Current liabilities€8.2B
  • Other current liabilities€8.2B
Current ratio0.74×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.74×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.47×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital(€2.1B)the cushion left after near-term bills
Deeper floors
Tangible book value€6.9Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value(€3.6B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases€1.8B€149M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'27€1.2B
'28€39M
'29€27M
'30€9M
'31€30M

Bars scaled to the largest single year.

Due in the next 12 months€1.2Bthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years€1.3Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year€1.2Bin 2027the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Due over the next five years€1.3Bthe near slice; the balance sheet carries €1.7B of debt in all

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2025€3.9B
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)€2.7B
Together, against €1.2B due next year5.3×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2025 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to €6.6B against the €1.2B due in the twelve months after the Mar 31, 2026 schedule: 5.3 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Mar 31, 2026 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2018–2025

Over the record, the business generated €15.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested€10.7B · 70%
  • Dividends€2.6B · 17%
  • Buybacks€1.5B · 10%
  • Retained (debt / cash)€547M · 4%
  • Returned to owners€4.1B

    44% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, €2.6B as dividends and €1.5B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran €1.5B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−7.7%

    The diluted count fell from 1194M to 1102M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record€0.40/sh

    Paid in 5 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 8% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained49%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (€2.5B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew €1.2B, so each retained €1 added about 0.49 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Ryanair Holdings plc is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 5 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Airlines

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
UALUnited Airlines Holdings$59.1B7.9%12%9%
AALAmerican Airlines Group$54.6B5.3%8%2%
LUVSouthwest Airlines Co.$28.1B7.6%11%11%
ALKAlaska Air$14.2B6.3%7%10%
RYAAYRyanair Holdings plc€13.9B13.3%21%16%
JBLUJetBlue Airways Corporation$9.1B-1.9%-2%4%
SKYWSkyWest Inc.$4.1B12%11.3%6%22%
ULCCFrontier Group Holdings Inc.$3.7B-1.4%-24%-4%
Group median7.0%7%9%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Per the filing's own cover, “American Depositary Shares, each representing two Ordinary”; Ryanair Holdings plc reports in EUR, so every figure in this tool is stated per ADS and translated at EUR 1 = $1.145 (2026-07-17, reference rate) so your dollar quote reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in EUR.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Ryanair Holdings plc has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Ryanair Holdings plc earns about $3.1B on its 19.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 19.3% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’25+11%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $2.1B on 522M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2026-03-31; net cash $2.5B. The if-converted diluted count is 551M, 6% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($1.8B) runs well above depreciation ($824M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $3.1B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Ryanair Holdings plc (RYAAY), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/RYAAY, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← RY its page in the Manual RYET →

Industry order: ← RJET the Airlines chapter SKYW →