Owner Scorecard


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SUPN, Supernus Pharmaceuticals Inc.

Pharmaceuticals consumer brand Cyclical

Supernus Pharmaceuticals Inc. is a biopharmaceutical company focused on developing and commercializing products for the treatment of central nervous system diseases.

Supernus Pharmaceuticals Inc. is developing a broad range of novel product candidates for CNS disorders.

Using dedicated sales and marketing resources in the U.S., we continue to drive the revenue growth of our key marketed products.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
SUPN · Supernus Pharmaceuticals Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$719M
+8.6% YoY · 7% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $777M 5-yr avg $647M
Gross margin 89% 5-yr avg 88%
Operating margin −7.8% 5-yr avg 4.9%
ROIC −4% 5-yr avg 3%
Owner-earnings margin 11% 5-yr avg 17%
Free cash flow margin 11% 5-yr avg 17%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Qelbree (42%) and GOCOVRI (20%), with 7 more lines behind.
Situation
Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 90% and operating margin about 15% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −8.7% to 38% — on a steadier 90% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Read this kind of business on the pipeline against the patent cliff, and pricing. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 11%). By owner earnings: roughly 26% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 7 lines, the largest Qelbree at 42%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Qelbree42%$305M
  • GOCOVRI20%$147M
  • Collaboration Revenue7%$53M
  • APOKYN7%$48M
  • Trokendi XR6%$42M
  • Oxtellar XR6%$41M
  • Other12%$84M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$215M$302M$409M$393M$520M$580M$667M$608M$662M$719M$777MRevenueRevenue
94%95%96%96%90%87%86%88%90%89%Gross marginGross mgn
49%46%38%39%39%53%57%55%49%68%67%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
20%16%22%18%15%16%11%15%16%15%15%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$54M$100M$144M$149M$174M$86M$46M($5M)$82M($62M)($60M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
25.2%32.9%35.3%37.8%33.4%14.8%6.9%−0.9%12.3%−8.7%−7.8%Operating marginOp. mgn
$91M$57M$111M$113M$127M$53M$61M$1M$74M($39M)($29M)Net incomeNet inc.
43%21%23%25%27%0%52%25%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$67M$115M$129M$143M$138M$127M$117M$111M$172M$47M$83MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$2M$8M$7M$7M$18M$33M$86M$85M$80M$92M$97MDepreciationDeprec.
($33M)$41M($361K)$9M($23M)$23M($47M)($2M)($10M)($39M)($19M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$2M$2M$844K$3M$3M$412K$551K$725K$1M$1MCapexCapex
0.7%0.7%0.2%0.7%0.7%0.1%0.1%0.1%0.2%0.1%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$65M$113M$128M$140M$135M$116M$111M$171M$46M$82MOwner earningsOwner earn.
30.3%37.3%31.3%35.7%25.9%17.4%18.2%25.9%6.4%10.6%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$65M$113M$128M$140M$135M$116M$111M$171M$46M$82MFree cash flowFCF
30.3%37.3%31.3%35.7%25.9%17.4%18.2%25.9%6.4%10.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$0$299M$950K$0$0$0$293M$293MAcquisitionsAcquis.
42%34%19%15%16%6%6%-0%6%-5%-4%ROICROIC
48%21%25%19%17%7%7%0%7%-4%-3%Return on equityROE
48%21%25%19%17%7%7%0%7%−4%−3%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$166M$274M$775M$939M$773M$459M$555M$75M$69M$128M$647MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$42M$66M$67M$87M$141M$149M$165M$144M$142M$188M$182MReceivablesReceiv.
$17M$16M$26M$27M$48M$86M$92M$77M$54M$112M$111MInventoryInvent.
$8M$7M$3M$10M$6M$9M$11M$2M$5M$3M$10MAccounts payablePayables
$50M$75M$90M$104M$183M$226M$246M$220M$192M$298M$283MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$151M$228M$493M$473M$630M$602M$734M$493M$686M$644M$732MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$81M$123M$161M$161M$245M$315M$688M$290M$292M$338M$374MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.9×1.9×3.1×2.9×2.6×1.9×1.1×1.7×2.3×1.9×2.0×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$0$78M$118M$117M$117M$117M$125M$121MGoodwillGoodwill
$310M$424M$978M$1.2B$1.5B$1.7B$1.7B$1.3B$1.4B$1.5B$1.5BTotal assetsAssets
$4M$329M$345M$362M$379M$0$401MTotal debtDebt
($161M)($445M)($594M)($411M)($80M)($555M)($246M)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
99.8×742.8×10.4×8.2×8.9×4.4×6.5×-2.2×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$192M$267M$453M$595M$745M$816M$886M$922M$1.0B$1.1B$1.1BShareholders’ equityEquity
2.8%2.8%2.8%3.8%3.2%3.1%2.6%4.4%4.2%4.6%4.3%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
51.7M53.3M54.1M53.8M53.7M54.4M61.7M55.5M56.0M56.5M57.6MShares out (diluted)Shares
$4.16$5.67$7.56$7.30$9.69$10.67$10.82$10.94$11.83$12.74$13.48Revenue / shareRev/sh
$1.76$1.07$2.05$2.10$2.36$0.98$0.98$0.02$1.32$-0.68$-0.50EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.26$2.11$2.37$2.61$2.51$1.89$1.99$3.06$0.81$1.43Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.26$2.11$2.37$2.61$2.51$1.89$1.99$3.06$0.81$1.43Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.03$0.04$0.02$0.05$0.06$0.01$0.01$0.01$0.02$0.02Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$3.71$5.02$8.37$11.06$13.87$15.01$14.37$16.60$18.51$18.81$18.68Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+13.2%/yr+5.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share−4.7%/yr−20.2%/yr
Capital spending / share−2.9%/yr−18.1%/yr
Book value / share+19.8%/yr+6.3%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
56Mpeak FY2022
ROIC
−5%low FY2025
Gross margin
90%low FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$46Mowner earningsvs.($39M)net incomelow FY2025

