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SR, Spire

Gas Utilities capital-intensive Regulated utility

Spire Marketing, which provides natural gas marketing services Spire Marketing Spire Marketing Inc.

Gas Utility Segment including the operations of the Utilities Spire Mississippi Spire Mississippi Inc.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

SR · Spire

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$2.5B

−4.5% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $2.6B 5-yr avg $2.4B

Gross margin 59% 5-yr avg 53%

Operating margin 22.2% 5-yr avg 18.9%

ROIC 5% 5-yr avg 6%

Owner-earnings margin 11% 5-yr avg 7%

Free cash flow margin −9% 5-yr avg −12%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Regulated utility. Returns are set by regulation on an approved rate base; the capital spending regulators approve becomes the growth, recovered through allowed rates.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 53% and operating margin about 18% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. Capital spending runs about 25% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on rate base and the allowed return. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 10 years). By owner earnings: roughly 12% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$1.5B	$1.7B	$2.0B	$2.0B	$1.9B	$2.2B	$2.2B	$2.7B	$2.6B	$2.5B	$2.6B	RevenueRevenue
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	48%	53%	59%	59%	Gross marginGross mgn
$282M	$341M	$294M	$302M	$206M	$450M	$408M	$419M	$488M	$524M	$577M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
18.4%	19.6%	15.0%	15.5%	11.1%	20.1%	18.6%	15.7%	18.8%	21.2%	22.2%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$144M	$162M	$214M	$185M	$89M	$272M	$221M	$218M	$251M	$272M	$358M	Net incomeNet inc.
33%	32%	—	16%	12%	20%	21%	15%	19%	18%	16%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$328M	$288M	$457M	$451M	$470M	$250M	$55M	$440M	$912M	$578M	$616M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$138M	$154M	$168M	$182M	$197M	$213M	$237M	$255M	$278M	$298M	$321M	DepreciationDeprec.
$47M	($27M)	$74M	$85M	$184M	($235M)	($403M)	($32M)	$383M	$8M	($64M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$293M	$438M	$499M	$823M	$638M	$625M	$552M	$663M	$861M	$922M	$838M	CapexCapex
19.1%	25.2%	25.4%	42.2%	34.4%	27.9%	25.1%	24.8%	33.2%	37.2%	32.2%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$191M	$134M	$288M	$269M	$273M	$37M	($182M)	$185M	$634M	$280M	$294M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
12.4%	7.7%	14.7%	13.8%	14.7%	1.6%	−8.3%	7.0%	24.5%	11.3%	11.3%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$35M	($150M)	($43M)	($372M)	($169M)	($375M)	($497M)	($222M)	$51M	($344M)	($223M)	Free cash flowFCF
2.3%	−8.6%	−2.2%	−19.1%	−9.1%	−16.8%	−22.6%	−8.3%	2.0%	−13.9%	−8.6%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$318M	$0	$0	—	—	$0	$0	$37M	$176M	$0	$2.5B	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$85M	$96M	$109M	$119M	$128M	$133M	$142M	$151M	$167M	$182M	$188M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
5%	6%	7%	5%	4%	6%	5%	5%	6%	6%	5%	ROICROIC
8%	8%	9%	7%	4%	10%	8%	7%	8%	8%	10%	Return on equityROE
3%	3%	5%	3%	−2%	5%	3%	2%	3%	3%	5%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$5M	$7M	$4M	$6M	$4M	$4M	$7M	$6M	$5M	$6M	$50M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$211M	$257M	$290M	$302M	$243M	$410M	$617M	$253M	$237M	$248M	$185M	Accounts payablePayables
$570M	$726M	$660M	$615M	$591M	$1.3B	$1.6B	$1.1B	$771M	$808M	$1.6B	Current assetsCur. assets
$1.2B	$1.1B	$1.3B	$1.5B	$1.4B	$1.6B	$2.4B	$1.8B	$1.7B	$2.5B	$2.9B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.5×	0.7×	0.5×	0.4×	0.4×	0.8×	0.7×	0.6×	0.5×	0.3×	0.5×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.9B	GoodwillGoodwill
$6.1B	$6.5B	$6.8B	$7.6B	$8.2B	$9.4B	$10.1B	$10.3B	$10.9B	$11.6B	$14.7B	Total assetsAssets
$1.8B	$2.0B	$2.1B	$2.1B	$2.5B	$3.0B	$3.2B	$3.7B	$3.7B	$3.9B	$6.2B	Total debtDebt
$1.8B	$2.0B	$2.1B	$2.1B	$2.5B	$3.0B	$3.2B	$3.7B	$3.7B	$3.9B	$6.2B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
3.7×	3.8×	3.0×	2.9×	2.0×	4.2×	3.4×	2.3×	2.4×	2.6×	2.5×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.8B	$2.0B	$2.3B	$2.5B	$2.5B	$2.7B	$2.8B	$2.9B	$3.2B	$3.4B	$3.4B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
											Per share
44.3M	47.0M	49.3M	50.8M	51.3M	51.7M	52.1M	52.6M	56.3M	58.7M	59.2M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$34.70	$37.04	$39.86	$38.43	$36.17	$43.24	$42.20	$50.69	$46.06	$42.19	$43.93	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$3.26	$3.44	$4.34	$3.63	$1.73	$5.26	$4.24	$4.13	$4.46	$4.63	$6.05	EPS (diluted)EPS
$4.31	$2.86	$5.85	$5.30	$5.31	$0.71	$-3.50	$3.52	$11.26	$4.77	$4.97	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.79	$-3.19	$-0.87	$-7.33	$-3.28	$-7.25	$-9.54	$-4.23	$0.91	$-5.87	$-3.76	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.92	$2.05	$2.20	$2.34	$2.50	$2.58	$2.72	$2.87	$2.97	$3.10	$3.18	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$6.62	$9.32	$10.13	$16.21	$12.44	$12.09	$10.60	$12.60	$15.30	$15.71	$14.16	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$39.91	$42.37	$45.75	$50.06	$49.17	$51.42	$54.10	$55.46	$57.42	$57.74	$57.73	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+2.2%/yr	+3.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+1.1%/yr	−2.2%/yr
EPS	+4.0%/yr	+21.8%/yr
Dividends / share	+5.5%/yr	+4.5%/yr
Capital spending / share	+10.1%/yr	+4.8%/yr
Book value / share	+4.2%/yr	+3.3%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

59Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

6%low FY2020

Gross margin

59%low FY2023

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

13.8×peak FY2021

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$280Mowner earningsvs.$272Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $280M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $298M it takes just to hold its position. It put $624M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($344M).

Reported net income$272M

Owner earnings$280M · 11% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$272M	$251M	$218M	$221M	$272M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$298M	+$278M	+$255M	+$237M	+$213M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$8M	+$383M	−$32M	−$403M	−$235M
Cash from operations	$578M	$912M	$440M	$55M	$250M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$298M	−$278M	−$255M	−$237M	−$213M
Owner earnings	$280M	$634M	$185M	($182M)	$37M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$624M	−$583M	−$408M	−$315M	−$412M
Free cash flow	($344M)	$51M	($222M)	($497M)	($375M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	11%	24%	7%	-8%	2%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $298M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $624M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 2.6×

Adequate

Operating income $524M ÷ interest expense $204M

What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $3.9B · 7.4× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $6M − debt $3.9B

What this means
Netting $6M of cash and short-term investments against $3.9B of debt leaves $3.9B owed, about 7.4× a year's operating profit. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 5%

Below average through the cycle

10-yr median, range 4%–7%; 6% latest = NOPAT $430M ÷ invested capital $7.2B

Industry peers: median 6%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 11%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -8%–24%; latest $280M = operating cash $578M − maintenance capex $298M

Industry peers: median 10%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 11% of revenue this year, a 11% median across 10 years. It chose to put $624M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($344M) — the gap is investment, not weakness.
Are earnings backed by cash? 2.13×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $578M ÷ net income $272M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 65%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $182M ÷ Owner Earnings $280M

What this means
Of $280M Owner Earnings, $182M (65%) went back to shareholders, $182M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 3.09×

Expanding

Capex $922M ÷ depreciation $298M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.5B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.32×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $3.9B vs ($1.7B) WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +42%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $4.17/share (latest year $4.60), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $57.33/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 10 of 10

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 18% → 19% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 18% early, 19% lately, median 18%.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 5%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
Owner earnings growth +12%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 12% a year over the record.
Worst year 2020 · 11.1% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count +3.2%/yr

What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.6B

Cash & short-term investments$50M
Receivables$102M
Other current assets$1.4B

Current liabilities$2.9B

Debt due within a year$488M
Accounts payable$185M
Other current liabilities$2.2B

Current ratio0.55×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.55×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.02×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital($1.3B)the cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$488M due · $50M cash cash alone won't cover the maturities; it leans on refinancing or operating cash · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+4.5%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters0.5× → 0.5×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$1.5Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$6.3B$65M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$11Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $4.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$6.3B · 149%
Dividends$1.3B · 31%

Returned to owners$1.3B
62% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.3B as dividends and $0 as buybacks.
Source of funding−$3.4B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $3.4B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $1.8B to $6.2B.
Net change in share count33.6%
The diluted count rose from 44M to 59M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$3.10/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 5% a year. It was never cut over the span.
Return on what it retained23%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($714M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $162M, so each retained $1 added about 0.23 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	—	$5.6M	$8.1M	$37M
2022	—	$5.0M	$2.9M	($182M)
2023	—	$5.2M	$4.1M	$185M
2024	Steve Lindsey	$3.4M	$3.5M	$634M
2025	Scott Doyle	$3.3M	$4.2M	$280M
2025	Steve Lindsey	$5.1M	$2.8M	$280M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years. A dash under the name means the filing tags the figure without naming the officer.

Insider ownership2.3%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Spire is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?33.6%
Diluted shares grew 33.6% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$1.8B → $6.2B
Debt rose from $1.8B to $6.2B while owner earnings went from about $204M to $366M — about 8.9 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 17 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did reported profit become cash?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Gas Utilities

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
OGSONE Gas	$2.6B	57%	17.9%	6%	-6%
SRSpire	$2.5B	53%	18.5%	6%	12%
NFGNational Fuel Gas	$2.2B	86%	31.4%	11%	27%
NJRNew Jersey Resources	$2.0B	37%	12.5%	7%	1%
SWXSouthwest Gas Holdings	$1.9B	51%	12.6%	6%	8%
KNTKKinetik Holdings Inc.	$1.8B	30%	8.1%	3%	22%
NWNNorthwest Natural	$1.3B	—	19.1%	6%	10%
EEExcelerate Energy Inc.	$1.2B	—	19.9%	7%	14%
Group median	—	52%	18.2%	6%	11%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Spire has delivered.

Spire’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Spire earns about $294M on its 11.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 11.3% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($294M) Net of stock comp Steady-state · maintenance capex ($317M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+12%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($223M) on 59M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-29; net debt $6.2B. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($838M) runs well above depreciation ($321M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $317M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh SR against another business →

The owners of SR: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Spire (SR), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SR, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← SPXC its page in the Manual SRCE →

Industry order: ← OPAL the Gas Utilities chapter SREA →