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SUPN, Supernus Pharmaceuticals Inc.
Supernus Pharmaceuticals Inc. is a biopharmaceutical company focused on developing and commercializing products for the treatment of central nervous system diseases.
Supernus Pharmaceuticals Inc. is developing a broad range of novel product candidates for CNS disorders.
Using dedicated sales and marketing resources in the U.S., we continue to drive the revenue growth of our key marketed products.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Qelbree (42%) and GOCOVRI (20%), with 7 more lines behind.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 90% and operating margin about 15% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −8.7% to 38% — on a steadier 90% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Read this kind of business on the pipeline against the patent cliff, and pricing. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). By owner earnings: roughly 26% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 7 lines, the largest Qelbree at 42%.
- Qelbree42%$305M
- GOCOVRI20%$147M
- Collaboration Revenue7%$53M
- APOKYN7%$48M
- Trokendi XR6%$42M
- Oxtellar XR6%$41M
- Other12%$84M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $215M | $302M | $409M | $393M | $520M | $580M | $667M | $608M | $662M | $719M | $777M | RevenueRevenue |
| 94% | 95% | 96% | 96% | 90% | — | 87% | 86% | 88% | 90% | 89% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 49% | 46% | 38% | 39% | 39% | 53% | 57% | 55% | 49% | 68% | 67% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 20% | 16% | 22% | 18% | 15% | 16% | 11% | 15% | 16% | 15% | 15% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $54M | $100M | $144M | $149M | $174M | $86M | $46M | ($5M) | $82M | ($62M) | ($60M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 25.2% | 32.9% | 35.3% | 37.8% | 33.4% | 14.8% | 6.9% | −0.9% | 12.3% | −8.7% | −7.8% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $91M | $57M | $111M | $113M | $127M | $53M | $61M | $1M | $74M | ($39M) | ($29M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | 43% | 21% | 23% | 25% | 27% | 0% | 52% | 25% | — | — | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $67M | $115M | $129M | $143M | $138M | $127M | $117M | $111M | $172M | $47M | $83M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $2M | $8M | $7M | $7M | $18M | $33M | $86M | $85M | $80M | $92M | $97M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($33M) | $41M | ($361K) | $9M | ($23M) | $23M | ($47M) | ($2M) | ($10M) | ($39M) | ($19M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $2M | $2M | $844K | $3M | $3M | — | $412K | $551K | $725K | $1M | $1M | CapexCapex |
| 0.7% | 0.7% | 0.2% | 0.7% | 0.7% | — | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.1% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $65M | $113M | $128M | $140M | $135M | — | $116M | $111M | $171M | $46M | $82M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 30.3% | 37.3% | 31.3% | 35.7% | 25.9% | — | 17.4% | 18.2% | 25.9% | 6.4% | 10.6% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $65M | $113M | $128M | $140M | $135M | — | $116M | $111M | $171M | $46M | $82M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 30.3% | 37.3% | 31.3% | 35.7% | 25.9% | — | 17.4% | 18.2% | 25.9% | 6.4% | 10.6% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | $0 | $0 | $299M | $950K | $0 | $0 | $0 | $293M | $293M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| 42% | 34% | 19% | 15% | 16% | 6% | 6% | -0% | 6% | -5% | -4% | ROICROIC |
| 48% | 21% | 25% | 19% | 17% | 7% | 7% | 0% | 7% | -4% | -3% | Return on equityROE |
| 48% | 21% | 25% | 19% | 17% | 7% | 7% | 0% | 7% | −4% | −3% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $166M | $274M | $775M | $939M | $773M | $459M | $555M | $75M | $69M | $128M | $647M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $42M | $66M | $67M | $87M | $141M | $149M | $165M | $144M | $142M | $188M | $182M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $17M | $16M | $26M | $27M | $48M | $86M | $92M | $77M | $54M | $112M | $111M | InventoryInvent. |
| $8M | $7M | $3M | $10M | $6M | $9M | $11M | $2M | $5M | $3M | $10M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $50M | $75M | $90M | $104M | $183M | $226M | $246M | $220M | $192M | $298M | $283M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $151M | $228M | $493M | $473M | $630M | $602M | $734M | $493M | $686M | $644M | $732M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $81M | $123M | $161M | $161M | $245M | $315M | $688M | $290M | $292M | $338M | $374M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.9× | 1.9× | 3.1× | 2.9× | 2.6× | 1.9× | 1.1× | 1.7× | 2.3× | 1.9× | 2.0× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | — | — | $0 | $78M | $118M | $117M | $117M | $117M | $125M | $121M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $310M | $424M | $978M | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.5B | Total assetsAssets |
| $4M | — | $329M | $345M | $362M | $379M | $0 | — | — | — | $401M | Total debtDebt |
| ($161M) | — | ($445M) | ($594M) | ($411M) | ($80M) | ($555M) | — | — | — | ($246M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 99.8× | 742.8× | 10.4× | 8.2× | 8.9× | 4.4× | 6.5× | -2.2× | — | — | — | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $192M | $267M | $453M | $595M | $745M | $816M | $886M | $922M | $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.1B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 2.8% | 2.8% | 2.8% | 3.8% | 3.2% | 3.1% | 2.6% | 4.4% | 4.2% | 4.6% | 4.3% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 51.7M | 53.3M | 54.1M | 53.8M | 53.7M | 54.4M | 61.7M | 55.5M | 56.0M | 56.5M | 57.6M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $4.16 | $5.67 | $7.56 | $7.30 | $9.69 | $10.67 | $10.82 | $10.94 | $11.83 | $12.74 | $13.48 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $1.76 | $1.07 | $2.05 | $2.10 | $2.36 | $0.98 | $0.98 | $0.02 | $1.32 | $-0.68 | $-0.50 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $1.26 | $2.11 | $2.37 | $2.61 | $2.51 | — | $1.89 | $1.99 | $3.06 | $0.81 | $1.43 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $1.26 | $2.11 | $2.37 | $2.61 | $2.51 | — | $1.89 | $1.99 | $3.06 | $0.81 | $1.43 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.03 | $0.04 | $0.02 | $0.05 | $0.06 | — | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.01 | $0.02 | $0.02 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $3.71 | $5.02 | $8.37 | $11.06 | $13.87 | $15.01 | $14.37 | $16.60 | $18.51 | $18.81 | $18.68 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +13.2%/yr | +5.6%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −4.7%/yr | −20.2%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −2.9%/yr | −18.1%/yr |
