Owner Scorecard


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SCSC, ScanSource

ScanSource is a leading technology distributor connecting devices to the cloud and accelerating growth for channel sales partners across hardware, software as a service, connectivity and cloud services.

ScanSource enables channel sales partners to deliver solutions for their end users to address changing buying and consumption patterns.

ScanSource uses multiple sales models to offer technology solutions from leading suppliers of specialty technologies, connectivity and cloud services.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
SCSC · ScanSource
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$3.0B
−6.7% YoY · −0% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $3.1B 5-yr avg $3.4B
Gross margin 14% 5-yr avg 12%
Operating margin 3.0% 5-yr avg 2.9%
ROIC 8% 5-yr avg 8%
Owner-earnings margin 4% 5-yr avg 3%
Free cash flow margin 4% 5-yr avg 3%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 12% and operating margin about 2.7% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from −2.1% to 3.6% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. Inventory runs near 16% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 8%). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$3.5B$3.6B$3.2B$3.2B$3.0B$3.2B$3.5B$3.8B$3.3B$3.0B$3.1BRevenueRevenue
10%11%12%12%12%11%12%12%12%13%14%Gross marginGross mgn
7%7%7%8%9%8%8%8%9%9%10%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$97M$88M$69M$95M($65M)$61M$122M$136M$90M$85M$94MOperating incomeOp. inc.
2.7%2.5%2.2%2.9%−2.1%2.0%3.5%3.6%2.8%2.8%3.0%Operating marginOp. mgn
$64M$69M$33M$58M($193M)$11M$89M$90M$77M$72M$73MNet incomeNet inc.
34%32%45%25%53%25%27%23%24%25%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$52M$95M$25M($27M)$182M$117M($124M)($36M)$372M$112M$133MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$17M$25M$34M$34M$35M$34M$30M$29M$28M$30M$25MDepreciationDeprec.
($36M)($6M)($49M)($124M)$334M$64M($255M)($165M)$257M($456K)$22MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$12M$9M$7M$6M$6M$2M$7M$10M$9M$8M$9MCapexCapex
0.3%0.2%0.2%0.2%0.2%0.1%0.2%0.3%0.3%0.3%0.3%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$40M$86M$18M($33M)$176M$114M($131M)($46M)$363M$104M$124MOwner earningsOwner earn.
1.1%2.4%0.6%−1.0%5.8%3.6%−3.7%−1.2%11.1%3.4%4.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$40M$86M$18M($33M)$176M$114M($131M)($46M)$363M$104M$124MFree cash flowFCF
1.1%2.4%0.6%−1.0%5.8%3.6%−3.7%−1.2%11.1%3.4%4.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$61M$84M$144M$32M$49M$0$0$0$0$57M$18MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$100M$21M$0$9M$6M$0$18M$16M$43M$107MBuybacksBuybacks
9%8%3%6%-6%9%8%8%7%8%ROICROIC
8%8%4%6%-28%1%11%10%8%8%8%Return on equityROE
8%8%4%6%−28%1%11%10%8%8%8%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$61M$56M$26M$19M$29M$63M$38M$36M$185M$126M$120MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$560M$637M$646M$523M$443M$569M$729M$753M$582M$636M$628MReceivablesReceiv.
$559M$531M$596M$554M$455M$470M$615M$758M$513M$484M$487MInventoryInvent.
$471M$513M$563M$488M$454M$635M$714M$691M$588M$599M$647MAccounts payablePayables
$647M$655M$679M$589M$444M$404M$630M$820M$506M$521M$468MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1.2B$1.3B$1.4B$1.5B$1.2B$1.2B$1.5B$1.7B$1.4B$1.4B$1.4BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$585M$656M$710M$701M$719M$733M$814M$787M$669M$683M$737MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.1×2.0×1.9×2.1×1.7×1.7×1.9×2.1×2.1×2.0×1.9×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$93M$201M$289M$311M$214M$219M$214M$217M$206M$231M$245MGoodwillGoodwill
$1.5B$1.7B$1.9B$2.1B$1.7B$1.7B$1.9B$2.1B$1.8B$1.8B$1.8BTotal assetsAssets
$5M$5M$249M$327M$219M$143M$271M$330M$144M$136M$102MTotal debtDebt
($56M)($51M)$224M$308M$189M$80M$233M$294M($41M)$10M($18M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
45.6×27.4×7.6×7.2×-5.3×8.9×18.7×6.9×6.9×10.6×12.9×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$774M$837M$866M$914M$678M$731M$807M$905M$924M$906M$906MShareholders’ equityEquity
0.2%0.2%0.2%0.2%0.2%0.3%0.3%0.3%0.3%0.4%0.4%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
26.7M25.5M25.6M25.7M25.4M25.5M25.8M25.4M25.2M23.8M22.0MShares out (diluted)Shares
$132.66$139.85$123.51$126.28$120.09$123.47$137.04$149.35$129.24$127.56$140.18Revenue / shareRev/sh
$2.38$2.71$1.29$2.24$-7.59$0.42$3.45$3.54$3.06$3.00$3.33EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.50$3.37$0.69$-1.28$6.92$4.48$-5.09$-1.80$14.40$4.37$5.62Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.50$3.37$0.69$-1.28$6.92$4.48$-5.09$-1.80$14.40$4.37$5.62Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.45$0.35$0.27$0.23$0.25$0.09$0.27$0.39$0.34$0.35$0.42Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$29.02$32.81$33.81$35.52$26.73$28.65$31.31$35.70$36.64$38.02$41.17Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−0.4%/yr+1.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share+12.6%/yr−8.8%/yr
EPS+2.6%/yr
Capital spending / share−2.9%/yr+6.7%/yr
Book value / share+3.0%/yr+7.3%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
24Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
7%low FY2020
Gross margin
13%low FY2016

