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TBLA, Taboola.com Ltd.

Software asset-light

Taboola is a technology company that helps businesses grow by placing ads on publisher sites, mobile apps, and devices, which we collectively refer to as digital properties.

We empower businesses to grow through performance advertising technology that goes beyond search and social and delivers measurable outcomes at scale.

Taboola began operations in 2007 and our technology provides significant value to both digital property partners and Advertisers.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

TBLA · Taboola.com Ltd.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$1.9B

+8.3% YoY · 10% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $2.0B 5-yr avg $1.6B

Gross margin 30% 5-yr avg 31%

Operating margin 6.1% 5-yr avg −0.5%

ROIC 11% 5-yr avg −1%

Owner-earnings margin 13% 5-yr avg 5%

Free cash flow margin 11% 5-yr avg 5%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −1.0% through the cycle on a 30% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −24 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −2%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2020–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
							Income statement
$1.2B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.8B	$1.9B	$2.0B	RevenueRevenue
27%	32%	33%	30%	30%	30%	30%	Gross marginGross mgn
5%	9%	7%	7%	6%	5%	5%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
8%	9%	9%	9%	8%	8%	8%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$26M	($13M)	($14M)	($64M)	$26M	$44M	$120M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
2.2%	−1.0%	−1.0%	−4.4%	1.5%	2.3%	6.1%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$8M	($25M)	($12M)	($82M)	($4M)	$42M	$110M	Net incomeNet inc.
							Cash flow & returns
$139M	$64M	$53M	$84M	$184M	$208M	$269M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$31M	$30M	$28M	$33M	$37M	$29M	$25M	DepreciationDeprec.
$71M	($70M)	($37M)	$69M	$84M	$73M	$72M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$18M	$39M	$35M	$32M	$35M	$45M	$51M	CapexCapex
1.5%	2.8%	2.5%	2.2%	2.0%	2.3%	2.6%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$121M	$33M	$26M	$52M	$149M	$179M	$244M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
10.2%	2.4%	1.8%	3.6%	8.4%	9.4%	12.5%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$121M	$24M	$19M	$52M	$149M	$163M	$218M	Free cash flowFCF
10.2%	1.8%	1.3%	3.6%	8.4%	8.5%	11.2%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$202K	$583M	$8M	$0	$719K	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	$0	$0	$56M	$74M	$255M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	-2%	-2%	-6%	1%	4%	11%	ROICROIC
18%	-3%	-1%	-8%	-0%	5%	12%	Return on equityROE
18%	−3%	−1%	−8%	−0%	5%	12%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
							Balance sheet
$243M	$319M	$263M	$182M	$230M	$121M	$150M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$245M	$257M	$306M	$370M	$360M	$310M	ReceivablesReceiv.
—	$260M	$248M	$282M	$309M	$331M	$278M	Accounts payablePayables
—	($15M)	$9M	$24M	$61M	$29M	$32M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
—	$629M	$594M	$559M	$656M	$558M	$521M	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$401M	$368M	$424M	$486M	$521M	$461M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	1.6×	1.6×	1.3×	1.4×	1.1×	1.1×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$19M	$550M	$556M	$556M	$556M	$556M	$556M	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$1.6B	$1.5B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$1.6B	$1.6B	Total assetsAssets
—	$51M	$5M	$14M	$116M	$102M	$102M	Total debtDebt
—	($268M)	($258M)	($168M)	($114M)	($19M)	($48M)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$47M	$768M	$835M	$1.1B	$1.1B	$907M	$955M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
2.4%	9.3%	5.3%	4.5%	3.8%	3.3%	3.2%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
							Per share
40.3M	143M	254M	296M	—	—	289M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$29.48	$9.65	$5.51	$4.87	—	—	$6.76	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.21	$-0.17	$-0.05	$-0.28	—	—	$0.38	EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.01	$0.23	$0.10	$0.18	—	—	$0.85	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.01	$0.17	$0.07	$0.18	—	—	$0.75	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.44	$0.27	$0.14	$0.11	—	—	$0.18	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$1.16	$5.37	$3.28	$3.58	—	—	$3.31	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×3.54 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.78 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	5-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	−45.1%/yr (3-yr)	−45.1%/yr (3-yr)
Owner earnings / share	−61.1%/yr (3-yr)	−61.1%/yr (3-yr)
Capital spending / share	−37.3%/yr (3-yr)	−37.3%/yr (3-yr)
Book value / share	+45.7%/yr (3-yr)	+45.7%/yr (3-yr)

The record, charted

FY2020–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

296Mpeak FY2023

ROIC

4%low FY2023

Gross margin

30%low FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$179Mowner earningsvs.$42Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2020FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $179M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $29M it takes just to hold its position. It put $16M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $163M.