| Book value / share | +19.8%/yr | +6.3%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $39M loss into $46M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2020 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($39M) | $74M | $1M | $61M | $127M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$92M | +$80M | +$85M | +$86M | +$18M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$33M | +$28M | +$27M | +$18M | +$17M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$39M | −$10M | −$2M | −$47M | −$23M |
| Cash from operations | $47M | $172M | $111M | $117M | $138M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$1M | −$725K | −$551K | −$412K | −$3M |
| Owner earnings | $46M | $171M | $111M | $116M | $135M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 6% | 26% | 18% | 17% | 26% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $33M), owner earnings is nearer $13M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
“In 2022 we identified material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- No meaningful interest burdenLittle or no interest expense reported
What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
- Net cashCash $128M + ST investments $368M − debt $23M
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $473M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. It also holds $94M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at net cash of $567M. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 95 + DIO 551 − DPO 13 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range -5%–42%; -5% latest = NOPAT ($49M) ÷ invested capital $956MIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle9-yr median margin, range 6%–37%; latest $46M = operating cash $47M − maintenance capex $1MIndustry peers: median 15%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 26% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $33M of SBC) leaves $13M.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($39M) · cash from operations $47M
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.01×HarvestingCapex $1M ÷ depreciation $92M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $719M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity NearCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.90×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $23M vs $306M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −86%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.21/share (latest year $-0.66), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $18.29/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 9 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 6 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 31% → 1% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing claims pricing power in its strongest form — price raised, volume held — yet the margin here has not widened to match. The claim leads the record; weigh them together.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 31% early to 1% lately, median 15% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −19%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Owner earnings growth +2%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 2% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2025 · −8.7% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +1.0%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$553M
- Receivables$182M
- Inventory$111M
- Debt due within a year$401M
- Accounts payable$10M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $1.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$14M · 1%
- Retained (debt / cash)$1.0B · 99%
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $397M and cash and short-term investments rose $463M.
- Net change in share count11.5%
The diluted count rose from 52M to 58M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
- Return on what it retained1%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($597M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $7M, so each retained $1 added about 0.01 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | Jack Khattar | $8.1M | $7.9M | — |
| 2022 | Jack Khattar | $10.0M | $11.1M | $116M |
| 2023 | Jack Khattar | $13.3M | $13.5M | $111M |
| 2024 | Jack Khattar | $12.6M | $9.2M | $171M |
| 2025 | Jack Khattar | $15.5M | $23.7M | $46M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership8.5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio81:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$33M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 5% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Supernus Pharmaceuticals Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
4 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?16.8% vs 33.0%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 33.0% early in the record and 16.8% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?11.5%
Diluted shares grew 11.5% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$4M → $401M
Debt rose from $4M to $401M while owner earnings went from about $102M to $109M — under 0.1 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 3.7 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?27% → 38% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $58M to $293M while revenue grew 261%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (27% of revenue then, 38% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Pharmaceuticals
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| COLLCollegium Pharmaceutical Inc. | $781M | 56% | 6.8% | 44% | 31% |
| CORTCorcept Therapeutics Incorporated | $761M | 98% | 30.6% | 25% | 34% |
| EBSEmergent BioSolutions Inc. | $743M | 58% | 12.5% | 6% | 8% |
| PCRXPacira BioSciences | $726M | 73% | 3.7% | 2% | 16% |
| AMPHAmphastar Pharmaceuticals Inc. | $720M | 43% | 11.0% | 9% | 15% |
| SUPNSupernus Pharmaceuticals Inc. | $719M | 90% | 20.0% | 11% | 26% |
| KNSAKiniksa Pharmaceuticals International, PLC | $678M | 88% | -9.3% | -6% | 5% |
| RAREUltragenyx | $673M | 100% | -154.9% | -92% | -113% |
| Group median | — | 80% | 8.9% | 7% | 15% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Supernus Pharmaceuticals Inc. has delivered.
Through the cycle, Supernus Pharmaceuticals Inc. earns about $186M on its 25.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 6.4% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $82M on 58M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-28; net cash $246M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← SUNC its page in the Manual SVC →
Industry order: ← STTK the Pharmaceuticals chapter SVRA →