Owner Scorecard


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GEF, Greif

Containers & Packaging capital-intensive

We are a leading global producer of industrial packaging products and services with operations in over 35 countries.

We produce and sell containerboard, corrugated sheets, corrugated containers and other corrugated products to customers in North America in industries such as packaging, automotive, food and building products.

We sell our industrial packaging products on a global basis to customers in industries such as chemicals, paints and pigments, food and beverage, petroleum, industrial coatings, agriculture, pharmaceutical and minerals, among others.

Latest annual: FY2024 10-KT
GEF · Greif
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2024
$4.4B
+4.3% YoY · −1% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $5.4B 5-yr avg $5.0B
Gross margin 20% 5-yr avg 21%
Operating margin 8.5% 5-yr avg 9.0%
Owner-earnings margin 3% 5-yr avg 7%
Free cash flow margin 3% 5-yr avg 7%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Durable Metal Solutions (37%) and Sustainable Fiber Solutions (29%), with 2 more segments behind.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 20% and operating margin about 8.7% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. That margin has held in a narrow 6.8%–11% band over the years, so steadiness itself is the evidence — the lever is unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 8%). By owner earnings: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

The biggest segment, Durable Metal Solutions, is also where the profit is made: 37% of revenue and 40% of segment operating profit.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2024
Operating profit same segments
  • Durable Metal Solutions37%$1.6B40% of profit
  • Sustainable Fiber Solutions29%$1.2B26% of profit
  • Customized Polymer Solutions26%$1.1B12% of profit
  • Integrated Solutions9%$375M23% of profit
By geographyUnited States53%EMEA32%Asia Pacific and Other Americas15%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2024

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’24TTMTTMOct 2024
Income statement
$3.3B$3.6B$3.9B$4.6B$4.5B$5.6B$6.3B$4.2B$4.4B$5.4BRevenueRevenue
21%20%20%21%20%20%20%22%21%20%Gross marginGross mgn
11%10%10%11%11%10%9%12%14%12%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$226M$300M$371M$399M$305M$585M$621M$427M$338M$465MOperating incomeOp. inc.
6.8%8.2%9.6%8.7%6.8%10.5%9.8%10.2%7.8%8.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
$75M$119M$209M$171M$109M$391M$377M$359M$269M$269MNet incomeNet inc.
47%36%26%29%37%15%27%21%8%9%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$301M$305M$253M$390M$455M$396M$658M$650M$356M$356MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$128M$121M$127M$206M$243M$234M$217M$231M$261M$261MDepreciationDeprec.
$98M$66M($83M)$12M$103M($229M)$64M$60M($174M)($174M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$100M$97M$140M$157M$131M$141M$176M$214M$187M$187MCapexCapex
3.0%2.7%3.6%3.4%2.9%2.5%2.8%5.1%4.3%3.4%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$201M$208M$113M$233M$323M$255M$481M$436M$170M$170MOwner earningsOwner earn.
6.0%5.7%2.9%5.1%7.2%4.6%7.6%10.4%3.9%3.1%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$201M$208M$113M$233M$323M$255M$481M$436M$170M$170MFree cash flowFCF
6.0%5.7%2.9%5.1%7.2%4.6%7.6%10.4%3.9%3.1%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$400K$0$0$1.9B$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$99M$99M$100M$104M$104M$106M$111M$117M$121M$121MDividends paidDiv. paid
$5M$0$0$0$0$71M$64M$0BuybacksBuybacks
7%10%14%7%5%14%13%8%7%ROICROIC
8%12%19%15%9%26%21%18%13%9%Return on equityROE
−3%2%10%6%0%19%15%12%7%5%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$104M$142M$94M$77M$106M$125M$147M$181M$198M$286MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$399M$447M$457M$664M$637M$890M$749M$659M$639M$707MReceivablesReceiv.
$277M$76M$76M$109M$80M$107M$87M$83M$87M$96MInventoryInvent.
$372M$399M$404M$435M$451M$705M$561M$498M$459M$501MAccounts payablePayables
$305M$124M$129M$338M$266M$292M$275M$244M$268M$302MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$912M$995M$977M$1.2B$1.3B$1.7B$1.5B$1.4B$1.5B$1.6BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$659M$688M$670M$825M$1.0B$1.3B$1.0B$939M$1.0B$1.2BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.4×1.4×1.5×1.5×1.3×1.3×1.4×1.5×1.5×1.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$786M$785M$776M$1.5B$1.5B$1.5B$1.5B$1.4B$1.7B$1.7BGoodwillGoodwill
$3.2B$3.2B$3.2B$5.4B$5.5B$5.8B$5.5B$6.0B$6.6B$5.6BTotal assetsAssets
$975M$953M$903M$2.7B$2.5B$2.2B$1.9B$2.2B$2.7B$714MTotal debtDebt
$871M$811M$809M$2.7B$2.4B$2.1B$1.8B$2.0B$2.5B$428MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
$947M$1.0B$1.1B$1.1B$1.2B$1.5B$1.8B$1.9B$2.1B$2.9BShareholders’ equityEquity

