← All companies ← S Manual SAFE → ← S Software SAIC →

SABR, Sabre

Software asset-light Distress / turnaroundCyclical

Sabre provides global travel solutions for travel suppliers and travel buyers through a business-to-business travel marketplace called Sabre Mosaic Marketplace consisting of our global distribution network and a broad set of solutions that integrate with our distribution platform to add value for travel suppliers and travel buyers.

We connect the world's leading travel suppliers, including airlines, hotels, car rental brands, rail carriers, cruise lines and tour operators, with travel buyers in a comprehensive travel marketplace.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

SABR · Sabre

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$2.8B

+1.0% YoY · 16% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $2.8B 5-yr avg $2.5B

Gross margin 56% 5-yr avg 58%

Operating margin 11.3% 5-yr avg −5.8%

ROIC 11% 5-yr avg −1%

Owner-earnings margin −9% 5-yr avg −10%

Free cash flow margin −9% 5-yr avg −10%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Distribution (80%) and IT Solutions (20%).
Situation: Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 57% and operating margin about 8.8% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −74% and 15% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −9 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 8%). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Distribution is 80% of revenue, with IT Solutions the other meaningful line at 20%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Distribution80%$2.2B
IT Solutions20%$554M
License fee0%$5M

By geographyUnited States39%All Other26%Asia Pacific18%Europe17%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$3.4B	$3.6B	$3.9B	$4.0B	$1.3B	$1.7B	$2.5B	$2.6B	$2.7B	$2.8B	$2.8B	RevenueRevenue
32%	30%	57%	57%	57%	59%	59%	59%	58%	56%	56%	Gross marginGross mgn
19%	14%	14%	15%	44%	36%	26%	22%	21%	20%	20%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$460M	$493M	$562M	$363M	($988M)	($665M)	($261M)	$32M	$242M	$295M	$320M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
13.6%	13.7%	14.5%	9.1%	−74.1%	−39.4%	−10.3%	1.2%	8.8%	10.7%	11.3%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$243M	$243M	$338M	$159M	($1.3B)	($928M)	($435M)	($528M)	($279M)	$525M	$497M	Net incomeNet inc.
26%	35%	15%	18%	—	—	—	—	—	3%	3%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$699M	$678M	$725M	$581M	($770M)	($415M)	($276M)	$67M	$70M	($109M)	($179M)	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$233M	$265M	$304M	$311M	$364M	$262M	$185M	$121M	$110M	$106M	$107M	DepreciationDeprec.
$175M	$126M	$26M	$45M	$78M	$131M	($109M)	$427M	$190M	($785M)	($822M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$328M	$316M	$284M	$115M	$65M	$54M	$69M	$81M	$80M	$83M	$87M	CapexCapex
9.7%	8.8%	7.3%	2.9%	4.9%	3.2%	2.7%	3.1%	2.9%	3.0%	3.1%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$372M	$362M	$441M	$466M	($836M)	($469M)	($346M)	($14M)	($9M)	($192M)	($266M)	Owner earningsOwner earn.
11.0%	10.0%	11.4%	11.7%	−62.6%	−27.8%	−13.6%	−0.5%	−0.3%	−6.9%	−9.4%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$372M	$362M	$441M	$466M	($836M)	($469M)	($346M)	($14M)	($9M)	($192M)	($266M)	Free cash flowFCF
11.0%	10.0%	11.4%	11.7%	−62.6%	−27.8%	−13.6%	−0.5%	−0.3%	−6.9%	−9.4%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$164M	$0	$0	$107M	$0	$0	$69M	$12M	$0	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$144M	$155M	$154M	$154M	$39M	$0	$0	—	—	—	$0	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$100M	$109M	$26M	$78M	$0	$0	—	—	—	—	—	BuybacksBuybacks
9%	8%	12%	8%	-22%	-16%	-7%	—	7%	11%	11%	ROICROIC
39%	35%	35%	17%	-450%	—	—	—	—	—	—	Return on equityROE
