Owner Scorecard


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SCI, Service Corporation International

Commercial Services & Supplies capital-intensive

Service sales is deferred until the time of need, sales of preneed cemetery property provide opportunities for full current revenue recognition to the extent that the property is developed and available for use.

At December 31, 2025, we operated 1,485 funeral service locations and 500 cemeteries (including 312 funeral service/cemetery combination locations), which are geographically diversified across 44 states, eight Canadian provinces, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.

Our funeral and cemetery operations consist of funeral service locations, cemeteries, funeral service/cemetery combination locations, crematoria, and other related businesses, which enable us to serve a wide array of customer needs.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
SCI · Service Corporation International
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$4.3B
+2.9% YoY · 4% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $4.3B 5-yr avg $4.2B
Gross margin 26% 5-yr avg 28%
Operating margin 22.4% 5-yr avg 23.8%
ROIC 11% 5-yr avg 13%
Owner-earnings margin 17% 5-yr avg 17%
Free cash flow margin 13% 5-yr avg 13%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 26% and operating margin about 22% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The cash cycle has run negative through the cycle (a median of −66 days): the operation is paid before it pays, so working capital releases cash as the business grows rather than tying it up. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 12%). By owner earnings: roughly 16% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$3.0B$3.1B$3.2B$3.2B$3.5B$4.1B$4.1B$4.1B$4.2B$4.3B$4.3BRevenueRevenue
22%23%24%24%28%32%28%27%26%26%26%Gross marginGross mgn
5%5%5%4%4%4%6%4%3%4%4%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$513M$571M$631M$667M$843M$1.2B$927M$944M$928M$978M$970MOperating incomeOp. inc.
16.9%18.5%19.8%20.6%24.0%28.7%22.6%23.0%22.2%22.7%22.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
$177M$547M$447M$370M$516M$803M$565M$537M$519M$543M$536MNet incomeNet inc.
46%-1%20%22%23%25%24%23%26%25%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$489M$503M$616M$629M$804M$921M$826M$869M$945M$943M$965MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$147M$153M$154M$151M$155M$159M$175M$191M$208M$220M$222MDepreciationDeprec.
$151M($211M)($654K)$93M$119M($56M)$70M$123M$199M$163M$190MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$193M$215M$236M$240M$222M$304M$370M$362M$374M$389M$390MCapexCapex
6.4%6.9%7.4%7.4%6.3%7.3%9.0%8.8%8.9%9.0%9.0%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$342M$350M$462M$478M$649M$761M$650M$678M$737M$723M$743MOwner earningsOwner earn.
11.3%11.3%14.5%14.8%18.5%18.4%15.8%16.5%17.6%16.8%17.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$296M$289M$380M$389M$582M$617M$456M$507M$571M$554M$575MFree cash flowFCF
9.8%9.3%11.9%12.0%16.6%14.9%11.1%12.4%13.6%12.9%13.3%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$73M$65M$176M$0$64M$121M$103M$73M$181M$101M$111MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$98M$109M$124M$131M$137M$147M$160M$168M$174M$184M$185MDividends paidDiv. paid
$228M$200M$278M$130M$517M$554M$661M$545M$254M$461MBuybacksBuybacks
7%13%13%10%12%16%12%12%11%11%11%ROICROIC
16%39%27%20%29%42%34%35%31%33%34%Return on equityROE
7%31%20%13%22%34%24%24%21%22%22%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$195M$330M$199M$186M$231M$269M$192M$222M$219M$244M$258MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$98M$90M$74M$82M$93M$106M$97M$98M$94M$100M$100MReceivablesReceiv.
$26M$25M$25M$25M$24M$26M$32M$34M$33M$35M$38MInventoryInvent.
$440M$489M$480M$479M$576M$659M$707M$686M$639M$685M$728MAccounts payablePayables
($315M)($373M)($381M)($372M)($459M)($528M)($579M)($554M)($512M)($549M)($590M)Operating working capitalOper. WC
$354M$481M$331M$374M$376M$441M$360M$498M$377M$412M$448MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$538M$829M$556M$557M$816M$728M$799M$749M$724M$746M$791MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.7×0.6×0.6×0.7×0.5×0.6×0.5×0.7×0.5×0.6×0.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1.8B$1.8B$1.9B$1.9B$1.9B$1.9B$1.9B$2.0B$2.1B$2.2B$2.2BGoodwillGoodwill
$12.0B$12.9B$12.7B$13.7B$14.5B$15.7B$15.1B$16.4B$17.4B$18.7B$18.6BTotal assetsAssets
$3.3B$3.5B$3.6B$3.6B$3.7B$4.0B$4.3B$4.7B$4.8B$5.1B$5.2BTotal debtDebt
$3.1B$3.1B$3.4B$3.4B$3.5B$3.7B$4.1B$4.5B$4.6B$4.9B$4.9BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
3.2×3.4×3.5×3.6×5.2×7.9×5.4×3.9×3.6×3.8×3.8×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.1B$1.4B$1.6B$1.8B$1.8B$1.9B$1.7B$1.5B$1.7B$1.6B$1.6BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.5%0.5%0.5%0.5%0.4%0.3%0.4%0.4%0.4%0.4%0.4%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
196M192M187M186M179M170M160M152M147M143M140MShares out (diluted)Shares
$15.46$16.10$17.06$17.41$19.62$24.36$25.66$26.91$28.52$30.20$30.96Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.90$2.84$2.39$1.99$2.88$4.72$3.53$3.53$3.53$3.80$3.83EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.74$1.82$2.47$2.58$3.63$4.48$4.06$4.45$5.02$5.07$5.31Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.51$1.50$2.03$2.10$3.25$3.63$2.85$3.33$3.89$3.88$4.11Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.50$0.57$0.66$0.71$0.77$0.86$1.00$1.10$1.19$1.29$1.32Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.99$1.12$1.26$1.29$1.24$1.79$2.31$2.37$2.55$2.72$2.79Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$5.57$7.33$8.78$9.83$9.79$11.22$10.45$10.12$11.43$11.48$11.32Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+7.7%/yr+9.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share+12.6%/yr+6.9%/yr
EPS+17.3%/yr+5.7%/yr
Dividends / share+11.0%/yr+10.9%/yr
Capital spending / share+11.9%/yr+17.0%/yr
Book value / share+8.4%/yr+3.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
143Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
11%low FY2016
Gross margin
26%low FY2016
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
6.8×peak FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$723Mowner earningsvs.$543Mnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $723M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $220M it takes just to hold its position. It put $169M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $554M.