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$104Mowner earningsvs.$72Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned $72M of profit into $104M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$72M
Owner earnings$104M · 3% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$72M$77M$90M$89M$11M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$30M+$28M+$29M+$30M+$34M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$11M+$10M+$11M+$12M+$8M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$456K+$257M−$165M−$255M+$64M
Cash from operations$112M$372M($36M)($124M)$117M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$8M−$9M−$10M−$7M−$2M
Owner earnings$104M$363M($46M)($131M)$114M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue3%11%-1%-4%4%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $11M), owner earnings is nearer $93M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $85M ÷ interest expense $8M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $10M · 0.1× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash $126M − debt $136M
    What this means

    Netting $126M of cash and short-term investments against $136M of debt leaves $10M owed, about 0.1× a year's operating profit (1.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 76 + DIO 67 − DPO 83 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    9-yr median, range -6%–9%; 7% latest = NOPAT $65M ÷ invested capital $916M
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -4%–11%; latest $104M = operating cash $112M − maintenance capex $8M
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 3% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $11M of SBC) leaves $93M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $112M ÷ net income $72M

    In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $107M ÷ Owner Earnings $104M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $104M of Owner Earnings, $107M (102%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $107M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $11M stock comp, the real buyback was about $95M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.27×
    Harvesting
    Capex $8M ÷ depreciation $30M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.0B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Pass
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.01×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $136M vs $687M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +44%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $3.91/share (latest year $3.52), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $44.60/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 2% → 3% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 2% early to 3% lately, median 3% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +16%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 16% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · −2.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −1.2%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.4B
  • Cash & short-term investments$120M
  • Receivables$628M
  • Inventory$487M
  • Other current assets$136M
Current liabilities$737M
  • Debt due within a year$3M
  • Accounts payable$647M
  • Other current liabilities$87M
Current ratio1.86×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.20×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.16×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$635Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$3M due · $120M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+8.8%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.1× → 1.9×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$593Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$472MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$113M$11M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$8Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $767M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$76M · 10%
  • Buybacks$320M · 42%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$371M · 48%
  • Returned to owners$320M

    46% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $320M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $320M over the span, but a stock split in the window left the reported buyback-share counts on a basis the diluted-share count doesn't match, so a comparable average price can't be drawn.

  • Net change in share count−17.5%

    The diluted count fell from 27M to 22M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained189%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($49M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $92M, so each retained $1 added about 1.89 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$294M16% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity25%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$427Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $76M of capital spent building

$119M written down across 1 year (2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 28% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mike Baur$6.6M$7.6M$114M
2022Mike Baur$5.6M$7.3M($131M)
2023Mike Baur$5.7M$5.2M($46M)
2024Mike Baur$5.9M$7.7M$363M
2025Mike Baur$8.2M$6.7M$104M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio143:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2025 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$11M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 13% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why ScanSource is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 6 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Electronic Components & Instruments

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
POOLPool Corporation$5.3B29%11.3%29%7%
SITESiteOne Landscape$4.7B5.3%12%5%
RYZRyerson Holding Corporation$4.6B18%3.7%12%2%
AITApplied Industrial$4.6B29%8.4%13%7%
MSMMSC Industrial Direct Company Inc.$3.8B42%12.0%15%8%
SCSCScanSource$3.0B12%2.8%8%2%
BXCBluelinx Holdings Inc.$3.0B15%2.2%11%2%
DSGRDistribution Solutions Group Inc.$2.0B35%2.9%6%3%
Group median29%4.5%12%4%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what ScanSource has delivered.

ScanSource’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

$

Through the cycle, ScanSource earns about $54M on its 1.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 3.4% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+16%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $124M on 20M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-04; net cash $18M. The if-converted diluted count is 22M, 8% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($9M) runs well above depreciation ($25M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $125M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "ScanSource (SCSC), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SCSC, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← SCL its page in the Manual SCVL →

Industry order: ← SANM the Electronic Components & Instruments chapter SNX →