The record, charted

FY2016–2024

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

ROIC
7%low FY2020
Gross margin
21%low FY2017
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
14.9×peak FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$170Mowner earningsvs.$269Mnet incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2024

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2024 the business reported $269M of profit but $170M of owner earnings: $99M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$269M
Owner earnings$170M · 4% of revenue
FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021FY2020
Reported net income$269M$359M$377M$391M$109M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$261M+$231M+$217M+$234M+$243M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$174M+$60M+$64M−$229M+$103M
Cash from operations$356M$650M$658M$396M$455M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$187M−$214M−$176M−$141M−$131M
Owner earnings$170M$436M$481M$255M$323M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue4%10%8%5%7%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Much of fiscal 2024's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2024 10-KT · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $338M ÷ interest expense $2M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $658M · 1.9× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $257M − debt $915M
    What this means

    Netting $257M of cash and short-term investments against $915M of debt leaves $658M owed, about 1.9× a year's operating profit (2.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 55 + DIO 10 − DPO 45 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    9-yr median, range 5%–14%; 9% latest = NOPAT $312M ÷ invested capital $3.6B
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 9% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    9-yr median margin, range 3%–10%; latest $170M = operating cash $356M − maintenance capex $187M
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 9 years.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $356M ÷ net income $269M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $121M ÷ Owner Earnings $170M
    What this means

    Of $170M Owner Earnings, $121M (71%) went back to shareholders, $121M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.71×
    Harvesting
    Capex $187M ÷ depreciation $261M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $4.4B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.27×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $915M vs $301M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (9-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (9)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +149%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $7.26/share (latest year $5.83), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $63.18/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2024

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 9
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 8% → 9% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing claims pricing power in its strongest form — price raised, volume held — yet the margin here has not widened to match. The claim leads the record; weigh them together.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 8% early, 9% lately, median 9%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 8%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +5%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 5% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · 6.8% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.6B
  • Cash & short-term investments$286M
  • Receivables$707M
  • Inventory$96M
  • Other current assets$475M
Current liabilities$1.2B
  • Debt due within a year$13M
  • Accounts payable$501M
  • Other current liabilities$713M
Current ratio1.28×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.20×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.23×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$338Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$13M due · $286M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−0.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.3× → 1.3×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$455Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$888M$175M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2024

Over the record, the business generated $3.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$1.3B · 36%
  • Dividends$960M · 26%
  • Buybacks$140M · 4%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.3B · 35%
  • Returned to owners$1.1B

    45% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $960M as dividends and $140M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$415.84

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 0M shares were bought for $71M, about $415.84 each.

  • Net change in share count

    No continuous share count across the span.

  • Dividend recordPays

    Paid in 9 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained19%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($978M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $188M, so each retained $1 added about 0.19 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$2.5B44% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity58%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$1.9Bover 9 years buying other businesses, against $1.3B of capital spent building

$13M written down across 1 year (2017): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$8.1M$19.2M$255M
2022$4.6M$8.7M$481M
2022$14.2M$7.9M$481M
2023$4.4M$3.1M$436M
2024$8.5M$10.6M$170M
2025$9.4M$13.8M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership3.5%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Greif is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2024.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?9 of 9 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 9 of the last 9 years, $223M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Containers & Packaging

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
BALLBall Corp.$13.2B46%8.8%9%6%
CCKCrown Holdings Inc.$12.4B11.5%10%5%
SLGNSilgan Holdings$6.5B16%9.3%9%7%
SNASnap-on$4.7B53%25.8%17%17%
GEFGreif$4.4B20%8.7%8%6%
GTLSChart Industries$4.3B30%7.3%5%5%
VMIValmont Industries Inc.$4.1B26%9.0%11%6%
ACAArcosa Inc. Common Stock$2.9B19%8.9%6%6%
Group median26%8.9%9%6%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Greif has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Greif earns about $249M on its 5.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 3.9% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’20→’24+1%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’24+5%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’22–’24)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $170M on 46M shares outstanding (a weighted cover-text, the only count this filer tags); net debt $428M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Greif (GEF), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/GEF, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← GE its page in the Manual GEGGL →

Industry order: ← ENTG the Containers & Packaging chapter GPK →