Reported net income$42M

Owner earnings$179M · 9% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$42M	($4M)	($82M)	($12M)	($25M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$29M	+$37M	+$33M	+$28M	+$30M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$64M	+$67M	+$64M	+$75M	+$128M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$73M	+$84M	+$69M	−$37M	−$70M
Cash from operations	$208M	$184M	$84M	$53M	$64M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$29M	−$35M	−$32M	−$28M	−$30M
Owner earnings	$179M	$149M	$52M	$26M	$33M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$16M	—	—	−$7M	−$9M
Free cash flow	$163M	$149M	$52M	$19M	$24M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	9%	8%	4%	2%	2%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $29M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $16M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $64M), owner earnings is nearer $115M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? —

No meaningful interest burden

Little or no interest expense reported

What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$19M

Net cash

Cash $121M − debt $102M

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $19M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? -21d

Negative, funded by others

DSO 69 + DIO 0 − DPO 90 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -2%

Below average through the cycle

5-yr median, range -6%–4%; 3% latest = NOPAT $31M ÷ invested capital $889M

Industry peers: median 8%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran 3% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 4%

Thin through the cycle

6-yr median margin, range 2%–10%; latest $179M = operating cash $208M − maintenance capex $29M

Industry peers: median 6%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 9% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 6 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $64M of SBC) leaves $115M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 4.93×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $208M ÷ net income $42M

In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 143%

Returned more than it generated

Dividends + buybacks $255M ÷ Owner Earnings $179M

What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $179M of Owner Earnings, $255M (143%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $255M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $64M stock comp, the real buyback was about $191M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
Investing or harvesting? 1.54×

Expanding

Capex $45M ÷ depreciation $29M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.9B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.07×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $102M vs $37M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (6-yr record) · 4 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.05/share (latest year $0.14), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $3.10/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2020–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 2 of 6

What this means
Lost money in 4 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 5 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 0% → −0% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 0% early, −0% lately, median −1%.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 1%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
Owner earnings growth +16%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 16% a year over the record.
Worst year 2023 · −4.4% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2023, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“If failures in Taboola's AI powered platform or our inability to innovate and improve the algorithms underlying Taboola's AI powered platform result in Advertisers and digital properties ceasing to partner with us, we cannot guarantee that we will be able to replace, in a timely or effective manner, departing Advertise…”

AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$521M

Cash & short-term investments$150M
Receivables$310M
Other current assets$61M

Current liabilities$461M

Accounts payable$278M
Other current liabilities$183M

Current ratio1.13×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.13×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.33×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$60Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+9.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.3× → 1.1×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$394Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$152M$85M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$10Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2020–2025

Over the record, the business generated $733M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$204M · 28%
Buybacks$384M · 52%
Retained (debt / cash)$145M · 20%

Returned to owners$384M
69% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $384M as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $384M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count615.9%
The diluted count rose from 40M to 289M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 6-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$570M35% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity61%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$592Mover 6 years buying other businesses, against $204M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 6-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Adam Singolda	$18.3M	$19.0M	$33M
2022	Adam Singolda	$802k	−$10.6M	$26M
2023	Adam Singolda	$6.2M	$9.4M	$52M
2024	Adam Singolda	$10.5M	$7.6M	$149M
2025	Adam Singolda	$8.1M	$11.2M	$179M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Stock-based compensation$64M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue, equal to 145% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Software

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
TTDThe Trade Desk Inc.	$2.9B	79%	17.4%	22%	28%
SABRSabre	$2.8B	57%	9.0%	8%	-0%
RXTRackspace Technology Inc.	$2.7B	29%	-6.7%	-10%	6%
IACIAC Inc.	$2.4B	66%	-3.9%	-2%	3%
FDSFactSet	$2.3B	53%	30.0%	30%	27%
TBLATaboola.com Ltd.	$1.9B	30%	0.3%	-2%	6%
TRIPTripAdvisor Inc.	$1.9B	93%	6.9%	9%	10%
TEMTempus AI Inc.	$1.3B	—	-59.8%	-210%	-37%
Group median	—	57%	3.6%	3%	6%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Taboola.com Ltd. has delivered.

Taboola.com Ltd.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Taboola.com Ltd. earns about $115M on its 6.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 9.4% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($115M) Net of stock comp (−$63M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($240M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+53%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’20→’25+16%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $218M on 293M shares outstanding, the balance-sheet count at 2024-09-30; net cash $48M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($51M) runs well above depreciation ($25M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $240M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh TBLA against another business →

The owners of TBLA: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Taboola.com Ltd. (TBLA), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TBLA, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← TBBK its page in the Manual TBPH →

Industry order: ← SVCO the Software chapter TDC →