Owner Scorecard


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AKAM, Akamai

Commercial Services & Supplies capital-intensive

Akamai offers solutions designed to protect our customers from threats and attacks, along with full-stack compute solutions to build and deliver high-performance, low-latency applications across our uniquely distributed architecture and edge network.

Since 1998, Akamai has developed and provided solutions for global enterprises to build, secure and accelerate their applications and digital experiences.

With this scale and distribution, Akamai has visibility and insight into traffic volumes, congestion, attack patterns, vulnerabilities and other activities across the internet's complex intersections of networks and systems.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
AKAM · Akamai
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$4.2B
+5.4% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $4.3B 5-yr avg $3.8B
Gross margin 58% 5-yr avg 61%
Operating margin 12.3% 5-yr avg 17.0%
ROIC 5% 5-yr avg 8%
Owner-earnings margin 26% 5-yr avg 27%
Free cash flow margin 26% 5-yr avg 27%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 63% and operating margin about 17% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. Capital spending runs about 10% of sales, below what it charges for depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 9%). By owner earnings: roughly 26% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

49% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • United States51%$2.1B
  • International49%$2.1B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$2.3B$2.5B$2.7B$2.9B$3.2B$3.5B$3.6B$3.8B$4.0B$4.2B$4.3BRevenueRevenue
65%65%65%66%65%63%62%60%59%59%58%Gross marginGross mgn
19%20%21%18%17%16%16%16%16%16%16%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
7%9%9%9%8%10%11%11%12%12%12%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$467M$314M$362M$549M$659M$783M$676M$637M$533M$567M$527MOperating incomeOp. inc.
19.9%12.6%13.4%19.0%20.6%22.6%18.7%16.7%13.4%13.5%12.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
$321M$223M$298M$478M$557M$652M$524M$548M$505M$452M$435MNet incomeNet inc.
31%29%13%10%8%9%19%16%14%25%21%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$872M$801M$1.0B$1.1B$1.2B$1.4B$1.3B$1.3B$1.5B$1.5B$1.6BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$334M$372M$435M$441M$478M$551M$593M$571M$648M$709M$718MDepreciationDeprec.
$72M$42M$92M($48M)($18M)($470K)($59M)($98M)($28M)($101M)($50M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$181M$254M$218M$360M$514M$329M$241M$458M$390M$508M$492MCapexCapex
7.7%10.2%8.0%12.4%16.1%9.5%6.7%12.0%9.8%12.1%11.5%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$691M$547M$791M$699M$701M$1.1B$1.0B$891M$1.1B$1.0B$1.1BOwner earningsOwner earn.
29.5%21.8%29.1%24.1%21.9%31.1%28.6%23.4%28.3%24.0%25.5%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$691M$547M$791M$699M$701M$1.1B$1.0B$891M$1.1B$1.0B$1.1BFree cash flowFCF
29.5%21.8%29.1%24.1%21.9%31.1%28.6%23.4%28.3%24.0%25.5%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$95M$369M$79K$165M$128M$599M$872M$106M$434M$55M$55MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$374M$361M$750M$335M$194M$522M$608M$654M$557M$800MBuybacksBuybacks
9%6%10%10%10%12%9%7%7%5%5%ROICROIC
10%7%9%13%13%14%12%12%10%9%9%Return on equityROE
10%7%9%13%13%14%12%12%10%9%9%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$1.6B$1.3B$2.1B$2.4B$2.5B$2.2B$1.4B$2.3B$1.9B$1.9B$1.7BCash & investmentsCash+inv
$369M$461M$480M$552M$660M$676M$679M$724M$728M$794M$881MReceivablesReceiv.
$76M$80M$99M$139M$119M$110M$145M$147M$130M$125M$151MAccounts payablePayables
$292M$381M$381M$413M$542M$566M$534M$577M$597M$669M$730MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1.3B$1.3B$2.5B$2.2B$1.9B$1.9B$2.0B$1.8B$2.6B$2.3B$2.1BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$375M$457M$1.2B$693M$758M$790M$819M$836M$2.1B$968M$1.0BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.5×2.9×2.1×3.2×2.5×2.4×2.4×2.2×1.2×2.4×2.1×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1.2B$1.5B$1.5B$1.6B$1.7B$2.2B$2.8B$2.9B$3.2B$3.2B$3.2BGoodwillGoodwill
$4.4B$4.6B$5.5B$7.0B$7.8B$8.1B$8.3B$9.9B$10.4B$11.5B$11.6BTotal assetsAssets
$640M$663M$874M$1.8B$1.9B$2.0B$2.3B$3.5B$2.4B$4.1B$4.1BTotal debtDebt
($976M)($617M)($1.2B)($533M)($590M)($190M)$859M$1.2B$525M$2.2B$2.4BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
25.0×16.7×8.4×11.1×9.5×10.8×60.9×36.0×19.7×18.4×16.3×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$3.3B$3.4B$3.2B$3.7B$4.3B$4.5B$4.4B$4.6B$4.9B$5.0B$4.9BShareholders’ equityEquity
6.2%6.6%6.8%6.5%6.2%5.9%6.0%8.6%9.9%10.9%11.2%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
176M173M169M165M165M166M160M155M154M147M150MShares out (diluted)Shares
$13.28$14.49$16.04$17.58$19.36$20.88$22.54$24.53$25.86$28.62$28.44Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.82$1.29$1.76$2.90$3.37$3.93$3.26$3.52$3.27$3.07$2.90EPS (diluted)EPS
$3.92$3.17$4.67$4.25$4.24$6.49$6.44$5.73$7.31$6.88$7.25Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$3.92$3.17$4.67$4.25$4.24$6.49$6.44$5.73$7.31$6.88$7.25Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.03$1.47$1.29$2.19$3.11$1.98$1.50$2.95$2.53$3.45$3.28Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$18.56$19.47$18.87$22.23$25.73$27.32$27.17$29.58$31.61$33.85$32.72Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+8.9%/yr+8.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share+6.4%/yr+10.1%/yr
EPS+6.0%/yr−1.8%/yr
Capital spending / share+14.4%/yr+2.1%/yr
Book value / share+6.9%/yr+5.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
147Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
5%low FY2025
Gross margin
59%low FY2025
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
2.2×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$1.0Bowner earningsvs.$452Mnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $452M of profit into $1.0B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$452M
Owner earnings$1.0B · 24% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$452M$505M$548M$524M$652M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$709M+$648M+$571M+$593M+$551M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$459M+$393M+$328M+$217M+$203M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$101M−$28M−$98M−$59M−$470K
Cash from operations$1.5B$1.5B$1.3B$1.3B$1.4B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$508M−$390M−$458M−$241M−$329M
Owner earnings$1.0B$1.1B$891M$1.0B$1.1B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue24%28%23%29%31%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $459M), owner earnings is nearer $552M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $567M ÷ interest expense $31M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.9B · 5.1× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $930M + ST investments $256M − debt $4.1B
    What this means

