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SJM, The J.M. Smucker Company

Food Products consumer brand Cyclical

We operate principally in one industry, the manufacturing and marketing of branded food and beverage products on a worldwide basis, although the majority of our sales are in the United States.

Operations outside the U.S. are principally in Canada, although our products are exported to other countries as well.

Our branded food and beverage products include a strong portfolio of trusted, iconic, market-leading brands that are sold to consumers primarily through retail outlets in North America.

Latest annual: FY2026 10-K

SJM · The J.M. Smucker Company

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2026

$9.1B

+3.7% YoY · 2% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $9.1B 5-yr avg $8.5B

Gross margin 34% 5-yr avg 35%

Operating margin 4.0% 5-yr avg 5.4%

Owner-earnings margin 13% 5-yr avg 12%

Free cash flow margin 13% 5-yr avg 9%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 38% and operating margin about 13% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from −7.7% to 17% — on a steadier 38% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 12% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	2026’26	TTMTTMApr 2026
											Income statement
$7.4B	$7.4B	$7.8B	$7.8B	$8.0B	$8.0B	$8.5B	$8.2B	$8.7B	$9.1B	$9.1B	RevenueRevenue
38%	39%	37%	38%	39%	34%	33%	38%	39%	34%	34%	Gross marginGross mgn
19%	19%	19%	19%	19%	17%	17%	18%	18%	17%	17%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$1.0B	$1.0B	$929M	$1.2B	$1.4B	$1.0B	$158M	$1.3B	($674M)	$360M	$360M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
14.1%	14.2%	11.8%	15.7%	17.3%	12.8%	1.8%	16.0%	−7.7%	4.0%	4.0%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$592M	$1.3B	$514M	$780M	$876M	$632M	($91M)	$744M	($1.2B)	($139M)	($139M)	Net incomeNet inc.
33%	—	27%	24%	25%	25%	—	25%	—	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.1B	$1.3B	$1.6B	$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.5B	$1.5B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$212M	$206M	$206M	$210M	$220M	$236M	$224M	$240M	$283M	$346M	$346M	DepreciationDeprec.
$233M	($342M)	$400M	$238M	$441M	$247M	$1.0B	$222M	$2.1B	$1.2B	$1.2B	Working capital & otherWC & other
$192M	$322M	$360M	$269M	$307M	$418M	$477M	$587M	$394M	$317M	$317M	CapexCapex
2.6%	4.4%	4.6%	3.5%	3.8%	5.2%	5.6%	7.2%	4.5%	3.5%	3.5%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$867M	$1.0B	$935M	$1.0B	$1.3B	$901M	$970M	$990M	$927M	$1.2B	$1.2B	Owner earningsOwner earn.
11.7%	13.8%	11.9%	13.4%	16.8%	11.3%	11.4%	12.1%	10.6%	12.8%	12.8%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$867M	$896M	$781M	$986M	$1.3B	$719M	$717M	$643M	$817M	$1.2B	$1.2B	Free cash flowFCF
11.7%	12.2%	10.0%	12.6%	15.7%	9.0%	8.4%	7.9%	9.4%	12.8%	12.8%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	$0	$1.9B	$0	$0	$0	$0	$3.9B	$0	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$339M	$350M	$378M	$397M	$403M	$418M	$430M	$438M	$455M	$465M	$465M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$438M	$7M	$5M	$4M	$678M	$270M	$368M	$373M	$3M	$6M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
6%	8%	5%	7%	8%	6%	1%	6%	-4%	2%	—	ROICROIC
9%	17%	6%	10%	11%	8%	-1%	10%	-20%	-3%	-3%	Return on equityROE