Reported net income$543M
Owner earnings$723M · 17% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$543M$519M$537M$565M$803M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$220M+$208M+$191M+$175M+$159M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$18M+$19M+$17M+$15M+$14M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$163M+$199M+$123M+$70M−$56M
Cash from operations$943M$945M$869M$826M$921M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$220M−$208M−$191M−$175M−$159M
Owner earnings$723M$737M$678M$650M$761M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$169M−$165M−$171M−$194M−$144M
Free cash flow$554M$571M$507M$456M$617M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue17%18%17%16%18%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $220M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $169M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $18M), owner earnings is nearer $706M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $978M ÷ interest expense $255M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $4.9B · 5.0× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $244M − debt $5.1B
    What this means

    Netting $244M of cash and short-term investments against $5.1B of debt leaves $4.9B owed, about 5.0× a year's operating profit (5.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 9 + DIO 4 − DPO 79 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 7%–16%; 11% latest = NOPAT $727M ÷ invested capital $6.5B
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 11% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 11%–18%; latest $723M = operating cash $943M − maintenance capex $220M
    Industry peers: median 14%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 17% of revenue this year, a 16% median across 10 years. It chose to put $169M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $554M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $18M of SBC) leaves $706M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $943M ÷ net income $543M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $645M ÷ Owner Earnings $723M
    What this means

    Of $723M Owner Earnings, $645M (89%) went back to shareholders, $184M dividends, $461M buybacks. Net of $18M stock comp, the real buyback was about $443M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.77×
    Expanding
    Capex $389M ÷ depreciation $220M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $4.3B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.55×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $5.1B vs ($334M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +37%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $3.86/share (latest year $3.93), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $11.86/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 18% → 23% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 18% early to 23% lately, median 22% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 13%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +9%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 9% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2016 · 16.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −3.5%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Promotional
    What this means

    The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$448M
  • Cash & short-term investments$258M
  • Receivables$100M
  • Inventory$38M
  • Other current assets$51M
Current liabilities$791M
  • Debt due within a year$57M
  • Accounts payable$728M
  • Other current liabilities$5M
Current ratio0.57×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.52×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.33×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($343M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. This business collects from customers before it pays suppliers (a negative cash-conversion cycle), so the balance sheet is funded by that float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Debt due this year vs. cash$57M due · $258M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+2.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters0.6× → 0.6×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($1.1B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$5.2B$51M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $7.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$2.9B · 38%
  • Dividends$1.4B · 19%
  • Buybacks$3.8B · 51%
  • Returned to owners$5.3B

    90% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.4B as dividends and $3.8B as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$618M

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $618M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $3.3B to $5.2B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$56.55

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 60M shares were bought for $3.4B, about $56.55 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $37.78 (2018) to $78.61 (2025); its heaviest year, 2022, paid $63.81 ($661M).

  • Net change in share count−28.6%

    The diluted count fell from 196M to 140M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$1.29/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 11% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Thomas L. Ryan$11.7M$29.3M$761M
2022Thomas L. Ryan$12.7M$14.2M$650M
2023Thomas L. Ryan$11.3M$11.2M$678M
2024Thomas L. Ryan$11.8M$17.8M$737M
2025Thomas L. Ryan$13.2M$10.6M$723M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership3.4%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$18M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 2% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Service Corporation International is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 6 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, nearest by economic model

No close industry peers in the catalog yet, so these are the nearest by economic model (capital-intensive), compared on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
LILALiberty Latin America Ltd.$4.4B77%2.0%0%2%
GEFGreif$4.4B20%8.7%8%6%
SCIService Corporation International$4.3B26%22.4%12%16%
GNRCGenerac$4.2B36%14.5%14%11%
AKAMAkamai$4.2B64%17.7%9%26%
CNRCore Natural Resources Inc.$4.2B4.6%4%14%
COOThe Cooper Companies Inc.$4.1B65%16.6%5%15%
SOLSSolstice Advanced Materials Inc.$3.9B35%21.2%23%20%
Group median36%15.5%9%14%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Service Corporation International has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Service Corporation International earns about $697M on its 16.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 16.8% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+1%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+8%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $575M on 138M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-03-31; net debt $4.9B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($390M) runs well above depreciation ($222M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $746M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Service Corporation International (SCI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SCI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← SCHW its page in the Manual SCL →

Industry order: ← RTO the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter SEZL →