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $39M loss into $46M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2020
Reported net income($39M)$74M$1M$61M$127M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$92M+$80M+$85M+$86M+$18M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$33M+$28M+$27M+$18M+$17M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$39M−$10M−$2M−$47M−$23M
Cash from operations$47M$172M$111M$117M$138M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$1M−$725K−$551K−$412K−$3M
Owner earnings$46M$171M$111M$116M$135M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue6%26%18%17%26%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $33M), owner earnings is nearer $13M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Material weakness in financial controls
“In 2022 we identified material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting.”

The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →

Will it survive?

  • No meaningful interest burden
    Little or no interest expense reported
    What this means

    Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.

  • Net cash
    Cash $128M + ST investments $368M − debt $23M
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $473M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. It also holds $94M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at net cash of $567M. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 95 + DIO 551 − DPO 13 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -5%–42%; -5% latest = NOPAT ($49M) ÷ invested capital $956M
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    9-yr median margin, range 6%–37%; latest $46M = operating cash $47M − maintenance capex $1M
    Industry peers: median 15%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 26% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $33M of SBC) leaves $13M.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($39M) · cash from operations $47M

    In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.

    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.01×
    Harvesting
    Capex $1M ÷ depreciation $92M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $719M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.90×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · $23M vs $306M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Near
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −86%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.21/share (latest year $-0.66), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $18.29/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 6 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 31% → 1% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing claims pricing power in its strongest form — price raised, volume held — yet the margin here has not widened to match. The claim leads the record; weigh them together.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 31% early to 1% lately, median 15% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −19%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth +2%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 2% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2025 · −8.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +1.0%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$732M
  • Cash & short-term investments$553M
  • Receivables$182M
  • Inventory$111M
Current liabilities$374M
  • Debt due within a year$401M
  • Accounts payable$10M
Current ratio1.96×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.66×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.48×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$358Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$401M due · $553M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+38.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.9× → 2.0×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$406Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$308MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$442M$41M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$1Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$14M · 1%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$1.0B · 99%
  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $397M and cash and short-term investments rose $463M.

  • Net change in share count11.5%

    The diluted count rose from 52M to 58M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained1%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($597M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $7M, so each retained $1 added about 0.01 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$694M48% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity12%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$593Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $14M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Jack Khattar$8.1M$7.9M
2022Jack Khattar$10.0M$11.1M$116M
2023Jack Khattar$13.3M$13.5M$111M
2024Jack Khattar$12.6M$9.2M$171M
2025Jack Khattar$15.5M$23.7M$46M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership8.5%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio81:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$33M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 5% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Supernus Pharmaceuticals Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

4 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?16.8% vs 33.0%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 33.0% early in the record and 16.8% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?11.5%

    Diluted shares grew 11.5% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$4M → $401M

    Debt rose from $4M to $401M while owner earnings went from about $102M to $109M — under 0.1 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 3.7 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?27% → 38% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $58M to $293M while revenue grew 261%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (27% of revenue then, 38% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Pharmaceuticals

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
COLLCollegium Pharmaceutical Inc.$781M56%6.8%44%31%
CORTCorcept Therapeutics Incorporated$761M98%30.6%25%34%
EBSEmergent BioSolutions Inc.$743M58%12.5%6%8%
PCRXPacira BioSciences$726M73%3.7%2%16%
AMPHAmphastar Pharmaceuticals Inc.$720M43%11.0%9%15%
SUPNSupernus Pharmaceuticals Inc.$719M90%20.0%11%26%
KNSAKiniksa Pharmaceuticals International, PLC$678M88%-9.3%-6%5%
RAREUltragenyx$673M100%-154.9%-92%-113%
Group median80%8.9%7%15%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Supernus Pharmaceuticals Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Supernus Pharmaceuticals Inc. earns about $186M on its 25.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 6.4% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’20→’25−3%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+2%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $82M on 58M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-28; net cash $246M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Supernus Pharmaceuticals Inc. (SUPN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/SUPN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← SUNC its page in the Manual SVC →

Industry order: ← STTK the Pharmaceuticals chapter SVRA →