4%	13%	2%	5%	6%	3%	−7%	4%	−28%	−11%	−11%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$167M	$193M	$101M	$391M	$334M	$170M	$656M	$62M	$70M	$59M	$107M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$439M	$386M	$504M	$551M	$534M	$525M	$598M	$737M	$619M	$656M	$656M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$906M	$854M	$910M	$895M	$960M	$1.1B	$1.0B	$1.0B	$1.2B	$1.1B	$1.1B	InventoryInvent.
$477M	$512M	$591M	$782M	$1.0B	$1.2B	$1.4B	$1.3B	$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.2B	Accounts payablePayables
$867M	$728M	$823M	$665M	$460M	$421M	$215M	$439M	$540M	$608M	$608M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$2.0B	$1.9B	$2.0B	$2.9B	$2.0B	$2.1B	$2.0B	$2.0B	Current assetsCur. assets
$1.8B	$1.0B	$2.3B	$1.6B	$2.9B	$2.0B	$2.0B	$3.8B	$2.7B	$2.5B	$2.5B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.9×	1.5×	0.7×	1.2×	0.7×	1.0×	1.4×	0.5×	0.8×	0.8×	0.8×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$6.1B	$5.9B	$6.3B	$6.3B	$6.0B	$6.0B	$5.2B	$7.6B	$5.7B	$5.2B	$5.2B	GoodwillGoodwill
$15.6B	$15.3B	$16.7B	$17.0B	$16.3B	$16.1B	$15.0B	$20.3B	$17.6B	$16.2B	$16.2B	Total assetsAssets
$4.9B	$4.7B	$5.5B	$5.4B	$4.7B	$4.3B	$4.3B	$7.8B	$7.0B	$6.5B	$6.5B	Total debtDebt
$4.8B	$4.5B	$5.4B	$5.0B	$4.3B	$4.1B	$3.7B	$7.7B	$7.0B	$6.5B	$6.4B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
$6.9B	$7.9B	$8.0B	$8.2B	$8.1B	$8.1B	$7.3B	$7.7B	$6.1B	$5.5B	$5.5B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.3%	0.2%	0.3%	0.3%	0.4%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
—	$145M	$98M	—	—	—	—	—	$1.7B	$508M	$508M	Goodwill written downGW imp.
											Per share
116M	113M	113M	113M	112M	108M	104M	106M	106M	107M	107M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$63.95	$65.11	$69.30	$68.79	$71.45	$73.79	$81.70	$77.02	$81.99	$84.86	$84.86	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$5.12	$11.85	$4.55	$6.87	$7.82	$5.83	$-0.87	$7.01	$-11.56	$-1.30	$-1.30	EPS (diluted)EPS
$7.50	$8.95	$8.27	$9.21	$12.01	$8.31	$9.29	$9.32	$8.71	$10.84	$10.84	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$7.50	$7.93	$6.91	$8.69	$11.23	$6.63	$6.87	$6.05	$7.67	$10.84	$10.84	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$2.94	$3.10	$3.34	$3.50	$3.60	$3.86	$4.12	$4.12	$4.28	$4.36	$4.36	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.66	$2.85	$3.18	$2.37	$2.74	$3.85	$4.57	$5.52	$3.70	$2.98	$2.98	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$59.26	$69.83	$70.47	$72.23	$72.54	$75.09	$69.84	$72.45	$57.15	$51.98	$51.98	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+3.2%/yr	+3.5%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+4.2%/yr	−2.0%/yr
Dividends / share	+4.5%/yr	+3.9%/yr
Capital spending / share	+6.7%/yr	+1.7%/yr
Book value / share	−1.4%/yr	−6.5%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Operating income+153.5%
“Operating income (loss) increased $1,034.1, primarily reflecting a $1.0 billion decrease in impairment charges related to the goodwill of the Sweet Baked Snacks reporting unit and the Hostess brand trademark, the lapping of a $310.1 net pre-tax loss on divestitures in the prior year, and a $32.4 decrease in selling, distribution, and administrative (“SD&A”) expenses, partially offset by the decrease in gross profit.”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2017–2026

