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SJW, SJW Group
A regulated utility, earning a set return on the capital it sinks into its network.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Regulated utility. Returns are set by regulation on an approved rate base; the capital spending regulators approve becomes the growth, recovered through allowed rates.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 22% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. Read this kind of business on rate base and the allowed return.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $328M | $382M | $389M | $448M | $549M | $560M | $587M | $678M | $736M | $806M | $820M | RevenueRevenue |
| 13% | 13% | 13% | 15% | 15% | 16% | 16% | 15% | 14% | 16% | 16% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $97M | $102M | $73M | $57M | $118M | $111M | $131M | $149M | $171M | $178M | $179M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 29.7% | 26.7% | 18.9% | 12.8% | 21.4% | 19.9% | 22.3% | 22.0% | 23.2% | 22.0% | 21.8% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $53M | $59M | $39M | $23M | $62M | $60M | $74M | $85M | $94M | $103M | $105M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 39% | 37% | 21% | 27% | 12% | 12% | 10% | 7% | 9% | 11% | 10% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $115M | $101M | $91M | $130M | $104M | $130M | $166M | $191M | $196M | $245M | $245M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $46M | $51M | $57M | $68M | $92M | $96M | $106M | $108M | $115M | $120M | $125M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $14M | ($11M) | ($6M) | $35M | ($53M) | ($31M) | ($19M) | ($7M) | ($19M) | $15M | $9M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| — | — | — | $835M | $0 | $24M | $433K | $8M | $0 | $0 | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $17M | $21M | $23M | $34M | $37M | $40M | $44M | $48M | $52M | $59M | $60M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| 7% | 7% | 6% | 2% | 5% | 4% | 5% | 5% | 5% | 5% | 5% | ROICROIC |
| 13% | 13% | 4% | 3% | 7% | 6% | 7% | 7% | 7% | 7% | 6% | Return on equityROE |
| 9% | 8% | 2% | −1% | 3% | 2% | 3% | 3% | 3% | 3% | 2% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $6M | $8M | $421M | $13M | $5M | $11M | $12M | $10M | $11M | $21M | $153M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $16M | $17M | $19M | $36M | $47M | $54M | $59M | $68M | $69M | $62M | $62M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $19M | $23M | $25M | $35M | $34M | $30M | $30M | $46M | $56M | $75M | $63M | Accounts payablePayables |
| ($2M) | ($6M) | ($6M) | $1M | $13M | $23M | $30M | $22M | $12M | ($13M) | ($811K) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $100M | $67M | $503M | $122M | $127M | $134M | $158M | $198M | $191M | $191M | $323M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $64M | $85M | $164M | $235M | $351M | $203M | $268M | $343M | $261M | $273M | $160M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.6× | 0.8× | 3.1× | 0.5× | 0.4× | 0.7× | 0.6× | 0.6× | 0.7× | 0.7× | 2.0× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | — | $2M | $628M | $628M | $640M | $640M | $640M | $640M | $640M | $640M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $1.4B | $2.0B | $2.0B | $3.1B | $3.3B | $3.5B | $3.8B | $4.3B | $4.7B | $5.1B | $5.4B | Total assetsAssets |
| $433M | $431M | $431M | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.9B | $1.9B | Total debtDebt |
| $427M | $423M | $11M | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.9B | $1.7B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| — | 4.4× | 3.0× | 1.8× | 2.2× | 2.0× | 2.3× | 2.3× | — | — | 2.5× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $422M | $463M | $889M | $890M | $917M | $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.8B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.5% | 0.7% | 0.5% | 0.8% | 0.6% | 0.8% | 0.8% | 0.7% | 0.8% | 0.8% | 0.8% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 20.6M | 20.7M | 21.3M | 28.6M | 28.7M | 29.7M | 30.4M | 31.7M | 32.8M | 35.1M | 38.5M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $15.94 | $18.46 | $18.25 | $15.68 | $19.14 | $18.82 | $19.29 | $21.42 | $22.46 | $22.95 | $21.27 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $2.57 | $2.86 | $1.82 | $0.82 | $2.14 | $2.03 | $2.43 | $2.68 | $2.87 | $2.92 | $2.72 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.80 | $1.03 | $1.08 | $1.20 | $1.27 | $1.35 | $1.43 | $1.51 | $1.59 | $1.67 | $1.57 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $20.48 | $22.39 | $41.69 | $31.16 | $31.96 | $34.79 | $36.51 | $38.95 | $41.70 | $43.89 | $47.58 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +4.1%/yr | +3.7%/yr |
| EPS | +1.5%/yr | +6.4%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +8.5%/yr | +5.6%/yr |
| Book value / share | +8.8%/yr | +6.5%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- AdequateOperating income $178M ÷ interest expense $66M
What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.9B · 10.5× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $21M − debt $1.9B
What this means
Netting $21M of cash and short-term investments against $1.9B of debt leaves $1.9B owed, about 10.5× a year's operating profit (10.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range 2%–7%; 5% latest = NOPAT $158M ÷ invested capital $3.4BIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 16%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $245M ÷ net income $103M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? —Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $806M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.70×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $1.9B vs ($83M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record PassUninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth PassEarnings +33% over the record · +87%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.24/share (latest year $2.45), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $36.83/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 25% → 22% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 25% early to 22% lately, median 22% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 4%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Worst year 2019 · 12.8% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +6.1%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$153M
- Receivables$62M
- Other current assets$108M
- Debt due within a year$9M
- Accounts payable$63M
- Other current liabilities$89M
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Net income |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $3.3M | $2.8M | $60M |
| 2022 | $3.2M | $4.6M | $74M |
| 2023 | $4.2M | $3.0M | $85M |
| 2024 | $4.0M | $1.8M | $94M |
| 2025 | $3.1M | $2.0M | $103M |
| 2025 | $2.9M | $1.9M | $103M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.
- Stock-based compensation$6M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 4% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why SJW Group is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
2 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?22.4% vs 25.1%
The operating margin averaged 25.1% early in the record and 22.4% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?5% → 8% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $16M to $62M while revenue grew 150%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (5% of revenue then, 8% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Water Utilities
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WTRGEssential Utilities | $2.5B | — | 36.8% | 6% | 30% |
| ORAOrmat Technologies Inc. | $990M | 37% | 25.6% | 4% | 11% |
| CWTCalifornia Water Service | $964M | — | 16.5% | 5% | 15% |
| CPKChesapeake Utilities Corporation | $930M | — | 22.3% | 7% | 16% |
| SJWSJW Group | $806M | — | 22.0% | 5% | — |
| MGEEMGE Energy | $744M | — | 20.8% | 7% | -3% |
| AWRAmerican States Water | $658M | 89% | 28.3% | 10% | 17% |
| MSEXMiddlesex Water | $195M | — | 27.3% | 6% | 21% |
| Group median | — | — | 24.0% | 6% | — |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFSJW Group is profitable, but its owner-earnings base could not be formed from this filing’s tagged data (operating cash flow or capital spending is missing), so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
Revenue, delivered9%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Manual order: ← SJM its page in the Manual SKWD →
Industry order: ← SBS the Water Utilities chapter WTRG →