16%	13%	19%	1%	−463%	—	—	—	—	—	—	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$364M	$361M	$509M	$436M	$1.5B	$978M	$795M	$648M	$724M	$792M	$644M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$401M	$491M	$508M	$547M	$255M	$260M	$354M	$343M	$287M	$312M	$367M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$169M	$163M	$165M	$187M	$115M	$123M	$171M	$232M	$243M	$260M	$208M	Accounts payablePayables
$232M	$328M	$343M	$359M	$140M	$137M	$183M	$112M	$44M	$52M	$159M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$853M	$961M	$1.2B	$1.1B	$1.9B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.1B	Current assetsCur. assets
$1.2B	$972M	$1.0B	$1.0B	$622M	$717M	$816M	$915M	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.2B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.7×	1.0×	1.2×	1.1×	3.0×	2.0×	1.7×	1.3×	1.0×	1.1×	0.9×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$2.5B	$2.6B	$2.6B	$2.6B	$2.6B	$2.5B	$2.5B	$2.4B	$2.4B	$2.4B	$2.4B	GoodwillGoodwill
$5.7B	$5.6B	$5.8B	$5.7B	$6.1B	$5.3B	$5.0B	$4.7B	$4.6B	$4.5B	$4.3B	Total assetsAssets
$3.5B	$3.5B	$3.4B	$3.4B	$4.8B	$4.8B	$4.8B	$5.0B	$5.2B	$4.5B	$4.5B	Total debtDebt
$3.1B	$3.1B	$2.9B	$2.9B	$3.3B	$3.8B	$4.0B	$4.3B	$4.5B	$3.7B	$3.9B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
2.9×	3.2×	3.6×	2.3×	-4.4×	-2.6×	-0.9×	0.1×	—	—	0.7×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$626M	$699M	$974M	$948M	$285M	($500M)	($873M)	($1.4B)	($1.6B)	($1.0B)	($1.0B)	Shareholders’ equityEquity
1.4%	1.2%	1.5%	1.7%	5.2%	7.2%	3.3%	1.8%	1.8%	1.6%	1.4%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
283M	278M	278M	276M	290M	321M	327M	347M	384M	392M	398M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$11.93	$12.93	$13.93	$14.39	$4.60	$5.26	$7.76	$7.62	$7.15	$7.07	$7.12	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.86	$0.87	$1.22	$0.57	$-4.42	$-2.89	$-1.33	$-1.52	$-0.73	$1.34	$1.25	EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.31	$1.30	$1.59	$1.69	$-2.88	$-1.46	$-1.06	$-0.04	$-0.02	$-0.49	$-0.67	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.31	$1.30	$1.59	$1.69	$-2.88	$-1.46	$-1.06	$-0.04	$-0.02	$-0.49	$-0.67	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.51	$0.56	$0.56	$0.56	$0.13	$0.00	$0.00	—	—	—	$0.00	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.16	$1.14	$1.02	$0.42	$0.23	$0.17	$0.21	$0.23	$0.21	$0.21	$0.22	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$2.21	$2.51	$3.51	$3.43	$0.98	$-1.56	$-2.67	$-3.97	$-4.18	$-2.65	$-2.58	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−5.6%/yr	+9.0%/yr
EPS	+5.1%/yr	—
Capital spending / share	−17.2%/yr	−1.3%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

392Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

11%low FY2020

Gross margin

56%low FY2017

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

6.3×peak FY2017

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($192M)owner earningsvs.$525Mnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2024

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $525M of profit but ($192M) of owner earnings: $716M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$525M	($279M)	($528M)	($435M)	($928M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$106M	+$110M	+$121M	+$185M	+$262M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$46M	+$49M	+$47M	+$83M	+$121M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$785M	+$190M	+$427M	−$109M	+$131M
Cash from operations	($109M)	$70M	$67M	($276M)	($415M)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$83M	−$80M	−$81M	−$69M	−$54M
Owner earnings	($192M)	($9M)	($14M)	($346M)	($469M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	-7%	0%	-1%	-14%	-28%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $46M), owner earnings is nearer ($237M).

Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 0.7×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income $295M ÷ interest expense $448M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $3.7B · 12.7× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $792M − debt $4.5B

What this means
Netting $792M of cash and short-term investments against $4.5B of debt leaves $3.7B owed, about 12.7× a year's operating profit (15.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -38d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 41 + DIO 0 − DPO 79 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 8%

Below average through the cycle

9-yr median, range -22%–12%; 11% latest = NOPAT $287M ÷ invested capital $2.7B

Industry peers: median 9%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 11% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin -1%

Consumes cash through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -63%–12%; latest ($192M) = operating cash ($109M) − maintenance capex $83M

Industry peers: median 10%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -7% of revenue this year, a -1% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $46M of SBC) leaves ($237M).
Are earnings backed by cash? -0.21×

Thinly cash-backed

Cash from ops ($109M) ÷ net income $525M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

No surplus to allocate

What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
Investing or harvesting? 0.78×

Harvesting

Capex $83M ÷ depreciation $106M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.8B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.07×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $4.5B vs $82M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 5 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 5 of 10 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −134%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.24/share (latest year $1.33), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-2.62/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 5 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 14% → 7% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The words explain the slip: the filing names price competition rather than pricing actions of its own — a business that looks to take its price, not set it.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 14% early to 7% lately, median 9% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Worst year 2020 · −74.1% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +3.7%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 5 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“Our competitors or other third parties may incorporate AI into their products more quickly or more successfully than we do, which could impair our ability to compete effectively and adversely affect our results of operations.”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.1B

Cash & short-term investments$644M
Receivables$367M
Other current assets$123M

Current liabilities$1.2B

Debt due within a year$358M
Accounts payable$208M
Other current liabilities$660M

Current ratio0.93×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.93×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.53×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($92M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$358M due · $644M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Cash runway2.4 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+8.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.1× → 0.9×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($3.7B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$4.3B$61M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$93Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

Reinvested$1.5B · 118%
Dividends$645M · 52%
Buybacks$313M · 25%

Returned to owners$958M
$645M as dividends and $313M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$1.2B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $1.2B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $3.5B to $4.5B.
Average price paid for buybacks$21.88
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 5M shares were bought for $104M, about $21.88 each.
Net change in share count40.6%
The diluted count rose from 283M to 398M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$0.00/sh
Paid in 5 of the years on record. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$2.7B59% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity—goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$352Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $1.5B of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Menke	$19.8M	$12.8M	($469M)
2022	Mr. Menke	$9.8M	$3.4M	($346M)
2023	Mr. Ekert	$8.5M	$8.3M	($14M)
2023	Mr. Menke	$3.3M	−$256k	($14M)
2024	Mr. Ekert	$8.5M	$5.8M	($9M)
2025	Mr. Ekert	$7.4M	−$2.4M	($192M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership2.8%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio109:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$46M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 15% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Sabre is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−2.6% vs 10.8%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 10.8% early in the record and −2.6% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?40.6%
Diluted shares grew 40.6% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $313M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$3.5B → $4.5B
Debt rose from $3.5B to $4.5B while owner earnings went from about $391M to ($72M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean

Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
MTCHMatch Group Inc.	$3.5B	73%	26.1%	17%	27%
TTDThe Trade Desk Inc.	$2.9B	79%	17.4%	22%	28%
SABRSabre	$2.8B	57%	9.0%	8%	-0%
RXTRackspace Technology Inc.	$2.7B	29%	-6.7%	-10%	6%
IACIAC Inc.	$2.4B	66%	-3.9%	-2%	3%
FDSFactSet	$2.3B	53%	30.0%	30%	27%
TBLATaboola.com Ltd.	$1.9B	30%	0.3%	-2%	6%
TRIPTripAdvisor Inc.	$1.9B	93%	6.9%	9%	10%
Group median	—	61%	7.9%	8%	8%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Sabre is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

Today’s price $

The assumptions Required return 9% Years to get there 10 Revenue growth 0%

Revenue, delivered16%/yr’20→’25

Mature owner-earnings margin 15%

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach—

Margin the price demands—

Owner-earnings margin today−9%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Weigh SABR against another business →

The owners of SABR: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Sabre (SABR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SABR, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← S its page in the Manual SAFE →

Industry order: ← S the Software chapter SAIC →