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

107Mpeak FY2017

ROIC

2%low FY2025

Gross margin

34%low FY2023

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

5.6×peak FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$1.2Bowner earningsvs.($139M)net incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2026

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2022–FY2026cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business turned a $139M loss into $1.2B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2026	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022
Reported net income	($139M)	($1.2B)	$744M	($91M)	$632M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$346M	+$283M	+$240M	+$224M	+$236M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$24M	+$30M	+$24M	+$26M	+$22M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$1.2B	+$2.1B	+$222M	+$1.0B	+$247M
Cash from operations	$1.5B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.1B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$317M	−$283M	−$240M	−$224M	−$236M
Owner earnings	$1.2B	$927M	$990M	$970M	$901M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	−$111M	−$347M	−$253M	−$182M
Free cash flow	$1.2B	$817M	$643M	$717M	$719M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	13%	11%	12%	11%	11%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $24M), owner earnings is nearer $1.1B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 4.4×

Adequate

Operating income $360M ÷ interest expense $81M

What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $6.5B · 18.0× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $59M − debt $6.5B

What this means
Netting $59M of cash and short-term investments against $6.5B of debt leaves $6.5B owed, about 18.0× a year's operating profit (18.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). It also holds $48M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at $6.4B of net debt. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 24d

Tight

DSO 26 + DIO 68 − DPO 71 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 6%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range -4%–8%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit

Industry peers: median 12%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 12%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 11%–17%; latest $1.2B = operating cash $1.5B − maintenance capex $317M

Industry peers: median 10%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 13% of revenue this year, a 12% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $24M of SBC) leaves $1.1B.
Are earnings backed by cash? $1.5B

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($139M) · cash from operations $1.5B

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 41%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $470M ÷ Owner Earnings $1.2B

What this means
Of $1.2B Owner Earnings, $470M (41%) went back to shareholders, $465M dividends, $6M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($24M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.92×

Maintaining

Capex $317M ÷ depreciation $346M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $9.1B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.78×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $6.5B vs ($565M) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −126%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.95/share (latest year $-1.30), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $51.98/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 7 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 13% → 4% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing claims pricing power in its strongest form — price raised, volume held — yet the margin here has not widened to match. The claim leads the record; weigh them together.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 13% early to 4% lately, median 13% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth +1%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 1% a year over the record.
Worst year 2025 · −7.7% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count −0.9%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
How management talks about it Owner’s terms

What this means
The filing reasons in an owner’s terms — per-share, return on capital, the long term — and the record has held; the words and the results are of a piece.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Named as a competitive risk

Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.

“However, if we are unable to effectively compete in the expanding e-commerce market, adequately leverage technology to improve operating efficiencies (including artificial intelligence, machine learning, and augmented reality), or develop the data analytics capabilities needed to generate actionable commercial insights…”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Apr 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.0B

Cash & short-term investments$59M
Receivables$656M
Inventory$1.1B
Other current assets$132M

Current liabilities$2.5B

Debt due within a year$150M
Accounts payable$1.2B
Other current liabilities$1.2B

Current ratio0.78×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.33×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.02×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($565M)the cushion left after near-term bills

Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. What it owes in the near term is money to suppliers and customers (payables and deferred revenue), not to lenders, so the balance sheet is funded by operating float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.

Debt due this year vs. cash$150M due · $59M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Apr 30, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+7.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.6× → 0.8×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value($5.3B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($8.7B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$6.7B$156M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated $12.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

Reinvested$3.6B · 29%
Dividends$4.1B · 33%
Buybacks$2.2B · 17%
Retained (debt / cash)$2.6B · 21%

Returned to owners$6.2B
61% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $4.1B as dividends and $2.2B as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $2.2B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count−7.7%
The diluted count fell from 116M to 107M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$4.36/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 4% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$10.9B67% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity94%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$5.8Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $3.6B of capital spent building

$2.4B written down across 4 years (2018, 2019, 2025, 2026): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 41% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2022	Mark Smucker	$8.5M	$8.5M	$901M
2023	Mark Smucker	$11.3M	$11.8M	$970M
2024	Mark Smucker	$10.4M	$3.9M	$990M
2025	Mark Smucker	$11.0M	$7.8M	$927M
2026	Mark Smucker	$10.9M	$5.7M	$1.2B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership2.8%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
CEO pay ratio141:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
Stock-based compensation$24M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 7% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why The J.M. Smucker Company is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

None of the 6 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2026

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$5.4B · 60% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“During 2026, our top 10 customers, collectively, accounted for approximately 60 percent of consolidated net sales.”verify →
Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Food Products

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
CAGConAgra Brands Inc.	$11.3B	28%	14.8%	8%	9%
CPBThe Campbell's Company	$10.3B	33%	13.6%	12%	11%
STZConstellation Brands Inc.	$9.1B	50%	29.9%	9%	25%
SJMThe J.M. Smucker Company	$9.1B	38%	13.5%	6%	12%
MNSTMonster Beverage Corp.	$8.3B	58%	32.9%	28%	24%
POSTPost Holdings	$8.2B	29%	9.8%	5%	7%
COKECoca-Cola Consolidated	$7.2B	35%	7.9%	32%	6%
LWLamb Weston	$6.5B	25%	16.4%	16%	10%
Group median	—	34%	14.2%	11%	11%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what The J.M. Smucker Company has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, The J.M. Smucker Company earns about $1.1B on its 12.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 12.8% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($1.1B) Net of stock comp (−$24M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+3%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26+1%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $1.2B on 107M shares outstanding, the balance-sheet count at 2026-04-30; net debt $6.4B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh SJM against another business →

The owners of SJM: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "The J.M. Smucker Company (SJM), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SJM, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← SITM its page in the Manual SJW →

Industry order: ← SFD the Food Products chapter SMPL →