    Netting $1.2B of cash and short-term investments against $4.1B of debt leaves $2.9B owed, about 5.1× a year's operating profit (7.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). It also holds $733M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at $2.2B of net debt. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 69 + DIO 0 − DPO 26 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 5%–12%; 5% latest = NOPAT $425M ÷ invested capital $8.2B
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 22%–31%; latest $1.0B = operating cash $1.5B − maintenance capex $508M
    Industry peers: median 21%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 24% of revenue this year, a 24% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $459M of SBC) leaves $552M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $1.5B ÷ net income $452M

    In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $800M ÷ Owner Earnings $1.0B
    What this means

    Of $1.0B Owner Earnings, $800M (79%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $800M buybacks. Net of $459M stock comp, the real buyback was about $341M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.72×
    Harvesting
    Capex $508M ÷ depreciation $709M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $4.2B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.36×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $4.1B vs $1.3B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +79%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $3.45/share (latest year $3.11), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $34.24/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 15% → 15% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 15% early, 15% lately, median 17%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 5%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +6%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 6% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2017 · 12.6% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −2.0%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Elevated contestability

The product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“This is particularly true with respect to our AI and cloud computing solutions, as a small number of very large competitors have established themselves as incumbents in these industries and exert significant purchasing power and priority access to servers, memory, co-location capacity and power.…”

The product is the kind capable AI most directly contests: when a substitute can be built cheaply, the incumbent's pricing power is the first thing at risk. The record cannot say whether the moat outlasts that; past durability is a starting point, not a promise.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.1B
  • Cash & short-term investments$930M
  • Receivables$881M
  • Other current assets$319M
Current liabilities$1.0B
  • Accounts payable$151M
  • Other current liabilities$884M
Current ratio2.06×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.06×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.90×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$1.1Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+5.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.3× → 2.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$1.1Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($4.6B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.8B$1.8B of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$224Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $12.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$3.5B · 29%
  • Buybacks$5.2B · 43%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$3.4B · 28%
  • Returned to owners$5.2B

    60% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $5.2B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $3.5B and cash and short-term investments rose $93M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $5.2B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−14.9%

    The diluted count fell from 176M to 150M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$3.8B33% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity64%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$2.8Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $3.5B of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Dr. Leighton$12.0M$15.7M$1.1B
2022Dr. Leighton$12.0M$3.5M$1.0B
2023Dr. Leighton$13.4M$26.2M$891M
2024Dr. Leighton$15.1M$1.7M$1.1B
2025Dr. Leighton$16.0M$12.4M$1.0B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership2.3%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$459M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 11% of revenue, equal to 81% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Akamai is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$640M → $4.1B

    Debt rose from $640M to $4.1B while owner earnings went from about $676M to $1.0B — about 0.9 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 4.1 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?16% → 21% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $369M to $881M while revenue grew 82%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (16% of revenue then, 21% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Credit & receivables, Stock compensation as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Commercial Services & Supplies

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
FIFiserv Inc$21.2B87%26.3%8%21%
GPNGlobal Payments Inc.$7.7B59%16.0%4%25%
EQPTEquipmentShare.com Inc$4.4B28%6.8%6%-1%
AKAMAkamai$4.2B64%17.7%9%26%
ALLEAllegion$4.1B44%19.4%23%15%
CSGPCoStar Group Inc.$3.2B79%17.7%9%21%
FTAIFTAI Aviation Ltd.$2.5B55%-8.2%-1%-12%
CTEVClaritev Corporation$965M9.9%-1%22%
Group median59%16.9%7%21%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Akamai has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Akamai earns about $1.1B on its 26.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 24.0% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+0%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+6%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $1.1B on 145M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-04; net debt $2.4B. The if-converted diluted count is 150M, 3% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Akamai (AKAM), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/AKAM, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← AJG its page in the Manual AKBA →

Industry order: ← AHG the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter ALIT →